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ABSTRACT 
The role of investor countries in large-scale land acquisitions is poorly understood 
in the contemporary “land grab” literature. Orthodox explanations largely build on 
deductive analyses that deviate from the emerging empirical evidence, and/or face 
analytical difficulties when trying to capture why large-scale land acquisitions happen. 
This thesis investigates the global phenomenon of “land grabbing” from the comparative 
perspective of two major investor countries: the UK and China. The regional focus is on 
Sub-Saharan Africa, a major target of land-consuming investments since 2000.  
The dissertation advances three arguments: Firstly, the specific details of the home 
country’s industrial set-up, development challenges, ideological framing, political 
economy, and significant events are critical to understanding what is happening. Chinese 
outward FDI (OFDI) reflects the demands of the country’s resource-intensive and market-
dependent manufacturing industry, and is part of economic upgrading. In the case of the 
UK, large-scale land acquisitions occur in response to reforms in the host countries, to 
international and domestic energy and climate policies, and to reindustrialization efforts.  
Secondly, the comparative perspective reveals that in spite of their differences, 
both countries share many similarities, such as the complexity of agencies, structures, and 
events involved, the guiding ideology in place, and the institutional framework supporting 
OFDI. This fact is overlooked by orthodox explanations of “land grabbing” which apply a 
narrow state-capitalist or market economic framing to explicate Chinese and British 
investments, respectively. Importantly, both countries’ governments frame OFDI as a 
strategic instrument to pursue particular development ambitions.  
This thesis has also reviewed the main features of late 19
th
-century colonial and 
imperial practices, to be aware of important factors and dynamics in the evaluation of 
contemporary land acquisitions. From this historical perspective, thirdly, it argues that 
contemporary land-consuming OFDI activities have novel and “old” features in 
comparison to the Scramble for Africa. On the one hand, core institutions, ideas, and 
structures that emerged in the 19th century are still part of the topography of today’s 
global society. The complexity of motives, actors, and sectors at play also strongly 
resembles that of the past. On the other hand, a more detailed assessment of those features 
highlights that their characteristics have changed in key respects: corporations have gained 
discretionary power vis-à-vis the state; host country governments proactively seek to 
attract foreign capital (rather than it being forced upon them); existing institutional 
structures supporting OFDI have been strengthened domestically and internationally, both 
in home and host countries; and contemporary capital exports by newcomers such as 
China reflect processes of global economic restructuring of which these overseas 
investments form a part.  
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. The Project 
This thesis investigates the global phenomenon of “land grabbing” from the 
comparative perspective of two major investor countries, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
China, and does so in the context of their political economy and development. The regional 
focus is on Chinese and British projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) – a region which 
appears to be a major target of land-consuming investments since 2000.
1
 Throughout, the 
project is guided by the two overarching questions it aims to answer: How do these 
investments occur? Why do these investments take place?  
Except for a few case studies, orthodox explanations of “land grabbing” build on 
deductive analyses when trying to capture why large-scale land acquisitions happen from a 
home country perspective. The orthodox hypothesis states that contemporary land 
acquisitions are primarily a reaction to the 2007/2008 crises of energy, food, and finance. 
Accordingly, the increase of commodity prices, together with the implementation of export 
bans by major food exporting countries, brought resources-scarce state-capitalist countries 
(i.e. countries where the government plays a central role in the economic system) to focus 
on land-consuming investments as a way to secure resources “offshore” for consumption 
back home. This narrative is often applied when describing China’s activities in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Simultaneously, land-consuming investment activities of actors from 
liberal countries are described as profit-driven and seen as a response to the wealth 
                                                 
1 ILC (2012), 4. For a discussion and explanation of the term “land-consuming investments” that this 
thesis uses for describing investment projects of more than 100ha, see Table 1-2. 
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destruction of equity investments during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. This narrative is 
used to describe overseas investments originating from the UK.  
Importantly, this orthodox hypothesis about investor motives continues to inform 
widespread understandings of “land grabbing” from an investor country perspective. Take, 
for instance, the assessment by Magdoff in his 2013 publication on “land grabbing” in the 
South: 
What has been happening over the last decade, and especially since the 2008 World Food 
Crisis, is clearly different in many respects than the earlier dispossessions. (…) There are 
now sovereign wealth funds of countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, 
and China that are lacking in sufficient land or reliable water supplies to grow enough food 
to feed their populations and do not want to rely on the workings of the “free market” to 
supply their import needs. The high prices of 2008 made it abundantly clear that there could 
well be future problems in getting needed food supplies on world markets. In addition, 
investors of capital, mainly from Europe and the United States, think they can profit by 
growing food or biofuels or engage in other types of agricultural ventures for a world 
market.
2
   
This thesis sets out to challenge the orthodox hypothesis about how and why 
international land acquisitions have occurred since 2000 from an investor (country) 
perspective. In doing so it searches for explanatory alternatives regarding the role of these 
land-consuming foreign direct investment (FDI) projects in the social, ecological, and 
political context of the home countries (see Table 1-2 for an explanation of the choice of 
terminology). By way of process tracing, and through a case study approach, the research 
project assesses who is involved, in which way, at what stage, and to which end. While 
process tracing “forces the researcher to consider alternative paths through which the 
outcome could have occurred,”3 the comparative research design with its evaluation of two 
unlike cases allows me “to uncover similar processes in unexpected contexts,” and on this 
                                                 
2 Magdoff (2013), 1. 
3 Khan and Van Wynsberghe (2008), 5. 
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basis to draw broader conclusions about the role of land-consuming outward FDI from a 
home country perspective.
4
  
A major challenge that this research project was confronted with was the collection 
of data to give an overall empirical sense of overseas land-consuming investments. The 
details of most investment projects are shrouded by secrecy, corporate reports are often 
vague, the projects themselves are constantly changing, and there exists no (accessible) 
land deal inventory that registers every investment that occurs. Nevertheless, the process 
tracing of specific Chinese and British outward foreign direct investments mentioned by 
three influential reports until 2012, and the continuous observation of both countries’ 
investment activities have allowed me to capture and understand the main empirical 
characteristics of what is happening and why in both country cases. 
The findings of this research project support my overarching argument that the 
specific details of the home country’s industrial set-up, development challenges, 
ideological framing, political economy, and significant events are critical to understanding 
what is occurring.
5
 Both country cases are characterized by a complexity of (f)actors at 
play that is not adequately accounted for in the orthodox explanations. In the Chinese case, 
outward FDI (OFDI) reflects the interests of the country’s resource-intensive and market-
dependent manufacturing industry, and is part of economic upgrading. Consequently, the 
land-consuming investments are intended to diversify the country’s energy and industrial 
                                                 
4 Khan and Van Wynsberghe (2008), 5. 
5 Importantly, my argument that a comprehensive assessment of “land grabs” has to account for the 
domestic political economy context of outward FDI activities is (at best) country-centric, not state-
centric. While my analysis of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI activities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
takes note of the particular foreign economic policy, it does not primarily focus on the activities of the 
state. 
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minerals’ supply, open new export markets, and facilitate the internationalization of 
Chinese companies’ production chains. At the same time, Chinese diplomatic engagement 
with Africa aims to establish or maintain international political alliances. 
 In the case of the UK, large-scale land acquisitions occur in response to reforms in 
the host countries, to international and domestic energy and climate policies, and to 
reindustrialization efforts. This means they occur because companies make use of the 
business opportunities offered to them in the form of divestiture programs in host countries, 
or the creation of markets by (inter)national climate and energy policies. Moreover, the 
expectation that Africa will be the new growth region drives the investments to the 
continent at a time of the financial crisis and economic stagnation back home. The latter 
perception also led the current UK government to promote land-consuming OFDI to Sub-
Saharan Africa as way to economic recovery and international political power through 
rising exports and industrial activity. The following paragraphs will further illustrate the 
main empirical and analytical results of the two case studies.  
My empirical research has found that Chinese land-consuming investments in 
Africa have had the following characteristics. They target a wide-range of sectors, from 
construction and mining to farming, and they involve multiple actors from the public but 
also private sector. While state-owned companies feature prominently in large-scale 
projects, public actors often come from different levels of government and do not 
necessarily act in the best interest of the central government. Most projects predate the 
2007/2008 timeline. Some even trace back to the 1970s; however, the way they are 
operated changed significantly since the late 1990s, switching from an aid to a profit 
rationale. In these projects, land is consumed as a resource for agricultural or mining 
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purposes, and as a space where industrial operations and construction takes place. This 
means that land is not necessarily the primary focus of these investment projects. Also, 
most projects produce for domestic and regional markets rather than for the home country 
economy – with the exception of energy and industrial crops. Access to land occurs on a 
contractual basis, through shareholding, leasing, or contract farming. 
Concerning the main empirical characteristics of British land-consuming OFDI, my 
research found that the projects comprised largely farming, mining, and construction 
activities. A significant share of the investments investigated predates the 2007/2008 
timeline. Some even trace back to the mid-1990s. Different from the Chinese case, a 
substantial portion begins in 2007/2008 in response to the crises of finance, energy, and 
food. Land is consumed by these investment projects as a resource, as a space for 
productive activities, and more recently, as a financial asset. Access to land is facilitated on 
a contractual basis, through equity investments, and/or outgrower schemes. Actors in these 
investments are corporations with a long presence in the host economies, early-stage 
companies, and financial investors. Also, public finance and government officials are 
active in their promotion. Most British investments in land as a resource envisioned 
producing for export to international or home country markets, but ended up selling locally. 
Analyzing these findings in the particular home country context, I argue that the 
patterns of Chinese investments are mainly explained by the following features of the 
Chinese political economy. Political reforms since the 1980s have increasingly reformed 
the country’s economic and corporate governance structure, and turned government 
officials into bureaucratic entrepreneurs. This explains the interest of state-owned 
enterprises in profitable business opportunities. At the same time, the structural 
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composition of the home country, where the resource-intensive export-oriented 
manufacturing industry is a major foreign exchange earner explains the interest by core 
political and economic actors involved in the investments to open new markets, globalize 
Chinese companies’ production process, and access external resources that these 
investments are part of. This interest structure of the home country’s political economy 
also explicates the small share of Chinese OFDI that is directed towards agricultural 
production, compared to the large share of investments in manufacturing, (trade) 
infrastructure, and resources. The set of ideas rationalizing and legitimizing Chinese land-
consuming OFDI to African countries further emphasizes the fundamental politico-
economic changes that the country has witnessed since the 1980s. Today (as of 2014), 
Chinese OFDI activities are embedded in a narrative that associates these with growth, 
profit, and other economic interests, rather than plunder and exploitation as was the case in 
the past.  
In the case of the UK, I argue that the empirical investment patterns reflect the 
following traits of the country’s political economy. These investments highlight the British 
investor legacy and the country’s liberal OFDI policy stance since the 1970s. Both features 
explain the greater capacity, advantage, and international outlook of British investors 
compared to those of emerging economies such as China. For instance, investments around 
the year 2000 involved companies with a long presence in African economies that took the 
opportunities on offer in the form of policy reforms in the host countries; in addition to 
early-stage companies that responded to transnational climate regimes and the new markets 
these create. At the same time, the strong presence of financial investors and stock-markets 
in these investment projects refers back to the “financial orthodoxy” at the core of British 
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political economy since the 1980s. On the one hand, the project details highlight that the 
productive segment of the British economy has to rely on the stock exchange and venture 
capital to finance industrial operations. Consequently, these companies are confronted with 
the problem of a lack of patient capital, a dysfunctional trait of the British political 
economy that plays out prominently in the case of agricultural greenfield investments. A 
significant share of those projects faced financial problems, partially because the long-term 
maturation timelines did not match the short-term return expectations of these types of 
“creditors.” On the other hand, the failure of the financialization-led development model 
promoted by UK governments since the 1980s to deliver sustained growth and social 
welfare explains the rise of overseas investments at the time of the financial crisis in 
2007/2008. The related economic recession and crash of equity value has led financial 
investors to seek (allegedly) profitable investment outlets overseas, and to target land as an 
asset and resource. In addition, the public sector has begun to promote overseas 
investments through means of public finance and commercial diplomacy, rationalizing and 
legitimizing it as a way to open new markets and/or business opportunities for its 
productive sector to create jobs back home and create or maintain political and economic 
networks that will allow the country to sustain its favorable international position in 
institutions and networks of economic and political governance. 
From a comparative perspective, I make the broader argument that these 
investments “push the limits” that different actors are facing at home in view of advancing 
their economic, political, and/or ideology-driven interests. This explains why Chinese and 
British land-consuming OFDI projects are pursued, even when they are not at all 
economically successful. The empirical evidence of the two country cases shows that a 
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substantial number of projects do not live up to the promise of extraordinary returns, and 
many projects collapse in the medium-term. Nevertheless, they seem to serve the interests 
of diverse agents (firms, governments, individuals) who are involved with them, (geo-) 
politically and/or economically. This is true for both countries, in spite of the quite 
different forms of these investments.  
In the next sections, this introductory chapter moves on to provide a brief 
background on the empirical characteristics of “land grabbing,” highlights the gaps in the 
literature that have led to this thesis’ focus on international land acquisitions from the 
viewpoint of home country development, and summarizes the main insights derived. The 
following two sections describe the research approach and methodological issues and also 
provide a synopsis of the key findings of the case studies that explicates the above 
summary in greater detail. The introduction concludes with an outline of the overall thesis 
structure.  
2. The “Land Grabbing” Debate and Research Puzzle 
In order to understand the contemporary debate on “international land 
acquisitions,” or “FDI,” and the related research puzzle, it is necessary to revisit the year 
2007/2008 – a time of financial, food (price), and energy (price) crisis, during which rising 
commercial pressure on land and agriculture in the form of land-consuming FDI gained 
international attention under the headings of “land grabbing,” “international land 
acquisitions,” or “land deals.” 6  The term “land grabbing” was first applied by the 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 2 (Section 3). 
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international non-governmental organization (NGO) GRAIN to describe events of 
dispossession, privatization, and ownership concentration in the form of FDI in 
agriculture.
7
 Since then, hundreds of studies have been published underlining the dramatic 
empirical dimensions of this phenomenon, both with regards to the affected lands and 
project scales. The International Land Coalition (ILC), for instance, suggests that 
approximately 71 million hectares (ha) of land were confirmed to be under negotiation 
during the 2000 to 2012 period.
8
 And research by the World Bank (WB) concludes that 
approximately one quarter of such land-consuming projects were larger than 200,000ha, 
while only one quarter of the reported “land deals” involved less than 10,000ha.9  
The debate about “land grabbing” has been constantly evolving. While the initial 
focus lay on the agricultural sector and related dynamics threatening the livelihoods of 
peasants in the form of dispossession, farmland-use change and ownership concentration, 
later, the body of empirical research on the topic of commercial pressure on land came to 
include non-agricultural forms of “land grabbing.”10 Accordingly, the 2012 report by the 
ILC about international, large-scale investments in land demonstrates that these occur in 
multiple sectors, such as tourism, industrial production, forestry, and mineral extraction. 
And while FDI flows in agriculture seem to make up the largest share, representing 78% 
(by value) of total investments since 2000, it is important to note that approximately three 
                                                 
7 GRAIN (2008). 
8 ILC (2012), 4. 
9 WB (2011), 51.  
10 For a review of the available literature on the topic and the overall development of the “land grab” 
debate, see Chapter 2. 
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quarters of these investments have targeted biofuels rather than food production.
11
 At the 
same time, the ILC report indicates great differences across regions, both with regards to 
the share of total land-consuming FDI and to the origin of related FDI flows. Africa takes a 
unique position, as it has received the largest overall share of land-consuming FDI flows, 
which have reportedly implicated 134 million ha (34 million of which have been 
confirmed).
12
 In addition, the largest share of FDI in Africa has come from outside the 
continent, allegedly from Asia; while intra-regional capital flows have predominated in 
“land grabbing” events in other regions, namely Europe, Latin America, and Asia.13 
The available literature remains inconclusive regarding the implications of this 
phenomenon. Existing analyses oscillate between descriptions of “development 
opportunity” and “land grab,” often depending on the particular framing underpinning the 
respective study rather than empirical substantiation.
14
 However, the emerging empirical 
evidence lends urgency to the topic, with a large number of case studies reporting negative 
effects of such “land deals” for the recipient country’s15 social, economic, or ecological 
development.
16
 A report by the World Bank, for instance, concludes that contrary to the 
(liberal) theoretical promises of job creation, diffusion of technology, capacity building, 
                                                 
11 ILC (2012), 4. These figures are confirmed by data from the Financial Times database (2011). 
Accordingly, during 2003-2008, an increasing share of global FDI in primary agriculture went into the 
alternative/renewable energy sector (in 2003: USD 7.9 billion; in 2008: USD 90.7 billion; in 2010: USD 
42 billion). During the same time period, only a moderate growth of FDI could be observed in the food 
and tobacco sector (in 2003: USD 1.4 billion; in 2010: USD 1.6 billion). See Heumesser and Schmid 
(2012), 13.  
12 It is followed by Asia, with 29 million ha (confirmed). See ILC (2012), 4. 
13 ILC (2012), 22. Note: Given the complex set of data constraints that the Land Matrix, as well as other 
databases on the topic, is confronted with, the argument that Asia is the largest provider of FDI to 
Africa seems questionable. For a discussion of data problems, see Section 2 of this chapter. 
14 IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009). Also see Chapter 2 of this thesis for a detailed literature review. 
15 To ensure terminological clarity, I would like to point out that the terms “recipient country” and 
“host country” are used interchangeably. 
16 See, for instance, WB (2011), xxv-xlv. 
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productivity increases, and/or food security improvements associated with capital imports 
in the form of FDI, many projects seem to have “contributed to asset loss and left local 
people worse off than they would have been without the investment.”17  My findings 
support this observation, particularly in view of the many instances in which projects failed 
due to unrealistic business models, financial constraints, or fraudulent behavior.
18
 Further, 
research on sustainable resources management emphasizes that the process of privatization 
of communal or public lands, which often accompanies land-consuming FDI projects, may 
constrain a country’s future land planning capacity, thereby curtailing its ability to manage 
and provide for key social needs, such as housing, food, energy, and water, in the face of 
rising eco-scarcity and climate change.
19
  
Thus, while the emerging empirical evidence about the scale and impact of “land 
grabs” explains the alarming tone underpinning the contemporary international debate in 
policy and academia on land-consuming FDI, it simultaneously raises questions about why 
these land-consuming investments occur in the first place, particularly in countries with 
weak governance, high political risk, and, in many cases, a deteriorating security.
20
 In 
contrast to the diverse set of analyses of the impact of land-consuming FDI projects, 
explanations about why these projects occur remain surprisingly homogeneous and 
superficial.
21
 The answer is commonly hypothesized by pointing at the investor countries, 
                                                 
17 WB (2011), 51. Also see Chapter 2 of this thesis for a detailed discussion of the contemporary debate 
on “land grabbing.” 
18 See empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 6. 
19 Home (2009), 107. Also see the literature review in Chapter 2. 
20 For instance, Africa Confidential (18 October 2013) suggests a deteriorating security situation in 
countries that have been favored by investors during recent years, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, 
and the DRC. Concerning the regional distribution of land-consuming FDI, see ILC (2012), 4. 
21 For a more detailed literature review, see Chapter 2. 
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with the standard explanation relying on stereotypical notions about the home country’s 
politico-economic constitution in combination with international timelines, namely crises. 
Accordingly, the so-called state-capitalist countries are said to “grab” overseas to manage 
domestic resources shortages back home, while “grabs” by the liberal economies are 
portrayed as market driven, individualist and for profit (see Table 1-1 for examples).  
More in detail, the general reasoning of orthodox explanations assumes that the 
crises of food, finance, and energy in 2007/2008
22
 triggered the global “land rush.”23 
Alongside the crises, continues the narrative, “more immediate drivers” were the rising 
“market demands for food, biofuels, raw materials, and timber” and the resultant scarcity 
that drove up commodity prices. In addition, carbon offset markets and capital flows 
speculating on an increase in the value of land have been important.
24
 Take, for example, 
the widely cited analysis by McMichael which states that “the land grab is both a response 
to food price reversals generating export bans and government initiatives to secure 
offshore food and biofuel supplies and reflects a speculative interest in food and biofuel 
futures and associated land price inflation on the part of finance capital.” 25 Also, see the 
Table 1-1 for further examples of this narrative that continues to be present in key 
academic publications, as well as reports by the civil society and policy institutions.  
                                                 
22 For a detailed and orthodox explanation of the interdependency effects of rising food and energy 
prices, see Headey and Fan (2010), xii-xvii. 
23 E.g., GRAIN (2008); and Arezki et al. (2013), 1; ILC (2012), 4; and Weingärtner (2010), 13. 
24 ILC (2012), 4. 
25 Mc Michael (2012), 683. 
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Table 1-1 – Orthodox Explanations of Foreign Land Acquisitions: Prominent Examples from 
Academia, NGOs and Development Agencies 
 
Source 
 
Quotation 
  
Quotes from Academia: 
 
Ingwe et 
al. (2010), 
29-30. 
 “Some attempts to explain the motives and forces driving these MNCs to grab 
land IN [sic] DCs have presented two major agenda [sic] thought to be behind their quest. 
The first agenda has been linked to food security problems in their home countries. It has 
been posited that due to the dependence of the populations of such countries, on food 
imported from abroad and the tightening of the global food markets, they have been 
forced to embark upon a new programme of outsourcing their national food production to 
others countries where MNCs provide a suitable platform for implementing the food 
production projects. Some of the countries that have been listed under this category are: 
Saudi Arabia, Japan, China, India, Korea, Libya, and Egypt.  
The second agenda is linked to profit making potential or favorable financial 
returns that the MNCs have overseen in the outsourcing of food production. It is argued 
that under the context of the ongoing global financial meltdown and economic recession, 
MNCs think that land acquisition presents a good strategy for making higher and reliable 
profit. Two strategic thoughts or considerations have emerged in the debate on land 
grabbing in developing countries (DCs). Some attribute the new scramble for Africa to 
the collapse of derivatives markets that were involved in the management of investments, 
private equity funds, investment houses, and so forth before the global financial and 
economic crisis of 2008. Therefore, the new thinking by investors in land is that food 
production constitutes a business sector that guarantees fast and stable turnover. Second, 
the investors in land in DCs, think that land serves multiple purposes of profit making, 
including its other uses (e.g. for the production of either food or bio-fuels and so forth).” 
 
R.Hall 
(2011), 
194. 
 
“China, India, South Korea and the Gulf States are among those at the forefront 
of this agricultural expansion, as they seek to produce food overseas for their growing 
populations. Most deals are private investments (…). Among these are European and 
North American banks and financial investors seeking alternatives to volatile 
international financial markets.” 
 
White et 
al. (2012), 
627. 
 
“High world food and fuel prices in 2007-08 led to a wave of protests and anti-
government riots in more than 60 countries (…), precipitating protectionist measures by 
those with food production capacities and expansionist strategies by those without. The 
combined effects of global climate change, agro-industrial development, natural resource 
extraction, neo-liberal austerity policies and rapid urbanization have increased insecurity 
and vulnerability in rural areas across the globe.” 
 
Cotula 
(2012), 
649. 
 
“These acquisitions involve outright land purchases or, more commonly, long-
term leases mainly on government-owned land. It is widely thought that private sector 
expectations of higher agricultural commodity prices and government concerns about 
longer-term food and energy security underpin much recent land acquisition for 
agricultural investments.” 
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McMichael 
(2012), 
681. 
 
“Land grab appears to be a phenomenal expression of deepening contradictions 
in the corporate food regime. In particular, the end of cheap food (signaled in the 2008 
‘food crisis’) has generated renewed interest in agriculture for development on the part of 
the development industry, matched by a rising interest in offshore land investments, 
driven by governments securing food and fuel exports and financiers speculating on 
commodity futures and land price inflation.” 
 
Brown 
(2013), 1. 
 
“Saudi Arabia, South Korea, China, and India are among the countries that are 
leading the charge to buy or lease land abroad, either through government entities or 
through domestically based agribusiness firms. Saudi Arabia’s population has simply 
outrun its land and water resources. The country is fast losing its irrigation water and will 
soon be totally dependent on imports from the world market or overseas farming projects 
for its grain. (…). 
Investment capital is coming from many sources, including investment banks, 
pension funds, university endowments, and wealthy individuals. Many large investment 
funds are incorporating farmland into their portfolios. In addition, there are now many 
funds dedicated exclusively to farm investments. These farmland funds generated a rate 
of return from 1991 to 2010 that was roughly double that from investing in gold or the 
S&P 500 stock index and seven times that from investing in housing. Most of the rise in 
farmland earnings has come since 2003.”  
  
Quotes from NGOs and Development Agencies: 
 
GRAIN 
(2008), 1. 
 
“Today’s food and financial crises have, in tandem, triggered a new global land 
grab. On the one hand, “food insecure” governments that rely on imports to feed their 
people are snatching up vast areas of farmland abroad for their own offshore food 
production. On the other hand, food corporations and private investors, hungry for profits 
in the midst of the deepening financial crisis, see investment in foreign farmland as an 
important new source of revenue. As a result, fertile agricultural land is becoming 
increasingly privatised and concentrated. If left unchecked, this global land grab could 
spell the end of small-scale farming, and rural livelihoods, in numerous places around the 
world.” 
 
Shepard 
and Mittal 
(2009), 3-
4. 
 
“A number of factors threatening food security (…) have led many nations, 
particularly in the Middle East and Asia, to reexamine domestic food security policies. 
Many governments are looking to stabilize supplies by acquiring foreign lands for food 
production in the hopes of averting domestic social unrest and political instability over 
food price and supply. (…) nations such as China, Japan, and South Korea are also 
seeking to acquire land as part of a long-term strategy for food security. China, which 
aims to increase its rice production from 100,000 tons to 500,000 tons in the next five 
years, has looked abroad to other Asian and African states, purchasing 101,171 hectares 
in Zimbabwe in June 2008 and investing 800 million dollars in Mozambique to 
modernize agriculture for export rice production.” 
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GTZ
26
 
(2009), 
12, 14-15. 
 
“The biggest deals are negotiated with investors from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf 
States and some Asian countries (China, South Korea, India). These countries are 
characterised by a shortage of fertile land due to unfavourable climate conditions or 
population growth on the one hand and sufficient financial means on the other hand. (…) 
Based on available information, it seems that the investors from oil rich and emerging 
countries mainly are governments or state enterprises or state funds respectively. In 
contrast, investors from industrialised countries primarily are private companies investing 
mainly in agro-fuel projects. When governments try to follow their food or energy 
strategies by investing in foreign lands, they usually set up investment contracts with the 
governments in the target countries themselves or with companies through which they 
act. While private investments are mainly driven by the goals of the companies 
(especially short and long term profit, sustainable development of the firm), public 
investments can result from different objectives.” 
 
UN DESA
27
 
(2010), 1; 
and UN 
DESA 
(2012), 146. 
 
 
“Foreign Land purchases: Private investors and governments have recently 
stepped up foreign investment in farmland in the form of purchases or long-term lease of 
large tracks [sic] of arable land, notably in Africa. (…) Importantly, the new investment 
strategy is more strongly driven by food, water and energy security than a notion of 
comparative advantage in the large scale production of indigenous crops for global 
markets, which has been more characteristic of foreign owned plantations since the end 
of the colonial era. The current land purchase and lease arrangements are about shifting 
land and water uses from local farming to essentially long distance farming to meet home 
state food and energy needs. It is, in practice, purchasing food production facilities. The 
growing scale of this practice today, combined with the increasing economic and 
environmental concerns that are motivating this surge, are creating a new dynamic of 
global importance. “ 
 
The quotes (presented in Table 1-1) also highlight that orthodox explanations tend 
to differentiate further between two types of economies to elucidate how “land grabs” 
occur. In the case of the state-capitalist countries, the state is said to be the main actor in 
large-scale land acquisitions, and often state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds 
are seen as major facilitating mechanisms. For instance, China’s sovereign wealth fund 
Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC), established in 2007, has been critically observed 
internationally: “Some observers were apprehensive that the Chinese government would 
                                                 
26 GTZ is the acronym for German Agency for Technical Cooperation (merged into the German Agency 
for International Cooperation [GIZ] in 2011). 
27 UN DESA is the acronym for United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
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use the CIC to acquire control over strategically important natural resources, obtain access 
to sensitive technology, and/or disrupt international financial markets.”28 
In the case of the liberal economies, large-scale land acquisitions are what Hall and 
Soskice have (in another context) called “equilibrium outcomes of firm behavior”29 in a 
free market system, outcomes based on market factors such as demand/supply and/or 
capital rich/resource-rich rationales. For example, a “land grabbing” panel at the 2014 
academic conference of the European Consortium for Political Research announces that 
“increasing concerns about scarcity of water resources and arable land have incentivized 
investor groups from capital-rich, resource-poor countries to engage in large-scale land 
acquisitions (…) in resource-rich, capital-poor countries.”30 Similarly, Odusola argues that 
“the primary factor pulling investors to grab land on the continent is that Africa is home to 
600 million ha of uncultivated arable land — about 60 per cent of the world’s total (…).”31 
In practice, however, these standard explanations, which run through major 
academic publications of otherwise different framing and outlook, deviate from the 
emerging empirical evidence on the topic. They also deviate greatly from historical 
explanations of economic expansion, and suffer from serious analytical incoherence. In the 
following paragraphs, I will briefly highlight each of the explanatory shortfalls that 
                                                 
28 Martin (2010), summary. 
29 P. Hall and Soskice (2001), 8. 
30 Haller (2014). Also, see Rulli and D’Odorico (2014), 1; and Odusola (2014), 9. The projections about 
land availability that led to the above framing of countries as land-scarce and land-abundant largely 
stem from modelling exercises. Consequently, these figures about arable land reserves available for 
cultivation are highly contested. It is safe to say that these models are problematic, as many of them 
only assess the potentially suitable land as measured by irrigation or climatic conditions, without 
considering its actual use, or the socio-economic and ecological repercussions of land use change. See, 
for instance, the models used by the FAO (Bruinsma, J. (2003)). Also see footnote 44. 
30 Odusola (2014), 9. 
31 Odusola (2014), 9. 
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sparked my interest in assessing “land grabbing” dynamics from a home country 
perspective.  
Most importantly, the few studies that do provide a detailed empirical assessment 
of investor countries all cast doubt on the stereotypes and presumptions on which this 
orthodox explanation relies. For instance, research on Chinese “land grabbing” projects in 
African countries highlights that they are not intended for food security back home, as 
would be expected from the common narrative about state-driven investments, but serve 
multiple purposes and involve numerous actors, both public and private.
32
 Moreover, a 
study on Japan suggests that even though the country should rank among the major 
investor countries – with its levels of foreign exchange reserves and dependency on food 
imports – this seems not to be the case.33 Even the case of South Korea, whose failed 
investment project by Daewoo in Madagascar has become a prominent example of 
offshore farming in the literature, the dynamics are more complex, the scale exaggerated, 
and the whole undertaking only marginally related to the 2007/2008 food crisis.
34
 The 
orthodox hypothesis also fails to account for agency in the recipient countries, while 
empirical evidence suggests this to be a significant component of how and why these 
investments take place.
35
  
From a historical perspective, this common narrative is surprising, if not puzzling. 
Implicitly, it proposes that contemporary land acquisitions differ from past ones in 
fundamental ways. Contemporary “land grabs” are portrayed as an outcome of purely 
                                                 
32 See Chapters 4 and 5. Also see Ekman (2010); Rosen and Hanemann (2009); and Brautigam (2011a).  
33 See D.Hall (2012). 
34 Lee and Riel Müller (2012). 
35 Boamah (2014); Kragelund (2009); and Brautigam and Ekman (2012). 
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economic factors. Historical evidence about international land acquisitions in the past, 
however, highlights that many factors were not economic in character, but rather related to 
particular ideologies (e.g., civilizing mission),
36
 actor constellations, or incidents of great 
power competition.
37
 Moreover, contemporary explanations often assume that international 
land acquisitions are driven by a rational choice interest in land as a natural resource, 
whereas historical research shows that other functions of land as a territory, strategic post, 
sphere of influence, or mythical promise were equally important in previous “grabs.”38 So, 
does this mean that contemporary “land grabs” together make up a historically 
unprecedented phenomenon? And if so, in which way would this be the case? 
Unfortunately, the available literature does not provide a detailed historical comparison, 
nor does it offer any evidence for its implicit claims. Instead, most descriptions either 
reveal an unawareness that the alleged resource focus of contemporary land acquisitions 
would make them different from the ones in the past, or they tend to oversimplify key traits 
of historical land acquisitions.
39
 
Finally, this orthodox hypothesis faces analytical challenges. Most importantly, it 
builds on presumptions and dichotomies that stem from mainstream economics
40
 (e.g., 
                                                 
36 See extended version of a speech on socialism and colonial policy by Kautsky (1907). 
37 See Chapter 3 for the historical review. 
38 See Chapter 3 for the historical review. 
39 Explicitly, some authors argue that the “land grabs” in Africa, a continent that has been most affected 
by the phenomenon since 2000, resemble strongly the Scramble of the late 19th century. At that time, 
European powers brought most of the continental territory under their control. Many infer the 
historical similarity on the basis of particular empirical traits, such as poor labor conditions, resources 
focus, and/or asymmetric trade relations (e.g., Jauch (2011)). For a critical discussion of this narrative 
in view of historical evidence on late 19th-century colonialism and imperialism, see Chapter 3. 
40 This thesis follows the assessment and definition of mainstream economics provided by Lavoie 
(2014). Accordingly, mainstream economics can be used interchangeably with orthodox economics, 
neoclassical economics, marginalism, and/or the dominant paradigm. Distinct from heterodox 
economists, “mainstream economists exhibit great confidence in the ability of uninhibited markets to 
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liberal vs. illiberal economy; state vs. market; supply and demand; pricing signals), the 
prevailing operative paradigm of (inter)national economic governance. Yet, this frame 
cannot meaningfully explain the “accumulation of anomalies” 41 that these land-consuming 
capital flows represent for it. Why, for instance, would rational actors prefer to acquire 
land in countries with weak governance and/or a deteriorating context of political stability, 
a particular characteristic of international land acquisitions since 2000?
 42
 And why would 
governments back these capital exports in some cases, particularly at a time of financial 
crisis when capital markets are tight? In fact, explanations that try to accommodate such 
“anomalies” 43  within the reasoning of the mainstream economics framing are rare, 
empirically unsound,
44
 and tend to contradict themselves analytically. For instance, the 
report by the WB argues that land acquisitions are a function of “commodity price 
volatility, growing human and environmental pressures, and worries about food 
security.”45 Interestingly, all of these factors are key indicators of a failure in the liberal 
                                                                                                                                                    
deliver stability and full employment, and to deliver solutions to any economic or social problem. The 
most extreme versions of neoclassical theory claim that instability and unemployment can prevail only 
when government interferes in the operation of markets, thus hampering the price mechanism from 
achieving equilibrium” (Lavoie (2014), 5-30). Regarding international organization, the World Bank 
(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are the two most prominent institutions whose 
policy advice has been informed by and promoted mainstream economic theory. For a detailed 
overview of key parameters and theoretical proponents, see Lavoie (2014). 
41 P. Hall (1990), 9. 
42 For instance, see data for major recipient countries under the WB Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
1996-2011 (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp); the Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/). 
43 P. Hall (1990), 9. 
44 The case of Ethiopia is particularly interesting. It has been argued that Ethiopia is a major target of 
foreign investments in land and agriculture due to its comparative advantage of land-related resource 
abundance. However, according to research in the field of ecological economics, Ethiopia is categorized 
as a country with an “ecological deficit.” This implies that it belongs to the bulk of countries identified 
as “net-exporters of biomass and sink-capacity” whose ecological capital is “eroding already due to 
local overuse of available biocapacity,” a fact that is worsened by the external factor of trade. See 
Andersson and Lindroth (2001), 116. Also, see Zebregs (1998). 
45 WB (2011), xiii. 
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paradigm despite its promotion as the best alternative for the effective and efficient 
provision and use of cheap resources. Yet, the WB recommends further liberalization as a 
remedy to the crises and promotes the creation of land markets.
46
 This approach screens 
out the analytical incoherence, while ignoring the question of the degree to which the 
operative paradigm might have contributed to the commercial pressure on land through 
policy advice and/or theoretical framing, as critiqued by Olivier De Schutter.
47
 
Apparently, the context of crises, the high-risk environment of recipient countries, 
and the supporting role of states, as well as the multitude and diversity of actors and events 
that together compose the global “land grab” phenomenon, render an international 
assessment of what is happening impossible. Having to rely on aggregate-level 
conceptualizations of actors and events, and/or having to draw on broad theoretical frames 
for explanatory purposes, such assessments necessarily fail to fully capture how and 
explain why these investments take place. More particularly, they cannot explain why the 
investments take place in some country cases but not others, why different countries 
display different patterns in view of these international land acquisitions, or the 
significance of different actors in these investments.  
Thus, this thesis argues that the phenomenon of “land grabbing” cannot be 
meaningfully understood through a deductive analysis that assumes unitary actor groups 
and states that exhibit rational (choice) behavior, and relies on predefined ideas about 
causal mechanisms in the form of demand and supply to explain what is happening. 
Clearly, rational (choice) and economic motivations and/or circumstances play a role in 
                                                 
46 WB (2011). 
47 De Schutter (11 June 2009), 15.  
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this phenomenon, as do international events. However, they do not a priori define actor 
motivations, policy outcomes, and/or land uses as is commonly hypothesized. Instead, 
contemporary, as well as historical, research about decision making and foreign (economic) 
policy indicates that non-rational (choice) and non-economic factors, such as ideas, 
political economy, development ambitions, events, or power politics might be equally 
important factors.  
3. The Research Objective and Approach 
To address this research puzzle and meet the research objective of explaining how 
and why international land acquisitions have been happening since 2000 from an investor’s 
perspective, this research project conducts a historical-institutional and politico-economic 
study that accounts for the multiplicity of actors, sectors, timelines, institutions, events, 
interests, and rationales at play. It also explores the specific roles of these investments in 
home country development beyond the narrow concepts of supply/demand or global 
resource scarcity. In more detail, the thesis comparatively assesses land-consuming FDI in 
Sub-Saharan Africa by actors of two investor countries, the UK and China. The time frame 
from 2000 onwards has been chosen for two reasons: First, to investigate whether the 
2007/2008 crises that orthodox explanations cite as having triggered the “land rush” 
actually led to a dramatic rise in land-consuming OFDI. Second, it is logical to consider 
investments starting in 2000 because the debate about “land grabbing” arose in relation to 
FDI projects that occurred at the beginning of the 21
st
 century. Additionally, the most 
comprehensive database on “land grabs,” the Land Matrix, lists projects from 2000 
onwards.  
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The empirical assessment of contemporary “land grabs” since 2000 is 
complemented by a historical review of land acquisitions during the late 19
th
 century, to 
clarify to what extent and in which ways today’s land-consuming FDI projects differ from 
those of the past. Due to the emphasis on an investor (country’s) perspective, empirical 
evidence about the impact of land-consuming FDI in host countries or the role that host 
country actors play in this phenomenon are mentioned only insofar as they contribute to a 
better understanding of the nature of these projects. 
Table 1-2 – A Note on Terminology 
 
FDI in Land, Land Grab, or Land Acquisitions? 
 
The terminological ambiguity that characterizes the “land grab” debate 
represented a conceptual challenge for this thesis. Hereafter, the thesis will primarily use 
the term “land-consuming FDI” to refer to listed “land grab” projects of over 100 hectares 
in scale. The use of other terms will be identified by quotation marks, inserted to remind 
the reader about the diversity of terms characteristic of the contemporary debate. The term 
land-consuming FDI highlights that the primary purpose of many investments mentioned 
in the “land grab” debate is neither the acquisition of land nor the investment in 
agricultural production. Instead, “land grabs” occur due to investments in all sectors and 
industries of a host country. Often, these investments have commercial opportunities or the 
acquisition of financial assets as a primary driver. However, what is characteristic of these 
investments is that they consume large areas of land in their operations.  
 
Importantly, the use of these terms does not mean that I subscribe to the 
assumptions of the particular frame that usually accompanies them. Also the conceptual 
choice of referring to these activities as capital flows and FDI is due solely to the fact that 
under the contemporary operative economic paradigm that is embedded in domestic and 
international institutions, as well as programs of economic governance, these flows are 
framed and treated as FDI. At no point does the use of this terminology imply that the 
assessment and explanation follows the normative statements of many policy makers 
and/or theoretical discussions about FDI.
48
 For a more detailed discussion of the political 
dimension of “land grabbing” terminology, see Chapter 2 (Section 3). 
 
                                                 
48 For a discussion of mainstream economic assumptions about FDI costs and benefits, see, for 
instance, Sornarajah (2010), 49-53; and Moran (2011), 1-9. 
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The approach taken in this thesis results in three contributions to the available body 
of literature on “land grabbing,”49 all of which are effectively alternative interpretations of 
what happened from 2000 to 2012. Firstly, the study provides an empirically grounded 
overview and meaningful understanding of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Through process tracing, the main empirical characteristics evident 
since 2000 are presented, connecting project-level data with insights about relevant aspects 
of the home country’s political economy, ideology, and development. Secondly, the study 
contributes to the existing body of research through its comparative design, which allows it 
to identify similarities and differences between the two cases. It highlights that the 
differences of political economy between the two investor countries are exaggerated, and it 
suggests that they are not necessarily significant for the explanation of “land grabbing,” as 
is commonly assumed. Moreover, thirdly, the comparative study of two unlike cases 
contributes to the debate about “land grabbing” through moderate theory building about 
the role that these land-consuming capital exports play in the context of home country 
development. 
The remainder of this chapter will continue as follows: Section 1.4 explicates the 
research approach in view of methodological issues, and Section 1.5 summarizes key 
findings of the case studies. The chapter concludes with an outline of the thesis structure 
(Section 1.6). 
                                                 
49 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2. 
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4. Methodological Issues 
The research approach of this thesis is to disaggregate the global phenomenon of 
“land grabbing” and comparatively assess international land acquisitions in the context of 
national and historical differentiations of political economy and development. This 
investigative, analytically inductive, and qualitative research approach was operationalized 
through a two-phase research process. Firstly, the empirical characteristics of land-
consuming FDI projects by Chinese and British actors in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
explored. This was done by using the method of process tracing and triangulation. 
Secondly, and building on these empirical findings, alternative analytical explanations of 
why these actors have been involved in these activities were investigated, largely by 
analyzing key empirical characteristics in the context of the home country’s political 
economy and in view of its social, ecological, political, and economic development context. 
The comparative research design, as well as case selection, allowed for differentiation 
between common and unique patterns of each country’s land-consuming outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) activities. The selection of unlike cases was also intended to 
challenge the orthodox hypothesis’ typology of investor countries previously outlined, and 
to engage in moderate theory-building on the role of land-consuming OFDI from a home 
country perspective. 
The following paragraphs will discuss the methodological issues in greater detail. 
Firstly, it will introduce the database and identify the data constraints that this thesis was 
confronted with, noting that these may limit the scale of the conclusions that can be drawn 
on the basis of its findings. Secondly, it will explain the methodological approach of 
process tracing and case study design in greater detail. Thirdly, this section will elucidate 
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the main considerations regarding the selected cases, and it will, fourthly, lay open the key 
assumptions and variables that have guided the study of political economy, as well as 
OFDI, in the context of home country development. Finally, the section will highlight the 
study’s objectivity criteria. 
Database and Data Collection 
A major challenge for this study has been the unreliable nature of the data available 
on the topic, together with its high degree of politicization.
50
 While the latter results in a 
biased focus on large-scale FDI in farmland
 
in the available “land grab” literature, the first 
feature means that existing databases can only serve as starting points of research, because 
they contain false reports, double postings, and outdated information. They also obviously 
suffer from the unwillingness of many governments and corporations to share information 
about investment deals. Even the World Bank was unable to overcome this lack of 
transparency and ultimately had to rely on the scattered information available in NGO-led 
databases.
 51
 Against this background, Oya’s methodological critique of the “land grab” 
literature warns us that many “authors’ conclusions have an air of scientific rigour” that 
“represent[s] an instance of ‘false precision’,” particularly in those cases where “the 
                                                 
50 The multiple epistemological and methodological challenges that researchers as well as available 
“land grab” databases (provided by Land Matrix and GRAIN) are confronted with have been discussed 
in detail by Oya (2013b); Edelman (2013); Anseeuw et al. (2013); GRAIN (2013); Scoones et al. 
(2013a). 
51 The WB report primarily relies on the collection of data available on the blog hosted by the 
international NGO GRAIN (www.farmlandgrab.org). Contrary to the WB Managing Director Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iweala’s promise that the report would help to lift “the veil of secrecy that often surrounds 
these land deals,” the report does not provide any information (data) in addition to that available on 
the blog. Moreover, instead of introducing 30 country case studies, it only includes 14. Out of these, not 
a single contract was published at the time. See WB (2011). Also see GRAIN’s critique of the report (8 
September 2010). 
40 
 
underlying data are actually riddled with uncertainties,” and where selection biases and/or 
prevailing assumptions go unchallenged.
52
 
The assessment process of this thesis confirmed that most databases seem to lack 
rigid fact checking of reported projects. Take, for example, the Land Matrix, which is the 
most comprehensive database on large-scale land acquisitions. Since it went public in 2012, 
it has constantly faced the problem of incorrect listings, resulting in great deviations of the 
number of “land grabs” over time (due to corrections and new listings). This is also the 
case regarding China and the UK: while in May 2012, China ranked above the UK, by 
September of that year, China ranked below the UK among the top investor countries. This 
was largely due to corrections (rather than new listings) in the database (see Table 1-3). It 
is important to note that in June 2013, the Land Matrix initiative relaunched the database, 
implementing major changes in how data is collected, monitored, and categorized. 
Therefore, data differences between September 2012 and April 2014 are strongly related to 
these changes in categorization and the introduction of a basic data updating system. 
Table 1-3 – Evolving Listings: May 2012, September 2012, and April 2014 (Land Matrix)53 
Country May 2012  
(Land Matrix) 
Sept 2012  
(Land Matrix) 
April 2014  
(Land Matrix) 
 
UK  
46 projects,  
3,008,472ha  
41 projects,  
2,736,104ha  
98 projects, 
2,232,547ha 
 
China 
51 projects,  
3,482,616ha  
46 projects,  
2,068,796ha  
90 projects, 
1,342,034ha 
 
                                                 
52 Oya (2013b), 503-504. 
53 These listings are taken from the Land Matrix at different points in time, namely May and September 
2012, and April 2014. 
41 
 
Overall, it must be acknowledged that no complete list of total hectares by sector 
and/or country could be found – nor does it seem likely or even feasible for such a list to 
exist in the future, due to terminological inconsistencies of what constitutes a “land grab,” 
the lack of administrative data by states and companies, and/or the constant changes to 
project details during a project’s lifecycle. Consequently, the figures of, and information 
about the phenomenon of “grabbed land” are only a proxy for commercial pressure on land, 
and they vary greatly across databases and reports, as a brief comparison of the total 
number and scale of assumed “land grabs” highlights: as of 2012, GRAIN listed 416 land 
deals in the agricultural sector that had been reported since 2006. Altogether these were 
using “35 million hectares of land in 66 countries.” 54 In comparison, The Land Matrix, 
which lists land-consuming investments from multiple sectors, including tourism, 
agriculture, mining and petroleum, and forestry, since 2000, counted 924 land deals 
covering 48,829,193ha of land.
55 
Lastly, the “grassroots environmental network”56 Friends 
of the Earth has been quoted as saying “that anywhere from 80 to 227 million hectares of 
rural, often agrarian land, typically in poorer countries hungry for foreign investment, have 
been taken over by private and corporate interests in recent years.”57  
In addition, the ahistorical, in time approach of these databases ignores land banks 
accumulated by foreign companies over time and prior to 2000. This posed a particular 
challenge for the comparative research design of this study with its focus on new and 
established investor countries, specifically China and the UK. For example, a rough 
                                                 
54 GRAIN (23 February 2012).  
55 Land Matrix (http://www.landmatrix.org/en/, accessed 21 November 2012). 
56 Friends of the Earth website (http://www.foei.org/). 
57 Biron (23 April 2012). 
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investigation of the situation in Kenya (based on a review of corporate reports) showed 
that between 1999 and 2010, British food companies controlled approximately 22,000ha of 
agricultural land in the form of plantations or outgrower schemes under a fully integrated 
supply chains system – some being present in the Kenyan economy since 1869, as the case 
of Williamson Kenya illustrates.
58
 Yet, none of these projects or hectares existed in the 
above-mentioned databases. And while these figures might seem insignificant in view of 
the scale of some contemporary FDI projects, they do highlight that investor (country) 
legacy, and the related foreign control over land banks accumulated before the year 2000, 
deserve greater scrutiny to ensure a balanced comparison of emerging powers and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Finally, the method of crowdsourcing to collect data that is applied across databases 
and reports aggravates the problem of false and/or biased data on the phenomenon, as the 
active contributors that function as the “crowd,” such as international media outlets, 
governments, and NGOs, often appear to give skewed attention to certain countries and 
phenomena, such as emerging countries’ investment activities or biofuel projects. As a 
result, it seems that some countries’ activities or certain investment types are potentially 
underreported in the aggregate. 
This research project uses the 2008-2010 project listings of three influential reports, 
published by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)/United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/International Fund for Agricultural 
                                                 
58 Based on information from IDE-JETRO (n.d.); Mwega and Ngugi (2006), 119, 138-140; Kariuki 
(1999); British American Tobacco (BAT) (http://www.bat.com/); Williamson 
(https://www.williamsontea.com/); and Wei and Balasubramanyam (2004). 
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Development (IFAD), the Global Land Project (GLP), and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), as a starting point (not endpoint) of the research process (see 
Appendices 1 and 2 for the finalized list of process-traced projects by British and Chinese 
actors in Sub-Saharan Africa).
59
 While this approach clearly limits the scale of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the research findings, it still allows testing of common 
propositions of deductive explanations on the topic; exploring specific factors and causal 
mechanisms that play a role in each case, namely “relationships between conditions and 
outcomes that can be applied to other contexts;”60 and, on this empirical basis, it allows 
engaging in moderate theory-building on the interrelation of OFDI and home country 
development through the cross-country-analysis of two cases.
61
  
The assessment and analysis of the projects draws on a wide range of data 
accessible via desk review, including official documentation, corporate reports, speeches, 
field reports, semi-scholarly literature, statistical accounts, and academic publications. 
Additional data has been retrieved by email enquiry (e.g., UK Trade and Investment, FIAN 
Germany, Information, Koordination, Tagungen (INKOTA)). Importantly, a process of 
data collection that involves a lot of grey literature and a body of research characterized by 
a strong normative orientation must treat the empirical information separately from the 
analytic interpretation that accompanies it. The diversity of actor motivations and interests, 
as well as the high degree of polarization among key stakeholders, makes the use of 
interviews with key actors as a primary source of information implausible. Instead, formal 
                                                 
59 IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009); GLP (2010); and IFPRI (2009). 
60 Falleti (2006), 5. 
61 Khan and Van Wynsberghe (2008), 5. 
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and informal interviews were conducted during 2010-2013 to double-check the research 
findings and conclusions and to keep the exploratory process open for additional variables, 
perspectives, and empirical data that the extensive desk review might have missed.  
Three semi-structured interviews were conducted with British or formerly British 
corporate actors from the financial sector (Highbury Finance), the consultancy industry 
(Africa Matters Ltd), and agribusiness (Jatropha Africa, now a Ghanaian company). The 
interview partners were chosen because of their active role in land-consuming investments 
as facilitators with headquarters in the home country, as well as their experience as 
operators on the ground in the host countries. Consequently, the qualitative interviews 
retrieved information about the actors’ outlooks on, and insights about land-consuming 
FDI targeting African economies, their clients’ motivations, the alleged drivers of land-
consuming investments, the dynamics of political economy on the ground, significant 
events influencing investor choices, relevant home country dynamics and policies, 
problems in the operationalization and operation of land-consuming FDI, and the 
sustainability of prevailing business models and land management. The interviews were 
conducted over the phone or in-person in London.  
Moreover, I conducted a series of other interviews with researchers, corporate 
actors, NGO activists, and policy makers from various countries (e.g., China, the UK, 
Saudi Arabia, Germany, Zambia, Tanzania, Madagascar, Ghana, the Netherlands, Kenya, 
and Ethiopia) and organizations (e.g., FAO, WB, OXFAM, Food First) between 2010 and 
2014. These informal interviews were, again, intended to interrogate my conclusions about 
mechanisms, factors, and dynamics related to the how and why of Chinese and British 
land-consuming FDI projects, to unearth new evidence, or to take notice of changing 
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trends and diverging perspectives (Table 1-4). They took place at conferences and 
workshops, and interview partners were selected with the intent to learn more about their 
organizational position and perspective on land-consuming investments; relevant research 
projects and findings; and/or their personal experience regarding the empirics and politics 
of land-consuming overseas investments. 
Table 1-4 – Overview of Informal Interviews (Actor Types) 
 
Actor type 
 
Quantity  
 
Academia  
 
31 
 
NGO/Association 
 
12 
 
Government officials 
 
15 
 
Private Sector/ Business  
 
10 
Methodological Approach 
In its attempt to gather reliable data, interrogate common propositions, and develop 
alternative explanations, the study applies two qualitative methodological tools: systemic 
process tracing combined with triangulation, and country case studies. Notably, the 
analytic inferences from this methodological approach do not aim to “establish universal 
generalizations across a broad (…) range of cases” beyond those studied, nor does this 
approach focus on prediction.
62
 It also does not aim to identify causal effects in the sense 
of independent and dependent variables. Instead, process tracing and the comparative 
                                                 
62 Falleti (2006), 1-2. 
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research design match the goal of this study to “test, challenge, and shift the prior beliefs 
about the cases under study.”63  
Process tracing and triangulation generate rich and differentiated evidence about the main 
empirical characteristics of Chinese and British land-consuming investments and uncover 
causal mechanisms about how and why they seem to take place. And the comparative 
study of at least two unlike cases, such as the UK and China, allows the researcher to 
identify whether an aspect is unique to the country case or resembles a “common pattern” 
across the two seemingly different contexts.
64
 Together with the rich and differentiated 
empirical evidence, it also highlights the relative significance of factors that would be 
difficult to understand in any single case study.
65
  
With regard to the exploratory research interest in alternative explanations of large-
scale land acquisitions, the context orientation of case studies permits the study “to achieve 
high levels of conceptual validity” in the face of rich and differentiated empirical data 
generated through process tracing.
66
 The results of the focus on empirical evidence at the 
project and country level, as well as on different and common patterns across the two cases, 
and comparison to historical evidence, also allows the researcher to provide for a “rich, but 
differentiated theory” about “land grabbing” that discusses OFDI in the context of home 
country political economy and development.
67
 
                                                 
63 Goldstone (2008), 50-51. 
64 Khan and Van Wynsberghe (2008), 5. 
65 George and Bennett (2005), 27, 19. 
66 See George and Bennett (2005), 216. 
67 See George and Bennett (2005), 216. 
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It has been mentioned before that the orthodox hypothesis about land-consuming 
FDI from an investor country perspective a priori assumes key characteristics, based on an 
antithetic actor typology (state-capitalist: security concern; private: for profit); the 
theoretical tenets of the current operative paradigm (rational choice, supply/demand); or 
their alleged correlation with the crises of food, energy and finance in 2007/2008 (see 
summary in Table 1-5).  
Table 1-5 – Summary of Orthodox Explanations about Land-Consuming FDI since 200768 
Actor 
Typology / 
Description 
and 
Explanation 
What is happening? Who is acting? 
How is it 
occurring? 
What events? 
To which 
end? 
State-capitalist 
country (e.g., 
China) 
Land-consuming 
FDI overseas to 
secure domestic 
energy and food 
“needs” 
The State 
(usually 
described as 
unitary actor) 
Through state-
owned 
enterprises and 
Sovereign 
Wealth Funds 
Crises of 
food, energy 
and finance is 
of major 
importance in 
explaining 
them 
For export 
back home 
Liberal 
country (e.g., 
UK) 
Land-consuming 
FDI for profit and 
as a function of 
international 
division of labor 
(e.g., cheap land 
and labor abroad) 
The Market 
(usually 
described as 
the sum of 
individual 
actors) 
Capital flows 
by private 
sector actors 
(e.g., 
entrepreneurs, 
banks) 
For market 
(unclear, 
which 
market) 
 
To achieve the study objective of “evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, 
discovering new hypotheses,” and considering alternative explanations about the two 
country cases, the process of data collection and analysis via process tracing and country 
case comparison is guided by several categories relevant for generating rich and 
                                                 
68 Also see the literature review in Chapter 2. 
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differentiated data on Chinese and British land-consuming FDI. These categories allow for 
the testing of existing hypotheses about actors, timelines, events, institutions, purposes, 
and land use. At the same time, they enable the exploration of alternative analytical 
explanations.
69
 Accordingly, each FDI project in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the associated 
country case, was assessed in view of 13 categories, namely the actors, institutions, and 
sectors involved throughout the project cycle; particular timelines of the projects (i.e. 
When did it begin, was it followed through?); the role of land in the investments (i.e. How 
was it used? How was it accessed? How was it governed?); the purpose of the investments 
(For export or domestic use?); and the role of the projects in the recipient country context 
(Was the project part of a national development plan?). Key outcomes of this process are 
documented in the appendix tables on Chinese and British investments since 2000. These 
also provide the final list of projects that I investigated in great detail. 
Moreover, the empirical findings were discussed in view of the political economy 
and social, economic, and ecological development context of the home country. Particular 
attention was given to relevant home country measures
70
 and guiding ideologies; specific 
events significant for investor choices, investment outcomes, and/or OFDI-relevant 
regulations; and the role played by investor legacy in these investments, in the form of 
linkages, quality of connections, and foreign policy traditions (see summary in Table 1-6). 
In order to enhance comparability of empirical findings over time, the historical review of 
                                                 
69 Collier (2011), 824. 
69 Collier (2011), 824. 
70 Home country measures refer to the policy frameworks of the investor country that support OFDI 
activities of the domestic industry. See, for instance, Sauvant et al. (2010). 
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international land acquisitions at the turn of the 20
th
 century was also structured according 
to these categories (see Chapter 3).  
Table 1-6 – Categories and Sub-Questions Guiding the Assessment of Land-Consuming FDI 
Empirical Characteristics of FDI in SSA Home Country Context 
Actors 
 Who is involved? 
 At which stage of the project? 
 To which end? 
Development context  
 What is the social, economic, and 
ecological state of home country 
development? 
 
Institutions 
 What institutions play a role in these 
projects? 
Home country measures  
 What is the institutional framework 
that OFDI is embedded in? 
 Do these institutions play a role in 
OFDI in SSA? 
Sectors 
 What sectors do these projects go to? 
 What are core characteristics of this 
sector in the host country? 
Guiding ideologies 
 How are capital exports rationalized 
by actors involved? 
 
Timelines 
 What does the project life-cycle look 
like? 
 When did the project start? 
 How does the project develop? 
Investor (country) legacy 
 Does the investor legacy play a role 
in how these investments occur? 
Purpose 
 Is the project producing for export 
markets? 
Political Economy 
 What are relevant features of state-
market relations? 
 
Role of land  
 How is land used? 
 How is land governed? 
 How is land accessed? 
Recipient country context 
 What is the official position towards 
inward FDI? 
 Is the project embedded in national 
development plans? 
Events 
 Which events were significant in the 
context of OFDI? 
 In which ways were these events 
significant? 
 
In addition to the very detailed empirical information that this approach generated 
on the investigated projects and home country contexts, I also incorporated other 
data(bases) (such as investment inventories by government agencies) in my analysis of 
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what has been occurring, to put things into a broader perspective.
71
 Moreover, I conducted 
an extensive literature review about “land grabbing,” the history of the OFDI regimes, 
foreign economic policies, development trajectories, and the political economies of the 
home countries. Also, to the degree necessary, I accounted for the political economy in 
host countries. This extensive literature review complements the very detailed information 
obtained during process tracing. The findings presented in this thesis are my best estimate 
of the main trends and periods of Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI since 2000. 
In sum, this methodological approach allows for identification of the main 
empirical characteristics of Chinese and British land-consuming investments throughout 
their life cycle, and it highlights the guiding ideology and home country measures in which 
they are embedded, as well as the particular traits of political economy which they reflect. 
Moreover, the approach enables a comparative discussion of empirical findings in view of 
the commonalities, differences, and significance of actors, institutions, interests, and causal 
mechanisms. And it allows me, in the context of each country’s development trajectory, to 
account for domestic development ambitions and challenges under a given political 
economy, while also acknowledging the importance of transnational factors in answering 
the question of why the investments occur. Thus, process tracing “show[s] how (…) events 
are plausibly linked given the interests and situations faced by groups or individual actors” 
to the extent that “actions are understandable in terms of knowledge, intent and 
                                                 
71 For instance, Chinese projects listed in the “land grab” databases are primarily agricultural ones, 
whereas government data on Chinese FDI in SSA shows that this type of investment actually only 
comprises a minor share of the total investment activities. 
51 
 
circumstances that prevailed at the time decisions were made.”72 And the comparative 
research approach then takes the findings of this assessment “to challenge and improve our 
understanding of how particular cases of interest are related or different”73 – and, more 
broadly, to deliberate on the role of OFDI from a home country perspective. 
In view of the question of objectivity, the method of process tracing and 
triangulation permits researchers to address the problem of unreliable data, generating an 
overview of the main empirical characteristics that followed from the assessment of the 
rich and detailed data collected across the core categories mentioned above. Also, the 
comparative case study approach has been guided by several considerations that are related 
to my research interests as well as associated objectivity concerns. Firstly, comparative 
case study research is an excellent tool that allows us to develop “an understanding of a 
complex issue or object and can extend experience or add strength to what is already 
known through previous research.” 74  In this regard, it ideally matches this project’s 
research objective of a “detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or 
conditions and their relationships.”75 While not offering highly generalizable findings, the 
case studies are useful in answering questions which begin with "how" or "why," thereby 
helping to fill a gap in current literature on international land acquisitions. Secondly, 
comparative case study research enables variation-finding comparisons (larger N, but not 
matched). Regarding the astonishingly homogeneous explanation of distinct investor 
countries in the literature, it seems highly beneficial to compare cases in view of their 
                                                 
72 Goldstone (2008), 48. 
73 Goldstone (2008), 48-50. 
74 See, for instance, Soy (1997). 
75 Soy (1997). 
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similarities and/or variations. Thirdly, the comparison of cases will allow us to engage in 
moderate theory building about the (f)actors driving these investments. 
Clearly, the chosen research approach and method come with particular limitations 
and challenges attached. Firstly, as I have highlighted above, my research approach does 
not allow me to derive broad generalizations beyond the two case studies and their 
investments in Sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, the method of process tracing has been 
difficult, for two reasons. On the one hand, it is impossible to find data for every one of the 
multiple categories that guides my systematic assessment of Chinese and British land-
consuming FDI projects. On the other hand, the data generated is very detailed, revealing 
many nano-level stories and factors that are interesting, but not necessarily significant in 
the micro- and macro-level analysis of how and why Chinese and British land-consuming 
projects occur from a home country perspective.  
Consequently, this thesis’ analysis of land-consuming FDI is the result of a trying 
decision-making process with respect to what information to include and what to exclude. 
Since I am not pursuing a single argument in this research project, the decision about 
significant and insignificant information has been influenced by the set of criteria that 
structure the broader assessment and analysis (see below). Moreover, I have been 
determined to depict the diversity of factors at play in each of the case studies, and to 
weigh them according to their importance. Therefore, this thesis presents the empirical and 
analytical findings of each case study in two distinct chapters. This structure provides the 
space to highlight the multiple factors that are part of the main empirical characteristics of 
each case and, in a second step, to draw broader analytical conclusions about why they 
occur from a home country perspective. 
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Case Selection 
The case selection of China and the UK complemented this exploratory research 
and methodological approach. Both countries are among the top 10 “land grabbers” 
according to the existing databases (measured by the total scale of their companies’ 
operations overseas), which makes their study important for a more meaningful 
understanding of what seems to be happening.
76
 Moreover, they are also commonly framed 
as embodiments of the above-mentioned antithetic investor country model (i.e., state vs. 
market) that underpins the orthodox hypothesis, meaning that a comparative study of these 
unlike cases allows the researcher to test the orthodox hypothesis and systematically 
explore alternative explanations of the political economy of “land grabs,” in view of the 
case-specific factors and dynamics at play, as well as regarding those that apply across the 
two cases.  
In addition, the choice of China and the UK as comparative cases was compelling 
with regards to this thesis’ intent to investigate and consider the role of land-consuming 
FDI in the context of home country development. This is because the countries differ in 
their industrial set-up and socio-economic orientation and history. They thus allow us to 
comparatively explore the ways in which international land acquisitions are reflective of a 
home country’s particular setting and development context in and over time. On the one 
hand, Chinese OFDI is interesting because the country is a newcomer as a source of capital 
exports. Such exports have to be understood against the background of China’s opening up 
in the late 1980s, which turned the country into an increasingly powerful international 
                                                 
76 See Land Matrix (http://landmatrix.org/en/get-the-idea/web-transnational-deals/). 
54 
 
actor in the group of so-called “emerging economies.” Therefore, any study of Chinese 
land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa has to be aware of the potential 
processes of international development, such as the global economic and political 
restructuring, that these investments might reflect. The rise of China since the 1990s has 
been closely associated with a domestic development path that Jiang summarized as 
“heavy industrialization, labour- and capital- intensive manufacturing industries, export-
led growth, low labour cost and high environmental damage.” 77  In 2013 (est.), the 
industrial sector continued to represent the largest share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
at 45.3%, compared to 45% for services and 9.7% for agricultural activities.
78
 With respect 
to the benchmark of genuine and sustainable development, this economic success has come 
at a high price in the form of low wages and worker welfare, plus contentious issues 
associated with “the eco-system and political reforms.”79  
On the other hand, and quite removed from China’s emergence as the “Workshop 
of the World”80 since the 1990s, the UK, as a former empire, has a long (industrial) history 
of economic presence worldwide, both as an investor and trading country. After the 
empire’s disintegration post-WWII, the UK has remained a ‘cosmopolitan’ economy, 
whose operations are integrated in, and dependent on the world economy. Domestically, its 
economic development after WWII was characterized by deindustrialization and the post-
oil-crisis collapse of the manufacturing sector during the late 1970s, the financialization of 
the economy, and the adoption of neo-classical development policies that slowed 
                                                 
77 Jiang (2009), 587. 
78 US Central Intelligence Agency (20 June 2014). 
79 Jiang (2009), 587. Also see Chapter 5 (Section 5). 
80 See, for instance, Martin and Manole (June 2004). 
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reinvestments by the private sector which would have been needed to modernize the UK’s 
industrial base.
81
 As a result, the tertiary sector features prominently in the UK’s 
development context: financial and other services make up 78.9% of GDP (est. 2013), and 
related (overseas) earnings have become an increasingly important revenue source for the 
state, compensating for the negative terms of trade that result from the economy’s great 
dependence on foreign inputs and its relatively small secondary and primary sectors, which 
represent 20% and 0.7% of total GDP, respectively.
82
 The political economy of UK 
development since the 1980s, characterized by an “embedded financial orthodoxy”83 and a 
financialization-led growth model, has come at the high price. The country faces an 
escalating private and public sector debt, rising wealth inequality, a jobs crisis, and a 
growing fear that heightened international economic competition might weaken the 
positional ability of the country to “punch above its weight” in world politics.84 Alongside 
the financial sector crisis, which has led to a prolonged stagnation of the home economy, 
the government has recently begun to consider the possibility of modifying economic 
policy to rebalance the distribution of economic sectors through reindustrialization. 
In both countries, the costs of these development challenges have become a matter 
of concern for the political elite due to a dramatic increase in domestic protests over 
working conditions and pollution (China), and public concerns over inequality, economic 
recession, and the consequences of the latter for the country’s international positional 
status (UK).  
                                                 
81 The New Political Economy Network (2010), 14, 11-12. Also see Chapter 7. 
82 US Central Intelligence Agency (20 June 2014). 
83 Cerny and Evans (2004), 51. 
84 See Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion. 
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Comparative Political Economy, OFDI and Home Country Development 
Due to the complexity of state-society relations and development dynamics, this 
study argues that a meaningful understanding of how and why land-consuming FDI is 
occurring from an investor country perspective has to: (1) take into account who is 
involved, in which way, at which stage of the overall process, and to which end; (2) 
investigate which processes and institutions carry out the investments, how they do so, and 
to what end; and (3) identify the differences and commonalities of the projects, both on an 
intra- and inter-country basis. But how can a study of “land grabbing” approached through 
the lens of political economy and development generate the rich and differentiated data and 
analysis necessary for a meaningful understanding of what is happening in the cases of 
China and the UK? To achieve those goals, the research project is inspired by three sets of 
literature: comparative political economy, FDI, and development. These will be introduced 
in this section in order to elucidate the premises upon which this study’s assessment and 
analysis of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI is built. 
Political Economy 
Firstly, the study of the comparative political economy of these projects was 
inspired by the work of key historical institutionalists. Drawing on the theoretical work of 
C/IPE
85
 scholars such as Katzenstein, Hall, and Rueschemeyer and Mahoney, the study did 
not assume that the interests of involved actors are exogenous, fixed, or necessarily 
                                                 
85 C/IPE refers to scholars that combine comparative political economy (CPE) and international 
political economy (IPE) research. 
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material.
86
 Instead, the research was based on the assumption that any study of the political 
economy of land-consuming FDI would have to be open to potentially new factors and 
variables that might shape relevant policy, project, and/or actor rationale, including the 
decision-making environment itself, psychological factors, international factors, domestic 
factors, and economic reasoning.
87
 
Additionally, the study’s interest in OFDI from the viewpoint of political economy 
was influenced by Katzenstein’s argument that the “management and the analysis of 
interdependence must start at home.”88 Conventionally, IPE scholars accentuate the role of 
international factors in the form of international regimes, trade, FDI, epistemic 
communities, and civil society, while the comparativists concentrate on domestic factors to 
explain policy outputs and outcomes. In the case of land-consuming OFDI, however, 
neither approach can fully capture what is happening. Instead, the literature review
89
 
suggests that national and international factors are at play, and that distinct domestic 
developments together make up the global phenomenon. In this context, the work by 
Katzenstein exemplifies a third way to study land-consuming FDI. He bridges the outlined 
divide between C/IPE scholars in his research on the foreign economic policy making of 
advanced industrial states, highlighting that it is the outcome of “the interaction of 
international and domestic forces.”90  
                                                 
86 See, for instance, Katzenstein (1977a; 1978); P. Hall (1990); and Rueschemeyer and Mahoney 
(2003). 
87 Other disciplines have acknowledged the multiplicity of factors in decision making. See DeRouen and 
Mintz (2010). 
88 Katzenstein (1977b), 606. 
89 See Chapter 2. 
90 Katzenstein (1977b), 587, 591. 
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This research project’s assessment and analysis of land-consuming FDI adopted 
Katzenstein’s argument that it is not possible to understand societies without examining 
the regional and global contexts within which they exist. At the same time, this logic 
suggests that one cannot understand regional and global phenomena without considering 
the distinctiveness of the societies (and the domestic structures of the nation-states) 
involved. Katzenstein’s work also underlines the importance of accounting for differences 
in national responses to international challenges, such as the food or energy crisis in 
2007/2008, even at a time when international interdependence and “the pervasiveness of 
transnational relations” are important phenomena in the reality of nation-states.91 For this 
project, the above implies that the assessment of how international land acquisitions are 
actually carried out by actors from two major investor countries provides for a better 
understanding of why they might be happening in the home country context, how they 
relate to issues of crisis, and what their implications could be for international economic 
and political relations. Moreover, Katzenstein’s conceptual framework matches the 
exploratory research design, thus enabling the study to capture the dynamic and complex 
nature of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, 
the institutional assessment differentiates between means (instruments) and ends (objective) 
while remaining aware that “means can become an end in itself, and ends can become a 
means in the attainment of other objectives.”92  
With regard to actor analysis, the study starts out by sorting actors into major 
interest groups of production relations (such as industry, finance, commerce, labor and 
                                                 
91 Also see, for instance, Dore (2000). 
92 Katzenstein (1977b), 588. 
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agriculture) and political action groups related to the structures of political authority (state 
bureaucracy and political set-up). However, I recognize that neither actor group should 
ultimately be seen as unitary during the process of assessment and analysis; nor should a 
strict normative distinction between private and public actors be upheld during process 
tracing and analysis. State power itself, for instance, is made up of particular individuals 
belonging to a particular group in society, and their strategic considerations for foreign 
(economic) policy might end up conflicted between national interests (as state power held 
by particular groups) and the public good. And private actors within the same field might 
pursue very different interests and experience highly dissimilar outcomes. Also, with 
regard to influence, a priori presumptions are not helpful for a meaningful understanding 
of how and why land-consuming FDI occurs. While interest groups, particularly in the 
field of economic policy, are important in influencing public preference and choice, it can 
also work the other way around, with public policy influencing private preferences.
93
  
More broadly, this thesis’ analysis of land-consuming OFDI from an investor 
perspective treats agencies, clusters of ideas that perform ideological functions
94
 (hereafter: 
guiding ideologies), structures, and events as co-determinant, and it does not assume 
                                                 
93 Katzenstein (1977b). Also see Levy and Prakash (2003) on transnational corporations in global 
governance or Chandler and Mazlish (2005). 
94 With ideological functions, I refer to the fact that ideologies tend to justify and reflect powerful 
interest structures. In my assessment of Chinese and British OFDI from a home country perspective, I 
take note of such powerful clusters of ideas that play a role in the promotion and rationalization of 
these investments. However, Gouldner (1976, 33) stressed that ideologies differ from propaganda 
which is purely strategically in nature. Instead, ideologies “are intended to be believed in by those 
affirming them publicly and by all men, because they are “true,” and they thus have universal 
character.” The universal appeal of ideologies, such as the claim that they serve the national interest, 
conceals the interest formation that they represent in their “concern for What is and by their world-
referencing “reports”.” In this sense, I argue that the clusters of ideas supporting OFDI to Africa fulfill 
an ideological function: they mobilize support, conceal the interests of the particular political economy 
that drives them, and appear to be universal in character. Moreover, these guiding ideologies justify as 
well as create the institutions and purposeful agents at play in OFDI activities to Africa. 
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variable independence. Consequently, the emphasis is on studying “these interactive 
effects of the interdependence of multiple causal variables”95 in-depth in the Chinese and 
British cases. The thesis accepts that “history and ideas matter,” that “institutions structure 
actor choices but are subject to change by actors themselves,” and that actors “make 
decisions that are not always efficiently or purely self-interested.”96  
Concerning the aspect of power in the study of the two home countries’ political 
economy, the thesis’ assessment has been influenced by the theoretical work of Barnett 
and Duvall. The authors developed a heuristic model of power as a social relation.
97
 Their 
conceptualization of power correlates with the above discussion of the importance of ideas, 
structures, and agencies in the study of “land grabbing.” Accordingly, power transpires in 
the interaction of actors (“power over”), as well as in the structural setting within which 
this interaction takes place (“power to”).98 In the first dimension (i.e. interaction), power 
can be compulsory or institutional. In my assessment of Chinese and British investments, 
therefore, I take note of the material, symbolic, and normative resources that are part of 
relevant compulsory or institutional contexts and that play a role in the interaction of actors 
involved in these investments. In the second dimension (i.e. structure), power transpires in 
the form of structural circumstances and “through more diffuse constitutive relations to 
produce the situated social capacities of actors.”99 Therefore, my assessment takes note of 
the home countries’ development trajectories and political economies, as well as the 
                                                 
95 Steinmo (2008), 166. 
96 Steinmo (2008), 178. 
97 Barnett and Duvall (2005). 
98 Clearly, this distinction should only be understood as a heuristic tool, because in practice, both 
power dimensions are intertwined. 
99 Barnett and Duvall (2005), 48. 
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existence and application of a particular discourse or cluster of ideas and reference systems 
that determine the subjectivities of actors, their capacity, and that shape preferences and 
perceptions.
 100
  
FDI Research 
Secondly, in order to investigate Chinese and British land-consuming FDI in the 
context of home country development, the study draws on FDI research. This allows for 
consideration of potential links between OFDI flows, domestic development, and foreign 
economic policy. Importantly, the OFDI research, which largely comprises economic-
historical and legal-institutional studies on OFDI in and over time, bridges the analytical 
divide between micro-level OFDI activities and macro-level economic development by 
documenting the empirical correlations between them. These insights proved helpful 
during the conceptualization stage of this thesis. They suggest that “OFDI is one part of the 
country’s overall strategy of economic development,” i.e. “a means to an end, not the goal 
itself,”101 and they therefore support this thesis’ argument that a meaningful assessment of 
OFDI projects has to acknowledge their particular framing and context back home.
102
  
In this context, the essay by Lall was particularly helpful, as it provides important 
findings on the significance of particular development challenges in influencing 
government policies on FDI activities. Lall’s research documents the use of “FDI flows for 
furthering the growth of national ownership and locational advantages,” mostly in cases of 
                                                 
100 Gouldner (1976), 33. 
101 Broadman (2010), 331. 
102 See,for instance, Sauvant et al. (2010); Te Velde (2007); Hyam (2010); Nunnenkamp (2006); and 
Dumett 1999. 
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market failure, and it reveals the relevance of the home country context for explaining the 
large OFDI variations between and within investor countries in and over time.
103
 The 
documented cases are not confined to state-capitalist countries, as the orthodox description 
of “land grabbing” countries would suggest, but include liberal economies such as the UK, 
whose statistics from 1973-2002 show that investment-related bilateral aid to improve the 
host country’s investment environment positively correlated with OFDI flows over time.104  
Also, the comparative study on OFDI by emerging economies, edited by Sauvant et 
al., contributed greatly to this thesis during the conceptualization phase due to its critical 
interrogation of the stereotypical notions of the orthodox hypothesis’ political economy. It 
identifies key frameworks and elements of OFDI regulation by emerging economies, as 
well as OECD countries; and it outlines their emergence in the context of their economic 
development process. Core findings support this thesis’ hypothesis that from a legal-
institutional standpoint, the antithetic framing used in the contemporary debate on “land 
grabbing” (e.g., state vs. market) is not helpful in explaining what seems to be happening, 
since the resulting contrastive description of Chinese and British political economies does 
not correspond with the actual institutional frameworks in place in both countries, which 
are relatively similar with regard to OFDI regulation and promotion (also see Chapters 5 
and 7).
105
 
At the same time, this body of research indicates that any implicit or explicit claims 
about the benefits of OFDI for domestic development need to be critically probed against 
                                                 
103 Lall (1996), 324-325. 
104 Te Velde (2006), 24-25; and Te Velde (2007), 96. 
105 Sauvant et al. (2010). 
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empirical evidence. In practice, particular cost and benefit rationalizations by investors and 
governments often do not materialize, and capital exports might not turn out to be in the 
best interest of the country. Prominent examples are the “hollowing out” of the Japanese 
manufacturing industry,
106
 the export of jobs, or cases of wealth destruction through 
project failure.
107
 Historical FDI research also raises awareness of the fact that the 
contemporary promotional policy stance towards OFDI that is characteristic of China and 
the UK (since 2000) is unique. Over time, governments have shifted back and forth 
between restricting and/or liberalizing such capital flows, which emphasizes the need to be 
aware of potential changes in the respective policy landscape and guiding ideology over 
time. 
Home Country Development  
Thirdly, this thesis studies Chinese and British land-consuming investments in view 
of home country development. Specifically, four development dimensions are considered 
during the assessment process: the ecological dimension (pollution; resource availability 
and access); the social dimension (unemployment; education; lack of skilled personnel; 
demographic change; inequality of wealth and opportunity); the political dimension (public 
policies; political landscape; state-market relations); and the economic dimension (crisis; 
debt; job creation; sectoral distribution; productivity; external vulnerability; ambitions). 
These factors have been derived from a body of literature that discusses the trajectories, 
                                                 
106 Also see Moran (2011), 124. 
107 See Lall (1996); Moran (2011); Snyder (1991); and Cottrell (1975). Also see historical evidence in 
Chapter 2.  
64 
 
dynamics, potentials, and challenges of development approaches since the late 19
th
 
century.
108
 
Objectivity in Social Science 
The exploratory and largely qualitative research design, together with the small-N 
case study approach might raise concern over the objectivity of the conclusions drawn. 
How can a researcher control for his or her own biases in such a case? The wide range of 
literature on the topic of objectivity in the social sciences and the role of case studies in 
assessment and theory development suggests that qualitative and small-N studies need not 
be an obstacle to the production of objective results.
109
 As a reminder, the research goal of 
this thesis is not to provide results that are generalizable, or ones that can be used for 
prediction. Instead, it intends to provide an empirically rich and differentiated narrative 
about how and why “land grabbing” occurs from the perspective of two specific investor 
countries, in the context of their development. And, it aims at developing a framework that 
could also be utilized to study other cases. 
The project follows the understanding of objectivity outlined by Bird in reference 
to Max Weber.
110
 Accordingly, it tries to realize the requirements of objectivity in the 
social sciences by providing a “public account” that is “honest, intelligible, and 
reasonable,” can be understood by diverse publics, and is responsive to “reasonable 
                                                 
108 E.g., Gillespie (2001); Bird and Velasquez (2006); Robbins (2004); Victor (2008); Hirsch (2005); 
Snyder (1991); Jackson (2011); Cato (2011); Ekins (1993); and Saeed (2008). Also see the literature 
review in Chapter 3 on the historical dynamics of home country development and overseas 
investment.  
109 George and Bennett (2005); Rueschemeyer and Mahoney (2003); Bird (1998). 
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criticism.” 111  With regard to value judgments, this thesis follows Bird’s argument 
according to which these are part of social research and occur in several forms and at 
different stages in the research process, such as topic selection; the making of “evaluative 
judgments” about events and persons studied; or in the form of value judgments about 
coherence, value or reliability of data studied.
112
 While these forms of value judgments are 
unavoidable, they must not undermine “objectivity rightly understood.” That is to say, it is 
not the question of value judgments as such, but the distinction between evaluative 
judgments and empirical ones which then is the criterion of objective scientific 
undertaking in the social sciences.
113
 Researchers who try to stay “aloof and without 
perspective” to avoid value judgments run the risk that they will “simply de facto assume 
or reflect the prevailing values of our times or their professions.”114  
Consequently, the research and methodological approach of this thesis are guided 
by three considerations that constitute “generic aspects of social scientific investigations:” 
the representation of research subjects, which measures to use, and how to proceed in order 
to arrive at reasonable judgments.
115
 Concerning the representation of research subjects – 
i.e. the public and private actors whose rationales and motivations this study tries to better 
understand – I am aware of the need to account for the insider-outsider problematic posed 
to the researcher. This means taking the reasons provided by the actors seriously, while 
nevertheless checking them against empirical facts. Clearly, the challenge lies in 
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discovering the actors’ interests and motives. This thesis rises to that challenge, and uses 
empirical data about the projects, development contexts, events, political economies, and 
guiding ideologies to evaluate actors’ ambitions. On the basis of this empirical information 
about how these investments occur (which is revealed to the reader in Chapters 4 and 6), 
the reader can also judge for him- or herself the reasonability of the conclusions drawn. 
5. Synopsis of Key Findings  
The findings of the two country case studies suggest that land-consuming FDI 
projects are indeed reflective of their particular home country context. They are embedded 
in guiding ideologies and domestic development approaches, influenced by specific events 
relevant for the particular country, supported by government measures, and related to the 
particular country’s political economy. At the same time, the two country cases suggest 
that simplified assumptions about their political economies and underpinning motivations 
are not conducive to a meaningful understanding of what is happening from an investor 
country perspective. While key differences in how these investments take place do exist, 
they do not necessarily imply a divergence in the investments’ purposes (to which end) or 
in other aspects relevant for “land grabbing.” Moreover, antithetic explanations tend to 
ignore the multiple commonalities and/or the complex nature of both countries’ 
investments, which are characterized by multiple purposes, actors, and dynamics.  
The process tracing of Chinese land-consuming FDI projects in Sub-Saharan Africa 
reveals that they are not undertaken for resource-related reasons alone. I argue instead that 
they are part of China’s resources and expansion diplomacy which aims to diversify the 
country’s supply of resources and its export markets; strengthen international partnerships, 
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and globalize its industrial base, which is characterized by resource-intensive and export-
oriented manufacturing operations.  
A closer look at the main empirical characteristics reveals the complexity of 
Chinese OFDI activities in Africa. They involve multiple sectors, from farming to 
construction, and show a mixed track record regarding the status of project implementation 
and, in some cases, project failure. The Chinese “farmland grab” often mentioned in the 
literature does not hold true: as of 2010, the agricultural sector only amounted to 3.1% of 
overall Chinese investments in Africa (measured by value),
116
 while many agricultural 
projects took place upon the request of African governments in exchange for resources. 
Moreover, the project timelines show that Chinese land-consuming FDI in African 
countries predates the 2007/2008 international crises of food, energy and finance. Most 
projects have their origins prior to 2000, though many of these projects have significantly 
changed their operations over time. In fact, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have 
switched from an aid and technical cooperation approach towards a market rationale, a 
trend that applies across sectors, as well as aid projects. 
Importantly, these investments involve multiple actors from the private and public 
sectors in the host countries (e.g., ministries, banks), multilateral organizations (e.g., FAO), 
and intergovernmental cooperation programs. From the Chinese side, government 
representatives, embassy personnel, and private and state-owned entrepreneurs are 
involved during a project’s lifecycle, whereas SOEs are particularly dominant in large-
scale projects. Contrary to the widespread assumption that subsumes SOEs under the 
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agency of the Chinese central state, investments often occur outside of central state control, 
and in the case of provincial SOEs even against the interests of the central government. 
The use of land is twofold in these investments: as soil with particular qualities and as 
space where industrial or modernization projects can be realized. The majority of land-
consuming projects in African countries seem to produce for domestic or regional 
consumption, except in the case of energy. These findings match official trade statistics 
which highlight that Chinese imports from African countries are largely composed of 
industrial minerals and energy. Land is accessed through leasing contracts, contract 
farming schemes, or through joint ventures with local companies. These access strategies 
reflect considerations of risk minimization, as well as the importance of liberal domestic 
legislation regarding foreign equity ownership in the host countries.  
From the home country perspective, several events led to a policy position 
increasingly supportive of OFDI and to an Africa-specific foreign policy. These include 
rising resource dependency in the 1990s, when industry demand exceeded the country’s 
resource capacity; the Asian crisis in the late 1990s and the associated collapse of export 
markets; and the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2000 that heightened 
domestic competition and resulted in a strategy to develop national champions, i.e. 
transnational corporations (TNCs) able to compete internationally. In addition, the 
unsustainably high social and environmental costs of the export-oriented, inward foreign 
direct investment (IFDI)-driven development path, particularly the high pollution and the 
low wages, led the government to focus on industrial upgrading, and to promote the 
globalization of Chinese companies’ production processes through OFDI. Together, these 
circumstances and their rationalization show that investments largely represent an attempt 
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to establish an economic system that can draw on other countries’ resources, skills, 
markets, and productive opportunities to further the development process, thereby 
moderating domestic social, economic, and ecological pressures. In fact, the guiding 
ideology embedded in official documentation embraces OFDI as an important policy tool 
to realize domestic development ambitions; and supports the notion that Chinese-African 
cooperation is mutually beneficial. Hereby, African countries and China are said to profit 
from engaging with each other due to the complementarity of their “needs,” namely 
China’s interest in resources and African countries’ interest in export markets for their 
resources. Consequently, the resulting trade and investment relations are less unique than 
the rhetoric about the mutual benefits for the partners involved might suggest: while a 
greater share of Chinese FDI (compared to FDI from the North) goes into manufacturing, 
the asymmetric trade relations strongly resemble North-South trade patterns. 
At the same time, the profit orientation, the positive attitude towards OFDI, the 
adoption of liberal economic principles in its policy, and the diversity of actors in Chinese 
land-consuming OFDI reflect profound changes in the country’s political economy. These 
have resulted from substantive political reforms and the related dynamics: government 
agents have turned into “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” who market their power for public 
but also private gain; corporate governance of SOEs has been eased, transferring some 
discretionary power to the companies from the state; and various policy areas have been 
decentralized, resulting in the rise of sub-state actors. At their core, land-consuming FDI 
projects are part of a trend to liberalize in order to cater to the interests of the resource- and 
export-dependent industrial base, the main source of foreign exchange since the 1990s. 
However, the choice of this approach has been influenced by the particular actor 
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constellation, specific events, and the international context that encourages economic 
expansion through OFDI.  
In the case of British land-consuming FDI in SSA, the process tracing shows that 
“land grabbing” is not only the result of individual investor choices. I argue that they also 
reflect the UK’s investor legacy, the country’s liberal OFDI policies, and the self-
perception as a great power with a globalized economy “punching above its weight.” In 
many cases, they also respond to public-policy induced incentives. Originally, British land-
consuming OFDI in SSA was driven by a highly diverse private sector in search for new 
growth markets and business opportunities at a time of economic stagnation; climate 
regulations that promote investments in biofuels; and/or the 2007/2008 financial crisis. 
More recently, the current government has begun to promote overseas investments as a 
grand strategy to economic recovery and reindustrialization through securing access to 
resources, promoting exports to growing African consumer markets, and identifying 
contract-based work opportunities for UK business overseas. Moreover, land-consuming 
OFDI has become part of a political strategy to maintain the UK’s influential international 
status as a major investor and trading country.  
More in detail, the empirical evidence highlights that such investments involve 
established corporations, often possessing a century of experience on the continent, that 
exploit business opportunities which opened up as part of the reform processes in the host 
countries; early-stage companies that respond to new policy regimes in the climate and 
energy sector; and financial investors that seek profitable investment options during a time 
of financial crisis. While the private sector has been a frontrunner in its turn to Africa since 
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2000, the government has begun to promote the trend in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis.  
With respect to sectoral composition, resources figure prominently in UK land-
consuming FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, but these are not the only kind of investment taking 
place. The UK investments
117
 explored here include a range of projects, from food 
production and livestock farming to mineral extraction and construction services. However, 
official UK OFDI data highlights that in 2008, financial services (43.5%) and mining 
(42.5%) were the largest sectors (measured by value), reflecting the UK investor legacy 
with its focus on natural resources, as well as its economic constitution with a strong 
financial-sector orientation back home. Regarding land use, the above highlights three key 
uses: as a natural resource, as space for industrial and construction projects, and/or as an 
asset. Contrary to the rhetoric of biofuels, such as Jatropha being grown on marginal lands, 
project data highlights that most investments consume prime land that is characterized by a 
mild climate, water availability, productive soils, and nearby infrastructure and markets. 
Similar to Chinese operations, British investors accessed land through various contract 
arrangements.  
But how do these investments relate to the home country context and development? 
Clearly, the UK – a former empire – has a long history as an investor country. Starting 
with EU accession and the oil crisis in the early 1970s, OFDI promotion was basically 
framed in economic terms. First it was pointed to as a resource-acquiring measure, then 
increasingly as a way to enter markets and access technology needed to sustain domestic 
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industrial operations, or as a means to mitigate market failure. Over time, OFDI has also 
increasingly taken over the income-earner role due to structural changes in the form of UK 
deindustrialization, deteriorating terms of trade, and changes in the international economic 
structure that have left the UK as only one of many industrial countries.
118
 As of 2014, 
OFDI is one of several instruments of UK industrial and foreign economic policy, and it 
focuses on export promotion, resource acquisition, and competitiveness. Only recently has 
it been referred to as a tool for opening up new growth markets in the context of the 
economic crises currently affecting established trading partners (e.g., US, EU). Notably, it 
has become part of the current government’s (since 2011) reindustrialization strategy 
which has emerged as a result of the financial crisis and the related economic recession in 
the UK’s large financial sector. As a consequence, the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation’s (CDC) institutional development finance as well as aid-funded programs 
offer business opportunities for British companies investing in SSA. 
In view of British OFDI in SSA, the promotional policy stance explains why 
external events such as reforms in host countries or international policy incentives and 
frameworks have featured prominently in the business rationales of British investors in 
Africa since 2000. Also, the dominance of the financial sector in British OFDI in SSA 
highlights core traits of the country’s political economy: it is a reflection of domestic actor 
constellations and the “embedded financial orthodoxy” that has guided domestic 
development policies since the Thatcher era, and it mirrors the overlap of interests and the 
“intellectual capture” across different actor groups in the public and private sectors. In 
                                                 
118 See Chapter 6. 
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British OFDI in African countries the financial sector has a strong presence not only as an 
investor but also as the primary provider of industry finance; however, the investments are 
not necessarily driven by it.  
A comparison of the main empirical characteristics of contemporary Chinese and 
British overseas investments with historical evidence highlights that most aspects of the 
ongoing “land grab” phenomenon are by no means new, as the common narrative, with its 
narrow focus on resources, (implicitly) claims.
119
 Instead, the empirical data on Chinese 
and British land-consuming FDI projects since 2000 shows that these occur in multiple 
industries, many of which use land not as a resource but as space for productive activities 
(e.g., manufacturing) and/or as an asset. Moreover, many projects are a function of 
multiple factors (e.g., ideological and political factors) rather than a function of pure 
economics and/or resource constraints back home. For instance, a large share of Chinese 
investments in agriculture are for domestic or regional consumption in the host countries; 
happen at the request of African governments; are part of China’s commercial and resource 
diplomacy; are promoted as a way to internationalize the operations and skills-set of 
Chinese agribusinesses; and are ideologically captured under the principle of “mutual 
development.”120  
Contrary to the labels – such as, for instance, “efficiency,” “utility,” or “profit” – 
that are frequently used by public and private actors, as well as the orthodox hypothesis, to 
describe and justify land-consuming FDI activities, these activities have historically been 
and continue to be exposed to great risk, often to a greater degree than other 
                                                 
119 See Chapter 3 for the historical review. 
120 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
74 
 
entrepreneurial endeavors. In fact, in many instances these risks have materialized and 
resulted in project failure, leading to wealth destruction and negative impacts on the 
ground.
121
 This makes it rather difficult for both home and host countries to assess the 
costs and benefits of such FDI projects. However, this risk exposure serves as a warning 
not to uncritically succumb to the rhetoric of success and extraordinary revenues applied 
by actors during their search for funding or political support. Potential host countries need 
to look beyond the seemingly convincing logic of scarcity and rising demand as a 
guarantee for success. Instead, a close assessment on a case-by-case basis is needed to 
capture what is happening, and whether the business model seems feasible.  
In fact, the findings of this thesis, as well as the interviews with representatives of 
three British corporate actors, all indicate that companies that lack prior experience and/or 
apply a narrow economic rationale to their operations which focuses on quick profits and 
efficiency while ignoring the specific social, ecological, economic, and political contexts 
in which they operating, are doomed to failure.
122
 At the same time, unexpected (or 
expected but unrealized) events back home can bring a project to a close, as the examples 
of economic crisis, regulatory reform, and/or protest highlight. Cases in point are the 
British Jatropha projects that started out on the false premise that Jatropha would be 
suitable for marginal lands and low quality soils. While the plants clearly survived under 
these conditions, they did not produce the much-needed fruit in sufficient quality or 
quantity. Moreover, the maturation timeline of five years drove away financial investors 
                                                 
121 Compare empirical evidence in Chapters 3, 4, and 6. 
122 Interviews with representatives of Highbury Finance, Jatropha Africa, and Africa Invest (see 
Chapter 1 (Section 2) on data collection). 
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who were expecting quicker returns on their investments in these projects. Together with 
either poor plantation management or a negative public image of “biofuels” in the home 
country, which led main purchasing clients, such as airlines, to withdraw their support in 
the form of take-off agreements until a certified production line was in place, this has 
resulted in the collapse of most of the Jatropha projects since 2000.
123
 
Finally, it is important to note that this thesis’ assessment and analysis of “land 
grabbing” focuses primarily on investor countries, their perspectives, and the role of these 
investments in the context of their development. As a result, dynamics, impacts, and events 
in the host countries have only been touched on in order to acquire a sufficient overview to 
be able to judge the nature of these investments in the particular context in which they are 
occurring – regarding, for instance, the specific market conditions, political economies, the 
uniqueness in comparison with other countries’ investment projects, the embeddedness in 
the local economy, the connection to political leaders, and/or the ecological, social, and 
environmental implications. However, this approach is largely due to the time and space 
constraints posed by the thesis, and not reflective of any conclusion that the actors, 
institutions, and other host country factors are unimportant with regard to a comprehensive 
explanation of what is occurring. To the contrary, as of 2014, there is ample empirical 
evidence in the form of reports and case studies
124
 which highlights the importance of host 
country actors, dynamics, and institutions in these investment processes – they often shape 
what takes place and how. Early descriptions of what seems to be occurring were 
                                                 
123 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
124 See, for instance, Sikor (2012); Fairbarn (2013); McCarthy et al. (2012); Visser et al. (2012); and 
Wolford et al (2013b). See also the papers presented at the conferences “Global Land Grabbing I” in 
2011 (Sussex University) and “Global Land Grabbing II” in 2012 (Cornell University). 
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especially prone to too easily dismissing the aspect of recipient country agency and 
responsibility, trotting down the well-known path of critiquing big (agri)business and 
contemporary (post-colonial) economic governance.
125
 In practice, however, these analyses 
do not mutually exclude each other. On the contrary, they call for more research on the 
linkages, overlaps, distinct agencies, events, contexts, ideologies, and broad structures that 
together compose the global “land grab.” 
6. Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this section will outline the structure of this thesis. Chapter 2 
reviews the contemporary body of research on “land grabbing” that has emerged since 
2007; identifies gaps in the literature; and concludes by highlighting the key aspects that 
this thesis will contribute to the debate.  
The review of historical literature on international land acquisitions in Chapter 3 
then complements the contemporary debate, which remains inconclusive and relatively 
imprecise in view of the questions of how, and in which way, contemporary “land grabs” 
differ from or resemble those of the past. The overview of the key features of “land grabs” 
in the late 19
th
 century, often referred to as the high watermark of globalization, aims to 
contribute a meaningful summary of key empirical characteristics and explanations. To 
that end, the categories studied are similar to the ones applied in the empirical assessment 
process of the case studies in order to ensure comparability of data (e.g., sectors; timelines; 
                                                 
125 Jauch (2011). 
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the roles of land, actors, and institutions; recipient context; political economy; home 
country measures; guiding ideology). 
Together, Chapters 4 and 5 compose the China case study. First, Chapter 4 presents 
the main empirical characteristics of Chinese land-consuming FDI in African countries. 
The chapter is structured according to the same categories that guided the historical review 
and process tracing. Additionally, this chapter incorporates a section on the role of Chinese 
labor in these projects, a hotly debated phenomenon that requires clarification for a 
meaningful explanation of what is happening. 
The presentation of empirical evidence in Chapter 4 is then complemented by 
Chapter 5’s discussion of these investments’ characteristics in light of the empirical 
evidence about China’s political economy; OFDI policy framework (called “home country 
measures”); guiding ideology; and development context. On the basis of this empirical 
overview of the key aspects of Chinese land-consuming FDI in African countries from a 
Chinese perspective, the chapter concludes by discussing how and why these investments 
are taking place, and what makes them Chinese, rather than British, in nature. 
The UK case study is also divided into two chapters. Chapter 6 presents the key 
empirical characteristics of British land-consuming FDI in African countries since 2000. 
Again, it does so according to the categories outlined previously. Similar to the China case 
study, this chapter contains a country-case-specific section on the role of British 
investment funds active in agricultural investments. This allegedly novel phenomenon 
features prominently in the “land grab” debate and thus merits a detailed discussion. 
Highlighting the key characteristics and dynamics provides the opportunity to clarify 
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misconceptions about these cases, which seem to represent a significant share of the UK 
investments, thereby contributing to a more meaningful understanding of the phenomenon.  
Chapter 7 discusses these investments and their characteristics in view of the 
empirical evidence about the UK’s particular political economy; the relevant OFDI policy 
framework (“home country measures”); guiding ideology; and development context. On 
the basis of this empirical overview of the key aspects of UK land-consuming FDI in 
African countries from a UK perspective, the chapter concludes by addressing how and 
why these investments are taking place, and what makes them British in nature. 
Chapter 8 comparatively summarizes and compares the key findings of both 
country cases, and contrasts them with both historical evidence on international land 
acquisitions and the orthodox hypothesis in the contemporary “land grab” debate. It 
concludes with a discussion of what these findings might tell us with regard to the linkage 
of OFDI and home country development. 
79 
 
Chapter 2: INTERNATIONAL LAND ACQUISITIONS TODAY – THE DEBATE SINCE 2008 
A new international division of labour in agriculture is likely to emerge between countries 
with large tracts of arable land – and thus a likely exporter of biomass or densified 
derivatives – versus countries with smaller amounts of arable land (i.e. biomass importers, 
e.g. Holland). The biggest biomass export hubs are expected to be Brazil, Africa and North 
America. 
–World Economic Forum 2010 
Like trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) has occurred throughout history. From the 
merchants of Sumer around 2500 BCE to the East India Company in the 17th century, 
investors routinely entered new markets in foreign dominions. In 1970 global FDI totaled 
$13.3 billion. By 2007 it was nearly 150 times higher, peaking at $1.9 trillion. 
– WB 2010 
Importantly, the new investment strategy is more strongly driven by food, water and energy 
security than a notion of comparative advantage in the large scale production of indigenous 
crops for global markets, which has been more characteristic of foreign-owned plantations 
since the end of the colonial era. The current land purchase and lease arrangements are 
largely about shifting land and water uses from local farming to essentially long-distance 
farming to meet home state food and energy needs. 
– UN DESA 2010 
1. Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview of the key explanations and empirical 
characteristics of past and present international land acquisitions – focusing on the how 
and why. In doing so, they contribute to the thesis’ investigative research objective by 
challenging common assumptions, identifying important issues, and raising questions 
deemed relevant for the meaningful understanding of what seems to be happening in the 
present, and how it resembles the past. These findings have informed the thesis’ research 
outlook, and they will be taken up again in the concluding Chapter 8, where historical and 
contemporary explanations will be compared with the evidence gathered via the country 
cases. 
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Chapter 2 will proceed as follows: Firstly, key factors will be discussed that might 
explain the unexpected surge of international interest in, and research on the topic of “land 
grabbing.” Secondly, the main terminological challenges will be outlined. Alongside the 
data challenges presented in Chapter 1, these are important in understanding the constraints 
and pitfalls that confront research on this topic. Thirdly, a literature review of major 
publications since 2008 will be presented, highlighting core explanations, and 
summarizing how the debate has evolved over time, analytically and empirically.
126
 
Fourthly, the three most influential framings that shape the policy debate and the research 
literature will be discussed. Aside from their significant role in identifying the problems of 
“land grabbing,” and, on that basis, recommending potential remedies, these framings also 
mirror core actor constellations and paradigmatic contestations that affect what is being 
discussed in the academic literature on the topic. Finally, the contribution made by this 
thesis to the literature will be briefly outlined.  
A review of the “land grab” debate since 2008 reveals few meaningful assessments 
of OFDI from a home country perspective – a gap that this thesis intends to address with 
its study of the UK and China. Most explanations continue to rely on a resource-scarcity 
framing in combination with stereotypes about the investor countries’ politico-economic 
constitutions. Moreover, they primarily refer to international events as major drivers (see 
Table 1-5). At the same time, the more nuanced assessments that have emerged to 
highlight the complexity of home-country-specific political economies, plus the significant 
                                                 
126 For clarification: While the “land grabbing” debate begun with the framing by GRAIN (2008) in 
2008, it is important to note, that the projects that are referenced in the debate often trace back to the 
year 2000, or even further back. 
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share of non-resource focused, yet land-consuming OFDI projects, support this thesis’ 
exploratory research approach of studying how and why “land grabs” occur from a home 
country perspective.  
2. Why “Land Grabbing” Made It Onto the International Research Agenda 
Before going into the debate on “land grabbing” itself, it seems important to reflect 
upon its basic parameters on a broader scale, namely the factors that put this topic on the 
international research agenda in the first place as well as the terminological ambiguity that 
characterizes it. These prior considerations about the context and terminology of the debate 
will allow us to identify potential interests, dynamics, and events that might be important 
for a better understanding of the “land grab” phenomenon. Clearly, processes of 
dispossession, concentration of ownership, and other aspects of commercial pressure on 
land that are discussed under the heading of “land grabbing,” “international land 
acquisitions,” or “FDI in land and agriculture,” are by themselves nothing new, nor do the 
authors who contribute to the respective literature and policy debate seem to make a 
particular effort to understand whether anything about the phenomenon differs from the 
past (see Chapter 3). What exactly does the broader context of timing, actor constellation, 
or terminology then tell us about the renewed popularity of land issues?  
I argue that the interplay of five factors appears to have prepared the ground for 
new interest in the phenomenon. These factors can be described under the headings of 
framing, empirical evidence, crisis, competition, and opposition.  
Firstly, the “land grab” framing itself seems important. In fact, “land grabbing” has 
not only become the title under which a growing body of interdisciplinary research on the 
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topic is emerging, but it also provides international NGOs such as GRAIN
127
 with a 
powerful diagnostic tool and political platform to pool and jointly articulate their 
discontent with the predominant policy paradigms of the national and international 
development institutions and agencies that initially supported these “investments” and 
related policy reforms in the name of “development,” “poverty reduction,” and/or “food 
security.”128  
Secondly, in this process of paradigmatic contestation there is growing empirical 
evidence of the often high social, environmental, and/or economic costs of “land grabs” at 
the local level, which has been admitted by the WB.
129
 Together with the sheer, unheard-of 
scale of the projects, this has lent practical credibility to the alternative framing that 
challenges the widely institutionalized policy paradigm of mainstream economics over its 
failed promises – pointing, for instance, to the poor job creation and skills transfer, limited 
taxation, dispossession, displacement, pollution, and ownership concentration.
130
  
Thirdly, the context of the financial, energy, and food crises of 2007/2008 also 
added to interest in the topic. On the one hand, the rise of FDI in land and agriculture, 
especially at a time when investments elsewhere were declining, generated attentiveness to 
the phenomenon on a general level – first from a quantitative angle by UNCTAD, and 
increasingly from a qualitative angle.
131
 On the other hand, the crises had governments 
worldwide worrying about political and economic regime security in the face of food riots, 
                                                 
127 GRAIN (2008). 
128 WB (2007); De Schutter (2011a); Caffentzis (2002); De Angelis (2005).  
129 WB (2011). 
130 WB (2011). 
131 UNCTAD (2009). 
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high energy and food prices, unemployment, debt pressure, and lagging growth. These 
concerns redirected their attention towards issues of food, job, and energy security, all of 
which are issues linked to land-consuming investments.
132
  
Fourthly, the renewed attention to “land grabs” was also fuelled by the widespread 
concern among public and private actors in old investor countries over heightened 
international competition and global economic restructuring.
133
 This is evidenced by the 
high research output of OECD-based institutions on the rise of new economic powers as 
well as the officially documented fears of old economic powers over their declining 
international influence (see Chapters 6 and 7 on the UK).
 
 
Finally, the opposing interests and paradigms of dominant institutions, such the 
WB, the FAO, or the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, have led to a lively, 
global-level policy debate on the issues of “land grabbing,” food security, and the role of 
agriculture for development (see Section 5).
134
 In this context, a well-prepared civil society, 
which had pushed the FAO since 2002 to change the course of its agricultural policy stance 
towards smallholder farming, also played a prominent role. It made productive use of the 
2007/2008 food crisis and its established institutional linkages with the Rome-based 
agency once the crisis hit.
135
 
                                                 
132 Against this background, the observation by Ayoob (2005) that the securitization of an issue is 
preceded by its politicization seems important.  
133 See UNCTAD (2009, 124), especially regarding the rise of transnational corporations (TNCs) from 
Asian countries among the top 25 TNCs globally. Also see Dicken (2007), 33-69. 
134 See WB (2007); IAASTD (2008); De Schutter (2011a); WB (2011); and IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009). 
135
 Personal communication, Steering Committee member of the Committee on World Food Security,, 
November 2013.
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In sum, these elements point to the political side of the “land grabbing” debate, and 
they call attention to the fact that not everyone who engages in the debate does so out of an 
interest in “land grabbing” itself. Instead, part of the discussion taking place under the 
label of “land grabbing” seems to be the result of media diplomacy and the furthering of 
other agendas. This is highlighted by the great discrepancy between empirical facts and 
rhetorical claims about what is happening. This discrepancy, which this research project 
witnessed in many cases during process tracing, cannot be explained by the complex set of 
data constraints alone.  
3. On Terminological Ambiguity  
The politics of the discourse on “land grabbing” that were discussed in the previous 
Section 2 are also reflected in the history of its terminology. This section will briefly 
summarize the terminological development to ensure an informed understanding.  
The “land grab” terminology was brought to life by GRAIN’s publication “Seized,” 
which first applied it to describe an allegedly new global trend, namely the securing of 
large tracts of (farm)land by foreign governments and private actors. While the term “land 
grabbing” had previously been used to describe historical incidents of “arbitrary seizure of 
land either by military force or through dishonest or illegal means,”136 GRAIN’s reframing 
of international investments in land as “land grabs” pointed to the similarities between 
contemporary events and those of the past for the affected populations in the form of “the 
                                                 
136 UNCCD (2010). 
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brutal expulsion of indigenous communities” and intensifying “struggles over land.”137 At 
the same time, it put the spotlight on the prevailing economic approach’s “accumulation of 
anomalies,”138 such as misleading assumptions about the benefits of foreign investments 
for the social and economic development of host countries. These assumptions did not 
match the empirical evidence and were plagued by an analytical inability to explain these 
investments meaningfully: why would investors target primarily countries with particularly 
low governance performance? 
Subsequent reports by international institutions,
139
 NGOs (e.g., Action Aid
140
 and 
Oxfam
141
), and academia followed up on the core questions raised by GRAIN’s alternative 
framing by assessing whether farmland acquisitions constituted a “land grab” or a 
“development opportunity.”142 Yet, these reports continued using different terminologies to 
describe land-consuming investments, such as “FDI in land,” 143  depending on their 
respective framing (also see Table 1-2 on terminology). In addition to the resulting 
pluralism of terms and frames to describe foreign investments in farmland, academic 
research broadened the focus of “land grabbing” to include “radical changes in the use and 
ownership of land” through FDI in sectors other than agriculture, such as tourism or 
industry.
144
 The resulting terminological ambiguity led Borras and Franco to conclude that 
                                                 
137 GRAIN (2008), 1-2. 
138 P. Hall (1990), 9. 
139 IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009); WB (2011). 
140 Action Aid has a thematic work area and several publications on “Biofuels and Land Grabs” 
(http://www.actionaid.org/eu/what-we-do/biofuels-and-land-grabs). 
141 Oxfam produces research on the political economy and outcomes of land policy 
(http://oxf.am/4LX). 
142 IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009). 
143 Weingärtner 2010; WB (2011); and WB (2010). 
144 Zoomers (2010). 
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“the 'global land grab' has become a catch-all to describe and analyze the current explosion 
of large scale (trans)national commercial land transactions."
145
  
At the same time, the analytical value of the concept came under increased scrutiny: 
as not all “land grabs” are the same, R. Hall argued that the concept’s primary value was 
for activist rather than analytical purposes, because it ignored the context-specific 
dynamics and processes at play in the host countries.
146
 Moreover, an increasing number of 
case studies began to question certain presumptions at the core of the “land grab” framing 
that were related to its peasant activist origin.
147
 Studies on international farmland 
acquisitions in Russia and Ukraine challenged, for instance, the common supposition that 
peasants are inherently opposed to large-scale investments and farming models.
148
 Instead, 
large-scale investments in farming can encounter a relatively positive expectation of 
production and expansion in country contexts where uncultivated land has a negative 
connotation as a further retreat of the state. This clearly highlights that research on “land 
grabbing” must account for the host country’s specific development practice and history, 
rather than assuming a unitary peasant culture. Moreover, D. Hall’s research on South East 
Asian crop booms advises “that we need to pay attention to smallholders as potential 
agents of land grabbing,”149 instead of assuming (a priori) that they are all necessarily 
victims in the process. At the same time, the shortcomings of the “land grabbing” frame’s 
                                                 
145 Borras and Franco (2010), 2.  
146 R. Hall (2011), 193. 
147 Borras et al. (2011). 
148 Steggerda and Visser (2012); Mamonova (2012). Also see special journal editions on “Global Land 
Grabs” by Third World Quarterly 2013 (Volume 34, Issue 9) (see Edelman et al. (2013)); and “Land 
Grabbing and Global Governance” by Globalizations 2013 (Volume 10, Issue 1) (see Margulis et al. 
(2013)). 
149 D. Hall (2011), 838. 
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narrow focus on smallholder farming and food sovereignty in particular institutional 
contexts and in view of de-peasantization have been highlighted (also see the policy debate 
review under Section 2.5).
150 
 
Currently (in 2014), this struggle over the adequacy of the terms and frames used to 
describe what seems to be happening in the context of “land grabs” continues. How 
significant this struggle is for the assessment of “land grabbing” becomes obvious when 
considering that under the existing terms and frames, it is impossible to clearly identify 
whether a “land deal” is a “land grab” or not.151 While GRAIN used the term to refer to 
any foreign investment in agriculture, over time research has challenged this definition, 
which only captures a minor share of the total dynamic, ignoring, for instance, the 
significant dynamics of land dispossession and ownership concentration attributed to 
domestic investors of the respective host countries. The importance of the latter has 
resulted in case studies assessing “land grabbing” through a focus on the political 
economies of the host countries. Similarly, attempts to update the “land grab” terminology 
in line with the empirical evidence, such as the Tirana Declaration,
152
 tend to forget that 
even under democratic methods, compensation and deliberation procedures might not 
solve the underpinning conflicts of land use and land struggles. Again, the definition is not 
precise enough to differentiate what is not a “land grab.” Yet, such a definition would be 
needed to discuss “land grabbing” in the broader development context, especially in view 
                                                 
150 De Master (2013). 
151 See also D. Hall (2013), 1592. 
152 The Tirana Declaration (ILC (2011), 8-10) was the outcome document of an international multi-
stakeholder conference organized by the National Federation of Communal Forests and Pastures of 
Albania (NFCFPA), the Government of Albania, and the ILC on the theme “Securing land access for the 
poor in times of intensified natural resources competition” (24-26 May 2011).  
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of the fact that it is both part of and symptomatic of pressure on land in the form of 
economic upscaling, growth, and/or economic liberalization.  
For the purpose of this research project, it is important to remember that I largely 
use the term land-consuming FDI. It is my understanding that this term best captures a 
common feature of many “land grab” projects that matters when assessing them from a 
home country perspective, – namely, that their primary purpose is neither the acquisition of 
land nor the investment in agricultural production. Instead, what is characteristic of these 
investments is that they consume large areas of land in their operations.  
4. The “Land Grab” Debate Since 2008 – A Literature Review 
The previous sections (and Chapter 1) highlighted that qualitative and quantitative 
information about “land grabbing” or commercial land transactions has to be treated with 
caution. In spite of the widespread and growing academic criticism of “false precision,” it 
is important to note that in the ongoing debate, as well as the public perception about the 
topic, a set of empirical facts continue to form a sort of “empirical fiction”153 about the 
phenomenon.
154
 Borras and Franco argue that the predominant empirical storyline about 
“land grabbing,” which runs through many scholarly, as well as para-scholarly, 
publications from the beginning, basically consists of five hypotheses: (1) land used for 
domestic consumption changes into land used for export production; (2) the main investor 
                                                 
153 This term does not mean to argue that the empirical observation of a concentration of land 
ownership, access, and control is false. I just want to highlight that available reports and databases 
often pretend to provide precise figures in view of land “grabbed” by project or in aggregate (e.g., Land 
Matrix), even though these figures might frequently be incorrect for various reasons (see discussion of 
data constraints in Chapter 1).  
154 For a detailed critique of the data foundation of the “land grab” debate, also see Rulli and D’Odorico 
(2013a) and (2013b); Scoones et al. (2013b); and Oya (2013b). 
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countries are “the Gulf states, Chinese and South Korean governments and companies;” (3) 
land deals also “involve finance capital, partly leading to speculative deals;” (4) they “are 
often shady in character, being non-transparent, non-consultative, and fraught with 
corruption involving national and local governments;” and (5) “land grabs” necessitate 
better regulation to prevent negative, and generate positive, outcomes.
155
 In light of the 
growing and increasingly differentiated research on land-consuming FDI since 2008, this 
simplified empirical narrative is predominantly an ossification of the original theme of 
2008, when the topic attracted international attention. The remainder of this section will 
provide an overview of the main themes, publications, and perspectives that have been 
characteristic of the evolving debate on land-consuming FDI over time.  
The key milestones in the literature are reports by NGOs
156
 and international 
institutions;
157
 research papers submitted to four conferences on “Land Grabbing” and 
“Food Sovereignty;”158 and articles in particular journals, such as the “Global Land Grabs” 
issue of the journal Development;
159
 the Journal of Peasant Studies, which not only 
published selected papers on the topic,
160
 but also special issues covering specific aspects 
of international land acquisitions (e.g., green grabbing; the peasant in relation to the state 
                                                 
155 Borras and Franco (2012), 38.  
155 ILC (2012), 4. 
156 GRAIN (2008); and ILC (2012). 
157 IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009); WB (2011).  
158 See the conference documentation of the international conferences on Land Grabbing I (6-8 April 
2011 at University of Sussex) and II (17-19 October 2012 at Cornell University), and the conferences 
on Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue (14-15 September 2013 at Yale University; and 24 January 
2014 at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague). 
159 Harcourt (2011). 
160 E.g., Zoomers (2010). 
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and class; biofuels, land, and agrarian change);
161
 the Globalizations journal (e.g., land 
grabbing and global governance);
162
 or Third World Quarterly (e.g., agrarian reform).
163
 In 
addition to this increasingly multi-faceted body of literature, numerous books on the topic 
have been written.
164
 
When starting off in 2008, the discussion of “land grabbing” focused largely on 
investments in farmland made by foreign agribusiness or financial investors in the context 
of the global food and financial crises.
165
 Based on over 100 cases of “offshore food 
production,” GRAIN argued that the governments of food importing countries, namely 
China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, China, India, Korea, Libya, and Egypt, were “snatching up 
vast areas of farmland abroad for their own offshore food production” and food security, as 
the food price crisis and food export bans in 2008 indicated the market’s failure to provide 
for cheap and secure food commodities. Foreign agribusiness and private investors were 
also identified as acquirers of farmland, but for different reasons, namely the search for 
profitable investment opportunities at a time of financial crisis (also see quotes in Table 
1-1).
166
  
The empirical description of investments in farmland has become more detailed and 
complex. Institutional and academic publications largely followed the original description 
                                                 
161 Fairhead et al. (2012); JPS (Vol. 34, Nr. 3-4, 2007); McMichael and Scoones (2010). 
162 Margulis et al. (2013). 
163 Edelman et al. (2013). 
164 Fritz (2010); Pearce (2012); and Liberti (2012), 
165 See more about the interrelation of food prices and financial sector speculation in the joint report 
by UNCTAD and Arbeiterkammer Wien (2011). 
166 GRAIN (2008). 
91 
 
of what seems to be happening,
167
 but added the energy alias “peak oil”168 crisis and the 
climate crisis to the range of “land grab” triggers – with the argument that these had 
resulted in domestic legislation with land-intensive (trans)national consequences.
169
 
Accordingly, under the header of “green grabbing,” a growing number of publications 
study the implications of biofuel policies, the REDD scheme,
170
 and/or other policy 
regimes and cases “where ‘green’ credentials are called upon to justify appropriations of 
land for food or fuel – as where large tracts of land are acquired not just for ‘more efficient 
farming’ or ‘food security’, but also to ‘alleviate pressure on forests’.”171  
At the same time, the 2009 report by FAO/IIED/IFAD emphasized the importance 
of domestic investors. It suggested that government-backed deals could be more about 
investing profitably than securing food, and stressed that the terminology of land 
acquisition might be misleading overall, as many land deals – depending on the regulatory 
context of the host country – were in effect land leases rather than purchases.172  
With time, more sub-themes emerged. For instance, the definition of “land 
grabbing” was broadened by some authors to include a wide range of land-consuming 
investments, such as tourism, infrastructure, and mining.
173
This broader definition 
illuminates the land-use competition dynamics at play. Additionally, the notion of 
                                                 
167 Shepard and Mittal (2009); Smaller and Mann (2009); IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009); WB (2011). 
168 See International Energy Agency (2013). 
169 Seiwald and Zeller (2011), Matondi et al. (2011). 
170 See the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (UN-REDD) website (http://www.un-redd.org/). 
171 See the introduction of the special issue of JPS 2012 (Vol. 39, No. 2) on Green Grabbing: a new 
appropriation of nature?, written by the editors Fairhead et al. (2012), 237. For an overview of 
relevant green grabbing publications, also see Steps Centre (25 April 2012).  
172 See IIED/ FAO/IFAD (2009); also see review of the debate by D. Hall (2013). 
173 See GLP (2010) and ILC (2012). 
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“grabbing” was taken up by (often environmental) researchers and applied to other 
resources whose “grabbing” seemed to be part of the “land grab” package, particularly 
water and forests. The briefing by Skinner and Cotula, titled “Are land deals driving ‘water 
grabs’?” is an example of this discursive shift from a focus on peasant struggles and food 
security to the topic of comprehensive and integrated resource management.
174
 The 
publication highlighted that the Malian government transferred water (use) rights together 
with land (use) rights to large investors, “with little regard for how this will impact the 
millions of other users – from fisherman to pastoralists.”175  It also warned about the 
potential consequences of such transfers, namely the corresponding inflexibility and 
exclusiveness that would hamper future attempts to implement comprehensive resource 
management in the affected countries.
176
 In fact, the latter aspect has been underlined by 
research on the relation of population, land use, and land ownership; for example, a study 
on the UK concludes that private land ownership at a time of rising eco-scarcity and 
climate change is unsustainable and might necessitate a public intervention in the medium 
term in order to regain the land planning capacity needed “for the successful management 
and security” of key social needs, namely “housing, food, energy, water, waste, 
ecosystems, transport and utilities.”177 
Simultaneous to the build-up of empirical case studies and the diversification of the 
debate, there has also been a rising number of distinct analytical approaches observable in 
the academic “land grab” debate. The phenomenon has been investigated using (multiple) 
                                                 
174 Skinner and Cotula (2011). 
175 Skinner and Cotula (2011), 1. Also see Smaller and Mann (2009) and Bizikova et al. (2013), 1. 
176 Skinner and Cotula (2011). 
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theoretical frames and related concepts of political ecology,
178
 Marxism,
179
 world system 
theory,
180
 mainstream economics,
181
 human rights,
182
 peasant studies,
183
 gender studies,
184
 
political economy,
185
 discourse analysis,
186
 and/or (global) governance.
187
 This varied body 
of analytical approaches has contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of what 
seems to be happening by studying the object from multiple angles.  
However, related assessments largely focus on the host country and IFDI-side of 
“land grabbing.” Moreover, the existing explanations of what is happening, and why, 
remain divided between two analytical (deductive and inductive) trends. On the one hand, 
fairly structuralist approaches address transnational zero-sum dynamics, but neglect to 
account for more complex or less clear dynamics on a case-by-case basis. Take, for 
example, the Marxist or political ecology delineations, which often limit their focus to 
instances of, and pre-assumed ideas about “accumulation through dispossession”188 and/or 
the transnational, socio-economic, and environmental consequences of land-intensive 
policies, such as the renewable energy policies.
189
 On the other hand, more case-based 
analyses in the area of human geography
190
 that do examine the details of local politics and 
the concrete business models of particular investors lack a structural outlook that would 
                                                 
178 White et al. (2012).  
179 Oya (2013a). 
180 Baumann (2013). 
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182 Bernstorff (2013); and Golay and Biglino (2013). 
183 Jansen (2014). 
184 Zetterlund (2013). 
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188 Harvey (2003), 137-182; also see the critical commentary on this framing by D. Hall (2013).  
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place the findings in the broader context of (trans)national developments and home country 
dynamics that they are part of – such as economic restructuring and/or geopolitical 
strategizing.
191
 
Overall, the debate about “land grabbing” still suffers from being “both wide and 
narrow,” not only with regard to analytical explanations, as highlighted above, but also in 
terms of focus on investments in farmland (also see Section 5).
 192
 FAO case studies, for 
instance, account merely for “broad processes of rural land and capital concentration in the 
context of neoliberal globalization,” 193  and confine the assessment to themes of food 
security, foreign government involvement, and the significance of scale. Environmental 
groups
194
 primarily focus on the problem of resource security, often without consideration 
for social implications. And land governance research
195
 tends to leave out the ecological 
implications of “land grabs.”  
Moreover, studies generally do not account sufficiently for the differences and 
commonalities between and within regions, while the emphasis on conflictive land deals in 
Africa has yielded a particular understanding of the “land grabbing” dynamics that does 
not seem to be applicable to other parts of the world.
196
 Take, for instance, “land grabbing” 
in Latin America, where empirical evidence shows that land acquisitions are largely made 
by regional or domestic actors rather than extra-regional actors as in Africa, and that they 
                                                 
191 The special issue “Governing the Global Land Grab: The Role of the State in the Rush for Land” in 
Development and Change 44:2 (Wolford et al. (2013a)) tries to address this problem. 
192 Borras et al. (2012), 847. Amanor (2012), 731-49. 
193 Borras et al. ( 2012), 847. 
194 See, for instance, Bizikova et al. (2013). 
195 ILC (2012). 
196 See the interview with Saturnino Jr. Borras on The Water Channel 
(http://www.thewaterchannel.tv/en/videos/categories/viewvideo/1387/food-security/5-ways-to-
re-think-land-grabs). 
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mostly occurred prior to the year 2000. Due to the narrow focus on foreign investors, these 
trends often remain invisible in many of the aggregate accounts on the phenomenon which 
center on foreign investments since 2008.
197
  
Finally, a large share of the research output concentrates on host countries and the 
implications of capital imports, whereas the depiction of investor countries relies strongly 
on preconceived notions of their motivations that I also outlined in Chapter 1.
198
 The few 
(yet rising number of) studies that do provide a detailed assessment all call to question 
related stereotypes.
199
 
5. What About Policy? Influential Frames and Paradigms in the Debate 
The review stressed that the range of analytical approaches to study the “land 
grabbing” phenomenon has diversified with time, particularly regarding the dynamics in 
the host countries. At the same time, the above sections and Chapter 1 highlighted the 
persistence of an orthodox narrative that framed the debate in the beginning and shaped 
this thesis’ research interest.200 Home country governments and corporations, so goes the 
narrative, acquire (farm)land overseas to produce food and other primary resources for 
export back home; or speculate on rising land values and commodity prices.  
Against this background, I argue that a review of the policy debate is important. It 
is a major component of the overall body of research on “land grabbing,” and it greatly 
                                                 
197 Borras et al. (2012), 847. 
198 These preconceived notions about investor country’s rationales largely reflect on the predominance 
of themes of the first “land grab” publication by GRAIN (2008). 
199 See, for instance, D. Hall (2012) on Japan; and Alden (2007); Brautigam (2009); Ekman (2010); 
Rosen and Hanemann (2009); Smaller et al. (2012); Cotula (2012) on China in Chapter 1. 
200 Borras and Franco (2012), 38.  
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contributes to the predominance of the orthodox narrative – particularly, the application of 
a resource-security framing. Moreover, its competing frames and normative judgments 
about international land acquisitions strongly influence the scholarly research output. 
Essentially, the academic and policy debates overlap in view of framings and 
persons, making it often impossible to clearly differentiate between scholarly and policy-
related research outputs. For instance, the NGO publication by GRAIN set the tone and 
focus of the debate on “(farm)land grabbing,” and the original assessment and problem 
definition continues to inform a significant share of academic research or media output.
201
 
Moreover, the work of certain actors, such as Deininger from the WB, is published and 
widely cited in academic as well as policy channels. Deininger’s publications are 
referenced in the “land grab” literature as a source of empirical evidence, and/or discussed 
regarding their conceptual validity.
202
 In particular, the World Bank report
203
 on large-scale 
land acquisitions, - produced under the lead authorship of Deininger and Byerlee - has 
stirred a conceptual and highly normative debate in the “land grab” literature. In this 
context, Starr writes that Deininger and Byerlee “are among a handful of authors who have 
built typologies of land deals.”204  
Most importantly, however, the policy debate is characterized by a competition of 
different framings that also influence the academic research output, particularly regarding 
                                                 
201 See, for instance, Simantke (12 August 2013). 
202
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Also, see critical discussion of Deininger’s work in view of concepts and norms in Li (2011); Wolford et al. 
(2013a); McMichael (2014).  
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the problem definition of “land grabbing.” Therefore, the next sections will review these 
key framings of the policy debate and their respective actor constellations. At first glance, 
two factors stand out: Firstly, the focus of the policy debate remains largely limited to 
investments in agricultural production, in spite of the empirical evidence that emphasizes 
the importance of other land-consuming activities in the global “land grab,”205 such as 
tourism, infrastructure, manufacturing, and mining. Secondly, most documents have a 
reductionist explanation of why international land acquisitions are occurring at this 
moment in time, based on economic notions of supply, demand, and international crises/ 
resource scarcities that are also a core part of many academic explanations.
206
  
Overall, the review shows that the policy debate has at its core a process of 
contestation or defense of the prevailing operative paradigm of (inter)national economic 
governance; and is shaped by (the interests behind) the three predominant analytical 
approaches. The next paragraphs will discuss these approaches under the labels of peasant 
activism, mainstream economics, and Right to Food. 
Peasant Activism 
Central to the policy debate on “land grabs” is the corresponding framing GRAIN 
that is a function of a peasant activist worldview and shared by other civil society 
                                                 
205 See, for instance, Skinner and Cotula (2011). 
206 Accordingly, the increasing food commodity demand (e.g., population growth and rising middle 
class), declining food supply (e.g., climate change and biofuel production), and the financial crisis (e.g., 
search for new speculative assets and biofuel production reducing food production) have led to a rise 
in food prices. As a result, there has been a surge in “FDI in land, agriculture, forestry” motivated by the 
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production to increase global supply and/or secure resources for import back home. Time-wise, the 
international food and financial crisis in 2007/2008 has become the marker to explain the occurrence 
of “land grabbing” in time. See ILC (2012), 4. Also, see Weingärtner (2010), 13. 
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organizations, such as the international NGO La Via Campesina. Its recommendations are 
closely aligned with the policy advice of the final report of the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Science and Technology for Development, an intergovernmental panel under 
the co-sponsorship of the FAO, Global Environmental Fund (GEF), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the WB, and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) (2005–2007) which was entrusted to assess how 
agriculture, science, and technology could contribute to a rural development process that 
was socially, economically, and environmentally sustainable.
207
 This peasant activist 
framing challenges the predominant frame of mainstream economics (see below). 
According to the peasant activist worldview, the fundamental complex of problems 
identified with regard to international land acquisitions relates to the fact that “fertile 
agricultural land is becoming increasingly privatised and concentrated,” a tendency that 
“could spell the end of small-scale farming, and rural livelihoods, in numerous places 
around the world” – “[i]f left unchecked.”208 In particular, four problems stand out as 
worrisome: 1) the securing of food supplies overseas by state-capitalist countries that have 
lost faith in the market and are bypassing existing market structures to reduce food import 
costs, thereby aggravating the world food crisis; 2) the loss of access to, and control over 
land by local communities and governments, and the prioritizing of “large industrial 
estates” that are connected to world markets – all of which will undermine the future 
                                                 
207 IAASTD (2008). See more under the internal NGO website on the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development, IAASTD 
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ability of countries and communities to implement the concept of food sovereignty; 3) the 
lack of sustainable investment planning by host governments in two areas: a long-term 
vision of economic activity and agricultural development, both of which are necessary to 
ensure that agricultural investment contributes to rural development; 4) food insecurity in 
host countries that are themselves net food importers might be growing as a result of these 
investments, particularly as the policy leaning in these countries heads towards an 
industrial model of export-oriented agriculture with a track record of “creating poverty and 
environmental destruction, and exacerbating loss of biodiversity, pollution from farm 
chemicals and crop contamination from modified organisms.”209  
Food sovereignty is a central concept in this framing, and it takes on multiple 
functions as analytical tool, as well as vision, depending on who is promoting it.
210
 
Contrary to the concept of food security which disregards considerations about how and by 
whom such security should be achieved, the concept of food sovereignty deliberately “puts 
the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of 
food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations” – to use 
the words of the Declaration of the Forum for Food Sovereignty.
211
 It provides an 
antithetic frame to the mainstream economic paradigm and the related “corporate trade and 
                                                 
209 GRAIN (2008), 7-8. 
210 See, for instance, the papers presented at the Agrarian Studies Conference “Food Sovereignty: A 
Critical Dialogue” at Yale University, 14-15 September 2013 
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food regime,” 212  and it also represents part of a mobilizing rhetoric that passes the 
“revolutionary agency (…) from the proletariat to the peasantry.”213  The latter aspect 
differentiates it from Marxist framings,
214
 and it re-politicizes the questions of resource 
management in view of use, access, control, distribution, and location.215 
In practice, the actors that use this food sovereignty perspective, such as FIAN and 
GRAIN, have cooperated with the FAO in an initiative to develop guidelines for the 
governance of land tenure and natural resources which are supposed to ensure “adequate 
and secure access to land and natural resources by the rural and urban poor” and serve as 
“an instrument for social movements, marginalized groups and civil society at large 
democratizing land and natural resources tenure for the well-being of the whole 
society.”216 In May 2012, after three years of negotiations between multiple stakeholders 
(governments and civil society organizations) the FAO’s Committee on World Food 
Security recognized suitable principles and practices under the “Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests.”217  
Overall, the peasant activist framing has questioned the notion, widespread in 
mainstream economics, that the location of capital ownership is irrelevant to assessing its 
potential impact or related implications for the host country. It has also mobilized 
widespread political support. However, from a methodological and analytical point of view, 
the framing has several shortcomings. For instance, it reflects a certain degree of peasant 
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217 See PANAP (2013) (http://www.panap.net/en/fs/page/food-sovereignty/77); and FAO (2012b). 
101 
 
essentialism.
218
 This is necessary for ascribing “revolutionary agency”219 to the peasantry, 
but it also poses a methodological challenge. According to Bernstein and Byres, this 
challenge lies in the “argument (or assumption) that the core elements of peasant ‘society’ 
– household, kin, community, locale – produce (or express) a distinctive internal logic or 
dynamic, whether cultural, sociological, economic, or in some combination,”220 which is 
oppressed by external actors and factors.
 221
 This assumption does not match empirical 
evidence on “land grabbing,” which calls into question the unitary (essentialist) peasantry 
presumption, as highlighted before.
222
 So far, the food sovereignty concept does not 
sufficiently explain how it can be gradually realized and implemented in countries where 
corporations are already important actors in food production and trade activities; in 
countries where peasants are integrated in the corporate food and trade system through 
outgrower schemes and/or processes of de-peasantization are at work; or against the 
background of a global setting in which the prevalence of private governance schemes (i.e. 
transnational supermarket chains) has led to the systemic marginalization of local voice 
and/or representation, while agriculture has become part of the food business within the 
global governance structures.
223
 Finally, from a systemic point of view, the primary focus 
on the Global South fails to account for equal processes in the Global North, while perhaps 
overemphasizing the role of foreign investors in the “land grab” dynamics. 
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Mainstream Economics 
The second worldview, the one challenged by the peasant activist framing of “land 
grabbing,” is composed of the models and assumptions of mainstream economics. It refers 
to “land grabs” as “international land acquisitions” or “investment projects,” and it applies 
a supply/demand market lens to the phenomenon. Compared to the activist peasant framing, 
which supports an agro-ecological model, the mainstream economics framing promotes a 
productionist agricultural model with life science elements.
224
 It associates the transition 
from small- to large-scale farming with economic development, often constricts the 
analysis of poverty to an evaluation of income levels, and supports the coexistence of 
genetically modified and organic, peasant and industrial farming. In the policy debate, the 
mainstream economic frame is applied by key policy entrepreneurs and policy makers, 
such as the WB,
225
 bilateral development agencies,
226
 many host governments’ national 
development plans, and/or private actors. 
The most influential framing in (inter)national economic governance since the 
1980s, this mainstream economic worldview does not identify “rising global interest in 
farmland” by corporate investors or government companies as itself problematic.227 Instead, 
international land acquisitions are proof of the underpinning assumption that the “market” 
is driven by supply and demand and that it has a natural “tendency toward convergence, 
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toward equilibrium” 228 of the factors of production. International land acquisitions are 
seen as part of a market process in which land-scarce but capital-rich countries (or their 
corporations) invest in land-abundant but capital-poor countries, creating a “win-win” 
scenario and development opportunity. Importantly, this assessment is a core component of 
the orthodox narrative about investor motives that I summarized in Chapter 1.  
According to the theoretical appraisal of FDIs under the liberal paradigm, benefits 
for host countries come from multiple factors. FDI flows make domestic capital available 
for other uses of public benefit; transfer and diffuse technology; create new employment; 
build capacity (new job profiles); transfer skills (labor); and build necessary public 
infrastructure.
229 
Against the background of decreasing aid flows and tight public budgets, 
such capital imports allow the host countries to increase productivity and efficiency levels 
in the agricultural sector and to improve food (supply) security both domestically (due to 
corresponding increases in food supply and income levels) and globally.
230
 This narrative 
is supported by a technical discussion that identifies “yield gaps” (i.e., the difference 
between the potential and the actual amount of crops grown in a country) as problem that 
these investments help to close.
231
  
                                                 
228 This argument rests on Harvey’s Marxist reflection on conventional economics: “So conventional 
economics is always talking about the tendency toward convergence, toward equilibrium, and that 
equilibrium is possible provided the right mix of policies and as long as there isn’t anything external 
that disrupts the whole system. External problems would be so-called natural disasters, wars, 
geopolitical conflicts, and protectionism. Crisis would then arise because of these external 
interventions, which take us away from the path to equilibrium, which is always possible.” See Harvey, 
D., & Rivera, H.A. (September 2010). 
229 WB (2011), 2. 
230 WB (2011). 
231 E.g., WB (2011); also see Li (2012). 
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The problem then is empirical. Emerging evidence about “large-scale land 
acquisitions” highlights that in practice, many investment projects do not live up to their 
theoretical promise. In its 2011 report, the WB admits that in addition to low job creation, 
many projects turn out to be economically unviable, do not improve food security or 
productivity levels significantly, and have a negative impact on rural livelihoods.
232
 
Consequently, good governance mechanisms are suggested as the solution to the negative 
side effects of the commercial pressure on land. These take the form of a voluntary set of 
“Principles for Responsible Agro-Investment” that corporate investors should abide by; the 
establishment of “effective consultation,” that comprises representation, administration, 
and monitoring; the development and improvement of transparent land transfer 
mechanisms; the introduction of an open land market; and the negotiation of terms of 
investment that distribute the benefits more equitably in the recipient context.
233
 Moreover, 
Deininger, lead economist in the rural development group within the WB’s Development 
Research Department, argues that the focus should be on raising the productivity of land 
under cultivation, rather than focusing on land expansion.
234
 
Overall, this frame runs into several problems that have been outlined before (see 
Chapter 1) when trying to assess or solve what is happening in the context of “land 
grabbing.” The narrow focus on productivity and efficiency in the context of food security, 
and on transparency and good governance in view of land deals, prevents the identification 
of structural problems that might greatly impede the multiplier effect of agriculture. For 
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instance, the assessment leaves aside aspects of political economy, and it argues for the 
coexistence of peasant and corporate farming, thereby masking asymmetric power 
constellations in the global food and trade regime.
235
 Moreover, the fact that FDIs are not 
only capital flows but also part of “a process whereby residents of one country (the 
investor country) acquire ownership for the purpose of controlling the production, 
distribution and other activities of a firm” 236 and/or land in another country is left outside 
the mainstream economic assessment of productivity and governance. Yet, it is exactly this 
aspect of international investment that has been critiqued for its political, environmental 
and socio-economic implications.  
Consequently, assessments using this frame tend to negate the problematic history 
of FDI in the form of colonialisms and imperialisms, and they are in constant danger of 
continuing the disreputable “tradition of imperial historiography,”237  with its uncritical 
description of the first wave of globalization.
238
 At the same time, such analyses remain 
inconsistent. It is, for instance, unclear why such reports end on overly optimistic notes by 
suggesting that the benefits of international land acquisitions can be captured through good 
governance, even though major host countries show deteriorating governance performance 
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also fails to mention that this example is hardly suited to the promotion of “free market” policies, as 
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according to the WB’s governance assessment method.239 Most problematic, however, is 
the unwillingness or failure to engage in more profound reflection about the sources of the 
current crises in the fields of agriculture, environment, and governance – an aspect that 
was critiqued by De Schutter, 
240 
and one that constitutes a general problem in the available 
body of research on land-consuming FDI and commercial pressure on land. 
Right to Food 
The third framing in the policy debate about “land grabbing,” the Right to Food 
approach, has been promoted by both civil society and the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter. Focusing on the human rights challenge represented by 
increased commercial and speculative interest in land, the right to food framing considers 
issues of access, culture, and livelihood that are impacted by shifts in access to, and 
ownership of land.
241
 
De Schutter criticizes the widespread assumption that the problems associated with 
large-scale investments in farming can be solved simply through regulation based on 
(voluntary) principles and governance approaches, such as the above-mentioned Principles 
for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) put forward by the WB, or the FAO’s 
                                                 
239 See Worldwide Governance Indicators by WB 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp#).  
240 De Schutter (2011a), 274-275; De Schutter (2009), 15. 
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Voluntary Guidelines.
242
 These governance approaches were developed and promoted by 
the very same institutions whose policy advocacy has in the recent past contributed greatly 
to the “land grab;” for example, by advising host governments to “cut (…) down 
administrative requirements and consultations that might slow down or restrict 
investments” by foreign investors.243 The question of regulation also ignores the “question 
of opportunity costs”244 brought about by acquisition-related changes in land access and 
ownership. For instance, the right to food could be undermined since large-scale 
investments in farmland reduce the multiplier effect of agriculture in view of sustainable 
development. Meanwhile, regulation is likely to actually increase the commercial pressure 
on land and other resources.
245
 Moreover, the governance initiatives proposed by the FAO 
and WB are arguably marginal in comparison to pre-existing treaties, agreements, and 
related obligations which both restrict the performance requirements that can be imposed 
on foreign investors
246
 and severely limit the leeway of host governments to negotiate and 
steer investments in their interest or seek alternative investment models that do not result 
in changes of access or ownership, for instance, through contract farming.
247
  
Thus, the human rights framing identifies the absence of (a broader debate about) a 
strategy and long-term vision of rights-based resource management as a key problem that 
needs to be addressed – particularly in view of growing commercial pressures, of which 
                                                 
242 De Schutter (2011a); FAO (2012b). 
243 Compare also Shepard and Mittal (2009); quote from De Schutter (2011a), 254. 
244 De Schutter (2011a), 255. 
245 De Schutter (2011a), 249. 
246 The legal agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), for instance, regulates the 
treatment of foreign investors by host countries. The agreement is part of the WTO regime, and it bans 
local content requirements and trade balancing rules from the (industrial) policy framework of 
signatory countries. 
247 De Schutter (2011a), 250, 266. 
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“land grabbing” is one.248 Accordingly, the question is how to invest in a way that best 
takes into consideration the “context of ecological, food, and energy crises.”249 In practice, 
the approach proposes Minimum Human Rights principles.
250
 These define states’ 
obligations on the basis of already existing human rights instruments “to clarify the human 
rights implications of land-related investments, in order to make it clear that governments 
had obligations they could not simply ignore for the sake of attracting capital.”251 The key 
elements of the principles are related to the right of self-determination and the right to 
development, both of which call for governments to ensure that investments do not weaken 
food security by generating a dependency on foreign aid or volatile markets if the 
produced food is intended for export (to the home country or the international market); that 
they do not dispossess local populations from productive resources indispensable for their 
livelihood; and that they protect workers’ rights and tenure rights.252 
The human rights approach provides a comprehensive analytical basis for 
questioning the limitations of the predominant policy frame of mainstream economics in 
terms of solving the relevant problems, as it accounts for aspects of political economy and 
ecology. However, and this is due to the nature of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food’s mandate, it continues to focus primarily on investments in farmland, even though 
commercial pressure on land comes from multiple sources, namely industrialization and 
urbanization. Moreover, while putting the role and responsibility of host country 
                                                 
248 De Schutter (2011a), 275. 
249 De Schutter (2011a), 250. 
250 De Schutter (2011a), 253. 
251 De Schutter (2011a), 254. 
252 De Schutter (2009). 
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governments in the spotlight of analysis, the responsibilities of investor countries remain 
largely ignored. Given that land-consuming domestic policies in the form of renewable 
energy policy for biofuels, as well as unsustainable consumption and production patterns in 
home countries,
253
 are among the factors driving “land grabs,” it seems that a crucial link 
in the rights-based resource management approach is still missing. As long as this aspect 
remains unaddressed, home country governments will continue to make unsustainable 
policy choices that have global repercussions. Notably, the rights-based approach itself 
might pose more challenges than solutions. While ideally delivering a strong analytical and 
legal instrument to judge the performance of states in fulfilling their obligations towards 
their citizens – revealing an important aspect that should be part of the responsibility that 
comes with sovereignty – its reliance on legal structures might prove ineffective in 
countries with weak legal capacities, limited rule of law, and a high degree of corruption. 
As I stated earlier (Chapter 1), the latter holds true for many of the host countries, as the 
examples of Sierra Leone and Sudan highlight. 
6. Conclusion  
The literature review emphasizes the rising number and increasingly differentiated 
body of empirical studies and analytical approaches on the topic. In discussing this diverse 
                                                 
253 See Chapters 5 and 7 on the role of OFDI in the context of home country development. Also, analyses of 
society-nature interactions show that industrialization led to a dramatic increase in the material use per 
capita. In fact, the material use doubled in the global economy, even though the material intensity (i.e. 
materials used per unit of GDP) declined over time. Overall, the material use “increased 8-fold” on a global 
scale from the beginning of the 20th century to 2005. A closer assessment highlights distinct trajectories 
of consumption of different materials: while “biomass use hardly keeps up with population growth,” 
mineral use increases dramatically, indicating that “an increase in material productivity is a general 
feature of economic development.” See, for instance, Krausmann et al. (2009), 2696; and Krausmann et 
al. (2008).  
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body of research, I have tried to contribute to a more nuanced yet comprehensive 
understanding of what seems to be happening with regards to the empirical phenomenon of 
“land grabbing.” Concurrently, I have tried to point out the political nature of the debate 
which takes place in academia as well as policy circles; and in which competing frames 
seem to be as important as empirical facts in shaping the perspectives, narratives, and 
responses towards land-consuming OFDI. This is also evidenced by the politics of 
terminology that sometimes cloud our understanding of what is happening.  
Overall, the review underlines the need for a critical handling of data and potential 
explanations throughout the research process. It has also become evident that certain 
aspects of “land grabbing” and commercial pressure on land are often absent from the 
literature and policy debate. Take, for example, the historical transformation of institutions, 
ideas, and political economies at the national, local, and international level that has 
resulted in natural resources, such as land and forests, being relatively accessible through 
economic mechanisms in many countries’ economies today. 254  This constitutes a 
fundamental change from prior understandings and institutions that restricted foreign 
access to food and land, framing these resources as critical infrastructure to meet a 
society’s basic social needs.255  
In addition, the policy debate, which is largely reflective of the contemporary actor 
constellation in the area of agriculture, needs to start incorporating non-farming aspects of 
                                                 
254 See WB (2010), 25-26. 
255 This fact is, for instance, reflected in governance systems that restricted alien land ownership at the 
time of the last international food crises in the 1970s; and it calls for case-based research on how this 
transition towards liberalizing access to primary resources occurred in different countries. Compare 
Weisman (1980) and WB (2010). See Chapter 3 for more details. 
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commercial land pressure highlighted in the “land grab” literature, as these can impact 
farming in the form of land use and ownership changes, soil erosion, or migratory 
pressures (as a side effect of extractive industry). Interestingly, these aspects have so far 
primarily entered the policy dialogue through broader development debates outside the 
issue of “land grabbing,” such as the negotiations over the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 
or the development and application of certain methods of measurement (e.g., virtual land 
imports).
256
 Moreover, more academic and policy-relevant research about the implications 
of land-consuming FDI and related changes in rural development for regions, urban 
populations, and local, national, and global food systems would be important to grasp the 
multiple repercussions in terms of food security, conflict, exodus, health, and demographic 
development that this trend might be part of or cause.  
Regarding the investor countries, the following assumptions persist about how and 
why “land grabs” occur, particularly in the large majority of reports that study the host 
country context: foreign governments and corporations are involved in land-consuming 
OFDI through land-intensive policies (e.g., green grabbing); the launching of offshore 
agricultural production to secure resources for consumption back home; and/or the search 
for profitable business at a time of financial crisis.
257
  
I have shown earlier (see Chapter 1) that this explanation does not offer any 
evidence on the home country and/or project-specific (f)actors at play. Moreover, it easily 
undervalues the role of host country actors, institutions, and contingent events in the 
commercial pressure on land. Therefore, my research approach studies in great detail a 
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limited number of projects to generate rich empirical data about project timelines; the role 
of land in these investments; the markets they produce for; the range of actors involved in 
a single project throughout its lifecycle; the role of the ecological, financial, food and/or 
other crises; the political economies; and/or the cluster of ideas that are part of Chinese and 
British land-consuming OFDI. On the basis of the rich empirical accounts of the two 
countries’ overseas investments, I then identify the main country-specific as well as cross-
country dynamics and factors at play, compare the findings with the above assumptions, 
and deliberate on the role of OFDI from a home country perspective. 
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Chapter 3: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON OVERSEAS LAND ACQUISITIONS IN THE 
SOUTH 
1. Introduction 
In view of the question of what differentiates the allegedly new “global land rush” 
from those of earlier times, the “land grab” debate since 2008 remains inconclusive. The 
ILC report argues that the international timelines can only explain the surge of acquisitions, 
while “[t]he dispossession and marginalization of the rural poor are nothing new.” 258 
Accordingly, the “land rush represents an acceleration of ongoing processes, and one that 
appears set to continue.”259 A UN Briefing states that the novelty of the phenomenon is to 
be found in the details, namely the trend towards offshore production by major investor 
countries “to meet home state food and energy needs.” 260  This largely follows the 
argument presented by GRAIN.
261
 Meanwhile, a study by the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center argues that details such as their scale and their focus on “staples 
instead of cash crops” distinguish contemporary land investments from previous ones – 
together with the fact that they occur on a contractual basis “instead of through the barrel 
of a gun.” 262  Excepting these very broad references to historical incidents of foreign 
investments at a time of colonialism and imperialism, there are few detailed comparisons 
of institutional or other empirical characteristics. Alden Wily, for instance, studies the legal 
practices of “land theft” during the Irish and English enclosures of the seventeenth to 
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nineteenth centuries, the processes of dispossession in North America, and the Scramble 
for Africa in the late 19
th
 century. She concludes that the historical use of legal instruments 
by the state to dispossess traditional land owners strongly resembles current practices.
263
  
Against that background, this chapter reviews the main empirical characteristics of, 
and key theoretical explanations for colonial and imperial relations in the late 19
th
 century 
– a period of European imperialism (1870-1914) that is often referred to as the “high-water 
mark of nineteenth-century globalization.”264  As such it shares many features that are 
characteristic of the contemporary world, namely large and growing “transfers of 
commodities, people, capital, and ideas between and within continents.”265 The period was 
also shaped by imperial expansion through colonization and continues to strongly inform 
the common notions of colonialism and imperialism prevalent today. Moreover, core ideas 
and practices of contemporary development approaches can often be traced back to that 
era.
266
 The focus of the review is largely on the perspective of the imperial powers. 
In the context of this thesis, the chapter fulfills two functions. Firstly, the review 
critically interrogates simplified references to imperialism/colonialism in the contemporary 
“land grab” debate. While some researchers argue that ongoing land-consuming FDI is the 
“new age” version of colonialism characterized by deregulated markets and state 
involvement, other analyses conclude that colonial “land grabbing” has been replaced by a 
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264 Daudin et al. (2010), 6.  
265 Daudin et al. (2010), 6. 
266 Kegley and Raymond (2011), 110-112, and Craggs (2014), 5-9. 
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form of corporate “land grabbing.”267 In many cases, the respective allusion to colonialism 
or imperialism seems largely a function of political sentiment rather than the outcome of a 
careful conceptual and empirical comparison of land-consuming investments over time. 
Take, for example, the article on Chinese investments in Africa by Jauch in which the 
author compares these to colonial undertakings on the basis of their poor labor records and 
strong resource orientation.
268
 Clearly, such a reduced understanding of what constitutes 
imperial or colonial phenomena is problematic, and any comparison of the past and present 
that rests on such a limited set of criteria – i.e. one that could be applied to many 
contemporary contexts within and across countries worldwide – will prove rather 
meaningless. Thus, this review shall also present a more useful theoretical and empirical 
basis for later discussion of the extent to which the imperial or colonial framing adequately 
captures what is happening today (see Chapter 8).  
Secondly, the historical empirical body of research and the theoretical explanations 
on the matter were important sources of inspiration for this thesis’ study of investments 
from a home country perspective, as they provided a range of potentially significant factors 
for consideration during the assessment process, while also highlighting the importance of 
contingency in explaining historical events in and over time.  
The key findings of this chapter are that the late 19
th
-century trade and investment 
relations, which followed earlier imperial expansion in the Americas and India, have to be 
considered in their complexity. They differ greatly from contemporary explanations of 
                                                 
267 See, for instance, Jauch (2011); Broughton (6 November 2012); Liberti 2012; Aziz (15 April 2011); 
and Sadeque (2012). 
268 Jauch (2011). 
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“land grabbing,” which seem to assume that land acquisitions made since 2000 resemble 
colonial undertakings due to their primary rational interest in land as a natural resource. In 
practice, historical evidence highlights that factors and motivations extended well beyond a 
narrow focus on natural resources. From an investor country perspective, colonial and 
imperial relations between the North and South, and related “divisions of labor,” were 
driven by domestic development processes, such as the process of industrialization in the 
home countries and the economic crisis of the 1870s, which led to the search for new 
(exclusive) markets. Moreover, the dynamic was a reflection of the political economy of 
aristocracy in which losses in land value, an outcome of industrialization, led landed elites 
to secure their wealth status by investing overseas. Other enabling or influential factors at 
the time were breakthroughs in technological and medical capacity, especially innovations 
in the transport sector and malaria medicine; and external events, such as the European 
state formation, and the great power competition dynamics in Europe.  
This means that while the search for gold and the extraction of resources for 
domestic consumption back home were important characteristics of colonial and imperial 
expansion, the latter was also about the (violent) opening of consumer markets, the 
acquisition of strategic assets, the facilitation of planned settlements, and the search for 
profitable business opportunities and financial services. More broadly, the rationalization 
of these enterprises in the home country context claimed that they would improve the 
state’s international positional status relative to others; or, as in the case of Belgium, the 
enterprises simply reflected an individually felt need by the ruler for self-aggrandizement 
117 
 
in comparison to other nations.
269
 This diversity of interests and factors is also evident on 
the policy level. Home countries’ imperial economic policies were biased towards, yet not 
exclusively focused on, the production of raw materials overseas. Government actors but 
also business associations had very different understandings of imperial politics, resulting 
in the lack of any clear-cut strategy or plan for colonial development.
270
 
In addition to this complex character of imperial and colonial undertakings, 
historical research questions the widespread assumption, present in many theoretical 
explanations (and visible in contemporary government and corporate rhetoric), about the 
utility of international land acquisitions for the home country and/or investor. Contrary to 
the accompanying rhetoric of efficiency, profit, necessity, or significance used by actors in 
the past and present to justify, motivate, or explain territorial and/or economic expansion 
and related capital exports, empirical evidence illustrates that in practice a high percentage 
of overseas investment projects did not generate profits or failed, and that projects did not 
automatically promise higher returns than investments back home. Instead, they were often 
the outcome of a metropolitan bias or non-economic interest constellations. This makes it 
very difficult to assess whether the benefits of these endeavors outweighed the costs for the 
home country.
271
 At a minimum, the expansion overseas provided temporary career and 
income options for those involved in it, and in doing so may have contributed to political 
regime stability in the home countries. Most importantly, the historical and theoretical 
research underlines the importance of studying OFDI in the context of a home country’s 
                                                 
269 See, for instance, Olukoju (2002); Green (1999); and Davis (1999). 
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political economy, ideology, and development in order to achieve a better understanding of 
what is happening. This insight was very influential for this thesis’ research outlook and 
investigation of contemporary land acquisitions from an investor country perspective. 
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows: starting with the key 
theoretical explanations (Section 2) and main international parameters (Section 3) of 
international land acquisitions between 1870 and 1914 in the South, the review will then 
look more closely at the “Scramble for Africa” due to the relevance of contemporary 
investment flows to Africa, but also because the Scramble has become synonymous with 
the imperial expansion of that era (Section 4). I will also highlight key aspects of 
institutional path dependency and change post-WWII whose consideration is important for 
a meaningful understanding of the ‘novel’ character of what is happening today (Section 5). 
The chapter concludes with a brief summary of core findings (Section 6). 
2. Imperialism and Colonialism – Key Theoretical Explanations  
My account of international land acquisitions from a home country perspective has 
been influenced by historical materialist, liberal, world systems, and political theories 
insofar as they (1) outline various factors and potential causal mechanisms to be taken into 
account during the process of assessing “land grabs;” (2) underline the importance of 
systemic dynamics that the individual cases under study might be reflective of or 
embedded in; and (3) provide an overview of prevailing narratives about imperialism that 
are present in the public perception and academic debate about “land grabbing” (e.g., 
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media).
272
 Ince, for example, has emphasized that “[o]ne line of inquiry approaches land 
grabs as instances of “primitive accumulation of capital” whereby lands in the Global 
South are “enclosed” and brought within the ambit of global capitalism.”273 However, it is 
not my ambition to comparatively assess which of the theories most adequately describes 
contemporary “land grabbing” phenomena, especially given that the theoretical literature 
on imperialism remains inconclusive. To the contrary, my comparative and exploratory 
research approach implies that the use of deductive theories should be limited to informing 
the research project during the design stage in order raise awareness of factors, dominant 
debates, and prevailing understandings. 
Historically, imperialism appeared in many regions, if we consider the Chinese, 
Roman, and British empires, and it comprised sets of very different features – from the 
commercial dominion of some countries over others to violent territorial expansion. As a 
result, multiple definitions and understandings of imperialism exist, reflecting these 
distinct forms of dominion. At a maximum, imperialism is conceptualized as the “policy or 
practice of extending a state's rule over other territories,” one form of which has been 
colonialism, defined as “the policy or practice of a power in extending control over weaker 
peoples or areas.” 274  At a minimum, imperialism takes place in indirect forms of 
“extension (…) of authority, influence, power, etc.” 275  Most imperialist undertakings 
combine(d) multiple forms of dominion, territorial as well as non-territorial, whereas 
                                                 
272 Makki and Geisler (2011).  
273 Ince (2013), 104. Also see D. Hall (2013) for a historical materialist interpretation of the “land grab” 
phenomenon. 
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edition, first published in 1995). 
120 
 
“[o]ver time, the social and political mobilization of opponents of territorial rule in the 
colonies simply outstripped advances in the technologies of coercion.”276 Non-territorial 
sources of power related, for instance, to the “dynastic and religious affiliations” of the 
Habsburg and the Ottoman empires prior to WWI; ideologies of supremacy in the case of 
European empires prior to and during WWII; and, later, to liberal ideologies (American 
Imperium) or anti-fascist “ideological capital,” in the case of the Soviet Union.277 Over 
time, the continuous political and economic power discrepancy between industrialized and 
developing countries became referred to as a type of imperialistic relationship, with the 
former dominating the latter (see below).
278
  
For the purpose of reviewing experiences of international land acquisitions in the 
South during the late 19
th
 century – the focus of this chapter – it is important to note that 
imperialism and colonialism describe related yet different phenomena. While imperial 
expansion might involve colonialism as a territorial source of power, it goes beyond this 
particular form of dominion and includes a specific outlook on world politics/policy. As a 
result, colonies were not only purposes in themselves for the imperial powers, but they 
were also used as pledges in global power games, particularly during the late 19
th
 century 
when the great powers used colonies as potential weights with which to rebalance intra-
European power struggles. During that time, colonies were exchanged amongst the great 
                                                 
276 Katzenstein (2005), 4. 
277 Katzenstein (2005), 4-5. Originally understood as a state strategy, the rise of the American 
Imperium post-WWII, with its emphasis on free markets and global economic integration, led to the 
perception that certain phenomena constituted forms of dominion of corporations over states, framed 
as corporate imperialism. 
278 Prahalad and Lieberthal (2003).  
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economic powers, and latecomers to the circle of great powers needed to achieve 
recognition of their new status and/or to negotiate the right to colonize.
279
  
Several theories have tried to explain why the “imperial landrush” 280  that 
characterized the “second wave of European imperialism” 281  in general, and the 
colonization of Africa in particular, occurred from a home country perspective and in the 
context of home country development. These shall be briefly introduced in the remainder 
of this section to thereafter allow for the detection of similar narratives in contemporary 
analyses of “land grabbing,” and to raise awareness of potential causal mechanisms in the 
empirical assessment and analytical explanation of Chinese and British investments in 
African countries. 
One of the most prominent works on the economic, social, ideological, and political 
dimensions of late 19
th
-century imperialism and colonialism is the study by Hobson,
282
 
which heavily influenced the subsequent historical materialist treatises on imperialism.
283
 
In particular, Hobson’s economic argument that “excessive powers of production, [and] 
excessive capital in search of investment” were drivers of British imperialist expansions 
became (and remained) very influential.
284
 Yet, Hobson’s study differs greatly from the 
large body of functional explanations that argues for the inevitability of imperial expansion 
along these lines. Instead, he suggested that imperial expansion could be prevented by 
addressing the concentration of wealth in the home country, namely Britain. Accordingly, 
                                                 
279 Rough translation of an argument made by Osterhammel (2009), 27. 
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281 Kegley and Raymond (2011), 110-112. 
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284 Siegelman (1965), xiii. 
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high inequality combined with increasing productivity composed the “economic taproot of 
imperialism” in the form of lagging domestic demand, over-saving, and overproduction.285 
This, however, could be remedied through equality-promoting public policy which would 
balance domestic demand with domestic production.
286
 Interestingly, Hobson’s related 
argument about the importance of qualitative rather than quantitative growth efforts – 
which could be placed under the heading of “inclusive growth”287 – is very topical again 
today (as of 2013) in view of the rising inequality within and across developing and 
industrialized countries (measured by income and accumulated wealth).
288
 Back in his time, 
Hobson’s study clearly offered a counterpoint to influential contemporary voices that 
justified imperial expansion by referring to it as a national necessity and whose basic 
rhetorical elements are still common today (see Chapters 5 and 7): 
However costly, however perilous, this process of imperial expansion may be, it is necessary 
to the continued existence of our nation; if we abandon it we must be content to leave the 
development of the world to other nations, who will everywhere cut into our trade, and even 
impair our means of securing the food and raw materials we require to support our 
population. Imperialism is thus seen to be, not a choice, but a necessity.
289
 
While Hobson’s study has been criticized by historians for exaggerating the 
importance of industry and the financial sector in the British empire, his empirical 
observations about imperialism and colonialism seem noteworthy. Indeed, they provide 
useful parameters for studying overseas investments from a home country perspective, 
such as the importance of examining the particular domestic political economy in home 
                                                 
285 Hobson (1965), 71-93. 
286 Hobson (1965), 85-92. 
287 See, for instance, the respective OECD initiative on Inclusive Growth (OECD (2015a)). According to 
the WB (2009), the “difference between pro-poor and inclusive growth is that the pro-poor approach 
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countries to understand their foreign economic policy; the significance of ideology in this 
process; the questionable utility and benefit of these overseas activities for the home 
country; the importance of public-private partnerships in facilitating overseas economic 
expansion, with public money used for private gain;
290
 and, finally, the fact that the process 
of economic expansion also has repercussions back home. Moreover, he pointed at the 
multiplicity of motivations and actors at play, in the form of “patriotism, adventure, 
military enterprise, political ambition, and philanthropy,” all of which constituted the 
“fuel” for imperial expansion.291  
Other historical materialist assessments of imperial and colonial relations largely 
followed Hobson’s outlook on the phenomenon, locating the agency in the home country’s 
capitalist development context, though with a deterministic twist. Consequently, 
imperialist expansion was framed as an inherent component of capitalism, and assumed to 
be profitable for the home country, which, according to historical evidence, was (often) not 
the case.
292
 Informed by Marxist thought about the crisis of capitalist systems in the form 
of over-accumulation,
293
 “[t]he consequence of the development of industrial capitalistic 
societies is a pressure for expansion which may lead to military or political acquisition 
(colonies) or to maintaining economic dependence (developing countries).”294 While the 
various imperialism theories differ in their explanation of the particular reason for “the 
                                                 
290 Hobson (1965), 96-97. 
291 Hobson (1965), 59. 
292 See Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter; and Snyder (1991). 
293 Over-accumulation means that excessive investment occurs and goods cannot be sold profitably. 
This results in capital increasing in some sectors or speculative endeavors, instead of being re-invested 
in productive enterprise. Moreover, this may lead to unused plants and equipment, large build-up of 
unsold commodities, rising unemployment, or the rise of financial markets as alternative outlet. 
294 Kuhnen (1986), 20. 
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pressure of expansion,” they do share the understanding that imperialism is the “result of 
the inability to cope internally [i.e. within the spatial limits of the nation-state, A.G.] with 
the consequences of permanent technological innovation and their effects on society.”295 
Moreover, distinct from the liberal frames with their arguments of efficiency gains, 
comparative advantage, or the international division of labor, imperialism theories focus on 
zero-sum dynamics – nationally and internationally – between capital and labor, states, and 
ecologies.
296
  
Another strain of imperialism theory emerged after WWII. In view of the persistent 
gap in living standards between industrial and developing countries after decolonization, 
and following the failure of modernization theory’s297 development policies to solve this 
problem, structural difference and related forms of disadvantageous “technological-
industrial dependence” were seen as causing the persistence of exploitative relationships 
                                                 
295 Kuhnen (1986), 20. 
296 Basically, classical imperialism theory (e.g., Luxemburg (1913) and Lenin (1975)) argues that 
imperialism is not benefitting the development of the colonies. Instead, the “establishment of new 
markets in underdeveloped areas destroys traditional markets and production relations of these areas. 
And while the expansion creates employment back home, it signifies an export of unemployment to 
these underdeveloped areas. At the same time, capital exports to these countries are reflective of 
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investments are remitted to home countries, this then highlights that these forms of economic 
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summary by Kuhnen (1986), 20.  
297 At the core, modernization theories assume that “industrialized countries are the model for 
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recommendations of multilateral and bilateral development organizations today. See Kuhnen (1986), 
12-13; and Lepenies (2008). Also, see the development narrative of the WB (2007), which equates 
rural development and poverty alleviation with increases in production, efficiency and per capita 
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between industrial and developing countries.
298
 Accordingly, this form of structural 
dominion occurred through “[i]ndustrial countries invest[ing] in the production and export 
of raw material in developing countries, influenc[ing] with their potential of power the 
terms of trade in their favour, and thus perpetuat[ing] the international division of labour” 
with detrimental effects for developing economies and societies.
299
  
At their core, these new imperialism theories, similar to dependency theories,
300
 
presume that post-WWII underdevelopment is a function of the historical legacy of violent 
and “asymmetric integration” of developing countries into an international division of 
labor defined by industrial countries. The economic structure of developing countries – 
namely the dominance of the primary sector and the export orientation – together with co-
opted elites and changes in culture, has contributed to sustaining the international 
asymmetry characteristic of colonial relations, as well as the pattern of overseas 
investments by industrial countries. Similarly, Wallerstein’s world systems theory 
differentiates between a wealth and power-related core and periphery of regions, and 
argues that “the dependencia-style linkage between development at the core and 
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299 See Kuhnen (1986), 21.  
300 In more detail, dependency theories that explain the genesis of underdevelopment in developing 
countries argue that the asymmetric trade relations of dominion result in “deteriorating exchange 
relations between industrialized and developing countries (and, as well, between the industrialized 
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international trade due to the rise in productivity together with elastic demand for value added 
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well as terms of trade. At the same time, the falling prices in world markets result in increasing exports 
to compensate for the worsening terms of trade. See summary of major authors of dependencia theory 
by Kuhnen (1986), 19-20. 
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underdevelopment in the periphery (uneven development) remains integral to the system 
and persists through alternating periods of growth and contraction.”301  
Deviating from these largely economic accounts of imperialism is, for instance, the 
political theory of imperialism developed by classical realists. Morgenthau perceives 
imperialism as a foreign policy of the state. Accordingly, imperialist undertakings aim at 
increasing a state’s power status within the status quo and in comparison to other states, 
thereby enhancing the relative security of the more powerful state in the international 
realm.
302
 
3. The International Parameters of 19
th
-Century European Imperialism  
This section complements the previous theoretical review by providing a brief 
overview of the most important international parameters of 19
th
-century European 
imperialism. In particular, I will look at the configuration of capital and trade flows during 
that era in order to assess the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of that era’s imperial 
and colonial relations. That is, what significance did capital exports and trade flows to the 
colonies have from the perspective of the home country? And what did the trade and 
investment policies of that time look like? The historical evidence on these questions 
allows us to derive a meaningful comparison with contemporary capital flows and foreign 
economic policies that – as I argue in this thesis – “land grabs” reflect. It also highlights 
their role in the context of home country development.  
                                                 
301 Wolfe (1997), 404. 
302 Morgenthau (2005).  
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Empirically, the time between 1870 and 1913 has been branded by historians as the 
“first wave of globalization,” 303 due to the (largely rhetorical) credo of free trade and the 
laissez faire approach to capital mobility. Geopolitically, this time is referred to as “Pax-
Britannica with London constituting the financial center of the world and the British pound 
the dominant currency in the context of the international gold standard.”304 At the same 
time, it was also a period that witnessed massive migration flows, reflecting the pressures 
of industrial development in the home countries and the hopes attached to moving to new 
lands.
305
 Between 1870 and 1914, approximately “60 million people emigrated from (…) 
Europe to (…) countries of the New World including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States.”306 A smaller share of migrants also targeted East 
Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, the Caribbean, and the West Coast of North 
America.
307
 
The historical evidence on overseas investment during the 1870-1914 period 
stresses three important characteristics, namely the asymmetric significance of trade and 
investment for the countries involved; the complexity of the sectoral composition of 
investments that went beyond natural resources; and the interrelation of trade and 
                                                 
303 Solimano and Watts (2005), 14. 
304 Solimano and Watts (2005), 14. It is against this background that Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996) 
argue that the myths about 19th-century globalization are primarily built on experiences of the British 
empire, but even in this case they fail to capture the complex character of this era.  
305 Solimano and Watts (2005), 14. 
306 The US was the main destination. Until 1920 about 26 million migrants arrived from “core Europe” 
(e.g., England, Germany, and France) and “peripheral Europe” (e.g. the relatively poorer Scandinavian 
countries; Spain, Italy and Portugal in the south; Poland, Russia, Romania to the east; and the former 
nations of the Austro-Hungarian empire). Also countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Uruguay, 
Cuba, Mexico, and Chile absorbed a significant share of European migration. Solimano and Watts 
(2005), 14. 
307 Solimano and Watts (2005), 16. 
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investment activities with home country events and public policies rather than “free 
markets.”  
Firstly, the different significance of imperial/colonial relations for the home country 
and colony is reflected in the asymmetric regional distribution of investment and trade 
flows. Empirical data on the regional composition of European capital and trade flows 
demonstrates that trading and investing primarily happened between the wealthiest 
countries, including the New World.
308
 At the same time, and quite surprisingly, the so-
called Scramble for Africa (1876-1914), which is often alluded to in the contemporary 
“land grab” debate, is not reflected in European investment trends in the form of any 
significant shifts.
309
 Available data on the main international lenders and borrowers shows 
that in 1913, the major capital exporters were Britain (with 41% of total overseas 
investments), followed by France (20%) and Germany (13%). Moreover, Europe, North 
America, and Latin America were the main recipients of the total overseas investment 
flows, receiving 27%, 24%, and 19%, respectively (Table 3-1).  
 
 
 
                                                 
308 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 12-13. According to Cottrell (1975, 27), in the case of Britain, 
“temperate regions of recent settlement” such as Canada and the US received the largest share of the 
total capital exports, amounting to 68% of the total share between 1865 and 1914. 
309 Cottrell (1975), 27; Cain and Hopkins (1987), 14.  
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Table 3-1 – Main International Lenders and Borrowers, 1913 (Percentage shares, Bairoch and Kozul-
Wright 1996)
310
 
Lenders  Borrowers 
 Total 
overseas 
investment 
FDI Region Total 
overseas 
investment 
FDI 
Britain 41 45.5 Europe 27 17.71 
France 20 12.2 Latin 
America 
19 32.7 
Germany 13 10.5 North 
America 
24 16 
United 
States 
8 18.5 Asia 14 20.9 
Others 18 13.3 Africa-
Oceania 
16 12.6 
 
The picture of asymmetric significance that emerges for trade relations is closely 
related to the one seen above for overseas investment flows. Even in the case of Great 
Britain, the country with the most globalized economy at the time, trade with the “poor and 
precarious markets” from the seized tracts of territories lagged behind trade volumes with 
other great economic powers.
311
 The largest share of trading occurred between Northern 
countries, both in manufacturing goods as well as primary commodities. As of 1913, 
approximately 60% of total world trade took place among industrial economies, and 40% 
of total world trade was intra-European (see Table 3-2).
312
  
                                                 
310 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 12. 
311 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 9. It is important to note that the UK’s trading pattern during the 
late 19th century, characterized by exports of manufactured goods to, and imports of primary 
commodities from the South, which has become a defining criteria of imperial/colonial relations, was 
“the exception rather than the rule” at that time (see Table 3-2). 
312 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 9. 
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Table 3-2 – Commodity and Geographical Composition of Exports, 1913 (Percentage shares, Bairoch 
and Kozul-Wright 1996)
313
 
Countries Share of 
world 
exports 
Trade 
with the 
North 
Exports of 
manufactures 
as share of 
total exports 
Exports to other 
industrial economies 
as share of total 
manufacturing 
exports 
UK 22.8 37.9 76.6 31.8 
France 12.1 68.2 57.9 63.8 
Germany 21.4 53.4 71.7 53.5 
Other 
Western 
European 
15.0 70.3 49.4 62 
United 
States 
22.1 74.5 34.1 63.2 
 
Secondly, the sectoral composition of colonial trade and investment relations points 
to the case-specific quality and overall complexity of colonial relations from a home 
country perspective. Empirical evidence from Britain and France shows that a large share 
of lending went to social overhead
314
 and related business rather than resources.
315
 Also, 
manufacturing enterprises were scarce, receiving “less than 4 per cent of total subscriptions 
to overseas issues” during the 1865-1914 timeframe.316  
Food processing (milling and meat-packaging), transport improvement, and public 
utilities were key sectors of interest. Regarding the latter, railway bonds featured 
prominently: in 1914, approximately 70% of British and French long-term foreign 
                                                 
313
 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 10. 
314 Social overhead refers to “capital goods of types which are available to anybody, hence social; and 
are not tightly linked to any particular part of production, hence overhead. Because of their broad 
availability they often have to be provided by the government. Examples of social overhead capital 
include roads, schools, hospitals, and public parks.” See Black et al. (2009). 
315 See, for instance, Svedberg (1980), 29. 
316 Cottrell (1975), 40. 
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investment went into this area.
317
 Apparently, most investors were “rentiers” rather than 
providers of risk capital, and non-resource sectors under straightforward management, 
such as railway construction, appeared less risky, due to guaranteed returns. The risk 
aversion of European investors is also reflected in the fact that FDI only accounted for one 
third of all international capital flows between 1870 and 1914.
318
 Except for the UK, the 
majority of overseas investment took the form of portfolio investments (see also Table 3-1 
on the share of FDI of the total international investment).
319
 This dissimilarity in 
composition compared to contemporary capital exports has been largely attributed to the 
fact that the 19
th
-century investment environment was riskier, which together with 
“[i]nformational problems made investments in debt safer than those in equity.”320  
Finally, it should be noted that in contrast to the widespread rhetoric of liberalism 
and free trade now associated with that era, financial mechanisms were not (only) 
“dominated by the market sentiment of private investors” during that period; neither were 
trade flows nor international relations.
321
 Instead, public actors and policies played a key 
role in setting incentives. As mentioned above, empirical data shows that “bond issues 
dominated other debt instruments (notably equities)” and prevailed over securities 
                                                 
317 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996). 13. 
318 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 11. 
319 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 11. Interestingly, it was the FDI component of total capital 
exports that showed a sectoral bias towards projects in the primary sector from 1870 to 1914. To the 
extent that FDI was a part of a strategy of expanding companies to develop intra-firm trade and related 
intra-firm facilitated division of labor, these projects also clearly impacted on international 
development and reinforced uneven developments in the world economy, creating a three-tier world 
whose divisions are still felt. Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 20-21, 10-11. 
320 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 3. 
321 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 12. 
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markets.
322
 This means that although private actors and banks from industrial countries 
invested overseas in long-term liabilities (such as railways), the borrowers were colonial 
and foreign governments in need of external capital to both address acute financial needs 
and finance infrastructure projects whose costs greatly exceeded the revenues.
323
 The 
associated obligation of the borrower to make fixed interest payments and/or to reimburse 
the investor made this formula appealing for foreign investors.
324
 While those guaranteed 
rates of return are not part of contemporary land-consuming investment projects, the 
accompanying rhetoric and provision of investor-friendly conditions (e.g., tax waiver) to 
attract foreign capital seem fairly similar to contemporary host governments’ strategies to 
attract foreign capital.
325
 
Also, trading activities were often regulated.
326
 In several independent Latin 
American countries, where “Western pressure had imposed (…) treaties (…) which 
entailed the elimination of customs and duties” at the beginning of the 19th century, 
governments began to introduce protectionist trade policies in 1870 to promote 
industrialization following independence.
327
 Simultaneously, policy preferences in 
industrial countries were characterized by great “divisions of opinion and interest over the 
empire’s economic function.”328 A case in point is the British Imperial Federation League 
(IFL), which emerged in 1884 to make recommendations on how to strengthen economic 
cooperation within the empire. This organization dissolved in 1893 due to an inability to 
                                                 
322 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 12-13. 
323 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 13; Cottrell (1975), 28. 
324 Cottrell (1975), 28. 
325 Cottrell (1975), 28. See Chapters 4 and 6. 
326 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 8-9. 
327 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 8-9. 
328 Green (1999), 47. 
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find consensus on imperial economic policy, with a particular point of contestation being 
the promotion of “free trade” or imperial preference as the key norm of economic 
organization.
329
   
Overall, however, it should be noted that, until 1913, free trade had a “doctrinal, 
quasi-religious status” 330  in the British empire, to the extent that “its rules of 
multilateralism and non-discrimination have shaped the post-World War Two international 
order” (see Section 5).331 It was widely supported by (British) civil society and “helped 
soften people’s earlier view of the state (…) as exploitative instrument of the ruling class” 
332
 – as popular notions of “Free Trade envisaged the social as relatively autonomous from 
state and market.”333 Simultaneously, the free trade doctrine reflected the growing reliance 
on foreign farmers and the rise in consumption.
334
 At the same time, it is important to note 
that references to free trade always also had a strong rhetorical character, allowing the 
colonizers and imperial powers to unilaterally enter overseas markets and territories 
without having to fear retaliation back home, given the power asymmetries in place.  
With time, the rise of a group of strongly growing countries impacted international 
economic governance and led to the emergence of an international monetary and economic 
framework tailored to these countries’ investing and trading interests. However, this did 
not necessarily imply a more competitive organization of international and domestic 
                                                 
329 Green (1999), 48. 
330 Trentmann (2008), 7. 
331 Trentmann (2008), 7. 
332 Trentmann(2008), 15. 
333 Trentmann (2008), 15. 
334 Trentmann (2008), 15. 
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economic, social and political relations.
 335
 Often, “imperial conflicts, were related to and 
interconnected with the class struggles that characterized the expansion of industrial 
capitalism” 336 at that time. They reflected “feudal forms of organization; (…) monopolism, 
protectionism, cartelization and corporatism; and (…) rural, pre-industrial, and autocratic 
structures of power and authority.”337 
Against this background, it is not surprising to see that economic expansion by the 
great economic powers was largely an outcome of cooperation between the governments, 
financial institutions, and entrepreneurs. The countries that went down the industrialization 
path relatively late in comparison to the United Kingdom, such as Germany, were 
particularly characterized by close cooperation between these seemingly different actor 
groups, with the result that “[f]requently, interested bankers obtained government approval 
and support for the projects of others” 338 – not to mention diplomatic and military support. 
Yet, private sector capital exports were not necessarily embraced by most home country 
governments. Countries such as Germany and France tried to “discourage such outflows or 
at least sought ways to tie them more closely to export orders.”339 They were concerned 
about structural unemployment and foreign debt.
340
  
                                                 
335 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 24. Key aspects of this framework, for instance, the protection of 
foreign property or the imposition of the “open door” principle, have become key pillars of the 
contemporary international economic constitution. 
336 Halperin (2004), 76. 
337 Halperin (2005), 4. 
338 See Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 24 
339 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 24. 
340 Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 24; and Raghavan (2000). 
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4. Finding an “African El Dorado”? – The Scramble for Africa, 1870-1914 
The African continent ranked comparatively low with regards to European trade 
and investment activities during the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. During the 1870-1913 
period, the continent received 9.1% of British capital exports, 7.3% of French, and 8.5% of 
German foreign investment.
341
 Nevertheless, the Scramble for Africa, i.e. the partition of 
and “run” onto the continent by European economic powers at the end of the 19th century 
has almost become synonymous with the popular notion of the “second wave” 342  of 
European imperialism. Since references to the Scramble are also common in the 
contemporary “land grab” debate that has emerged since 2000,343 a more detailed summary 
of how and why it occurred from the perspective of the European colonizers will now be 
provided. It will look at timelines, sectors, and the roles of land, actors, and institutions. 
The findings will help to yield meaningful comparison with the dynamics and factors of 
contemporary “land grabs” in Chapter 8. 
In the early 1870s, the African continent remained unexplored and “mysterious” 
from the perspective of Europeans, who considered the region to be “‘vacant’: legally res 
nullius, a no-man’s-land,” except for the trading hubs and a few strategic colonies (South 
Africa, Algeria) on the coastline.
344
 The African continent had never occupied an 
important spot on the European imaginary map prior to the Scramble, a “term (…) coined 
                                                 
341 Daudin et al. (2010), 12 (Table 1.4). 
342 See Bowden (2009), 25-26. 
343 E.g., Biney (2009). 
344 Pakenham (1992), xxiii. Also see Duignan and Gann (1969a), 2-3. 
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in 1884.” 345  Therefore, it was surprising then, and still is today, that within “half a 
generation, the Scramble gave Europe virtually the whole continent: including thirty new 
colonies and protectorates, 10 million square miles of new territory and 110 million dazed 
new subjects.”346  
What happened? The historical literature remains inconclusive over why the 
Scramble occurred from 1876 to 1913. However, there is broad agreement that monocausal 
explanations that point, for instance, to surplus capital are insufficient to capture the 
multiplicity of events and factors at work.
347
 Aside from mythical notions of an African El 
Dorado
348
 that were inspired by the diamonds and gold mines in South Africa, there was 
the “lure of the unknown,” which was stimulated by geographic sciences for which “Africa 
was still (…) one of those few great regions where cartographers still left white spaces in 
place of rivers lakes and mountains.”349 Moreover, the context of the economic crisis in 
Europe, which was experiencing its first Long Depression,
350
 as well as international 
power shifts, such as the rise of the US, and great power competition within Europe over 
markets and the positional status in the European system of states were important. These 
all have been influential factors in the imperial expansion onto, and the colonization of, the 
African continent.
351
 Technological and scientific innovations that lowered the transport 
                                                 
345 In this sub-chapter the term is used to “embrace the whole hectic phase of the partition, beginning 
with a prelude in 1876 and ending in 1912,” following the description of Pakenham (1992), xxvii. 
346 Pakenham (1992), xxiii. 
347 Pakenham (1992), xxiii-xxiv. 
348 See, for instance, Pearce (1984), 90. 
349 Duignan and Gann (1969a), 6-7. 
350 Hobsbawm (1989), 45. For a detailed explanation of this crisis, see Nelson (2008). 
351 See Pakenham (1992), xxiii-xxvi; Duignan and Gann (1969a); and Dumett (1999). 
137 
 
and health barriers to explore the interior of the continent sped up the Scramble.
352
 At the 
same time, the Scramble relied on institutions developed during the first half of the 19
th
 
century, namely the international banking system, the reform of corporate governance, or 
strategic posts along the coastline that served as points of entry into the continent. 
Historical research also points to the importance of country-specific factors and 
dynamics. In practice, different imperialisms of political and economic character were at 
play, and they depended on a country’s particular political economy, ideology, and 
development setting, in addition to the international context.
353
 For instance, British and 
French rationalizations of imperial expansion were influenced by their investor legacy. 
Accordingly, the key drivers of British interest in the African continent were “first to 
safeguard their [trade, A.G.] passage to India and secondly to profit from economic 
opportunities.” These interest priorities led Duignan and Gann to argue that the British 
participation in the Scramble occurred at the beginning out of “self-defense,” i.e. out of a 
fear of losing political control in the context of the French-British rivalry over positional 
status within Europe.
354
 And the French expansion was pushed forward by diverse actor 
groups (e.g., “soldiers, merchants, geographic societies”) “to promote the idea of empire” 
as a form of political power that would spread French culture and the allegedly “universal 
ideals of the Enlightenment.”355 The core empirical characteristics of the Scramble and 
how it occurred from a home country perspective are reviewed next.  
                                                 
352 Duignan and Gann (1969a), 2. 
353 E.g. Duignan and Gann (1969a); Pakenham (1992); Dumett (1999); and Hobsbawm (1989).  
354 Duignan and Gann (1969a), 8. 
355 See Jones (2014).  
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To start, the Scramble timelines underline the procedural character of colonization 
and late 19
th
-century imperial expansion. This process consisted of a gradual move from 
exploration and treaty-based forms of land acquisition and colonization, which were 
accompanied and often executed by imperial philanthropists (missionaries), to the use of 
force, the atrocities of which are well-documented.
356
 In fact, “paper imperialism,” such as 
the partition of Africa among European powers at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), 
proved insufficient in the process of acquisition: “When effective occupation became 
necessary to establish a good title, conflict became inevitable.”357  
An assessment of the colonization timelines also shows that the strategies for 
gaining or staying in control changed with time. While killings and violence were widely 
applied at the beginning of the occupation, some colonial administrations shifted their 
focus from direct to indirect forms of exploitation to prevent further revolts (see, for 
instance, the governance of farmland below). Throughout, law constituted an important 
instrument of acquisition and colonization, as it
 “provided a far more comprehensive 
framework than did the others for recalibrating land and life on the colonizers’ terms and 
without reference to indigenous antecedents.”358 The central role of law as primary tool to 
access the best land and govern colonial territory led Fahrmeir and Steller to refer to these 
practices as “lawfare” instead of warfare. 359  Interestingly, though, many aspects of 
“lawfare” had their origin in the commercial conflicts among European powers that they 
                                                 
356 Take, for instance, the German extermination order against Hereros in Southwest Africa. Pakenham 
(1992), xxv.  
357 Pakenham (1992), xxv. 
358 Harris (2004), 179; Alden Wily (2012). 
359 Fahrmeir und Steller (2013), 172.  
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were meant to regulate – a point to consider when assessing contemporary legal 
approaches and voluntary initiatives in the context of governing land-consuming FDI.
360
 
Importantly, the widespread narrative of primary-resources-driven colonialism, 
which the previous overview of key imperial parameters called into question for the 
majority of imperial projects, does apply to the African case. The empirical evidence on 
the sectoral composition of capital imports from 1870 to 1935 shows that the largest share 
of private foreign capital “went into mining and much colonial public investment was 
intended for developing mining.”361 In practice, this led to the establishment of enclave 
economies that were characterized by their export-orientation, as well as their strong 
reliance on foreign capital and the facilitating institutions in the form of colonial 
administration and law, infrastructures, and labor needed for the exploitation of 
resources.
362
 In the process of acquisition and colonization, colonial governments made use 
of mining policies and marketing mechanisms to put African enterprises at a disadvantage 
compared to their foreign competitors, ultimately resulting in their elimination.
363
 This was 
also true for cases such as the gold industry in Southern Rhodesia, “where the geological 
conditions favored small-scale producers and where African tradition and experience were 
considerable.” 364  Also, following decolonization, foreign investments in Africa have 
remained biased towards the natural resource sector (agriculture, mining), which still made 
up 50% to 80% of total FDI flows as of 2005. At the same time, the positional status of 
                                                 
360 The Act of Berlin (1885), the “legislative vehicle for the Scramble for Africa,” was as much about the 
partition of the continent amongst the European powers as it was about guaranteeing free trade in 
spite of the partition. See Gardner (2012), 43. 
361 Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Union (2011), 12. 
362 Stuchtey (2010). 
363 Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Union (2011), 13. 
364 Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Union (2011), 13. 
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African countries has remained evocative of the continent’s colonial heritage: South Africa, 
which was a major, late 19
th
-century target country of foreign investments “with the other 
economies in its orbit,”365 continues to be a major trading and investment hub on the 
continent.
366
 
A core component of these processes of colonization and capital transfers was that 
they consumed land in its multiple forms, as territory, resource, and cultural landscape; by 
multiple means, namely legal and violent, direct and/or indirect forms of dispossession; for 
multiple reasons. However, it is important to remember that land as a resource only 
became a core issue at a later stage of colonization. Historical evidence on the “Conference 
of Berlin” (1884-1885) indicates that in the beginning European economic powers met to 
negotiate the future of the African continent as a way to ease competition pressures and 
conflicts over commercial routes and (exclusive) markets. These issues had been building 
up amongst themselves. And then they gained further significance during the Great 
Depression, and in the context of the declining possibility of expansion on the European 
continent due to the formation of nation-states.
367
 Contributing factors to the focus on 
commercial and strategic interests during this partition process might have been that 
“many African colonies were short of (…) known mineral deposits,”368 and that large parts 
of the continent were “terra incognita” and not intended for settlement.369  
                                                 
365 Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Union (2011), 12. 
366 Ezeoha and Cattaneo (2011), 2.  
367 Pakenham (1992); Anghie (2007). 
368 Austin (2010), 9-10. 
369 Austin (2010), 9-10. 
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Over time, land played an important role as a sphere of influence and strategic 
territory for the home countries’ commercial interests, as a resource, as a productive space 
of society, as an area of settlement, or as an asset (in cases where investors speculated on 
rising land values)
370
 – a list that is similar to the functions of land in contemporary foreign 
investments (see Chapters 4 and 6). However, the initial neglect of, or ignorance about 
land resources on the African continent led to situations in which investors and colonial 
administrations had to realize that the acquired land (tropical soils) was not necessarily 
conducive to the colonial export economy they had envisioned. In addition, the colonized 
territories often faced a shortage of labor and lacked the infrastructure required for 
industrial export agriculture.
371
  
Similar to the varying role of land within and across colonies, the governance of 
land was characterized by plural, complex, and evolving modes and events rather than a 
single approach. In view of access, the “ability to dispossess rested primarily on physical 
power and the supporting infrastructure of the state.” 372 At a later stage of colonization, 
the threat of military intervention and/or legal punishment by the colonial administration or 
the chartered company was often sufficient to acquire land through dispossession.
373
 At the 
same time, the governance of land was shaped by commercial interests; concerns over 
lacking wage labor – in this case land dispossession together with taxation provided a 
                                                 
370 Hobson (1965), 63, 357. 
371 Austin (2010), 10; and Duignan and Gann (1969b), 102. 
372 Harris (2004), 179.  
373 Harris (2004), 179.  
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mechanism to force Africans to work in the mines and plantations of colonial governments 
and corporations;
374
 and the fiscal needs of the “colonial treasury.”  
Moreover, governance depended on how the respective colony was framed by the 
colonizer, namely whether it was deemed a “settler,” “plantation,” or “peasant” colony.375 
The framing was based on the utility of the soils and infrastructure for primary export 
production, and had significant consequences in view of the support that home country 
agents were receiving from the colonial government.
376
 In the case of (British) Ghana, a 
“peasant” colony, British farmers were, for instance, allowed to get involved in cocoa 
production. However, they did not succeed in the competition with African producers.
377
 A 
key factor for their failure was that these farmers did not receive the biased support from 
the colonial administration that British subjects were experiencing in “semi-settler” 
colonies such as Kenya and Southern Africa. Instead, the colonial government preferred to 
“rel[y] on the efforts of African small capitalists and peasants in growing and local 
marketing of export crops” for accommodating commercial projects and generating state 
revenues. This strategy proved very profitable, “yielding a 20-fold rise of foreign trade 
(measured in real value) between 1897 and 1960.”378  Another example is the case of 
Nigeria, also a “peasant” colony. Between 1906 and 1925, the colonial government turned 
down the advances of the soap manufacturer H.W. Lever (whose manufacturing companies 
today form part of the Unilever Corporation
379
) who asked permission to develop large oil 
                                                 
374 Austin (2010), 9. 
375 Austin (2010), 9, 13. 
376 Austin (2010), 9, 13. 
377 Austin (2010), 8. 
378 Austin (2010), 9. 
379 See the corporate website of Unilever (http://www.unilever.co.uk/aboutus/ourhistory/). 
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palm plantations.
380
 As a consequence, “African producers literally delivered the goods (…) 
through land-extensive methods well adapted to the factor endowment,” resulting in the 
“continued African occupation of virtually all agricultural land.” 381  However, these 
examples do not mean that these farmers were free to grow what they wanted in the way 
they wanted. Instead, “the colonial administration completely discouraged the cultivation 
of food crops while encouraging cash crops production.”382 As a result of this economic 
policy, existing economic systems that ensured the food self-sufficiency of families were 
destroyed, resulting in rural households’ starvation.383 
More broadly, in the agricultural sector, three business models prevailed that are 
still popular today: plantations, contract farming,
384
 and commercial farming.
385
 In most 
colonies, preferential treatment was given to foreign-owned plantations, or farms owned by 
European emigrants.
386
 Plantations reflected European visions of establishing an export 
economy in the colonies. However, in practice, this production and governance model 
often struggled for economic viability, and it never became the most common mode of 
production or land use on the African continent.
387
 Until today, this model and related 
governance schemes are known for their detrimental social impacts in the form of slavery 
and indentured labor, violent expropriation, undervalued compensation for land; as well as 
                                                 
380 Austin (2010), 9. 
381 These choices by colonial governments were largely a function of giving in to the resilience of 
“African production for the market” and/or resistance, and not outcomes of a greater strategy for 
colonial development. Austin (2010), 9, 13. 
382 Shokpeka and Nwaokocha (2009), 57. 
383 Shokpeka and Nwaokocha (2009), 57. 
384 This form has been promoted as a way to integrate small-scale farmers in the plantation economy 
by turning them into suppliers to estate structures. See Smalley (2013), 11. 
385 Smalley (2013). 
386 Smalley (2013), 3. 
387 Smalley (2013), 21. 
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their land-extensive and capital-intensive nature. In practice, plantations depended strongly 
on colonial administration to govern the economy and territory in a way that defeated the 
competition from African smallholder producers or facilitated the forced labor supply to 
meet their labor demands.
388
 Usually, plantations were set up close to ports by settlers or 
corporations (like Del Monte, Firestone); and they had the widest application in settler 
colonies such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.
389
 In the case of settlers’ 
commercial farms, the other business model characteristic of the late 19
th
/early 20
th
 century 
on the continent, the colonial administration allocated specific land areas to settlers.
390
 In 
contrast to plantations, with their focus on monoculture and their operation by 
multinational corporations, these farms tend(ed) to be less integrated in the world economy, 
to plant multiple crops, and to raise livestock.
391
  
The descriptions above highlight two things about the colonial administration of 
land: colonial land governance did not necessarily displace African producers in every case; 
however, colonial administration used other means of control, such as economic policies, 
to steer what was being produced and it also used biased agricultural marketing methods 
that treated European producers with partiality.
392
 These subtleties have to be kept in mind 
when assessing contemporary land-consuming FDI projects. At the same time, land 
governance depended strongly on the respective administration’s perception of local 
realities – from the framing of a colony as peasant, settler, or plantation colony, to the 
                                                 
388 Smalley (2013), 9. 
389 Smalley (2013), 21, 9. 
390 Smalley (2013), 11. 
391 Smalley (2013), 11. 
392 Austin (2010), 12. 
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establishing of land markets for African land-owners. Moreover, land governance changed 
with time. Kenya is a case in point. Colonial administration had prevented “the emergence 
of land markets in areas controlled by Africans.”393 However, much later, in the post-
WWII period and more than a decade prior to Kenya gaining independence (in 1962), there 
were controlled cases of land registration “in response to the de facto emergence of land 
sales and individual proprietorship.” 394  An important reason was that the colonial 
government saw this as a way to strengthen its control by empowering conservative 
African land-owners.
395
 More broadly, historical records show that public colonial 
spending “was concentrated on a combination of administration, defense, and 
infrastructure,” and governed to both “promote expansion of primary export industry” and 
service debt.
396
 Hardly any of the state budget was made available for social investments in 
schools, hospitals, pension, or other welfare areas of state action that were rapidly 
expanding in Europe at the time.
397
  
While the governance of lands and colonies focused strongly on favoring 
Europeans and installing a primary export industry, it would be wrong to think of actors 
and institutions in the target regions as passive objects in this process. In practice, their 
responses lay somewhere between the two poles: strategized cooperation as a means to 
exert their own influence on the ground and resistance.
398
 Consequently, the particular 
                                                 
393 Austin (2010), 12-13. 
394 Austin (2010), 12-13. 
395 Austin (2010), 12-13. 
396 Gardner (2012), 36-40. 
397 Gardner (2012), 34, 234. 
398 For instance, anglicized Africans in Nigeria “possess[ed] a sense of the British ‘imperial mission’” 
from their religious point of view; while some traders in Senegal hoped to protect their trade against 
competitors under French rule. In some cases, “[l]iterate Africans looked for promotion in the local 
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response on the ground, together with the political institutions in place in African regions, 
which ranged “from stateless societies (…) to city states and extensive kingdoms” with 
monarchies,
399
 partly shaped the interaction between European and African actors.
400
  
From a home country perspective, the Scramble involved a wide range of actors 
and institutions, such as state officials, adventurers, missionaries, and entrepreneurs, but 
also landed elites and bankers. Moreover, it relied on important institutions that emerged 
during that time of great power competition, including the forms of international law 
mentioned above,
401
 commercial treaty standards,
402
 and/or principles of the international 
economic system, particularly the Most Favored Nation principle. A particularly prominent 
institution of that time, which could be traced back to the 16
th
 century, was the chartered 
company with its “dual roles of entrepreneur and representative” of the respective home 
                                                                                                                                                    
public services.” At the same time, some groups of the African aristocracy, whose cooperation imperial 
control depended on, established a kind of ‘sub-imperialism,’ securing and even expanding their 
influence over and control of the territory and the population within the colonial framework (e.g., Lozi 
in Gambia, Ganda in Uganda). See Duignan and Gann (1969a), 4, 13, 16; Duignan and Gann (1969b), 
109, 122; and Boamah (2014). 
399 Duignan and Gann (1969a), 11. 
400 Austin (2010), 15. Also see Halperin (2005). 
401 Anghie (2006, 739-742) describes the “evolution of international law from the 16th century” as a 
discipline of European origin, “consist[ing] of a series of doctrines and principles that were developed 
in Europe, that emerged out of European history and experience, and that were extended to the non-
European world which existed outside the realm of European international law.” Accordingly, law was 
an institutional mechanism in facilitating imperial expansion, but it was at the same time shaped by it, 
with colonialism being “central to its formation,” and thus making it “universal.” Key for this process of 
international law facilitating and legitimizing colonial enterprises was the “dynamic of difference.” The 
assumed universality of the norms and principles of international law “posit[ed] a gap, a difference 
between European and non-European cultures and peoples.” That gap then needed closing, and this 
legitimated the framings of imperialism as a “civilizing mission.” To a certain degree, this was reflected 
also in “an aggressive variety of imperial philanthropy,” that tried to “help (…) the unbelievers in the 
African bush.” Also see Duignan and Gann (1969a), 9, 6-7. 
402 The incorporation of commercial treaty standards on the protection of alien property and the 
obligation of full compensation in case of expropriation into international law in the 19th century 
reduced the risk for internationally operating firms. As a result of property standards, 
“[u]ncompensated seizure [of alien property, A.G.] was considered robbery, and the use of unilateral 
force was considered a legal and legitimate response.” See Jones (2005a), 24-25. 
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government.
403
 It allowed merchants to pool resources in order to invest and trade overseas, 
sometimes to the extent of administering the colonies as proxies of the home country state 
politically, economically, and by means of military force. Usually, these companies were 
given a contract by the home country government, which in return expected to profit from 
the annual revenues in the form of royalties or intensified trade (exports), and/or hoped to 
maintain or gain a favorable positional status at the international level at relatively low 
cost.
404
  
Institutionally, colonial undertakings also profited from the internationalization of 
the banking sector.
405
 The British government, for instance, supported overseas 
investments and colonial administrations through loans and public spending in the form of 
grants-in-aid. These financial schemes needed the approval of the British Treasury, the 
main guarantor in most cases, which provided the colonies with lower interest rates.
406
 
Loans were granted in cases where the local colonial state revenue did not manage to cover 
the expenditures, even though the stated goal was for colonial governments to become self-
sufficient and produce balanced budgets in the medium term.
407
 While the colonized had to 
pay for their own subjugation, in practice, the case of Britain highlights that few colonies 
became financially independent.
408
 Repeatedly, the already volatile financial situation of 
                                                 
403 Moss et al. (2004), 6. 
404 See Duignan and Gann (1969a), 17. 
405 Jones (2005a), 25. 
406 Gardner (2012), 40-41. 
407 Gardner (2012), 37-40. 
408 Gardner (2012), 32. It is important to note, however, that India, the largest and most important 
colony of the British empire, appears to have been financially profitable for Great Britain, which kept 
“draining Indian revenues to pay for an expensive bureaucracy (including in London) and an army 
beyond India's own defence needs” and to meet other financial interests in London. See, for instance, 
Kaul (3 March 2011). 
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the colonies deteriorated with slowdowns in world trade and/or falls in commodity 
prices.
409
 As a result, the colonial governments tried to build up financial reserves for these 
incidents of revenue declines through export trade, and they cut down on the size of their 
administrations to reduce costs. The interrelation of colonial governance and financial 
administration has been highlighted by Gardner, who argues that the British approach to 
“indirect rule” was less the outcome of an ideological choice than of financial constraints 
in view of limited revenues available to the colonial state in spite of their violent collection 
from the colonized in the process of conquest and colonization (e.g., taxes).
410
  
With time, the support of home country governments for capital exports changed, 
as did the approach to colonial administration. While the governments had originally 
framed capital exports as beneficial (at least to a certain degree), suggesting them as a way 
to expedite the import of food and raw materials, to promote exports and thus create jobs, 
and to ensure an annual state income in the form of commission fees and remittances, this 
“laissez faire” attitude changed during World War I.411 Even the British government began 
to fear that outward investments could have negative repercussions on the foreign 
exchange position of the motherland and pressure the internal capital markets. This 
resulted in tighter regulation designed to ensure the availability of capital for domestic 
development or the development of the colonies.
412
  
In conclusion, the above-presented material begs the question of utility, i.e. was the 
violent colonization of, and imperial expansion into African, but also Asian and Latin 
                                                 
409 Gardner (2012), 6. 
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American lands, actually rewarded with the finding of an “El Dorado?” Historical evidence 
suggests that outcomes were complex, and not necessarily a success story. Contrary to the 
claims that outward investments would increase exports, create jobs, secure resources, and 
provide a stable source of annual state revenues in the form of commissions from issuing 
loans or remittances on profits, in practice, the impact was less obvious.
413
 Particularly 
regarding the colonization of tropical Africa, the effects of overseas trade, migration, and 
investment were ambiguous, and “capital exports to colonies were important, but not 
dominant” for economic development back home. 414  For instance, it remains unclear 
whether overseas investment in the primary resource sector in the colonies or (in the case 
of Britain) the empire was even necessary from the home country perspective. Europe was 
resource abundant with regard to major energy sources (coal), “and nearly self-sufficient in 
iron ore and other minerals.” 415  Only industrial crops such as cotton constituted an 
important commodity, and they were largely supplied to European countries by the United 
States. And, the acquired colonial territories that supposedly served as outlets for European 
capital and trade accounted for less than 15% of European countries’ exports.416 At the 
same time, there is an ongoing debate over the extent to which colonial tax and trade 
revenues from major colonies (e.g., India in the case of Britain) constituted vital inputs for 
                                                 
413 Colonial India, which is not covered in this chapter, seems to be an exception in this regard. 
Historical research suggests that it might have played an important role in British development and 
expansion. For instance, colonial tax and opium trade revenues were used to service the debt and 
facilitate the further expansion and maintenance of the British empire; and the colonization of India 
brought prestige to Great Britain. See Cain and Hopkins (1987); and Deming (2011). 
414 Daudin et al. (2010), 17. 
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the home country’s development and imperial expansion.417 While Cain and Hopkins have 
shown that colonization was a relevant factor, subsequent historical research underlines 
that the benefits are not straightforward.
418
 
These basic colonial trade and investment figures, however, raise doubts about the 
usefulness of many of these undertakings from the home country perspective, particularly 
regarding resource security. They also highlight that other interests, be they commercial or 
geopolitical in nature, were equally relevant. At the same time, the project details 
emphasize that capital exports were not necessarily profitable. In fact, the “tropical 
treasure house myth”419 that underpinned and legitimized colonial expansion in the home 
countries neither reflected the reality of mining projects nor that of agricultural projects. 
Instead, many enterprises, such as the chartered companies, turned out to be highly 
unprofitable, leading to their ultimate failure – in spite of the monopolistic concessions and 
coercive means at their disposal. Prominent cases in point were the British South Africa 
Company in Southern Rhodesia, as well as French activities in Equatorial Africa.
420
 To 
attract foreign capital, these companies facilitated the “granting of large scale territorial 
concessions on easy terms” to foreign investors. 421  Since their business model relied 
heavily on foreign funding, these concessionary companies faced the problem that their 
“grantees usually failed to invest sufficient funds or to do much serious development 
work.”422 The shareholders often did not profit either. The British South Africa Company, 
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for instance, which was active in mining, landholding, and railway construction, and was 
basically a chartered company constructed on the example of the infamous British East 
India Company,
423
 “never paid a single penny to its shareholders and was generally 
unprofitable” (between 1890 and 1923).424  
Contrary to the rhetoric of progress and efficiency, it also turned out that 
insufficient ‘on the ground’ knowledge and shortages of labor “did not make for efficient 
agriculture.” 425  In the African colonies, European farming enterprises faced the same 
challenges as local farmers, namely “plant disease, floods, droughts and sickness,” as well 
as poorly developed communication and transport routes, which made their projects 
relatively expensive and economically unviable.
426
 At the same time, imported animals and 
plants often did not suit the climate, and the European farmers also “had to cope with the 
unfamiliar properties of African soils” – a fact that seems as pertinent today as it was back 
then. Oftentimes, this unfamiliarity with local conditions resulted in detrimental impacts in 
the form of declining soil fertility and rising soil degradation.
427
 Even ventures in the 
mining sector (e.g., diamond and gold) that generated returns, nourished the public 
imagination on colonialism and imperialism, and came closest to the “concept of colonial 
super-profits” were encountering difficulties, and “large dividends in some mines were 
balanced by low profits or losses in others.”428 
                                                 
423 Regarding the East India Company, see for instance Britannica.com 
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Regarding job creation, it is impossible to clearly judge the impact of these 
undertakings. On the one hand, empirical evidence suggests an inverse relation between 
overseas investments and jobs available in the home countries.
429
 On the other hand, the 
overseas territories, particularly those in the New World, created (even if they were 
moderate in most cases) some outlets for surplus production, capital, and labor. Cottrell 
argues that this allowed the ruling elite to uphold regime stability by opening new sources 
of profit to landed elites back home while offering avenues for social mobility through a 
military career or migration. Moreover, Daudin et al. highlight that “[m]igration was the 
dimension of globalization that had the greatest impact on European workers’ living 
standards during this period” through its prompting of real wage rises in poor economies 
back home and provision of a way to bypass or leave behind domestic barriers.
430
 In this 
latter sense, it provided an option to earn a higher income and/or evade religious or 
political oppression or persecution in the home countries.
431
 In most cases, European 
migrants came from rural populations, but increasingly they also came from cities and 
industrial (i.e. deskilled, unschooled worker) backgrounds.
432
  
At the same time, these very same elements that sustained stability also prevented 
domestic reform processes. Politically, the old elites were able to secure their positional 
status, while economically, many overseas investments turned out to be harmful due to 
                                                 
429 Cottrell (1975), 53. 
430 Daudin et al. (2010), 21-23. 
431 Daudin et al. (2010), 21-23. See, for instance, the case of European migrant farmers in Argentina, 
Solberg (1974), 127; and Solimano and Watts (2005) for an overview of migration flows during the 
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432 See, for instance, the description of the political economy of core countries by Halperin (2005); and 
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their wasteful and fraudulent quality
433
 or the fact that their focus on primary resources 
abroad led to the neglect of domestic agricultural production back home.
434
 More broadly, 
capital exports resulted in the stagnation of domestic industry productivity and export 
growth since “the bulk of the savings generated in the non-industrial sectors of the 
economy had been directed not into industry but into (…) secure investments” such as 
“government stocks, (…) agricultural mortgages, or after 1840, the railways.”435 Moreover, 
from 1880 onwards until 1914, the marginal returns of Britain’s colonial investments were 
below those from (less risky) investments in industry back home. However, when taking a 
broader view of what the benefits might have been for the home country, research suggests 
that overseas investment facilitated an elite strata continuation at a time of economic 
transformation back home. Tax and trade revenues of key colonies also seem to have 
mitigated financial volatility and serviced debt in the British empire.
436
 This underlines the 
importance of looking at the nuances and the political economy of the home country’s 
colonial undertakings for a meaningful understanding of how and why overseas 
investments occur when assessing contemporary acquisitions, rather than adopting the 
investor’s framing or the rhetoric of efficiency and profit. 
From the viewpoint of the colonies and/or the countries in the South that received 
FDI and other capital flows, these foreign funds were part of very violent processes of 
dispossession, suppression, and acquisition. Economically, they proved harmful for the 
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host countries, because they destroyed local socio-economic institutions
437
 and were 
mostly “unable to establish (…) a cumulative growth dynamic.” 438  In particular, 
“speculative capital flows were (…) likely to become a destabilizing element,” resulting in 
“deflationary pressures, debt crisis, reduction[s] in [capital] imports.”439 As a result, non-
colonies also grew increasingly dependent on the orders of their European lenders, namely 
banks and governments, which cooperated with industry in this context to further joint 
interests at the cost of the borrowing countries.
440
 The imported funds extended the 
asymmetric export-import trading relationship, establishing a specialized economic 
structure that was not conducive to the debtor countries’ economic development in the 
medium term, yet very difficult to overcome.
441
 
The forming of an uneven development geography, which was characteristic of the 
Scramble, often went along with environmental degradation due to the concentration of 
land ownership and control. This concentration led to overcrowding and the use of less 
valuable land by dispossessed and/or relocated rural populations, and exceeding domestic 
biocapacity became a problem due to the focus on primary exports.
442
 While “[d]e-
industrialisation in colonies and developing countries predated the era of global 
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integration,” the process was “accelerated, during much of the period of global 
integration.” 443  This process is evidenced by the low share of imperial borrowing in 
manufacturing:
444
 between 1860 and 1913, “the developing country share of world 
manufacturing production declined from over one-third to under a tenth,” a fact that has 
been closely linked to the dramatic rise of imports of European manufactured goods in the 
South.
445
 
On the individual level, a large share of the local population, particularly in Africa, 
Latin America, and Asia did not benefit from these forms of “coercive development.”446 
Instead, populations were evicted from their lands and then confronted with hunger and 
starvation
447
 while concurrently being framed by colonial administrations as cheap “labour 
reservoir[s].”448 Even farmers who produced for multinational corporations through new 
forms of outgrower schemes did not profit from integration of the agricultural sector in the 
international markets. To the contrary, they were confronted with dramatic declines in 
agricultural prices, had to bear all the risks such as currency fluctuations and weather 
events, and lacked any political privileges under colonial administration.
449
 
In retrospect, the legacy of the three-tier world that emerged during this era is still 
felt today. Its three tiers were, firstly, the “small group of rapidly industrializing 
economies” that is seen as having most profited from the international capital dynamics, 
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while also playing the central role in the emergence of economic standards (gold standard); 
secondly, the few settler countries which managed to profit from primary resource exports 
and, over time, to begin to industrialize; and, thirdly, the large group of countries that 
“shared a tenuous position in the new international division of labour,” and did not manage 
to industrialize sustainably, or – in the case of the colonies – were discouraged or even 
prevented from doing so.
450
 
5. Decolonization and Globalization 
For the assessment of the novel character of contemporary “land grabs” (or, in the 
terminology of this thesis: land-consuming investments), it is important to account for 
international structures as well as domestic developments in the home and host countries in 
the post-WWII period. The underpinning question is whether fundamental changes in 
agencies, structures, and ideologies are observable in the context of foreign land 
acquisitions after decolonization.  
Regarding the situation in recipient and home countries, decolonization has not led 
to a radical break with colonial economic structures, ideas, policies, or legislation in the 
form of a zero hour:  
Many of the ideas, policies, and priorities of postcolonial development can trace their 
genealogies to the colonial era, where they were shaped through metropolitan concerns to 
maintain and modernise colonies, and through contact with the local people, knowledge, and 
conditions.
451
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Importantly, most African countries show a mix of path-dependent
452
, as well as 
new, elements in areas relevant to land-consuming OFDI. As of 2014, it seems to be a 
combination of colonial-state legacy (state as nominal land rights holder), the persistence 
of modernization ideas informing domestic and international development programs,
453
 
and the postcolonial history of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)
454
 that lays the 
institutional, ideological, and legal ground for these investments to take place.  
A closer look at natural resource governance also shows that many countries’ 
governments (North and South) have moved away from “state-led large-scale 
development” conceptions and the related “interventionist development policies” that were 
characteristic of colonial policies in the 1930s and continued for a certain period of time 
post-independence.
455
 Today, many governments have adopted a neoclassical outlook on 
development characterized by the preference of private ownership of means of production, 
the promotion of minimum state intervention in sectoral governance, the assumption of 
                                                 
452 Path dependency is an analytical concept of social sciences. It basically assumes that history 
matters when trying to understand contemporary institutional developments, collective action, power 
asymmetries, and perceptions. See, for instance, the work of North (1990). 
453 Craggs (2014), 5-9. This particularly applies to large-scale agricultural investment projects by 
multilateral or bilateral development programs that focus on infrastructure, yield, and productivity 
improvement. 
454 See Chang (2003) for a detailed discussion of the track record of these policies in the form of an 
underprovision of public goods and services, or the failure to live up to their own standards (e.g., 
declining rather than rising growth levels during the 1990s). In practice, related development 
strategies resulted in a drop in public investment in the agricultural sector, the preference of private 
sector investment, and/or the liberalization of the primary sector. The country data on public 
expenditure on agriculture from 1980 to 2007 highlights that the total amount, as well as the share of 
agriculture in African governments’ expenditures, dropped significantly from 1980 to 2007 (FAO 
(2012a), 4, 134-135). 
455 In fact, the plantation project that Unilever Ghana invested in during the 1990s is a perfect example 
of a formerly aid-funded, state-led, large-scale plantation program. Following the divestiture program 
in the 1990s, Unilever exploited this opportunity by buying the shares of this plantation on the Stock 
Market. 
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rational actors, and the reduction of socio-economic development to issues of efficiency 
and productivity.
456
  
Consequently, many countries’ national development plans put an emphasis on 
foreign capital attraction and liberalization, and reflect an ideology of development as a 
process of unlimited growth rather than a zero-sum process of resource allocation that was 
characteristic of rival systems and orders 
457
 in the past.
458
 In the governance of FDI, the 
ideological contestation of foreign investment by the recipient governments, which 
characterized the years during colonization and after decolonization, has largely 
disappeared.
459
  
Table 3-3 highlights that most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have adopted a very 
liberal legal framework (as of 2010) that allows close to full foreign equity ownership in 
the agricultural, mining, or forestry sectors: “whereas countries used to list those specific 
sectors open to foreigner investment, the norm is now to assume a legally open regime 
with restricted sectors listed as exceptions.”460 Moreover, several African governments 
have created investment promotion agencies and introduced favorable policies to attract 
                                                 
456 Thomas (1994), 75-77; Kotz (2002), 64-66. For a critical discussion of mainstream economic 
theories that the neoclassical outlook on development is part of, see the publications by the heterodox 
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investors, in the form of long lease terms, tax exemptions, and the promise of low labor 
costs.
461
  
Table 3-3 – Statutory Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of Equity across Regions and Sectors (where 
100 = full foreign ownership allowed, WB 2010)
462
 
Region/Eco
nomy  
Mini
ng, 
oil 
and 
gas▼  
Agri-
cultur
e and 
for-
estry
▼ 
Light 
manu
-
factur
-
ing▼  
Tele-
com
▼ 
Electr
i-
city
▼ 
Bank
-
ing▼  
Insur-
ance
▼ 
Trans
-
port
▼ 
Medi
a▼ 
Const
r-
uctio
n, 
touris
m 
and 
retail
▼ 
Healt
h care 
& 
waste 
mana
ge-
ment
▼ 
East Asia 
and  
Pacific 
78.4 82.9 86.8 64.9 75.8 76.1 80.9 66.0 36.1 93.4 84.1 
South  
Asia 
88.0 90.0 96.3 94.8 94.3 87.2 75.4 79.8 68.0 96.7 100.0 
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean 
91.0 96.4 100.0 94.5 82.5 96.4 96.4 80.8 73.1 100.0 96.4 
Eastern 
Europe and 
Central 
Asia 
96.2 97.5 98.5 96.2 96.4 100.0 94.9 84.0 73.1 100.0 100.0 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
95.2 97.6 98.6 84.1 90.5 84.7 87.3 86.6 69.9 97.6 100.0 
High-
income 
OECD 
100.0 100.0 93.8 89.9 88.0 97.1 100.0 69.2 73.3 100.0 91.7 
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa 
78.8 100.0 95.0 84.0 68.5 82.0 92.0 63.2 70.0 94.9 90.0 
 
                                                 
461 Moss et al. (2004), 3. Also see Chapters 4 and 6. 
462 This table shows statutory restrictions on foreign ownership of equity in new investment projects 
(greenfield FDI) and on the acquisition of shares in existing companies (mergers and acquisitions). One 
hundred equals full foreign equity ownership. The table is from the online database of the WB (2010) 
report (http://iab.worldbank.org/Data/Explore%20Topics/Investing-across-sectors). 
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The trend towards deregulation and economic liberalization since the 1980s has 
increased the discretionary power of the private sector vis-à-vis the state. Regarding host 
countries, multinational companies have profited from the fact that “regional blocs and 
countries compete against each other for investments (…) by offering them best 
investment and climate conditions.”463 In addition, existing national and international laws 
are “not precise enough to account for diffused responsibility in multinational corporations 
between local subsidiaries and headquarters,” enabling, for instance, practices of trade 
mispricing and tax evasion, both of which reflect and further reduce the decreased control 
and benefits available to state authorities. However, this tendency is not limited to the 
realm of host countries. The economic importance of multinational companies for home 
country job creation, supply sourcing, and trading activities has also expanded their power 
in negotiations with state authorities (see below).
464
 
At the same time, foreign land-consuming FDI continues to face other 
administrative barriers, such as limits “on the amount of equity owned by non-resident 
foreigners,”465 or political interventions in the economies.466 Importantly, public actors and 
interventions (in the form of state-owned enterprises and/or public approval processes) 
remain a key characteristic in many host economies characterized by high inequality.
467
 
While post-independence land reforms aimed to achieve greater equality through land 
redistribution, these have not overcome the legacy of the colonial period in the form of the 
                                                 
463 Kumar and Graf (1998), 133. 
464 Kumar and Graf (1998), 133. 
465 Moss et al. (2004), 9. 
466 Moss et al. (2004), 9. 
467 WB (2010); and Moss et al. (2004). 
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concentration of land ownership and socio-economic marginalization.
468
 This means that 
“land grabbing” in SSA occurs in countries with a land crisis and a political economy 
characterized by highly unequal ownership structures, high socio-economic inequality, and 
discriminatory legislation.
469
 
A coexistence of novel and path-dependent elements also characterizes the 
international level. Core principles of imperial law, namely the most favored nation norm 
and the non-discrimination principle, have become key pillars of the post-WWII trade 
governance and legal structures that also govern FDI (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), then WTO).
470
 At the same time, the institutional framework regulating 
FDI in general, and agriculture in particular, has changed – due to the extension of liberal 
principles and frames to this activity and sector. Under the WTO’s Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA), for instance, the approach towards agriculture has shifted from the 
notion of agriculture to agribusiness.
471
  
In the home countries, many governments had shifted towards restrictive OFDI 
regulations after WWII to ensure that capital would be available for domestic 
reconstruction purposes (also see Chapter 7). However, since the 1980s, capital exports 
and trade activities have been deregulated again, and in some cases even pro-actively 
supported by policy makers. As a result of these processes of economic liberalization and 
deregulation, which have occurred almost worldwide since the 1990s, the most recent 
                                                 
468 Home (2012), 19. 
469 For a discussion of land reform problems, see Home (2012); and Borras and McKinley (2006). 
470 See collection of clauses in GATT and WTO in the database of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCT9901e.html). Also see Anghie 
(2007) on the role of imperialism in realizing the universality of international law. 
471 Weis (2007).  
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decades have often been characterized by an increasing corporate concentration, intra-firm 
division of labor, and market internationalization by TNCs, particularly in the food and 
energy sectors.
472
 Against this background, Clapp and Fuchs have stressed the significant 
structural and discursive power of contemporary TNCs relative to the state and civil 
society.
473
 Others, such as Murphy, have pointed to the importance of nation-states and 
governments in this process of private sector expansion.
474
 From a historical perspective, it 
has become clear that these two seemingly contradictory observations might as well be 
complementary phenomena. At the same time, it seems that what is at least partly fueling 
the contemporary debate on “land grabbing” is the discontent with the social, economic, 
political, and ecological repercussions of this development trajectory, combined with a 
fundamental concern about how the state will be able to deliver core welfare functions in 
the future, considering the rapidly progressing privatization of access to, and governance 
of land and its multiple functions (also see Chapter 2).  
6. Conclusion 
The review presented above outlined particular mechanisms that could be labeled 
as imperialist “best practices,” such as the exertion of diplomatic pressure, use of military 
force, facilitation through legal instruments and corporate actors, or the provision of 
financial support by the state. Together, they showcase the strong role that was taken by 
the public sector in facilitating private sector expansion. Public actors promoted overseas 
investments, stating that these operations would provide the home country with revenues, 
                                                 
472 See Clapp and Fuchs (2009); and Goldthau and Witte (2010). 
473 Clapp and Fuchs (2009). 
474 Dunning and Narula (1996); and Murphy (1994). 
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jobs, and access to markets. Moreover, overseas investments were defined from a 
mercantilist viewpoint as a means to improve the home country’s positional status in the 
system of states. Obviously, multiple imperialisms were at play; they were made unique by 
their particular country settings, actor constellations, and specific motivations. 
References to (neo)colonialism and imperialism in contemporary explanations of 
“land grabs” since 2000 do not often match this diverse historical evidence on colonialism 
and imperialism; nor are they particularly meaningful. Rather than being solely about land, 
natural resources, or labor, colonial and imperial expansion was driven by a multitude of 
factors, including the protection of commercial interests; personal desire to achieve “self-
aggrandizement;” state desire to expand political influence as part of the European power 
game; or other events that resonated in the home countries, such as the Long Depression 
and processes of economic restructuring. Thus, both economic and non-economic aspects 
mattered, and “grabbed” land was important as natural resource, as well as territory, 
market space, strategic hub, or place of settlement. Together, the findings support this 
thesis’ focus on large-scale land acquisitions in the specific context of major investor 
countries.  
The review also emphasizes the importance of accounting for the subtle changes 
that have occurred in political agendas, actor constellations, and corporate and resource 
governance post-World War II. Processes of economic liberalization and deregulation have 
yielded corporate concentration, intra-firm division of labor, and market 
internationalization by TNCs. Moreover, economic liberalization and deregulation has 
increased the discretionary power of corporate actors vis-à-vis the state. At the same time, 
governments in the host and home countries seem to embrace land-consuming overseas 
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investments from the private sector and/or development agencies as a way to realize 
specific development agendas, – even in sectors such as agriculture where foreign access 
and ownership had been restricted in the past (also see Chapter 4-8).
475
  
Importantly, the official support for land-consuming FDI raises questions about the 
accuracy of references to imperialism and (neo)colonialism in the literature and media, 
particularly in those cases where land-consuming OFDI is proactively sought after by the 
host countries. Do these concepts help to further our analysis and empirical understanding 
of what is happening in a particular “land grab” context, or to find effective ways to 
address the phenomenon? To highlight this problem, take, for example, the Oakland 
Institute’s definition of “land grabbing” as “a neo-colonialism concept that has arisen in 
the midst of a severe food and economic crisis in the world in 2008.” 476 Accordingly, it 
describes the “purchase of vast tracts of land by wealthier food-insecure nations and 
private investors from mostly poor, developing countries in order to produce crop for 
export.”477  
An article in the Somaliland Press rightly notes that such a “description is based on 
the assumption that the term of neo-colonialism is defined as a system that has been 
invented in place of colonialism, as a main instrument of oppression.”478 Accordingly, “the 
essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subjected to it, at least in theory, is an 
independent and has all outward features of international sovereignty (…). However, in 
                                                 
475 See, for instance, Lavers (2011). 
476 Somaliland Press (19 May 2013). 
477 Somaliland Press (19 May 2013). 
478 Somaliland Press (19 May 2013).  
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reality both its economic system and political policy are directed from outside.”479 Such 
references to (neo)colonialist traits of Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI have 
been popular in the media. The National Post, for instance, writes the following about 
recent Chinese investment negotiations in the Ukraine:  
Ukraine has agreed a deal with a Chinese company to lease 5% of its land to feed China’s 
burgeoning population, it was reported on Tuesday.  
It would be the biggest so called “land grab” agreement, where one country leases or sells 
land to another, in a trend that has been compared with the 19th century “scramble for 
Africa”, but which is now spreading to eastern Europe. 
Under the 50-year plan, China would eventually control 7.5 million acres, an area equivalent 
to the size of Belgium or Massachusetts, which represents 9% of Ukraine’s arable land. 
Initially 250,000 acres would be leased. The farmland in the eastern Dnipropetrovsk region 
would be cultivated principally for growing crops and raising pigs. The produce would be 
sold at preferential prices to Chinese state-owned conglomerates, said the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corp (XPCC), a quasi-military organisation also known as 
Bingtuan. 
But KSG Agro denied reports that it had sold land to the Chinese, saying it had reached 
agreement for the Chinese only to modernize 7,500 acres and “may in the future gradually 
expand to cover more areas”. 
Any sort of “land-grab” deal can be sensitive politically. Madagascar was forced to scrap a 
plan to lease 2.5 million acres to South Korea in 2009 after protests against “neo-
colonialism”. The Philippines has also blocked a China deal. 
“This reminds us of a colonial process even when there is no colonial link between the two 
countries involved,” said Christina Plank, the co-author of a report by the Transnational 
Institute on “land-grabbing”.480 
However, this news article highlights two problems that apply to most descriptions 
of “land grabbing” as (neo)colonial. First, it seems that the concept of (neo)colonialism is 
used to weave a seemingly clear and coherent “land grab” story, rather than contribute to 
better data and an actual understanding of what is going on – in Ukraine, in China, or 
elsewhere. Second, as highlighted in Chapter 2, it remains unclear under what conditions 
                                                 
479 Somaliland Press (19 May 2013).  
480 Spillius (25 September 2013). 
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such an investment transaction between two unequal partners would not be considered 
“land grabbing,” nor qualify as a (neo)colonial relationship. 
Concerning the subsequent assessment of Chinese and British land-consuming 
OFDI in SSA, all of the above stresses the need to generate rich empirical data and to 
account for the mix of structural and individual, strategic and contingent dynamics at work. 
At the same time, my case findings (see Chapters 4-7) suggest that contemporary 
references to imperialism and (neo)colonialism do not adequately capture the diversity of 
agency and political economies. In particular, these references seem to exaggerate the 
purposeful agency and strategic mastermind qualities of home countries, and to 
underestimate the agency of host countries regarding “land grabs.” 
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Chapter 4: CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA – “CREATE INFINITY, BENEFIT 
MANKIND” 
The Chinese government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises with strength and 
good reputation to expand their investment in Africa, and has adopted necessary measures to 
guide them in this respect. The result is satisfactory.
481
 
– State Council 2010 
1. Introduction 
The Yuan Long Ping High-Tech Agriculture Company, a seed company which is 
named after the “father of hybrid rice” and involved in investments in Africa, describes its 
managerial approach with the slogan “create infinity, benefit mankind.” 482 The company 
associates three aspects with this motto: to abide by the government strategy to upgrade 
and improve the sector’s industry operations; to push ecological limits through 
technological innovation; and to expand business operations to profit from economies of 
scale. With regard to Chinese overseas investments in Sub-Saharan Africa, the how and 
why of which are the focus of Chapters 4 and 5, the motto seems to stretch beyond this 
originally operational context to capture major findings about these investments.  
I maintain that Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA occurs for multiple complex 
reasons. Specifically, four drivers stand out from the home country perspective. I argue 
that Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects are part of (1) a long-term strategy to diversify 
supply and access to resources (mineral products), even if these are not always exported 
                                                 
481 State Council (2010). 
482 Yuan Long Ping High-Tech Agriculture Company (2014), corporate website 
(http://www.lpht.com.cn/eng/company/Company.htm). 
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back home; (2) a diplomatic strategy to foster political alliances and expand the country’s 
soft power in international relations; (3) a strategy to develop and open new markets for 
Chinese products; and (4) a strategy to internationalize China’s industrial base to address 
the competitive pressures back home, as well as the ecological and social challenges of the 
country’s development trajectory. 
Key evidence for this argument is found in official documentation which openly 
links overseas investments in general, as well as land-consuming OFDI in SSA in 
particular, to the country’s political economy, development trajectory and agenda. 
Moreover, at the international level, this rhetoric is matched by the increase in material, 
symbolic, and normative resources invested in China-Africa relations, as part of Chinese 
resource and commercial diplomacy. Most importantly, this argument is based on the 
assessment and analysis of the main empirical characteristics of Chinese land-consuming 
OFDI to SSA since 2000.  
In the structure of this thesis, this chapter represents the first part of the two-part 
case study on China. It will present the core empirical characteristics of how (and partially 
why) Chinese land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa take place, in and over 
time. To collect the data, I systematically investigated 19 projects that have been listed in 
influential “land grab” databases until 2012 (see Appendix A for the final list of projects). 
In addition, I have continuously monitored Chinese investment activities and relevant 
home country developments that occurred thereafter. Importantly, this chapter and the rich 
empirical details of Chinese land-consuming OFDI it presents, provides the basis on which 
to explore alternative explanations about why Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA 
occurs from a home country perspective (Chapter 5). It also allows me – at a later stage – 
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to conduct cross-country comparisons, and deliberate more broadly about the role of OFDI 
in the home country context (Chapter 8).  
After the above introduction (Section 1), Section 2 introduces the history of 
Chinese-African relations. These relations reach far back in time, but they have intensified 
since the 1990s. Section 3 then discusses the details of how these investments occur. In 
particular, it will focus on land-consuming FDI’s sectoral composition and timelines, the 
role of land, the recipient context, key actors and institutions. Section 4 briefly highlights 
the recipient context in which these investments occur, and Section 5 reviews the issue of 
Chinese labor exports that has attracted international attention. The chapter will conclude 
by summarizing the key empirical findings about Chinese land-consuming FDI in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Section 6).  
Core findings of this chapter underline that the empirical characteristics of Chinese 
land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa are more multifaceted than orthodox 
explanations acknowledge. Despite a strong focus on resources, and the predominance of 
public actors, they involve a diverse range agencies and interests from the private and 
public sectors, home and recipient countries, and multilateral agencies; and they comprise 
investments in multiple sectors, from construction and mining to farming. Many projects 
predate the 2007/2008 crises, and some build on a long history of China-Africa 
cooperation. Distinct from orthodox explanations, investments in food production only 
made up a minor share of Chinese land-consuming FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, and largely 
produced for regional consumption. Most projects apply market principles and mainstream 
managerial economics in their operations. Regarding the role of land, it is used in these 
projects as resource as well as productive space. 
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2. Background on China in Africa 
While China-Africa cooperation began attracting international attention relatively 
recently, modern Chinese relations with the African continent trace back to the 1950s. 
However, China’s engagement with African countries has only intensified dramatically in 
the last two decades. In 2010, China became the continent’s third largest trading partner.483 
Additionally, Chinese OFDI activities in African countries rose from USD 317.43 million 
in 2004 to USD 2,111.99 million in 2010.
484
 Moreover, Africa was receiving 46.7% of all 
Chinese Official Development Aid (ODA) as of 2008, making the continent the primary 
focus of Chinese aid and economic cooperation.
485
  
The nature of the relations between China and Africa has also changed significantly: 
from the 1950s up to the 1970s they were characterized primarily by “unilateral economic 
assistance from China to Africa” to improve the “self-reliance” and “self-development 
abilities” of recipient countries, but these relations have grown more complex.486 In the 
1980s, the focus shifted from unilateral economic assistance in the form of aid towards 
“carrying out mutually beneficial cooperation with Africa.” 487 The latter was supposed to 
benefit China’s interests as much as Africa’s (see below).488  
Increasingly, aid came to resemble economic cooperation projects with the 
medium-term objective of profitability, whereas the focus on self-reliance and self-
                                                 
483 State Council (2010). 
484 Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (2011a), 81-87. Note: Data for 2004-2006 includes only non-
financial OFDI flows. 
485 State Council (2011); and Li (2006). 
486 See interview with Lu Shaye, Director-General of the Department of African Affairs, conducted by 
Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
487 Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
488 Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
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development was disbanded. While the eligibility to receive aid remained linked to the 
One China principle
489
 of the past, at the same time, aid and economic cooperation became 
part of China’s resource and, as this chapter argues, expansion diplomacy, – in the search 
for export markets, business opportunities, and allies in international politics. In an 
interview in 2011, Lu Shaye, Director-General of the Department of African Affairs in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, describes the driver for, and nature of these changing relations 
as follows: 
With China's rapid economic development, there is a growing demand from China for 
Africa's market and resources. China's investment in Africa also grew rapidly. While taking 
away resources from Africa, we also give back to African countries. We helped African 
countries put in place a large number of infrastructure projects according to their economic 
development needs. It's all about each taking what he needs.
490
 
Along these lines, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the intensification of 
China-Africa relations has allowed China and African countries to satisfy their rising 
demand “for products and technologies from each other during the process of 
industrialization and urbanization.” Moreover, Zhong Manying, chief of the Department of 
Western Asian and African Affairs in the Ministry of Commerce, has been quoted as 
saying that “[t]here is [still] tremendous potential for economic cooperation.”491 
In practice, this mutual demand model has resulted in Chinese-African trade flows 
that largely follow the Western pattern. China imports primary commodities relevant for its 
economy, such as cotton, phosphates, energy, and mineral products, and exports value-
added products, such as machinery, chemicals, food, and textiles (see Figure 4-1). To 
                                                 
489 The One China policy is about the rejection of Taiwan as a sovereign state and the acceptance of 
Beijing as the sole legitimate representative of China. It is a precondition for entering into diplomatic 
relations with China. See, for instance, Winkler (June 2012). 
490 Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
491 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (15 October 2010). 
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expand imports and moderate the negative trade balance of African countries, China has 
offered zero-tariff treatment to some countries. Moreover, freight charges were reduced or 
annulled, and Chinese trade missions were sent to African countries “to help increase the 
continent’s exports to China,” particularly regarding primary commodities. 492  On the 
investment side, mining and manufacturing projects made up 51% of Chinese OFDI in 
Africa in 2010, reflecting the country’s industrial make-up and policy orientation while 
hinting at the importance of looking more closely at the potential pull and push factors for 
these investments. 
Figure 4-1 – China-Africa Trade Flows, 2000-2009 (Romei and Jopson 2010)493 
 
At the same time, it is essential to consider that even though Africa seems to have 
gained importance in China’s development ambitions, by regional comparison, the 
continent still only ranks fifth as a destination of Chinese OFDI. It is preceded by Asia 
(Hong Kong in particular), Latin America, Europe, and North America.
494
 The same kind 
of asymmetric significance holds true for China’s top trading partners, the top five of 
                                                 
492 CAITEC (2010), 3. 
493 The figures are from UNCTAD; they were compiled by Romei and Jopson (14 December 2010). 
494 State Council (2010). 
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which are the US, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan.
495
 Yet, the details of these 
investments are much more complex than such a broad comparison suggests. On the 
bilateral level, for instance, Angola has become the second-largest oil supplier to China 
after Saudi Arabia,
496
 and China has become the primary export destination for Angola, 
followed by the US, with the greatest share of exports being crude oil.
497
  
3. Key Characteristics of Chinese Land-Consuming OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa  
Clearly, the empirical evidence on China-Africa relations suggests that the common 
narrative, according to which Chinese land-consuming investments are relatively new and 
meant to address energy and/or food security concerns back home following the 2007/2008 
crises, might fall short of apprehending the diversity of factors and events at play. To 
facilitate a meaningful understanding of how Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) actually happen, this section will highlight their primary empirical characteristics, 
accounting for sector distribution and project timelines, and the role of land, stated goals, 
the issue of labor migration, and key actors and institutions. The assessment presents rich 
empirical details that are necessary to explore alternative explanations and to meaningfully 
compare Chinese and British investment activities. 
The major findings of this section are as follows: (1) The investments include 
different sectors, and the agricultural sector makes up the smallest percentage of land-
consuming investment projects in SSA. (2) Most investment projects predate the 2008 
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crisis, and they have taken an economic turn over time. (3) The role of land in these 
projects is often secondary, as these investments are mostly about expanding business 
operations overseas rather than acquiring land. Still, what characterizes these investment 
projects is that they consume land in their operations. (4) Only a few incidents in which the 
Chinese government proactively tried to acquire land for agricultural or resettlement 
purposes have been reported. (5) Most investments are embedded in the respective 
recipient countries’ national development plans. 
Sectors 
The investigated investment activities comprise multiple sectors, such as farming, 
attempted resettlement projects, mining, manufacturing, and construction. Some of these 
projects have failed while others have already been implemented. In more detail, these 
investment projects aim to grow and process food, biofuels, cotton, or sugar; restore so-
called farm wasteland; resettle Chinese farmers; produce cement; construct public 
infrastructure and irrigation systems; train farmers in particular agricultural technologies; 
or construct Special Economic Zones that serve as manufacturing, agribusiness, or IT hubs 
for Chinese and/or other foreign companies.
498
  
While the international debate on Chinese investments in Africa focuses largely on 
investments in agriculture in the context of food security, a report by the State Council 
                                                 
498 It is important to note that agricultural projects prevail in my list of investigated projects (see 
Appendix A). However, compared to other assessments and official data by the Chinese government, 
this does not seem to be representative of the actual sectoral composition. Instead, it appears to be the 
result of biased reporting, and I have relied on related “land grab” reports to start investigating 
Chinese projects. In fact, the discussion about Chinese land-consuming FDI in the “land grab” literature 
has largely focused on food production and farming. 
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suggests that this sector only accounted for 3.1% of total Chinese direct investments in 
Africa in 2009 (measured by value).
499
 The predominant investment sectors were the 
mining industry (29.2%) and the manufacturing sector (22.0%), followed by construction 
(15.8%) and finance (13.9%) (see  
Figure 4-2).
500
 It has been noted by Brautigam that the small percentage of OFDI 
going into agricultural projects is not the outcome of a lack of opportunities. In fact, 
Chinese actors have continuously been offered land to invest in by African governments: 
If Chinese investors wanted large land leases, they clearly could have signed some. After all, 
as a 2012 Oakland Institute study 
501
 showed, "Mozambique granted concessions to investors 
for more than 2.5 million hectares (ha) of land between 2004 and the end of 2009" almost 
entirely to European and South African investors – there were no Chinese investors in their 
list.
502
 
Rather, the small percentage of agricultural projects reflects the low priority 
assigned to them by the Chinese government, as well as investors, in the past. In fact, 
agricultural investments since the 1990s have largely been undertaken as part of Chinese 
resource diplomacy, and upon the request of African governments.
503
  
However, in the medium-term, it seems that the sectoral composition of Chinese 
land-consuming investments is likely to change. On the one hand, a declaration of the 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2009,
504
 a political platform that facilitates dialogue 
between China and African countries on matters of trade, aid, and investment, announced 
that the countries would explore new areas of investment, such as tourism, which might 
                                                 
499 State Council (2010). Also see remark in previous footnote 498. 
500 State Council (2010). 
501 Home and Mittal (2011), 2. 
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involve different kinds of land development.
505
 On the other hand, the previous 
marginalization of the commercial agricultural sector might be ending. In 2011, China’s 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce issued a joint Notice
506
 outlining their 
financial support for the overseas expansion of Chinese agribusiness.
507
 Accordingly, 
special funds of a maximum of RMB 30 million (per annum and enterprise) were made 
available for investment projects in mining, agriculture, forestry, or fisheries.
508
 However, 
this general financial support for overseas farming is not necessarily intended for 
investments in Africa. Therefore, it is difficult to assess what impact it might have for 
African countries and farmers.
509
 
Figure 4-2 – Distribution of China’s Direct Investment in African Industries (end of 2009, State 
Council 2010, measured by value)
510
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509 For a list of MOFCOM-approved Chinese agricultural projects in African countries until 2013, see 
Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1680. 
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Timelines 
The Chinese land-consuming investments that I investigated (see Appendix A) 
often go far back in time, thereby questioning the widespread narrative of a “land rush” 
that began as a result of the ‘international financial, food, and energy crises in 2007/2008 
(see Chapter 2). Interestingly, this holds true especially for investments in agriculture, 
many of which are either a continuation of Chinese agricultural aid programs in Africa, the 
rehabilitation of former Chinese agricultural friendship farms, or related to other events 
predating the 2007/2008 crises.
511
 For instance, the project by SINO CAM IKO in 
Cameroon builds on the remnants of a formerly Taiwanese Cooperation Farm that was set 
up in 1972. After bilateral negotiations in 2005, the project officially began in 2006.
512
 
Also, the ZTE energy project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) would have 
been part of an attempt to rehabilitate a plantation-based Sino-Congolese cooperation 
project from 1972.
513
 However, as of 2013, this palm oil project, which would have 
consumed up to 100,000ha, and intended to convert palm oil into biofuels, has not 
materialized. Instead, the company operates a farm on 256ha that produces maize, soy, 
meat, chicken, and eggs.
514
 Meanwhile, the failed resettlement project in Mozambique, 
which is one of most frequently cited projects in the “land grab” literature, dates back to 
1997 and the time of the Asian financial crisis.
515
  
                                                 
511 See, for instance, Li (2006). 
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See Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1686. 
515 Brautigam and Ekman (2012), 5; and Ekman (2010), 30-31. 
178 
 
Similar to these agricultural investments, land-consuming projects in the 
manufacturing, construction, energy, and/or mining sectors also have histories that predate 
the crises in 2007/2008. For example, investments in the construction and mining sectors 
started to pick up speed in the 1950s and 1990s, respectively. While the rise in construction 
projects was associated with Chinese aid projects, the mining projects reflect China’s 
rising external resource dependency. Even in the manufacturing sector overseas 
investments date back to the 1980s, with approximately 200 investments taking place 
between 1979 and 2001.
516
 However, investments in most sectors have only increased 
significantly in number and size since China’s opening in the 1990s, and particularly with 
the adoption of the “Go Abroad” (zou chuqu) policies in 2000 (also see Chapter 5 on home 
country measures). 
Even though many projects have long histories, their conduct and purposes have 
changed with time in ways that are key to understanding the core features of contemporary 
Chinese land-consuming OFDI. Projects with a long history bear especially strong witness 
to the altered nature of the Chinese presence in African countries. Take, for example, the 
SUKALA S.A. project, a joint venture between the Chinese state-owned company CLETC 
and the Malian government.
517
 In its current form, the project began in 1996, when the 
Chinese company – following a request made by the Malian government – bought a 
majority share in the Mali state company SUKALA S.A. through a debt-for-equity-swap. 
Tracing the project back to its beginnings in the 1960s reveals that it had started out as an 
                                                 
516 Rosen and Hanemann (2009). 
517 Diaz-Chavez et al. (2010), 50; Aiddata.org (n.d.c); Feng (2010); and Baxter and Mousseau (2011), 
19, 22. 
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aid and technical cooperation project under cooperative management. It then went through 
a phase of transitional management before becoming a joint venture.
518
 This project’s 
shifting character is in fact representative of the overarching trend in Chinese investments: 
most have changed from an aid basis to an economic (for-profit) rationale.  
This change in the rationale of long-term projects in the context of home country 
reform is also characteristic of the construction sector. Until 1978, Chinese construction 
companies were part of unilateral technical aid programs, along with agricultural projects. 
Thereafter, following domestic governance reforms in China, construction companies were 
turned into sub-contractors and began bidding for contracts and financing from multilateral 
development programs, domestic development budgets, and bilateral “barter exchange 
deals” through which construction was undertaken in exchange for resources (to be 
exploited in the future).
 519
 These “barter exchange deals” were pre-financed by the China 
EXIM Bank following approval by China’s Ministry of Commerce.520 Today, Africa is the 
second largest market after Asia for Chinese construction companies, while the percentage 
of turnover in Africa has more than doubled since 2001, rising from 14.1% to 30.9%.
521
 
This story is again linked with, but not exclusive to, home country support, reforms, and 
resource diplomacy. According to a WB study, China has become a major financier of 
African infrastructure construction, covering a wide range of projects from dams, irrigation, 
and roads to schools, hospitals, and power stations.
522
 Aside from their predominance in 
                                                 
518 Moreover, the precursor factories date back even farther, having been built in the 1960s and 
renovated in the 1980s with Chinese government involvement.  
519 Asche and Schueller (2008); Yi and Yong 2011, 7-8. 
520 Asche and Schueller (2008). 
521 Yi and Yong (2011), 7-8. 
522 Foster et al. (2008). 
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the construction sector across Africa, these companies fulfill multiple other functions of 
significance for China-Africa cooperation. For instance, they are important agents in the 
export promotion of Chinese manufactured products and Chinese labor services.
523
  
While this trend towards a market rationale seems to apply to land-consuming 
OFDI activities across sectors, the focus on timelines highlights that there are also 
peculiarities observable in each of the sectors over time. The recent renewal of agricultural 
(aid) projects, for instance, is often seen as an outcome of bilateral resource diplomacy and 
the proactive lobbying of African governments.
524
 As a result, there are 20 so-called 
agricultural demonstration centers being established across Africa, as announced at the 
2009 high-level summit of the Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Sharm-El-
Sheik.
525
 In 2012, at the fifth FOCAC meeting, it was agreed that China would build more 
agricultural demonstration centers in the future.
526
 These demonstration centers were 
initiated “all at the request of local governments (…) for their own agricultural purposes,” 
with the aim of rehabilitating former aid projects. The estimated investment value is RMB 
40-55 million per center.
527
 Some of these centers have been listed in “land grab” 
databases.
528
 The other category of agricultural investment projects, so-called “commercial 
agricultural enterprises investing in land and agriculture in Africa,” is a rather recent one. 
                                                 
523 Shengjin (1995). 
524 Brautigam (2009); Alden (2007). 
525 See Li (2010). 
526 FOCAC (2012). 
527 Brautigam (12 January 2012). Also see Ekman (2010), 33-35; and Li (2010), who support this 
assessment.  
528 Projects that appear in „land grab“ listings have entered the database via crowdsourcing. This 
means they have been reported by NGOs or media. This fact explains the relatively random 
(incomplete) listing of projects such as the agricultural demonstration centers; and it warns to 
automatically equate a listed project with „land grabbing.“ Instead, it is necessary to review the 
individual cases and evaluate what is happening. 
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The precursors, however, were again former agricultural aid projects that had been 
strategically re-orientated in the 1990s to run profitably and sustainably under market-
oriented management. 
Given the growing intensity and changing quality of China-Africa exchanges, how 
successful they will be remains to be seen. Looking at the time that passes from a 
company’s first relevant statement until project completion, particularly in the agricultural 
sector, there often seems to be a great difference between announced project deadlines and 
what has actually been implemented by the time that deadline arrives.
529
 This observation, 
which also holds true for many British land-consuming FDI projects,
530
 is usually related 
to difficulties with administrative processes, funding problems, or other unexpected events. 
At the same time, it is hard to evaluate such projects given the lack of data on investment 
deadlines and the absence of follow-up reports on project outcomes. On a general note, 
statements made by representatives from various sectors suggest that it is possible to work 
profitably, but that it would be unrealistic to expect extremely high returns on investment. 
This is a feature to keep in mind when researching the projects of investment funds that 
promise above-average returns on their land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
531
 
More broadly, the findings support this thesis’ argument that a meaningful 
explanation has to account for country- and project-specific timelines to capture what is 
happening with regards to “land grabbing.” What can be said about the roles of the 
                                                 
529 See Brautigam and Zhang (2013) for a review of major Chinese agricultural projects, their timelines, 
and actual implementation status. 
530 See Chapter 6. 
531 See example in Table 4-1. 
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2007/2008 food, energy, and finance crises that the orthodox explanations rely on? 
Regarding the financial crisis, it has so far had an ambiguous impact on Chinese overseas 
investments. On the one hand, it allowed some companies to ‘go out’ and get ‘cheap 
bargains,’ profiting from price sensitivity and declining asset prices. At the same time, the 
global economic crisis presented a challenge for potential Chinese investors.
532
 In 2009, 
the total value of approved non-financial OFDI projects declined by nearly two thirds 
(USD 3.7 billion) from the value of the previous year (USD 10 billion); however, it has 
since been recovering.
533
 Regarding the food crisis, China was largely food self-sufficient 
as of 2007,
534
 when the crisis hit. Finally, external energy dependency has been a 
government concern since the mid-1990s. It is not a recent phenomenon (see Chapter 5). 
Land: Its Role and Use in the Investments 
The multiplicity of investment sectors and their changing character over time raises 
questions with regard to the role played by land in these investments. The following 
section will therefore briefly outline the extent and use of land in these investments. It will 
also highlight the major strategies of access and aspects of land governance observed in the 
projects under study. 
Extent  
In a 2011 interview, Lu Shaye, who is Director-General of the Department of 
African Affairs within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that Chinese 
                                                 
532 Rosen and Hanemann (2009). 1. 
533 Rosen and Hanemann (2009), 1. 
534 FAO (2009), 33-35. 
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investments in agriculture are small in scale and do not enclose land, contrary to “western 
countries [which] have enclosed a total of 30 million hectares of land, equivalent to the 
half of France.”535 My assessment of projects (see Appendix A for the list of projects), as 
well as reports
536
 on more recent projects mentioned in the “land grab” literature, indicates 
that the Chinese land-consuming projects in Sub-Saharan Africa seem to range from 100ha 
to 100,000ha, with the majority using less than 10,000ha. This means that compared to 
Chinese land-consuming FDI in other regions (e.g., Latin America and Eastern Europe), 
but also in comparison with British land-consuming OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
average size of Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects in Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be 
smaller. Then again, it is all a matter of perspective: when, for instance, the 100ha project 
size is compared to the average farm size in major investor countries, such as China, where 
the average amount of land available to farmers is 0.47ha (in 2005),
537
 or seen against the 
background of the land crisis
538
 and small-scale farming in the recipient countries, the 
amount of land claimed by some investments seems enormous.
539
 
Overall, it is impossible to assess the total extent of land used by Chinese overseas 
investments, partially due to the lack of comprehensive data, and partially due to the great 
discrepancy between the announced or envisioned size of a project and the actual land 
under operation. The discrepancy seems to be particularly characteristic of land-consuming 
                                                 
535 Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
536 E.g., Brautigam and Zhang (2013); ILC (2012); Smaller et al. (2012). 
537 Kahrl et al. (2005), 11. 
538 The land crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by the highly unequal distribution of land, 
insecure tenure relationships, and rising land use competition (amongst other problems) that the 
respective host governments have not been able to resolve since independence in spite of the fact that 
land reforms have been a core component of political programs. 
539 See, for instance, Eastwood et al. (2004); or Agriculture Council of America. (2014). 
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projects in agriculture. To provide several examples: even though negotiations had been 
completed in 2006, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) had been signed between 
the Chinese SOE Shaanxi Agricultural Group and the Ministry of Agriculture (Cameroon), 
the Chinese subsidiary in Cameroon, SINO CAM IKO, was operating only 100-150ha of 
the announced 10,000ha five years later (in 2011).
540
 In fact, the company was only able to 
build a rice demonstration center on the land of a formerly Taiwanese-aided farm that had 
been closed when Cameroon decided to engage in diplomatic relations with China 
instead.
541
 As of 2010, operations were still being held back by the Cameroonian 
government, which had not approved the further expansion of this and other projects, 
contrary to the original investment agreement in the form of the MoU.
542
 Also, the Chipata 
Cotton Company (now the China Africa Cotton Company),
543
 which is a subsidiary of 
Qingdao New Textiles Ltd., operating in Zambia since 2004, originally only had 2,500 
contract farmers out of the envisioned 20,000.
544
 And the Hebei Hanhe Investment 
Company, a state-owned provincial company that has started in Uganda in 2009, and is 
targeting the development of around 17,000ha in 10 years, had a total of 173ha under 
operation as of 2011, growing maize, vegetables, and trees.
545
  
                                                 
540 Li 2010; and Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1684-1685. 
541 Putzel et al. (2011), 31. 
542 Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1685; and Putzel and Kabuyaya (2011), 31. 
543 It seems that Chipata Cotton Company experienced profitability problems, leading to its temporary 
closure in 2007. It changed its name and re-opened in 2008 with the financial support of the China-
Africa Development Fund of the China Development Bank, which invests in African companies. See 
Schoneveld et al. (2014), 25-27; and China Development Bank (31 May 2012). 
544 Tschirley and Kabwe (2009); Times of Zambia (14 June 2004); Chinese Embassy in the Republic of 
Zambia (10 September 2013); Phiri (11 September 2013); Wang (30 June 2014); and China 
Development Bank (31 May 2012). 
545 Wang (10 October 2011); and Aiddata.org (n.d.b). 
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These discrepancies point to the difficult and time-consuming nature of large-scale 
investment projects, particularly in the agricultural sector, where investors can run into 
political, ecological, social, and operative problems. At the same time, the discrepancy 
between the announced investment scales and the actual amount of land under operation 
underlines that in the near future an expansion of Chinese land-consuming investments in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is to be expected. This seems even more likely given the above-
mentioned recent (2011) policy turn and the new funds that were made available to 
Chinese agribusiness by the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance.
546
  
Use and Purpose  
There exist two main types of land use in these investments: its use as resource with 
particular qualities such as limestone or arable land, and its use as productive space for 
industrial or modernization projects. One observation is that the purpose differs across 
regions, at least with regard to investments in agriculture. In the case of Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, reports indicate that Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects might be 
producing for export to China in order to “circumvent the Chicago commodities exchange 
and secure direct grain and oil supply.”547 However, this does not seem applicable to most 
agricultural investment projects in African countries.
548
 Instead, most of the investment 
projects in SSA that this thesis looked at seem to produce products that are intended for 
local and/or regional consumption. In the area of food production in particular, there is no 
                                                 
546 Macquarie University and Free University Amsterdam Project (15 May 2011). 
547 See Rasmussen et al. (2011). Also see Finance.jrj.com.cn (May 2011).  
548 See Rasmussen et al. (2011). Also see Finance.jrj.com.cn (May 2011).  
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evidence that these projects are intended to meet Chinese food demands.
549
 However, the 
outputs of farming projects that produce biofuels or industrial crops such as cotton seem to 
be intended for export to international markets or China.
550
 Moreover, some projects might 
affect food security not because they export food crops, but as a result of land-use 
competition, (de facto) ownership changes, and/or the diversion of food resources such as 
cassava to the production of biofuels. The latter case has been reported from Benin.
551
  
At the same time, other factors that relate to the use of land have to be accounted 
for when assessing the utility derived from these investments. This clearly extends beyond 
the question of production for local or international consumption. In the case of the 
agricultural demonstration centers, for instance, these projects support the 
internationalization of Chinese agribusinesses, allow for economies of scale, and create 
new markets for their services in the form of proprietary seeds and machinery. In the case 
of infrastructure or mining projects, these projects often support Chinese efforts to access 
resources and/or promote exports. This means that in many cases, the additional utility 
derived from the use of land overseas perfectly matches China’s official development 
objectives, as outlined in its OFDI policy, the country’s 11th and 12th Five Year Plans,552 
and/or Africa-relevant policies. A closer assessment of the question of how these 
investments relate to the interests of influential Chinese actors and broader development 
                                                 
549 Brautigam (2009); Ekman (2010). 
550 One example is the Chipata Cotton Company. It exports the surplus cotton that exceeds the capacity 
of its ginning factory to international markets and China. See Schoneveld et al. (2014), 25-27; and 
China Development Bank (31 May 2012). 
551 See details and organogram in Nonfodji (2011). 
552 Chinese Government (2006); Chinese Government (2011). 
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agenda will be provided in Chapter 5, where the country’s political economy, ideology, 
policy, and development trajectory are considered. 
Strategies of Access 
Land for agricultural investments is usually acquired through leasing contracts, 
contract farming schemes, or through joint ventures with domestic companies that have 
direct or indirect access to land. The method used depends on domestic legislation and 
context. Ordinarily, the suitability of the land area has been identified through exploratory 
visits. Interestingly, there are hardly any known cases in which Chinese investors or 
officials explicitly tried to request large-scale land leases.
553
 One such case has been 
reported from Mozambique, where the Chinese government negotiated a resettlement 
project of Chinese farmers that was first proposed in 1997. However, the project 
negotiations never left parliament and were discontinued due to political 
sensitivities.
554
Another case is the ZTE biofuel project in the DRC, where the company 
negotiated at least 100,000ha for palm oil plantations with the DRC Ministry of 
Agriculture in 2007.
555 
As of 2013, the palm oil project had not been implemented. Instead, 
the company was farming 256ha as previously mentioned. The fact that a case which has 
been widely reported as the “land grabbing” case – a Chinese company’s acquisition of 
                                                 
553 Brautigam and Zhang (2013). 
554 Ekman (2010), 30-31. 
555 Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1686. 
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2,800,000ha of land for the production of biofuels
556
 – does not exist highlights the 
unsound quality of many “land grab” reports.557  
In many cases, the recipient governments’ agencies have offered land for 
agriculture to Chinese investors. In Cameroon, for instance, the government presented the 
Chinese businessman Wang Jianjun (who manages the SINO IKO CAM company) with a 
long-term land lease option for 10,000ha for the production of hybrid rice.
558
 In 
Mozambique, several agricultural projects in the Zambezi valley, mostly in processing, 
were chosen and lobbied for by the Mozambique government.
559
 In Mali, the SUKALA 
S.A. project, which owns an approximately 5,000ha sugarcane plantation, was requested 
by the Mali government. This last investment took the form of a debt-equity swap that led 
to a joint venture between the Chinese SOE CLETC and the Malian government. The 
arrangement gave the Chinese side indirect control due to its majority stake (70%) in the 
project.
560
 The pro-active attraction of Chinese investors also seems to be the case with 
regard to the agricultural demonstration centers
561
 mentioned earlier. To obtain this type of 
cooperation project the recipient country has to submit an application. The agricultural 
demonstration center in Tanzania, for instance, comprises between 62 and 300ha 
(depending on the estimate), and is run by the Chongqing Seed Corporation, a Chinese 
municipal state-owned enterprise. The land is used both to produce a hybrid rice variant 
that has the Chinese company’s identifiable intellectual property and to train others in its 
                                                 
556 E.g., GTZ (2009), 66; GLP (2010), 24. 
557 For comparison of different reports and their use of data, also see Giovanetti and Ticci (2011), 44 
(Table A 1).  
558 Putzel et al. (2011), 31. 
559 Ekman (2010), 29-30. 
560 Diaz-Chavez et al (2010), 41; and Nolte and Voget-Kleschin (2013). 16-17. 
561 Li (2010).  
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cultivation. Apart from the demonstration site, the center grows rice through centralized 
outgrower schemes with local farmers, and expects to modernize Tanzanian agricultural 
production.
562
  
The phenomenon of African governments offering land to investors for lease is far 
from unique to the Chinese case. An informal interview with two representatives of Saudi 
Arabia’s Ministry of Agriculture in 2011,563 as well as the very straightforward website 
announcements and, in some cases, overseas presence of Investment Promotion Agencies 
from host countries (e.g., Zambia), all reveal that this phenomenon seems to be common 
practice. At the same time, land lease processes remain tricky: the SINO CAM IKO project 
in Cameroon, for instance, was still awaiting approval of the land contract from the 
recipient government’s presidential office, even though the China EXIM Bank had already 
transferred two thirds of the total (USD 62 million) announced in the signed investment 
agreement.
564
 In another case, reported by the China State Farm and Agribusiness 
Corporation, the Mauritanian government suddenly decided to raise the annual land rent by 
20%, which, together with other events, namely the fuel price rise and a host government-
induced price ceiling on agricultural products, led to a failure of the investment project (see 
Table 4-1).565 
                                                 
562 Tanzanian Affairs (1 January 2013); Brautigam and Tang (2012), 9-10; and ChinaDaily.com.cn (17 
May 2008).  
563 Informal interview, Berlin, November (2011). 
564 See Khan and Baye 2008; Jansson (2009), 10; Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1685; and Li (2010). 
565 China.org.cn (10 December 2003). 
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Table 4-1 – The Case of the China State Farm and Agribusiness Corporation (China.org.cn)566 
 
The China State Farm and Agribusiness Corporation (CSFAC) 
 
““Decades ago we were at the forefront of China’s campaign to reclaim 
wasteland. Now we apply our skills in African countries.” – Han Xiangshan, 
Vice President of the China State Farm and Agribusiness Corporation, and leader 
of its agricultural projects in Africa. 
Currently, CSFAC operates on a total of 16,000 hectares in different countries in 
SSA, growing cash and food crops, and engaging in the whole range of 
agricultural production, processing and sales. 
Success factors mentioned are (1) the political and policy support by African 
governments (e.g., preferential policies for expansion of the agricultural sector; 
tax exemptions on agricultural machinery and production material imports; tax 
rebates on fuel for agricultural use; reduction of annual land rent); (2) natural 
conditions such as the availability of fertile soil, favourable climate; (3) China’s 
capability to provide adequate agricultural technology, management, machinery 
and other inputs. 
Yet, political and natural risks remain, together with varying market potential, 
ideology gaps and differences in work efficiency. Han Xianshan refers to a 
former CSFAC project in Mauretania [sic], which had to close after three years 
despite a successful process of reclamation, experimentation and cultivation on 
the rented farm. However, the government raised the annual land rent by 20%, 
and together with the domestic fuel price inflation, the annual expenditure rose 
by USD 100,000. When the local government then put a price ceiling on 
agricultural products, the state farm project ran high losses, and had to close.” 
 
 
For reasons of risk minimization and/or domestic legislation, most investment projects rely 
on indirect forms of access to farmland, including joint ventures, contract farming, and/or 
purchase agreements. If the data on the number of farmers under contract is correct, 
contract farming as a form of land access seems to be very common and must be affecting 
many rural households. Take, for example, the Malawi Cotton Company, a joint venture of 
the China-Africa Development Fund
567
 and the Qingdao Ruichang Cotton Cooperation. It 
                                                 
566 China.org.cn (10 December 2003). 
567 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed description of this fund in the home country context. 
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is active in cotton production from farming to processing, and reportedly involves 110,000 
rural households under a central farming contract scheme (“company + rural household”). 
In practice, this means that the farmers grow the cotton, whereas the company controls and 
provides inputs and reaps value-added margins by processing the harvest at the new 
spinning and ginning plant in Balaka for export to China.
568
 Through the scheme, the 
company was harvesting close to 40,000 tons of cotton as of 2011.
569
 In another project, a 
Chinese company appears to deliver fertilizer and other assistance to a peanut growing 
project in Senegal. There, the recipient country’s farmer association organizes the 
production of the peanuts on 100,000ha. It is envisioned that 30% of the yield will be 
shipped to China, while the rest will be processed at local factories.
570
 Finally, there are 
projects which mix direct and indirect forms of access as a strategy to ensure sufficient 
supplies for plant operation in the context of supply scarcities. For instance, the SUCOBE 
Company in Benin, which is an affiliate of the Chinese SOE COMPLANT, relies on 
external harvests to complement its own agricultural output. In addition to sugar cane 
production on 4,800ha of land, which the company is leasing for 99 years (renewable), it 
buys cassava from local farmers for its plant operation.
571
 As a result, there has been a 
cassava price hike in Benin.
572
 
Aside from investments by agribusiness or mining corporations, the use of land 
usually plays out more indirectly in its function as a space where productive activities can 
                                                 
568 CDB (31 May 2012); and Chirombo (29 December 2009). 
569 See CDB (31 May 2012); and Chirombo (29 December 2009).  
570 Smaller et al. (2012), 16 (Note: While China imports significant amounts of peanuts from Senegal 
(e.g., China DSIC International Trade Co. Ltd 2014), this particular case has so far remained 
unconfirmed.) 
571 See Nonfodji (2011). 
572 Nonfodji (2011), 12. 
192 
 
take place. In the case of construction and infrastructure projects, for instance, the land is 
appropriated by the respective government and only of profit for Chinese companies in its 
use as a construction or rehabilitation site. And with regard to Chinese Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs), seven of which are currently operating across Africa, the land is leased and 
becomes the basis of a quasi-extraterritorial zone. Though special regulations apply within 
the zone, it remains under the control of the respective recipient government (see Table 
4-2). China itself has used SEZs to serve as controlled areas of economic reform while 
retaining the old political system and it now seems to export its development experiences 
to countries that are officially striving to become emerging economies.
573
 In Mauritius, for 
instance, Chinese companies are establishing an SEZ which is intended to become a major 
manufacturing hub for Chinese light industrial products, medicines, textiles, and 
electronics. Built on an area of 200-500ha, this SEZ is headed by Chinese companies, and 
it is expected to accommodate 40 Chinese companies and create 34,000 jobs, of which 
8,000 shall go to Chinese contractors. It is claimed to generate USD 220 million through 
exports and attract an inflow of USD 750 million worth of investments.
574
 
                                                 
573 See, for instance, Konijin (2013), 3 (Box 3). 
574 Brautigam and Tang (2011). For a more detailed story of the JinFei Special Economic Zone, see 
Alves (2011). 
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Table 4-2 – Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa (Brautigam and Tang 2011; Brautigam 
(February) 2011) 
Nr. Special Economic Zone 
1 Chambishi, Zambia: copper and copper related industries. 
2 
 
Lusaka, Zambia: garments, food, appliances, tobacco and electronics. This zone is classified as a  
subzone of the Chambishi zone. 
3 Jinfei, Mauritius: manufacturing (textiles, garments, machinery, high-tech), trade, tourism, and  
finance. 
4 Ethiopia: electrical machinery, construction materials, steel, and metallurgy. 
5 
 
Ogun, Nigeria: construction materials, ceramics, ironware, furniture, wood processing, medicine,  
and computers. 
6 
 
Lekki, Nigeria: transportation equipment, textiles, home appliances, telecommunications, and  
light industry. 
7 
 
Suez, Egypt: petroleum equipment, electrical appliance, textile, and automobile manufacturers.  
(completed in October 2010) 
Aspects of Governance 
A closer look at issues of land governance also highlights the importance to take 
note of the agency in the host countries. In most recipient countries, land is owned by the 
state. Key ministries or government agencies are involved in these investments, often 
depending on the land’s function. Arable land, for instance, frequently falls within the 
competency of the respective Ministry of Agriculture, whereas land suitable for mining is 
overseen by the respective Ministry of Land and Resources. At the same time, investments 
often take place under the guidance of Investment Promotion Agencies. The negotiation 
and approval process has sometimes included parliamentary consultations, while in other 
cases the investment has been approved by a single office within a Ministry vested with 
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extensive powers to decide over land leases, as, for instance, a report about the Office du 
Niger in Mali underlines.
575
  
Many cases show an overlap of competencies, as well as an absence of effective 
governance structures, clear objectives, or a country-wide land-use or development plan. 
Often, the respective agencies do not know how much arable land is available in total and 
earmark territory for foreign investments based on assumptions which differ across 
agencies.
576
 In some cases, the political elite seem divided on matters of land-consuming 
FDI.
577
 From a more historical perspective that accounts for the context of the SSA land 
crisis in which these investments take place, these failures to effectively govern the land 
used by the investments are not surprising. Rather, they are closely related to the political 
economy of land in the respective host countries.
578
 In this regard, a reporter commenting 
on the weak governance structures in Angola concluded that the foreign investments were 
the outcome of “a global alliance between well-connected in Angola and get-rich forces in 
China, Brazil and Portugal,” which in the case of Angola have come to form an alliance 
that is even “a threat to the former colonial forces in Europe and the speculators in Wall 
Street.”579 
                                                 
575 See a detailed description of the Office du Niger, Mali, in Baxter and Mousseau(2011), 18-58. 
576 See, for instance, Baxter and Mousseau (2011), 1-3. 
577 The latter became obvious in the case of Ethiopia where the Prime Minister, Girma Woldegirogis, 
wrote a public letter to the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Tafera Derbew, to stop a USD 4.4 billion 
investment deal in the Western Region by an Indian company intending to grow pulses and edible oil 
crops for export to India. The deal was likely to negatively impact the region’s fragile micro-climate, 
yet the Minister of Agriculture refused to react to the Prime Minister’s request. See, for instance, 
Ethiopian Review.com (2 February 2011).  
578 See Mosley (2012); and Besada and Goetz (2012). 
579 Campbell (1 December 2011).  
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Actors and Institutions 
From the previous assessment it has become clear that on the recipient side these 
investments involve various ministries and agencies from different levels of government, 
and that host country agency matters. Civil society groups and local community members 
remain largely on the sidelines in the ongoing negotiations. Being embedded in national 
development plans, some projects gain access to funding from national banks or 
multilateral programs or are part of inter-governmental credit agreements or cooperation 
programs. 
From the Chinese side, representatives of different levels of government and 
embassy personnel, as well as private or state-owned entrepreneurs (central, provincial, 
municipal), are involved in these investment projects, (see Table 4-4). Among the more 
unique public actors are the SOEs that belong to the so-called state farm system
580
 and are 
subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture’s State Farm Bureaus at the central or provincial 
level. In the past, these SOEs have been used as “a mechanism for leading the way and for 
gauging the effect of national agricultural/rural policies.” 581  At the same time, they 
represented the ‘first wave’ of Chinese agribusiness going global.582 As of 2014, these 
companies run the agricultural technology demonstration centers on a for-profit basis. I 
previously mentioned the example of SINO CAM IKO in Cameroon. The company is a 
subsidiary of a provincially-managed Chinese state farm (Shaanxi Land Reclamation) that 
is currently engaged in the rehabilitation and operation of such a center in Cameroon, in 
                                                 
580 WB (1998), 55. 
581 WB (1998), 55. 
582 Brautigam (2009), 255-257. 
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collaboration with IRAD,
583
 a national agricultural research center. These kinds of state 
farms
584
 highlight the important linkages between processes of home country development 
ambitions, the international context, and “land deals,” that will be assessed in greater detail 
in Chapter 5. 
Unfortunately, there is hardly any information about the wide range of Chinese 
private actors and their projects in Africa. Among the few that have been assessed in great 
detail is the China International Fund Limited (CIF), which was established in Hong Kong 
in 2003 and has since begun investing in various construction projects in Angola.
585
 The 
fund, which has a bad reputation as a “murky Hong Kong real estate, construction and 
investment company,” has no reported connection to the Chinese government. However, it 
has pretended to act on behalf of the Chinese government to gain access to certain projects 
in the past.
586
 The company is also involved in a joint venture with a company named SPI 
that is the business arm of the Liberation Front of Mozambique Party (Frelimo). This 
mining and cement production project began in 2012 (see Table 4-3). On several occasions, 
the Chinese government has distanced itself from the fund’s activities, hinting at the 
                                                 
583 IRAD is the abbreviation for Institut de Recherche Agricole pour le Développement. The institute 
conducts multi-disciplinary research on how to improve agricultural production. Its history traces 
back to the year 1889; however, it has been reformed since (http://iradcameroun.org/en). 
584 Established in 1947, China’s “state-owned farming system today has expanded considerably – a 
sharp contrast to the decline of state-owned enterprises in the urban sector.” State farms are a vital 
element in China’s agricultural system, “operating in 30 provinces (….), occupying 39 million hectares 
of land (…), employing over 3.5 million people, (…) and contributing to 3.4% of the country’s total 
output” (Zhang (2010), 365). For a detailed description, see Zhang (2010). 
585 See the company’s website (http://www.chinainternationalfund.com/). 
586 Brautigam (2 June 2010).  
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conflict of interests of the different actors involved in Chinese land-consuming OFDI 
activities (see Chapter 5).
587
 
Table 4-3 – Project Projections from the CIF's Website (CIF)588 
Original Condition of the Construction Site Future Condition of the Construction Site 
  
 
In addition to such diverse individual interests that play a role in Chinese land-
consuming OFDI (also see Chapter 5), several institutions structure the political realm. The 
Chinese government has used the Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a high-
level summit established in 2000 that is modeled after the French Summit,
589
 to 
institutionalize relations with African countries and push for the implementation of 
projects on a bilateral basis. Similar forums, such as the Forum on Economic and Trade 
Cooperation between China and Portuguese Countries (FCECCPLP), have also been put in 
place for other regions in order to re-establish economic and political ties.
590
 
Also, several financial institutions support these investments. Specifically, the two 
Chinese policy banks created in the 1990s, the China EXIM Bank and the China 
                                                 
587 Shih (18 January 2010). 
588 See CIF website (http://www.chinainternationalfund.com/projects1.asp?Id=286). 
589 On the role and constitution of annual Franco-African Summits since 1974, see Chafer (2002), 3. 
590 Jansson and Kiala (2009), 3. 
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Development Bank (CDB), play an important role. For instance, the CDB supervises the 
newly created (in 2006) China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund), a stock equity fund 
that targets Chinese companies whose trade and economic activities will reach or take 
place in Africa.
591
 Further, the Chipata Cotton Company in Zambia (now the China Africa 
Cotton Company) received financial support – in the form of equity investment through the 
CADFund – in 2008 after its temporary closure due to financial problems the previous 
year.
592
 Importantly, the regulations of the CADFund ensure that African companies are 
able to acquire funding only through a joint venture with a Chinese company.
593
  
In many cases, however, investments take place without official funding. Some 
SOE subsidiaries seem to profit from preferential loan access through their headquarters, 
while other projects receive national bank credit in the recipient country or multilateral 
funding, in particular in the construction area. In addition, some projects profit from the 
tripartite cooperation structure of FAO projects under the “South South Cooperation” 
umbrella program on food security.
594
 Furthermore, in 2011, the Africa Development Bank 
(AfDB) signed a memorandum of understanding with the Agricultural Bank of China on 
“collaborative ventures in co-financing, technical cooperation for capacity building and 
                                                 
591 CADF (2014). 
592 Schoneveld et al. (2014), 25-27; and China Development Bank (31 May 2012). 
593 Basically, the fund differs from aid because it provides market-based funds, and it differs from 
credit because it invests together with the enterprise, increasing the latter’s financial capacity. Since 
2009, the CDB has an additional special fund for African SMEs, which will be made available on the 
basis of lending and tending. See CADFund website (http://www.cadfund.com/en/). 
594 Brautigam (2010), 31-33. Under the FAO Special Programme for Food Security, Chinese projects 
were implemented in Gabon, Sierra Leone, Caribbean Islands, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Ghana, among 
others. Projects have included the sending of agricultural technicians, training of local agricultural 
technicians, construction of agricultural schools, and building of general infrastructure, such as 
irrigation and road projects. In Angola, for example, over 120,000 farmers from 60 farming 
associations and cooperatives are benefiting from the construction of a dam and irrigation channel and 
training of agricultural technicians. See InSouth.org (2014).  
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knowledge partnership” in the areas of trade finance, infrastructure, agriculture and 
agribusiness, clean energy projects, energy conservation, non-traditional lending business 
(e.g., investment banking, consultancy, and advisory business), knowledge sharing and 
technical assistance, and, if necessary, other areas.
595
 Moreover, the company ZTE was 
accredited as a UN World Food Programme supplier for an experimental plot of 10ha near 
Kinshasa, where it has been growing food since 2008 in cooperation with the DRC 
Ministry of Agriculture.
596
 
With regard to investments that are part of aid projects, the choice of aid 
instruments is largely context specific. While grants and zero-interest loans are spread 
across the continent, concessional loans are linked to the receiving country’s capacity, 
which depends on its economic status, or the condition that the loan goes into a productive 
project whose generated income allows for repayment over time.
597
 Brautigam has shown 
that basically all SSA countries that have diplomatic ties with Beijing (China) receive 
foreign aid to various degrees.
598
 A precondition for diplomatic ties is adherence to the 
previously mentioned ‘one China principle.’ At the same time, there is no indication that 
resource-rich countries, namely Nigeria and the DRC, are the recipients of larger amounts 
of aid.
599
 
                                                 
595 See AfDB (9 June 2011). 
596 ZTE Energy (n.d.b). The current status of this project remains unclear. 
597 Brautigam (2011b), 212. State Council (2011a). 
598 Brautigam (2011b), 212. 
599 See Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
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Table 4-4 – China in Africa: Actors involved in Land-Consuming OFDI (selected) 
Actors Involved at Different 
Levels of Governance 
Public Private  Hybrid 
INTER-
NATIONAL/ 
OTHER 
International 
agents 
-FAO South-South 
Cooperation Program 
-United Nations’ World 
Food Program (WFP) 
Supplier Program 
-WB 
-AfDB 
-Earth Rights Institute 
(NGO) 
 
CHINA AND 
HONGKONG 
(HK) 
National -China EXIM Bank 
-SINOSURE 
-State Council 
-Ministry of Commerce 
-MoFTEC
600
 and MoL 
-Ministry of Agriculture 
-China Development 
Bank -(CADFund) 
-SOEs from central state 
-SUCOBE (Benin) is a 
subsidiary of China 
National Complete Plant 
I/E Corporation (Group) 
(COMPLANT) under 
supervision of State 
Council 
-“snakeheads”601 
-Private owned 
enterprises (POEs) 
(only a few are known) 
-China Africa Cotton 
Company (listed at 
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange) 
AOCABFE (umbrella 
organization)
602
 
-China International 
Investment (investor 
umbrella organization 
for 260 Chinese 
organizations) 
-ZTE Energy, 
subsidiary of ZTE 
corporation
603
 
-China International 
Fund (Hong Kong) 
-Farmers 
-Workers 
-Labor Export 
Companies 
-Daitong (POE) 
 
 
 
Sub-national -SOEs from provinces or 
municipality, 
bureaucratic agents and 
agencies:  
-Chongqing Sino-
Tanzania Agriculture 
Development Company, 
subsidiary of Chongqing 
Zhong Yi Seed Ltd. in 
Tanzania (outgrower 
scheme, hybrid rice) 
-Shaanxi Land 
Reclamation General 
-Malawi Cotton 
Company (joint 
venture between 
CADFund and 
Qingdao Ruichang 
Cotton Company) 
                                                 
600 The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MoFTEC) preceded the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM). 
601 This term describes criminal organizations that smuggle people and drugs. See African Labour 
Research Network (2009), 27. 
602 AOCABFE stands for Association of Overseas Chinese Agricultural, Biological, and Food Engineers. 
603 Formerly an state-owned enterprise, ZTE Corporation has been turned into a private company 
(shareholding). See testimony in front of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the US 
Congress by ZTE’s Senior Vice President for North America and Europe, Zhu (2012); and the report by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Rogers and Ruppersberger (2012). 
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Corporation (state-owned 
conglomerate)  
-Hebei Province Bureau 
of Foreign Trade 
Promotion 
-Shandong Province 
(Cement Factory) 
-Fuzhou Province Fishery 
Coop 
-Shaanxi State Farm 
(provincial actor), has a 
subsidiary (SINO IKO) in 
Cameroon 
-Guangdong Agribusiness 
Group 
BILATERAL   -SUKALA (China-Mali) 
Inter-provincial 
cooperation between Gaza 
Province (MOZ) and 
Hubei Province  
-CADFund office in 
Zambia  
Friendship Farms 
China International 
Fund (HK) and 
Frelimo's investment 
arm, SPI-Gestão e 
Investimentos (JV on 
cement in MOZ) 
-Viscount Energy 
Limited  
-Nigeria’s Ebony 
State government 
-Zambia 
Development 
Agency -China 
LongPing High Tec 
Company 
RECIPIENT 
COUNTRIES 
National -Senegal National Bank 
-Zambia Development 
Agency 
-IRAD (Institute de 
Recherche Agricole pour 
le Developpement, 
Cameroon) 
-(Cameroon) Office of the 
Prime Minister  
-Inter-Ministerial 
Committee - local 
authorities at Ndjoré 
Tanzanian government 
-Mali National Assembly 
-DRC Ministry of 
Agriculture 
-African Finance 
Corporation (Nigeria) 
-Nigerian Banks 
 
 
Sub-national   -Chief of Ndore (in 
Nigeria) 
 
In order to further elaborate on the official perspective on land-consuming FDI in 
the recipient country context, the following section will briefly outline the stated goals of 
the investment projects on the project and country levels. 
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4. The Investments in the Recipient Context: Stated Goals and Multifaceted Reality 
Host country agency and public policy are often ignored by orthodox explanations 
of land-consuming OFDI from an investor country perspective. Yet, overall, Chinese 
investments are embedded in the national (and international) development programs and 
rhetoric. Therefore, the next sections provide several examples that I have encountered 
during process tracing, focusing on the stated goals, development policies, and actual 
impact of Chinese land-consuming investments. The insights gained contribute to the 
exploration of alternative explanations of how (and why) Chinese OFDI projects take place, 
and they show that so-called pull and push factors coexist.  
The stated goals of the investigated investments vary slightly across different levels 
of analysis. On the project level, the stated goal of many investments in both the 
agricultural and mining sectors is often to reduce imports and boost production of the 
respective product in order to promote food security and/or the industrialization goals of 
the recipient country. For instance, SINO CAM IKO in Cameroon envisioned reducing 
rice imports by increasing output from 50,000 tons to 400,000 tons per year,
604
 and the 
CIF-SPI joint venture in Mozambique (called CIF-MOZ) allegedly aims to increase 
cement production and thereby support industrialization and modernization plans through 
reduced cement prices.
605
 In the case of Nigeria, VISCOUNT Energy, the “Chinese-
                                                 
604 Khan and Baye (2008), 7, 15; Wikileaks (2010a). 
605 Cementchina.net (27 August 2010); Cementchina.net (31 May 2011); Duran (2012), 20-22. 
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supported Nigerian firm” active in the biofuels sector claims that the project is intended to 
improve domestic energy security.
606
 
On the recipient country level, many investment projects are embedded in national 
development plans that the respective government wishes to implement with the help and 
capital of foreign investors.
607
 For instance, the detailed case study by Ekman on Chinese 
investments in Mozambique shows that the agricultural investment projects have been 
determined by the Mozambican government.
608
 The same applies to other countries and 
projects. The previously mentioned VISCOUNT Energy project in Nigeria matches the 
Nigerian National Biofuel Development Policy.
609
 The ZTE Energy investment in the 
DRC (status unclear) would be part of a project to restitute a former agriculture 
cooperation farm (DAIPN); it would involve Chinese investors as well as the African 
Development Bank and other foreign companies.
610
 Moreover, the extension of the 
SUKALA S.A. project in Mali is part of the Malian government’s acclaimed goal to turn 
the country into an “agricultural powerhouse.”611 Similarly, agricultural investments in 
Senegal are part of the Senegalese Growth Plan (“Grand Agricultural Offensive for Food 
and Abundance (GOANA)”) that has come about as a result of the food crisis. It favors 
foreign investors through free repatriation of profit, tax breaks, or the provision of public 
                                                 
606 Rothkopf (2007), 336. 
607 See, for instance, Baxter and Mousseau (2011) on Mali; and Lavers (2011, 2012) on Ethiopia. 
608 Ekman (2010). 
609 Shaad and Wilson (2009), 10; Galadima et al. (2011), 22-24; and This Day (28 August 2006). 
610 Baende (29 March 2010); and Braeckmann (September 2009). 
611 Xue (2010). See also Baxter and Mousseau (2011), 19, 24; Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Mali 
(2009), 14. 
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subsidies.
612
 And the SUCOBE project in Benin matches the government’s proclaimed 
goal of stepping up agricultural production and mechanization.
613
  
These domestic development programs are matched by programs and institutions at 
the regional level, such as the African Union Commission (AUC), the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Secretariat, or the African Development Bank (AfDB). 
These organizations have, for example, started an initiative for the development of 
infrastructure in Africa, which is framed as a prerequisite for economic development and 
growth on the continent.
614
 They are also promoting FDI projects in agriculture to boost 
food security and improve drought resilience. In fact, the AfDB’s regional strategy for 
2012 refers explicitly to “the mobilization of resources from China, India, Brazil and 
Argentina” as a means to address related challenges.615 
Despite such claims about the developmental offerings of land-consuming FDI 
projects made by people and institutions involved in the relevant processes, empirical 
evidence underlines that for the host countries, as well as the home countries, the 
implications are ambiguous. For instance, from a social viewpoint, these investments are 
not necessarily a developmental success story: while they can create jobs and generate 
revenue, in many cases few jobs are generated, and these are characterized by poor labor 
relations and/or wage discrimination between Chinese and local labor.
616
 Wages in some 
cases are reported to be below the domestic minimum wage, and in most cases, jobs are 
                                                 
612 See, for instance, Stads and Sène (2011), 3. 
613 See Nonfodji (2011). 
614 See AfDB (2014).. 
615 AfDB (8 February 2012). 
616 Baah and Jauch (2009), 330. 
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offered on a daily wage basis without social insurance. Employees earn about USD 1.5-2 
per day.
617
 Unfortunately, these unfavorable social conditions seem to be common to most 
foreign projects rather than being unique to Chinese ventures.
618
 With regard to rural 
development, the large-scale implementation of central contract farming schemes seems 
unlikely to improve rural livelihoods given the weak legal environment, lack of risk 
insurance, and official corruption present in many host countries. Indeed, historical 
evidence about the developmental implications of such schemes suggests that they tend to 
reduce rather than strengthen the multiple positive impacts that agricultural work can have 
with regards to social, economic, political, or environmental aspects of society.
619
  
Empirical (albeit anecdotal) evidence also suggests that the development policies in 
many recipient countries pose challenges for national economic development, for instance, 
by disadvantaging otherwise competitive indigenous enterprises that suffer from limited 
access to capital, technology, or global markets. The crowding out of such enterprises by 
these investments has been observed to a certain degree in the textile industry, though 
mainly through the intensified trade and import of textiles. Also, the strong presence of 
Chinese construction companies that manage to profit from government-facilitated 
‘resource for infrastructure’ deals, seems to squeeze the operating space for local or 
regional firms.
620
 Plus, the influx of Chinese small-scale entrepreneurs, a side-effect of 
intensifying Chinese-African trade and investment relations, has proved challenging for 
local shop owners. Another concern raised in the context of national economic 
                                                 
617 Baah and Jauch (2009). 
618 See, for instance, Baah and Jauch (2009), 108. 
619 See, for instance, Smalley (2013); and IAASTD (2008). 
620 Brautigam (2011a), 7; Chen et al. (2009). 
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development is the issue of financial debt. It is true that “barter exchange deals” consider 
issues such as the “manageability of debt,” often by requiring recipient country 
governments to repay it with the investment returns that are anticipated from the benefits 
of industrialization.
621
 Yet, the high degree of corruption and poor governance record in 
most countries, together with the generally long period before repayment is due, provide 
valid reasons for concern over the sustainable management of debt.
622
  
Aside from these economic and social challenges, some reports highlight the 
negative environmental impacts of some large-scale farming projects, specifically 
regarding regional micro-climates or water security. Take, for example, the SINO CAM 
IKO’s farming project in Cameroon that was mentioned above. In order to gain access to 
fertile ground in a moderate climate zone, the investor cut down trees, which might result 
in problematic changes to the regional micro-climate. Another example is the sugar cane 
production project in Mali. A case study by the Oakland Institute mentions the problem of 
water diversion and the declining level of the Niger River as a project-related challenge 
that is likely to intensify water insecurity and affect neighboring countries that depend on 
this river.
623
 And Bosshard has pointed to the fact that key development finance 
institutions, such as the China EXIM Bank, have financed projects, including dam 
construction, for which the environmental pre-assessment did not meet international 
standards, yielding problematic results for the affected population and environment on the 
                                                 
621 See Brautigam (2011a), 7. 
622 Brautigam (2011a), 7-8. 
623 Baxter and Mousseau (2011), 15-26. 
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ground (Sudan).
624
 Finally, the water-intensive character of Chinese agricultural projects in 
African countries has been highlighted as worrisome, since rice, sugar cane, and cotton 
rank among the 'thirstiest' crops.
625
  
Regarding the public perception about Chinese investments within recipient 
countries it is interesting to note that this does not seem to differ from that about Western 
countries, according to a study by Gadzala and Hanusch.
626
 These authors write that the 
“negative rhetoric emanating from much of the surrounding literature tells only part of the 
story, as African perceptions of China are found to be near equivalent to those held vis-à-
vis Western countries.”627 Nevertheless, the Chinese presence in African economies has 
become politicized and entered the political discourse during electoral campaigning in 
some countries as the case of Zambia highlights (see below).  
In some cases, rising and vocal discontent has emerged among third parties affected 
by Chinese investments through increased competition. A cable by the US Embassy in 
Mali,
628
 for example, reported that the US company Schaffer had complained about the 
strong Chinese presence in the country. This was likely in relation to the SUKALA S.A. 
(Sino-Mali joint venture) expansion plans, which pertain to areas of land that had 
originally been promised to Schaffer by the host government. According to statements 
made by Schaffer, the expansion is part of a broader strategy to prevent other companies 
from entering the sugar market, thereby preserving the joint venture’s quasi-monopoly 
                                                 
624 Bosshard (2008), 3-5.  
625 See Davis’ (2003) study on the water-intensity of the crops rice, wheat, cotton, and sugar cane. 
626 Gadzala and Hanusch (2010). 
627 Gadzala and Hanusch (2010), 4. 
628 Wikileaks (2009a). 
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position within this sector.
629
 In this context, it is interesting to note that since 2008 there 
has been a proliferation of Western funds set up by the development agencies of OECD 
countries to support Western agribusinesses in Sub-Saharan Africa (also see the case of the 
UK in Chapters 6 and 7).
630
 While difficult to prove, these funds seem to be inspired by the 
basic model of the China-Africa Development Fund, which was put in place by China in 
2006. The Western funds are clearly aimed at strengthening the OECD economic presence 
on the continent. The impact of heightened competition through newcomers such as China 
is also well documented in the context of the Chipata Cotton Company in Zambia. Due to 
the company’s presence, the previous informal pricing regime led by quasi-monopolists 
from France and Britain has been challenged.
631
 
5. The Issue of Labor 
One phenomenon that has received widespread international attention is the issue of 
Chinese labor exports in these investments to SSA. The following section will provide a 
brief overview of the core issues to discern myths while deliberating on the dimension and 
background of this phenomenon. This step seems necessary for a meaningful 
understanding of the Chinese presence in SSA. Moreover, given the historical roles of 
migration and labor exports in political regime stability and social mobility, which were 
described in Chapter 3, this overview of the contemporary situation will provide valuable 
insights for comparison.  
                                                 
629 Wikileaks (2009a). 
630 Miller et al. (2010), 146-165.  
631 Tschirley and Kabwe (2009). 
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A study by Yoon Jung Park reveals that the number of Chinese migrants in Africa 
rose constantly over the 10-year period ending in 2012 and probably reached one million 
that year. It also reports that many of these migrants live in segregated communities: 
In 2009, the Chinese population in Africa was estimated at between 580,000 to 820,000. 
Today, that number is likely closer to (or even over) 1 million, although exact counts are 
virtually impossible to ascertain due to the mobility of Chinese migrants as well as highly 
porous borders within Africa, high levels of corruption within some African government 
agencies, and inefficiencies within agencies tasked with immigration and border control.  
While most Chinese in Africa are there only temporarily — as contract laborers and 
professionals — there are a growing number of Chinese migrants choosing to remain in 
Africa to explore greater economic opportunities. Recent research in southern Africa 
indicates that, although many Chinese migrants plan to eventually return to China, many in 
South Africa and Lesotho have already stayed years beyond their original plans.
632
 
While it appears that China has no grand strategy of labor export in place, several 
factors in the home country do encourage it. These include official propaganda portraying 
Africa as the continent of opportunity,
633
 the absence of sufficient unemployment 
protection in China,
634
 widespread corruption, development and climate change-related 
land loss, the problematic hukou system
635
 which discriminates against rural workers 
wishing to migrate to urban areas, lax migration controls, and the negotiation of work visas 
for Chinese staff overseas by the Chinese government. The confluence of all of these 
features in the Chinese context definitely creates an environment of high migration 
pressure. This could be seen as the silent promotion of labor export so long as conditions 
back home do not improve significantly for the rural population. 
                                                 
632 Park (4 January 2012); also see Park (2009). 
633 Park (4 January 2012).  
634 Lee (2000), executive summary. 
635 Hukou refers to a household registration system that restricts rural to urban migration. In its 
current form it “discriminate[s] against poor migrant workers in favor of the wealthy and educated.” 
For more details, see, for instance, Congressional-Executive Commission on China (2005), 1; also see 
Murphy and Tao (2006). 
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Moreover, Chinese companies continue to gain a competitive advantage over 
Northern competitors when using comparatively cheap skilled Chinese labor.
636
 One of the 
striking aspects of Chinese labor export is that it highlights the shortfalls of the country’s 
economic development in view of social development. Research about Chinese 
construction projects shows that even in current times, (skilled) Chinese workers (in China) 
often do not earn significantly more than their African counterparts (in Africa) while 
working under harsh conditions and being denied basic social rights.
637
 Brautigam argues 
that the use of Chinese workers in investments in agriculture is especially common in oil-
rich countries with higher wage levels. In such places, Chinese labor provides companies 
with a competitive edge in contract bidding.
638
 At the same time, the wages paid to 
Chinese staff in overseas projects can be higher than those paid in China, which explains 
why many workers decide to go overseas and work in projects in Africa to improve their 
family’s welfare back home.  
Overall, however, the cost competitiveness of skilled Chinese labor is only (a minor) 
one of several considerations that influence Chinese companies’ choice of hiring Chinese 
rather than local staff. Equally important are cultural and social aspects. Hiring Chinese 
staff, particularly for managerial positions, allows the company to circumvent language 
barriers that arise from the lack of knowledge of foreign languages among Chinese 
technical experts, and makes it easier to implement Chinese work modes: “Using Chinese 
works ensured fast communication within project teams and prompt completion of the 
                                                 
636 See Alden (2007). 
637 Chen et al. (2009), 83-84. 
638 Brautigam (2011a), 7-8. 
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work.”639 A contributing factor seems to be the (alleged) lack of skilled African workers, 
particularly in the construction sector. The resultant rise of skilled African workers’ wages 
close to the level of skilled Chinese workers’ wages, together with the perception that 
skilled African labor is less productive, has also motivated Chinese companies to import 
slightly more costly Chinese workers in the implementation of projects.
640
 
Even though labor export is not a primary concern of the central government in 
China, the internationalization of the labor market is promoted for different reasons by 
different actors. The central government has endorsed it as a way for its companies to 
succeed in contract bidding by taking on the comparatively ‘cheap (skilled) labor.’ There 
are other voices, particularly at the provincial and municipal government levels (e.g., 
websites of provincial governments), that promote labor export as a way to address the 
social costs of the chosen development path, such as the problems of structural 
unemployment, poverty, low social mobility, and land-loss-related displacement. In an 
interview in 2008, for instance, Li Ruguo, President of the China EXIM Bank, is quoted as 
saying that his Bank would assist 12 million workers who were to lose their land through 
modernization, industrialization, and urbanization to find work abroad.
641
 And former 
President Hu Jintao has been quoted as saying that emigration was “a good way to lower 
demographic pressure, economic overheating, and pollution in mainland China.”642 Also, 
                                                 
639 Chen et al. (2009), 83. 
640 Chen et al. (2009), 83. 
641 Coonan (28 December 2008); Patton (7 April 2008); Murphy and Tao (2006). 
642 Sege and Beuret (2009), 5. 
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as mentioned above wages can be from 30% to 400% higher in Africa, for skilled workers 
in managerial positions.
643
  
In practice, the increasing number of (un)skilled Chinese laborers, who often live in 
segregated communities, is perceived as a threat in recipient countries with high 
unemployment levels. The concerns of the host populations over these social aspects of 
Chinese investments have been politicized by some political actors during electoral 
campaigns, such as the former opposition leader and then elected president Micheal Sata in 
Zambia (who was in office from 2011 until his death in October 2014). However, the case 
of Zambia also reveals that it might be too easy to blame these unfavorable conditions on 
foreign investors such as the Chinese. Undeniably, the previous Zambian governments 
actually abstained from governing whole sectors (e.g., cotton) and from negotiating local 
content requirements in the context of IFDI.
644
 And the newly-elected president (and 
suddenly deceased), Michael Sata, has not undertaken reforms that will provide a better 
framework for the Zambian population to profit from these and other investments during 
his time in office.
645
 Several case studies document that national policy and politics in 
recipient countries matter greatly in shaping how these investments take place. The labor 
report by Baah and Jauch, for instance, cites numerous incidents where the response by 
government agencies or trade unions improved conditions on the ground.
 646
 At the same 
time, the increasing risk awareness among Chinese government officials and the fear of 
huge investment losses overseas have led the government to offer CSR training to the 
                                                 
643 Park (2009). 
644 Tschirley and Kabwe (2009).  
645 Spilsbury (2012/2013). 
646 Baah and Jauch (2009). 
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corporate management staff of SOEs and to implement the Equator Principles as 
evaluation criteria for public funding.
647
 
From the official angle, the global repercussion of this trend towards 
internationalizing the Chinese labor market and its specific characteristics (e.g., segregated 
overseas communities) have been downplayed and/or explained in the context of China’s 
development trajectory. Lu Shaye, Director-General of the Department of African Affairs 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, partially dismisses labor-related problems of 
Chinese investments to Africa by arguing that it is all a matter of perspective.
648
 His point 
is that the low wage levels associated with the investments in Africa are high when 
compared to wage levels in the same sectors in China. The overseas wage levels result 
from the fact that Chinese companies’ competitive edge is their low cost. Moreover, the 
segregation of Chinese workers from local communities is due to “a problem of cultural 
gap and language barrier” that leads the workers to “(…) build up their own social 
circle.”649 In his opinion, this trend is intensified by the fact that Chinese employees abroad 
work in harsh conditions to ensure a better life at home: “The Chinese employees work in 
tougher conditions than the employees of western companies. (…) They live a hard life, 
eat simple food and live in simple domiciles so that they can send home the money they 
earned to raise their families and improve their living conditions.” Notably, all of this bears 
a strong resemblance to migratory patterns in the late 19
th
 century (see Chapter 3).
650
 At 
                                                 
647 Leung (2010). 
648 Gouraud (18 October 2011). Also see Buckley (2011) for an ethnographic description of the 
different perspectives involved in Chinese-Senegalese agricultural projects. 
649 Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
650 Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
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the same time, the number of Chinese labor disputes has increased, reflecting “attempts by 
China-based labor export agents to get extra income from the Chinese workers.”651 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the main empirical characteristics of what is happening 
regarding Chinese land-consuming OFDI since 2000. The chapter reported in great detail 
on agricultural projects. These were the most common in the “land grab” reports that 
served as a starting point of my research.
652
 However, as I have emphasized, official data 
shows that agricultural investments only make up a minor share of total on Chinese (land-
consuming) OFDI in SSA.  
The rich empirical details are the foundation that allows me to explore alternative 
explanations of land-consuming OFDI from a Chinese perspective (Chapter 5); to 
meaningfully compare the differences and similarities of Chinese and British land-
consuming OFDI; and to assess the role of OFDI in the context of home country 
development (Chapter 8). Importantly, the empirical findings challenge and move beyond 
the orthodox narratives about Chinese ‘land grabbing,’ due to the complexity of (f)actors at 
play and/or the different timelines involved (also see Chapters 1 and 2).  
In this conclusion, I will summarize the core empirical findings for each of the 
categories that have guided this chapter (see Table 4-5). This implies a reduction of the 
                                                 
651 Chen et al. (2009), 83. 
652 I have highlighted that the strong focus on Chinese agricultural projects that characterized early 
publications and project listings of the “land grab” debate is a result of two things: biased reporting; 
and the initial focus on farmland grabs. In the UK case, similar data problems led to an overreporting of 
biofuels investments.  
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complexity that has been characteristic of the main empirical traits identified, and it clearly 
means that certain features which are also part of Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA 
will be excluded. However, it is a necessary step to guide the reader and refresh the core 
results that the Chapter 5 will then explain. 
The findings highlight that multiple actors are involved in Chinese land-consuming 
OFDI in SSA. However, they also show that public actors and agencies are predominant in 
(large-scale) Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA. SOEs, for example, run economic 
cooperation projects, regardless of the sector, and also search for profitable investment 
operations on their own. They are often involved – usually with a majority position – in 
joint ventures with host country companies or SOEs. Government officials of the home 
and host country are also active in these joint ventures, particularly in negotiating the terms 
of economic cooperation, which they frequently do at political forums (such as FOCAC) or 
through other (bilateral) exchange channels.  
Importantly, these forms of state agency are composed of diverse “land grab” 
interests and strategies. Chinese official actors often pursue their own agenda rather than 
the central state’s. Moreover, Chinese SOEs rely on multiple institutions and financial 
sources (e.g., headquarters, host country national banks, and multilateral funding) in their 
operations, aside from Chinese development finance. They also apply mainstream 
managerial economics in their operations and are characterized by a profit orientation, 
even in cases where Chinese development finance is involved, or where resources are 
being exploited. The previous assessment also highlighted that Chinese land-consuming 
FDI projects are often pro-actively sought by African governments, and reflective of 
recipient countries’ development policies. 
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Most companies produce for domestic and regional markets in SSA, particularly in 
the agricultural sector. However, the latter makes up only a minor share of total Chinese 
OFDI activities of which land-consuming investments form a part. The majority of 
investments go into mining, manufacturing, and financial services. With regard to the role 
of land, this means that land is used as a natural resource, but also as a space to open up 
profitable business opportunities in construction, manufacturing, and/or through SEZs.  
The timelines of most of these investment projects can be traced far back. While 
China is a newcomer to the role of capital exporter, it shares a long history of cooperating 
with and providing aid to many African countries. Several actors, such as construction 
companies, have previously run aid projects on the ground, and more recently, they have 
turned into successful contract bidders due to their experience and cost advantage. The 
multiple crises of 2007/2008 have not been critical for what has been happening since 
2000. Instead, their role in Chinese OFDI activities has been ambiguous, – preventing as 
well as enabling Chinese overseas investments.  
In the case of China, Section 5 addressed the issue of labor migration and related 
claims of strategic labor export. These claims have regularly appeared in the media and led 
to political tensions in host countries, many of which suffer from high unemployment. It 
showed that while the central government has no pro-active strategy in place to promote 
labor export, it also does not have a strategy to curb the phenomenon, nor are the origins of 
the pressure to work abroad adequately dealt with by the home government.  
In concluding, several tendencies of Chinese land-consuming OFDI seem 
noteworthy and demand an explanation that assesses them in the home country context. In 
particular, the empirical findings show that Chinese investment projects in SSA establish 
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new markets, access and secure resources, engage in profitable business undertakings, 
internationalize the operations of particular companies and/or strengthen and expand the 
home country’s political ties and powerful economic presence in African countries. What 
this actually means from a home country perspective will be evaluated in the following 
chapter. 
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Table 4-5 – Review of the Empirical Characteristics of Chinese OFDI653 
Category Core Empirical Characteristics 
Actors Projects involve public actors from the recipient country and China; 
they are usually operated by Chinese SOEs, often in cooperation with 
host country SOEs; some actors have a long history on the continent 
(e.g., construction companies) because they began implementing 
Chinese aid projects in the 1950s; Chinese workers and experts are an 
integral part of Chinese investment projects: the experts are part of 
agricultural training centers that Chinese companies are rehabilitating 
and the workers are often employed by construction and energy 
companies in order to keep costs low 
Institutions The main cooperation strategies are negotiated at FOCAC; regarding 
finances, companies rely on multiple sources, ranging from 
headquarter support and Chinese development finance to multilateral 
and host country funding 
Sectors The majority of investments go into mining and manufacturing, 
followed by financial services; according to government data, 
agricultural investments make up only a minor share of total Chinese 
OFDI in SSA 
Timelines Projects predate the 2007/2008 crises, often they can be traced back 
to Mao-Era cooperation with African countries; however, the way 
they are run has changed significantly over time; today, they are for-
profit enterprises 
Role of land Land is used as a natural resource, but also as a space in which to 
open profitable business opportunities (e.g., construction and 
manufacturing); in both cases, projects have a strong profit 
orientation, and are not necessarily producing for export to China 
Recipient context Projects, particularly in the agricultural sector, have been requested 
by African host country governments; mostly, they seem to be the 
result of inter-governmental cooperation at different levels of 
government; the actors involved can have very different interests 
 
                                                 
653 I acknowledge that this summary substantially reduces the complexity that has characterized the 
empirical findings of this chapter. However, it is intended to guide the reader by highlighting the core 
traits of Chinese investment projects that will be explained from a home country perspective in 
Chapter 5 and compared with British empirical characteristics in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 5: THE CHINESE CONTEXT: INVESTMENTS FROM A HOME COUNTRY 
PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
The empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter cast doubt upon the 
widespread claims according to which Chinese land-consuming OFDI is for the country’s 
food security. In practice, the comparatively small share of agricultural projects produces 
for domestic or regional consumption, and many projects can be traced back before the 
2007/2008 crises. Moreover, Chinese projects target multiple sectors that use land not only 
as a resource, but also as a productive space for industrial and modernization activities. At 
the same time, the agency of the state is very diverse. And, a wide range of non-state actors, 
Chinese and other are involved.  
This chapter will take the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4 and assess how 
and why Chinese land-consuming OFDI activities happen against the background of the 
investor country itself. In particular, it will discuss these activities in view of China’s 
OFDI policy (Section 2), the guiding ideology of China-Africa relations (Section 3), and, 
finally, against the background of the country’s political economy (Section 4) and 
development trajectory (Section 5). The multiple threads emerging from this discussion 
will be summarized in the conclusion (Section 6), which will be guided by the question of 
why these investments occur as they do in and over time. In addition to domestic dynamics 
and international contexts, this section will also briefly assess the investments’ likely 
welfare implications. 
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In this second part of the two-part case study, I focus on the home country context 
that these investments emerge from. In particular, I argue that the following features are 
significant in explaining Chinese OFDI from a home country perspective: (1) these 
investments are embedded in an increasingly supportive OFDI framework that emerged as 
a result of the country’s resource-intensive and export-oriented industrial set-up; (2) they 
are guided by a foreign policy ideology that is affected by the neoliberal terminology of 
“win-win” and embedded in the analytical frame of today’s mainstream economics – 
representing a major shift away from previous concepts of autarky and self-reliance that 
informed China-Africa relations; (3) the very actors and institutions involved are reflective 
of a system of “neoliberal governmentality” that has emerged since 1978, and whose state-
market relations are more complex than the concept of state capitalism usually assumes; 
and (4) the investments reflect the rising resource pressures, external dependencies, high 
international competition, and social costs of China’s development trajectory since the 
1990s. 
More broadly, as stated in the introduction of Chapter 4, I conclude that four 
drivers explain why Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA happens from the home 
country perspective. This general argument about Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA 
builds upon the empirical evidence presented about the home country context in this 
chapter, and the main empirical characteristics of Chinese OFDI presented in the previous 
chapter. Accordingly, Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects are part of a long-term 
strategy to diversify supply and access to resources (mineral products), even if these are 
not consumed back home; a diplomatic strategy to foster political alliances and expand the 
country’s soft power in international relations, through economic presence as well as 
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commitment to host country requests; a commercial strategy to develop and open new 
markets for Chinese products; and a strategy to internationalize China’s industrial base to 
address the competitive pressures back home, as well as the ecological and social 
challenges.   
2. Home Country Measures: The “Go Out” Framework  
Institutionally, the investments in Africa reflect the full range of home country 
measures that have been implemented in China since the mid-1980s. This section will 
assess key timelines of the emerging “go out” policy framework underpinning Chinese 
overseas investments; deliberate on the framework’s changing objectives in and over time; 
and introduce its key components that pertain to Chinese engagement with African 
countries. The discussion of Chinese land-consuming investments in the context of policy 
will be complemented by consecutive sections addressing the ideological and politico-
economic specificities of Chinese “land acquisitions” from a home country perspective.  
From a historical perspective, the increasingly supportive stance on OFDI flows 
and the related policy framework emerged in the 1990s. They then gained momentum in 
2001 with the adoption of the “Go Out” (zou chuqu) policy framework.654 While it built on 
existing aid projects and bilateral diplomatic relations, this framework also reflects the 
fundamental change that the Chinese government has undergone in its OFDI policy 
preferences since 1978. Outward investments had long been referred to as “poisonous 
                                                 
654 Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2013). 
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grass” 655  in the domestic debate. They were portrayed as unfavorable for a domestic 
development strategy prioritizing the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.  
The transition from this OFDI-restrictive policy regime towards a supportive one 
has happened over several periods, stretching from China’s opening up in 1984 until the 
present.
656
 Firstly, during the 1980s, the Chinese government prioritized the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves, and maintained a prohibitive stance towards OFDI. Capital 
exports needed the approval of the National People’s Congress; foreign exchange earnings 
were only applicable for licensed companies in the export sector; and requirements 
established a USD 10 million limit together with the obligation to remit all profits made 
overseas.
657
  
Secondly, from 1991 until 2000, and particularly after Deng Xiaoping’s famous trip 
to the South in 1992 and the victory of the economically liberal faction within the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) over the socialist faction, OFDI provisions and related regulations 
began to undergo far-reaching reforms. SOEs took on the status of monopolistic 
enterprises, which gave their management more leeway in operational decisions;
658
 foreign 
exchange regulations “changed from the previous ‘earn to use’ mode into a ‘buy and use’ 
mode;” and OFDI was framed in an official document (“opinion”) by the National 
Planning Commission (NPC) as a strategic instrument for overseas expansion.
659
  
                                                 
655 Xue and Han (2010), 310-320. 
656 Xue and Han (2010), 310-320. 
657 Xue and Han (2010), 310-320. 
658 Wang (2002), 201-205. 
659 The NPC document was titled, “Opinion of the State Planning Commission on the Strengthening of 
the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects.” (The NPC is now the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC)). See Xue and Han (2010), 316-317. 
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Thirdly, since 2001, the Chinese government started implementing the “go out” 
framework, reflecting a more technical and increasingly supportive stance on Chinese 
OFDI (see below for a more detailed description of the framework). As a result, the 
overseas expansion of Chinese companies was supported by financial mechanisms and/or 
the provision of information about the host countries to the companies.  
Since 2009, the regulatory framework has “further eased and decentralized the 
approval procedures,” thereby encouraging the overseas activities of Chinese 
companies.
660
 Moreover, “[i]n July 2009, the PRC government launched a small pilot 
program to permit selected Chinese companies to settle their cross-border trades in select 
offshore jurisdictions in RMB.”661 In this context, China’s Central Bank has also begun to 
push the internationalization of the renminbi, for instance, in the form of an agreement 
with the trade hub Nigeria in Africa to include the RMB as part of its foreign exchange 
reserves from January 2011.
662
  
OFDI: Development, Contexts, and Objectives  
A closer look at the official OFDI documentation helps to break down the sequence 
of events and identify the objectives that led the government (under the given political 
economy) to perceive overseas investment as a useful instrument to realize particular 
                                                 
660 Rosen and Hanemann (2009). Of particular interest is Table 1 (p. 20) on “China’s OFDI Policy 
Framework.” 
661 King and Wood Mallesons (May 2014). 
662 See Payi (September 2011) according to which “Nigeria diversif[ies] reserves into Renminbi” to 
moderate the currency volatility and inflation experienced between US and Naira (Nigerian currency). 
The negative US sovereign rating and the ongoing economic crisis in Europe have been influencing the 
decision by Nigeria to diversify its foreign exchange reserves as a strategy to improve security, 
liquidity, and returns. Also see the case of Zimbabwe, which has adopted the renminbi as legal 
currency under BusinessDaylive.co.za (30 January 2014).  
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interests. The following will show that OFDI has been framed as a tool to facilitate the 
acquisition of resources, technology, and knowhow, promote exports, and create new 
markets. Specifically, OFDI is said to support the country’s efforts to upgrade its industrial 
structure to reduce the negative environmental, ecological, and social impacts of the 
economic development strategy; enhance resource security through the diversification of 
supply; counter the negative impacts of the economic crisis in Asia (and Europe) on the 
Chinese export industry; strengthen and support the emergence of national champions 
(enterprises) in the context of liberalization and WTO accession; and, thereby, ensure the 
stability of the political regime whose legitimacy is seen to rely on economic growth (see 
Sections 3 and 4).  
Historically, two events explain the changing attitude of the Chinese government in 
view of OFDI in the mid-1990s: firstly, the rise to power of the economically liberal 
faction within the CCP; and, secondly, the rising external resource dependency in the 
1990s and the increasing inability of the domestic resource base to keep up with industrial 
demand. Consequently, in 1992, OFDI became part of the country’s economic 
development plan, primarily in the context of encouraging the national oil companies to go 
abroad and diversify supply.
663
 The official document of the National Planning Committee 
also stated that OFDI should be endorsed to “acquire resources, technologies and markets 
overseas.”664  These were all crucial elements that the formerly closed-of country was 
missing in its industrial set-up, which did not have a global production network dimension. 
                                                 
663 Adapted from Xue and Han (2010), 317. And Rosen and Hanemann (2009), 20. 
664 The NPC document was titled “Opinion of the State Planning Commission on the Strengthening of 
the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects.” See Xue and Han (2010), 316-317. 
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Consequently, changes in foreign exchange management made it easier for a greater 
variety of (SOE) enterprises to invest overseas.
665
  
With time, additional dynamics played an important role. In 1999, the Asian 
financial crisis gave impetus to further reform of the existing OFDI regulations. The crisis 
had led to a huge decline in exports due to the relative appreciation of the renminbi, and 
this decline was negatively affecting the manufacturing industry, a major source of jobs 
and state revenues. In response, a first reference to the “Go Out” strategy appeared in the 
1999 State Council document titled “Opinion on encouraging companies to carry out 
overseas material processing and assembly.” 666 This document affirmed the use of OFDI 
to address the problem of a massive decline in regional export demand, and it encouraged 
overseas assembly and processing activities to profit from cheap labor and resources in the 
context of the rising international competition for markets. In this reform step, the 
economic emphasis was on export promotion and industrial restructuring.  
Another event that impacted OFDI regulation was China’s WTO accession in 2001. 
In anticipation of this event, the 5
th
 Plenary Session of the 15
th
 Congress of the CCP issued 
a “suggestion” for economic and social development in 2000, which mentioned four 
investment types that would be supported, namely “processing, trade, resources extraction, 
project contracting.”667 Among the policy support measures mentioned were credit and 
insurance services.
668
 This “suggestion,” which forms the basis of today’s “Go Out” 
Strategy, was then embedded in the “Outline of the 11th Five Year Plan for national 
                                                 
665 Xue and Han (2010), 316-317. 
666 Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9. 
667 See Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9. 
668 Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9. 
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economic and social development.”669 It has become the foundation of ongoing reforms, 
such as the further simplification and decentralization of approval procedures regarding 
overseas investment,
670
 particularly with regard to foreign exchange management and the 
provision of funds for market development and internationalization.  
The underpinning story of this reform process, namely the association of overseas 
investment with domestic economic interests (framed as “needs” in the respective official 
documentation), has since become a common pattern of official rhetoric and action. For 
instance, at the 16
th
 National Congress of the CCP in 2002, then-President Jiang Zemin 
stressed the importance of overseas investments for facilitating domestic reforms and 
liberalization in the context of WTO accession, and for creating competitive TNCs and 
brands with the help of the export of commodities and labor services.
671
 Ongoing reforms 
of OFDI management continue to simplify approval structures while freeing more financial 
resources in support of OFDI activities.
672
  
Together, these multiple objectives, which have come to be associated with the 
Chinese perspective on OFDI projects and embedded in the contemporary policy 
framework, provide important parameters of Chinese development challenges, economic 
interests and paradigms that any assessment and explanation of Chinese land-consuming 
FDI has to take into consideration. The key institutional features of this framework in 
which Chinese OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa is embedded will be outlined in the following 
                                                 
669 Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9. 
670 Rosen and Hannemann (2009), 20; Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9. 
671 Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9-10. 
672 See Xue and Han (2010). 
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section. At the same time, this positive framing of OFDI mirrors shifts in the country’s 
guiding ideology and political economy that will be explained subsequently. 
The “Go Out” Framework 
Today, the set of home country measures that supports Chinese OFDI is cross-
cutting in view of both sectors and policy fields (aid, trade, and investment). It incorporates 
a large range of encouragement policies in the form of tax relief, loans support, foreign 
exchange policy, expat insurance, bilateral investment treaty (BIT) agreements, and 
information services, as well as simplified approval processes, and regularized 
supervision.
673
 While this OFDI policy framework is among the most elaborate when 
compared to those of the other BRICS countries
674
, it still lags behind those of the OECD 
countries, and Chinese entrepreneurs will remain at a disadvantage compared to their 
Western counterparts as long as government and governance “largely function by way of 
the ‘unwritten rules’ of political life.”675 The framework also suffers from the overlapping 
responsibilities of the agencies involved, especially the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM)
676
 and the NDRC, which coordinate the host country catalogue. That 
catalogue lists the countries in which Chinese investors are eligible for subsidies from their 
government.
677
 Moreover, the transfer of approval authority over foreign investments of 
                                                 
673 Xue and Han (2010), 305-323. 
674 BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 
675 Yu (2008), 23. 
676 MOFCOM, the Ministry of Commerce of the Government of the People's Republic of China, was 
established in its current form in 2003. It focuses on trade policies, consumer regulations, FDI, and 
foreign economic policies/agreements (e.g., bilateral and multilateral trade agreements). 
677 For a detailed description of responsible agencies, their competencies, and issued policies 
concerning OFDI management, see Wilkes and Huang (2011); and Han and Xue (2010). 
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less than USD 3 million from central government agencies, namely SAFE
678
 and 
MOFCOM, to the provincial level in 2003 resulted in what has been described as “an 
alphabet soup of agencies, bureaucrats, and businesses looking to regulate or profit from 
Chinese firms’ overseas investments.”679  
With regard to Africa, the Chinese government has negotiated 26 bilateral 
investment agreements with African countries in recent years.
680
 It has also put in place an 
information service platform, through which companies can report difficulties they are 
facing in different countries and learn from each other’s experiences while retrieving legal 
and resource-related data on a given country. At the same time, formalized supervision has 
been introduced in the form of annual reporting by the investing company. All of these 
measures not only support OFDI, but also allow for the steering it.  
In addition to the regulatory institutions, several political and financial instruments 
specifically directed towards investments in SSA are part of this framework of home 
country measures that play an important role in the facilitation of Chinese land-consuming 
investments. In the political realm, the Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, 
Zhong Fei hezuo luntan) has become a central platform for inter-governmental exchange, 
coordination, and cooperation. Since its establishment in 2000, high-level summits have 
taken place on a triennial basis.  
                                                 
678 SAFE, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange established in 1978, is a government agency 
that administers the rules and regulations of foreign exchange market activities. It also manages 
foreign exchange reserves. 
679 Salidjanova (2011), 13; Xue and Han (2010). 
680 Takman (2004).  
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Activities at FOCAC include the announcement of major economic and aid 
cooperation projects between China and Africa, such as the agricultural technology 
development centers, and the release of important whitepapers about the terms and 
principles of cooperation. Many heads of state and high-level ministry personnel have 
attended the summits. For instance, the 4
th
 FOCAC meeting in 2009 attracted heads of 
states and government officials from 49 African countries in addition to a big Chinese 
entourage. In his opening speech, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the 
significance of the forum: 
Since its founding nine years ago, FOCAC has played a major role in guiding and promoting 
the development of China-Africa relations and become a bridge of friendship and a platform 
of cooperation between China and Africa. In the three years since the Beijing Summit in 
particular, the two sides have worked together to build the new type of strategic partnership 
featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural 
exchanges. Together, we have opened a new chapter in China-Africa cooperation. 
681
 
Accompanying this form of strategic political cooperation are new forms of so-
called development finance for overseas projects. In the case of Chinese investments in 
Africa, several financing sources which are embedded in the “Go Out” framework and 
located in the aid, trade, or investment policy fields are essential and will be highlighted in 
the following paragraphs. 
Firstly, grants, zero-interest loans, and concessional loans support Chinese aid 
projects, which have been aligned to trade and investment objectives since a reform in the 
1990s. Zero-interest loans and grants are taken from China’s aid budget and overseen by 
MOFCOM and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
682
 The China Development Bank (CDB) 
and the China EXIM Bank, created in 1994, provide most of this finance under MOFCOM 
                                                 
681 Wen (2009).  
682 Brautigam (2011a), 3; and State Council (2011a). 
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supervision. Moreover, concessional loans were introduced as a new aid instrument in 
1995 under the management of the China EXIM Bank. These loans have a long-term 
repayment period of 20 years, a fixed interest rate (2-3%), and a five-year grace period. 
Importantly, the aid funds are only used to cover the difference between the China EXIM 
Bank’s rate and the fixed interest rate. 683  Using these new instruments to deliver 
development finance, the Chinese government could increase the total number of 
development assistance activities.
684
 
Another financial mechanism is the Special Fund for Foreign Economic and 
Technical Cooperation (hereafter ‘the Special Fund’), one of several under the supervision 
of MOFCOM that are meant to support Chinese companies “carrying out the needs of 
China’s economic diplomacy.” 685  It has, for instance, been used to back Chinese 
companies involved in the establishment of the Special Economic Zones mentioned in 
Chapter 4.
686
 The Special Fund repays to companies active in African countries a share of 
their pre-investment costs and provides interest rate subsidies for bank loans. Importantly, 
the Special Fund is not part of the official aid budget.
687
  
Loans made by the two major policy banks, the CDB and the China EXIM Bank, 
are also important for Chinese land-consuming investments. While these loans are “heavily 
influenced by government policies and are not to operate in full compliance with market 
                                                 
683 Brautigam (2011a), 4.  
684 Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
685 Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
686 State Council (2010). 
687 Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
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rules,” they have to meet criteria of profitability. 688 Since these banks get the same credit-
rating as the Chinese government, they can increase funds by issuing bonds with that 
favorable rating; and they can take a long-term perspective.
 689
 
In addition, export buyer’s credits, a long-time feature of the OECD countries’ 
OFDI frameworks, were introduced in 1998. They were initially for firms with projects in 
the construction sector overseas (Asia). Since 2005, the China EXIM Bank has offered 
such credits for investments in Africa. These export buyers’ credits, which make up the 
majority of lending done by the China EXIM Bank, are not part of the foreign aid regime. 
Instead, they are issued in United States dollars using international standard rates like the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or the Commercial Interest Rate of Reference 
(CIRR).
690
 Moreover, preferential export buyer’s credits are issued. 
Aside from the above-mentioned activities conducted by the so-called policy banks, 
financial activities in Africa also involve Chinese commercial bank activities, such as the 
China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the 
Agricultural Bank of China, and the Bank of China. These banks have recently set up 
branches in African countries with the aim of supporting Chinese companies overseas. 
Take, for example, the ICBC, which purchased a 20% share in the South Africa’s Standard 
Bank. The latter is active in 18 African countries, and it is a major financial actor with 
regard to loan services in Africa.
691
 This means that increasingly, Chinese financial actors, 
both private and state-owned, are becoming influential actors in the financial sectors of key 
                                                 
688 Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
689 Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
690 Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
691 See the report on China’s financial institutions by Executive Research Associates Ltd. (2009), 77-91. 
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African countries and gaining the ability to facilitate investments through bilateral 
arrangements and beyond. This is also evidenced by the internationalization of the 
renminbi and its previously-noted recognition as foreign exchange currency in some host 
countries (e.g., Nigeria, Zambia). 
On the inter-governmental level, the China-Africa Development Fund, an equity 
fund established in 2006 at FOCAC, supports Chinese companies whose trade and 
economic activities concentrate on Africa. Rather than providing credits, this fund invests 
in these companies in order to raise their financial capacities. It also provides consulting 
services. It is overseen by the China Development Bank, and projects are chosen on the 
basis of China’s diplomatic and economic policies towards the continent. In addition, in 
2009, the China Development Bank announced a Special Loan for African SMEs in 
selected sectors (export orientation, agriculture), using the mode of direct lending and 
tending.
 692
  
In Hong Kong, the “Go Out” strategy was mirrored by the creation of the China-
Africa Business Council on 21 April, 2007. The Council, under the Presidency of Mr. Hu 
Deping, was established by the China Society for Promotion of the Guangcai Program, 
together with the United Nations Development Program and the Ministry of 
                                                 
692 Definition of “African SMEs:” solely African-owned small- and medium-sized enterprise(SME); 
Chinese-owned SME in Africa; Joint African-Chinese private equity SMEs; contractual joint venture 
SMEs. Sectors supported: infrastructure, agriculture, tertiary industry. In 2009, the CDB developed and 
recorded 34 projects in Africa. These have a total value of USD 961 million in commercial or 
preferential loans, which does not count as aid but as market-based financial support. See MOFCOM 
(2011b); and MOFCOM, Department of Western Asian and African Affairs (2010). 
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Commerce/China International Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges.
693
 It seeks 
to explore business opportunities among Hong Kong, the Mainland, and African 
businesses. 
Summary 
Five observations regarding Chinese land-consuming investments in SSA can be 
derived from the OFDI policy framework and its emergence. Firstly, these investments are 
part of a general trend of growth in Chinese overseas investments that is related to the 
adoption of a supportive OFDI policy over time, particularly since 2000. According to 
China’s Ministry of Commerce, at the end of 2010, 13,000 Chinese investors or 
institutions were operating 16,000 overseas enterprises in 178 countries.
694
 By that year, 
China had become a major source of global OFDI flows, moving into fifth place among all 
investor countries (preceded only by the US, Germany, France, and Hong Kong).
695
  
Secondly, the comparatively low levels of OFDI stock nonetheless reveal that 
China has just begun to catch up with the international standards represented by the OECD 
countries.
696
 The ratio of Chinese IFDI-to-OFDI, which in 2011 stood at a level of 1:0.09, 
was still below the world average of 1:1.11. In comparison, OECD countries have an 
average ratio of 1:1.14.
697
  
                                                 
693 See China-Africa Business Council (Hong Kong) website (http://cabc.hkbu.edu.hk/news6.html); 
and Africa Confidential (2014). 
694 MOFCOM (2011a), 79, 80.  
695 See MOFCOM (2011a), 79, 80.  
696 MOFCOM (2011a); 81. On the limitations of OFDI data from MOFCOM, see, for instance, Korniyenko 
and Sakatsume (2009), 3.  
697 Sun (2011), 8. 
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Thirdly, despite being part of a general trend, the instruments summarized above 
apply particularly to the Chinese investments in African countries. Yet, it is important to 
note that it remains unclear to which extent Chinese land-consuming FDI projects have 
actually accessed or profited from these political and financial support mechanisms.  
Fourthly, while these investments are unique within the Chinese country context, 
they are not exceptional in comparison to other countries’ practices. Comparative research 
on FDI regulations shows that the home country measures implemented in China are rather 
common worldwide, particularly among the highly industrialized countries.
698
 Also, 
Chinese development finance is far from being extraordinary in international 
comparison.
699
  
Fifth, the timeline of the emergence of China’s OFDI framework underscores that it 
was a response to country-specific developments and politico-economic constellations at 
certain points in time. These include the rise to power of the economically liberal faction 
within the CCP; the industrial demand surpassing the country’s resource base; the 
increasing dependence on export markets; and the enhanced competition at home due to 
the IFDI-led growth strategy as well as WTO accession.  
In sum, the above overview of frameworks, timelines, and objectives supports this 
thesis’ argument that it is crucial to account for the specificities of home country context 
and development in explaining why these investments are occurring. This section has done 
so by comparatively introducing the key features and events that have constituted and 
                                                 
698 Sauvant et al. (2010). 
699 See, for instance, Brautigam (2011a). 
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shaped the contemporary policy framework that supports Chinese OFDI in general and 
Chinese OFDI in Africa in particular. Such a detailed contextualization of the investments 
in country frameworks, timelines, and objectives also points to the importance of taking 
the structural (i.e. export dependency, limited resource base, or WTO accession) and 
contingent (i.e. Asian crisis or the victory of the liberal faction within the CCP) factors of a 
home country’s development trajectory into account when assessing and analyzing land-
consuming investments. As Marks so pointedly highlighted in his history of the modern 
world, in many cases events not plans shape great powers.
700
 This insight emphasizes the 
limits of using highly functional theoretical approaches to capture why “land grabs” occur. 
3. Guiding Ideology 
Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects do not transpire in an ideological vacuum. 
Rather, their facilitation and legitimation is embedded in an overarching and guiding set of 
ideas that is prone to shifts over time. This guiding ideology, basically a cluster of ideas 
that perform ideological functions (see Chapter 1), ranges over several policy sectors, 
taking the form of whitepapers, significant government speeches, or declarations at the end 
of FOCAC conferences. A closer look at the discourse surrounding these investments 
reveals the profound changes that have taken place in China’s political landscape and 
development orientation since 1978. Instead of portraying the anti-capitalist and self-
dependence dogma of Mao-era foreign policy, the new discourse is affected by the 
neoliberal terminology of “win-win” and embedded in the analytical frame of today’s 
                                                 
700 Marks (2007) 
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mainstream economics.
701
 The latter has become entrenched in the thoughts of the different 
factions in the CCP,
702
 and it is visible in official reports on China-Africa relations, such as 
the one by the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(CAITEC), which argues that the “sustained, rapid growth of China’s economy has 
provided a broad and stable market for African products.”703 Phenomena that under Mao-
era rhetoric would have been attributed to “imperialism” are now framed as 
“opportunities,” and the exploration of resources is now referred to as serving both parties’ 
“development needs” rather than representing unilateral “exploitation” and “plunder.”704  
However, this rhetoric is not confined to the realm of international economic 
relations. Instead, it reflects the ‘trickle down’ ideology that has been embraced by the 
political elite since the 1990s in national development programs. The strengthening of the 
(economically) liberal faction within the CCP led to the adoption of a development 
strategy that has become known as “playing two hands hard.”705 While one hand represents 
the ultimate power and political control by the party, the other hand has been used “to 
achieve economic growth by any and all means possible and available.”706 Under this 
development paradigm, economic growth has come to be seen as a guarantee of political 
regime stability, (allegedly) providing jobs and state revenues. Accordingly, it is at the 
center of political agendas across all levels of government. In 2011, the mounting social 
                                                 
701 Compare, for instance, Deng (1974) and the whitepaper on peaceful development by the State 
Council (2011b). 
702 Cheng (2001). 
703 CAITEC (2010). 
704 The comparison is based on Deng Xiaoping’s speech at the UN General Assembly (Deng (1974)) and 
contemporary government rhetoric of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (MOFA (2006)). 
705 Oman (1 July 2011).  
706 Oman (1 July 2011).  
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unrest related to the high costs of this development approach led the Chinese government 
to change the principle of “strong state, wealthy people” into “wealthy people, strong 
state” (12th Five Year Plan),707 indicating a new emphasis on social, environmental, and 
ecological aspects of development. Yet, in practice, the political control of the party still 
comes before the wellbeing of the people or the environment (see Table 5-1 for relevant 
publications articulating China’s development ambitions and strategies).  
Against this background, China’s outreach to Africa since 2000 is seen in relation 
to China’s construction of a “socialist market economy”708 and is argued to be of “mutual 
benefit”709 for the parties involved. While the first notion clearly establishes a linkage 
between domestic economic interests and development plans and overseas investments, the 
latter exposes the fundamental shift in China-Africa relations, from unilateral aid provision 
by China to Africa towards “mutually beneficial” cooperation, which is supposed to 
benefit Chinese economic interests as much as it does African countries (see Table 5-1 for 
key documents establishing this linkage).
710
  
                                                 
707 Chinese Government (2011). 
708 State Council (2011a). 
709 State Council (2011b). 
710 Li (2006). 
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Table 5-1 – Key Documents Outlining China’s Development in Relation to the Chinese Presence in 
Africa (selected) 711  
 
Speeches 
 
1974 – Deng Xiaoping, Speech at the UN General 
Assembly 
 
Government (White) Papers 
 
2005 – Whitepaper, “Peaceful Development Road 
2006 – Whitepaper, “China’s Africa Policy” 
2006 – Strategy paper, “11th Five Year Plan, 2006-2010” 
2010 – Whitepaper, “China-Africa Trade and Economic 
Cooperation” 
2011 – Whitepaper “Peaceful Development” 
2011 – Whitepaper “Foreign Aid” 
2011 – Strategy paper, “12th Five Year Plan, 2011-2015”  
 
Official Notice and Frameworks 
 
1991 – National Planning Committee “Opinion”712 
1999– State Council “Opinion”713 
2000 – CCP “Suggestion”714 
Since 2001– Emerging “Go Out” Framework for Overseas 
FDI
715
 
 
Reports 
 
2010 – China-Africa Trade and Economic Relationship 
2011 – Statistical Bulletin of China’s OFDI 2010 
 
China’s Africa Policy 
In 2006, for the first time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published “China's 
Africa Policy” (January 2006),716 a whitepaper that “present[ed] to the world the objectives 
                                                 
711 The documents can be found in the bibliography section as follows: Deng (1974); State Council 
(2005); MOFA (2006); National People’s Congress (2006); Chinese Government (2006); State Council 
(2011b), State Council (2011a); National People’s Congress (2011); Wilkes and Huang (2011); Chinese 
Government (2011); CAITEC (2010); Ministry of Commerce (2011a). 
712 See description in Xue and Han (2010), 316-317. 
713 See description in Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9. 
714 Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9. 
715 See description of major reforms and notices under Xue and Han (2010); Wilkes and Huang (2011); 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2013). 
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of China's policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for 
cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view to promoting the steady 
growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial 
cooperation to a new stage.”717 
The document starts out by portraying Africa as a post-colonial continent with a 
“long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for 
development,” and continues by identifying the guiding principles of China-Africa 
relations as “equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development.”718 At the 
same time, the Ministry describes China as the “largest developing country in the world, 
[which] follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign 
policy of peace.”719 
With regard to the guiding ideology, the complementary concepts of “peaceful 
development” and “common development” are of special importance. Already in 2004 
(and again in 2011), a foreign policy whitepaper titled “Peaceful Development” outlined 
this concept against the background of rising international concerns over Chinese 
investment activities abroad. Basically, the concept of peaceful development claims that 
China’s development trajectory is different from that of Western countries in the past, 
particularly regarding its foreign economic policy. Contrary to Western countries’ episodes 
of economic expansion and industrial restructuring, which were characterized by violence, 
domination, and colonization, China is framed as a responsible “big country,” managing its 
                                                                                                                                                    
716 MOFA (2006). 
717 MOFA (2006). 
718 MOFA (2006).  
719 MOFA (2006). 
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current industrial ‘need’ to expand overseas in a peaceful manner that allows for the 
realization of the development goals of all parties involved. Therefore, it allows for 
“common development,” which again matches the guiding principles of China-Africa 
relations, namely “mutual benefits,” “equality” and “solidarity,” as mentioned in “China’s 
Africa Policy” (see Table 5-2). Multiple statements made by government officials apply 
this narrative, including the earlier quote from 2011 by Lu Shaye, Director-General of the 
Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the nature and driver 
of Chinese-African relations.
720
 China-Africa relations are said to be complementary in 
nature, meeting China’s interest in new markets, resources, and business opportunities, and 
African countries’ interest to increase their primary commodity exports, import technology 
to improve their economies’ productivity, and improve their representation in international 
fora.
 721
 
It is worth noting that the 2006 “China’s Africa Policy” also provides a detailed 
account of measures to be implemented to realize the “mutually beneficial” cooperation. 
Measures named in the political realm include enhanced governmental cooperation at all 
levels of government between the African continent and China, as well as cooperation in 
international affairs, with China speaking up for African interests in international 
institutions. Objectives in the economic field are to establish a China Africa Joint Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (CAJCCI),
722
 stimulate trade, facilitate investment, enhance 
agricultural cooperation, boost infrastructure projects, and foster “resource cooperation” 
                                                 
720 Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
721 Gouraud (18 October 2011). 
722 See the website of the China Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (http://www.china-
africajcci.org/english/about_us.asp) for more information.  
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while continuing with FOCAC ministerial conferences, amongst other projects. In the case 
of Chinese land-consuming investments in agriculture, the document states that the “focus 
will be laid on the cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation, breeding 
technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the processing of agricultural and 
side-line products.”723 
Table 5-2 – Guiding Principles and Objectives of "China's Africa Policy" (MOFA 2006)724 
 
SINCERITY, FRIENDSHIP AND EQUALITY. China adheres to the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road 
of development and supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through 
unity. 
 
MUTUAL BENEFIT, RECIPROCITY AND COMMON PROSPERITY. China supports 
African countries' endeavor for economic development and nation building, 
carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, 
and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa. 
 
MUTUAL SUPPORT AND CLOSE COORDINATION. China will strengthen cooperation 
with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's 
just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the 
international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and 
development in Africa. 
 
LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER AND SEEKING COMMON DEVELOPMENT. China and 
Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and 
development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture 
and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, 
China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable 
development. 
 
The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and 
development of China's relations with African countries and regional 
organizations. 
 
 
                                                 
723 MOFA (2006). 
724 MOFA (2006), part III. 
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In many cases, this rhetoric of mutual benefit, learning, solidarity, and common 
development is replicated when outlining inter-governmental project goals (see Chapter 4), 
but it is also present on the private firm level. For example, the “murky” China 
International Fund Ltd. (CIF) uses a Chinese allegory tracing back to the philosopher 
Laozi to show how its investments in Africa will serve the goal of “common development” 
and “mutual benefit” by transferring technology and knowhow on the one side, and 
creating new business opportunities on the other: “Give a Man a Fish and you Feed him for 
a Day. Teach a Man to Fish and You Feed Him for a Lifetime” (see Figure 4-1 and 
Figure 5-1).
725  
Figure 5-1 – China International Fund Information Material (CIF 2011)726 
 
                                                 
725 To learn more about the dubious reputation of this Fund, see a summary of critical reports on the 
blog by Brautigam (19 October 2011). 
726 “Give a Man a Fish and You Feed Him for a Day. Teach a Man to Fish and You Feed Him for a 
Lifetime.” This saying is reported to date back to Laozi, a philosopher of ancient China who developed 
the strain of Taoism (dao-ism). Chinese characters displayed are as follows: 非洲 (feizhou) = Africa; 中
国 (zhongguo) = China; 鱼 (yu) = Fishery; 渔(yu) = Fish. The sentence plays with the multiple meanings 
of the word “yu” (jade alias wealth; fish; fishery). The comic is taken from the information brochure of 
the China International Fund (2011), 27-28. 
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Summary  
China’s changing ideological orientation clearly correlates with the shifting 
interests of its growth- and export-oriented and resource-intensive (political) economy. 
Undoubtedly, such an economy cannot function along the lines of an anti-capitalist ethics 
framework. That old framework, focusing on “self-dependence” and “autonomy” and 
assuming a zero-sum nature of international economic and ecological exchanges conducted 
on a capitalist basis, was the common Chinese standpoint prior to the opening up of the 
country. To the degree that the current ideology basically denies that there are zero-sum 
aspects in the above outlined bilateral relations that might make one of the two partners 
worse off, – from an ecological, economic, and/or social point of view –, the ideological 
discourse reveals an affinity with mainstream economics framings of development and 
cooperation that are embedded at the level of international economic and aid governance. 
At the same time, the above presented information/publicity brochure of the China 
International Fund Ltd. (Figure 5– 1) reflects the slightly asymmetric conception of this 
“mutual benefit” relationship that is outlined in “China’s Africa Policy” and other 
significant publications mentioned before. It anticipates the exchange of resources from 
African countries for technology and knowhow from China. For the moment being, this is 
largely a reflection of the economic set-up of the partnering countries, but historical 
evidence highlights that such asymmetric exchanges carry the danger of becoming 
permanent. At the least, they are hard to overcome, especially once they are locked into 
existing societal and economic structures (see Chapter 3). The following section will 
expand on the key characteristics of Chinese political economy because they are important 
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to understanding the core traits of this liberal turn presented above from the viewpoint of 
interests involved.
 
4. Political Economy 
Given the complexity of actor constellations in the context of land-consuming 
investments (see Chapter 4), but also in view of the previously-described discursive turn 
since the 1990s, it seems vital to outline the key characteristics of the investor country’s 
political economy that might explain both phenomena in the larger context of home 
country development. Evidently, referring to the dominant role of the state in China’s 
economy falls short of capturing the specificities and/or misses to account for conflicting 
interests.  
In this section, I argue that three aspects of the political economy are of particular 
relevance when contextualizing and explaining – in the home country context – the guiding 
ideology, as well as the multitude of Chinese agents, involved in overseas investments in 
SSA. In the following sub-sections, these aspects will be discussed under the headings of 
state fragmentation; the rise of bureaucratic entrepreneurs; and shifting state-market 
relations. The characteristic mixture of these three aspects has been summarized by Feng 
Xu under the concept of “neoliberal governmentality.”727 
                                                 
727 Feng (2009), 432. 
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State Fragmentation  
Though this is often overlooked, the emergence of the OFDI framework has been 
the outcome of a process of political reform. That is, despite the absence of a reform in 
China towards a “multiparty system and the separation of powers,”728 it was a political 
reform process which created the foundation for the economic transition outlined above. 
This reform process, which has yielded an increasing “fragmentation of the central 
government,”729 as well as the “rise of sub[-]state actors,” has taken place in the areas of 
“state governance and of the administrative systems of the state.”730 As a result, Feng Xu 
argues that a system of “neoliberal governmentality” has emerged: 
Although China is in broad terms an illiberal polity, the Chinese state is increasingly 
adopting a neo-liberal way of governing or neo-liberal governmentality. Following Michel 
Foucault, “governmentality” refers to forms of governance that utilize a network of state and 
non-state actors, with the specific aim of steering individuals (both individual persons and 
individual institutions) to govern themselves in the market economy.
731
 
Increasingly, governance of areas such as energy, agriculture, investment, and labor, 
all of which are related to Chinese land-consuming OFDI, reveals forms of neoliberal 
governmentality in the way it is organized. Particular characteristics are the engagement of 
multiple actors from the public and private sectors, the decentralization of approval 
processes to lower levels of government, and the rising degree of “rule by regulation” in 
the governing of these policy areas.  
                                                 
728 Yu (2008), 23. 
729 Bo (2011). 
730 Yu (2008), 23. 
731 Feng (2009), 432. 
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Importantly, Foucault coined the term “neoliberal governmentality” to describe a 
middle ground of economic governance between laissez faire and state collectivism.
732
 In 
addition, Lemke highlighted that the term defines the fundamental change in how a 
particular socio-economic and political order is legitimized: “Collective wealth produced a 
social consensus on a state that was no longer defined in terms of a historical mission but 
legitimated itself with reference to economic growth. Economic prosperity revealed the 
legitimacy of the state for all to see (…).”733 Moreover, from the perspective of liberal and 
neoliberal political and economic theories, the term neoliberal governmentality seems to 
capture elements of both definitions. On the one hand, the economic liberalization 
processes underway since the 1980s have led to greater importance being placed on the 
rule of law and markets in the governance of China’s economy; however, the (altered) state 
remains central in establishing these institutions and governing this process.
734
 On the 
other hand, some areas have become increasingly deregulated, and (central) state control 
has been significantly reduced.  
This transformation is reflected in the increasingly elaborate “Go Out” framework 
as well as in the composition of OFDI. Not only have approval processes been transferred 
to the provincial level, but provincial actors have also begun to act as foreign policy 
entrepreneurs and investors. For instance, a pilot farm in Mozambique is the result of inter-
provincial cooperation between Gaza province and Hubei province.
735
 In some cases, 
                                                 
732 He attributed this form of governmentality to Germany, and acknowledged that different countries 
have different degrees of neoliberalism and governmentality in their socio-economic orders. 
Foucault(2008), 192-194. 
733 Lemke (2010), 195-197. 
734 See, for instance, North et al. (2009), 45 (Footnote 16). 
735 Chichava (2013), 2, 9-11.  
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provincial overseas activities have even been in direct conflict with the foreign policy 
objectives of China’s central government.736 Moreover, the major actors and institutions of 
the OFDI governance system have been created rather recently in order to meet the 
administrative challenges posed by the new complexity of economic relations and 
international development objectives. Take, for example, MOFCOM. This ministry was 
established in 2003 and given the responsibility of supervising Chinese OFDI in the 
domestic and international contexts while also coordinating foreign aid policy and 
instruments (funds and loans).
737
 The institution is a merger of multiple functions that were 
carried out by other departments prior to its existence. Another example is the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). It was created as an ‘ad 
hoc’ institution in 2003 and tasked with the management of national SOEs, including 
supervision and approval of their OFDI projects. It operates on the premises of the 
Ministry of Finance,
738
 And since its establishment, it has constantly advanced FDI-related 
deregulation. Likewise, the acting Premier, Li Keqiang, and the State Council have asked 
government agencies to further deregulate and reduce “unnecessary administrative 
approvals.”739 
The Rise of “Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs” 
It is crucial to understand that in spite of the above-mentioned political reform 
process and the multiplicity of actors involved in land-consuming overseas investments, 
                                                 
736 Chen and Jian (2009). 
737 See Xue and Han (2010), 308-309. 
738 See Xue and Han (2010), 308-309. 
739 Wildau (10 May 2013). 
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the state remains a dominant actor in both the domestic economy and outward investment 
activities. The political reform was the result of a choice by the ruling elite to transform the 
economic structure while ensuring the “continuation of the elite strata.”740 Similar to the 
industrial revolution in Great Britain and that country’s subsequent overseas expansion 
(see Chapter 3), political actors in China gave up a certain portion of their political and 
legal privileges while becoming “new entrepreneurs and legislators” in a process that 
enhanced the intermingling of political office and economic opportunity.
741
  
The concentration of economic power within the multilevel realm of the state is 
reflected by the fact that among the 500 largest Chinese enterprises, the so-called “China 
500,” almost all of the assets (96%) and profits (85%) were held by SOEs in 2006.742 
Currently, the Chinese government is also trying to increase its influence over the private 
sector, which is said to contribute more than two thirds of the annual growth in GNP.
743
 A 
rising number of private enterprises feature a party cell in their organizational set-up.
744
 
However, it seems that in some cases, private companies undertake such CCP-related 
activities primarily as a way to present themselves to relevant cadres and gain access to 
funding. This makes sense in the context of more than two decades of financial repression 
and a re-tightening of economic control by the political elite that has put the private sector 
                                                 
740 Cheng (2001), 241. 
741 Cheng (2001), 241. 
742 Rudman (2006), 34. 
743 BloombergBusinessweek.com (21 August 2005). 
744 English.news.cn (21 June 2011). 
249 
 
at a disadvantage, both compared to state-owned enterprises and international 
competitors.
745
  
Since China’s opening up, this process of the “marketization of power”746  has 
turned state officials into bureaucratic entrepreneurs. At the same time, the party has 
opened its membership regulations to allow private entrepreneurs in the CCP. By 2000, 
20% of private entrepreneurs were said to have become party members. This trend 
enhances the synergetic relationship between public and private interests, particularly since 
a growing number of entrepreneurs belong to local party committees that exercise great 
influence at the local level.
747
 At the 18
th
 National Congress of the CCP in 2012, Liang 
Wengen, the billionaire entrepreneur, was elected as a delegate for the second time, the 
first being in 2007. Wengen epitomizes this intermingling of political power and economic 
wealth, as he had originally been a government official before he became an 
entrepreneur.
748
  
With regard to Chinese OFDI, this dominance of the state, together with the 
shifting interest structure of the actors involved, has several implications. On the one hand, 
overseas investments do reflect the dominance of state actors within the domestic economy: 
most (recorded) OFDI projects were still being undertaken by state-owned enterprises as of 
2013.
749
 In Chinese land-consuming OFDI in Africa, research by Jansson indicates that 
SOEs usually dominate large-scale investment projects in the oil and construction sectors, 
                                                 
745 Fewsmith (2001), 170-176. 
746 He (13 November 2012). Also see He (2002). 
747 Rudman (2006), 50. 
748 Tây Sơn News Wire (27 September 2011); and ChinaDaily.com.cn (12 November 2012). 
749 Davies (2013), 8. 
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while private enterprises tend to have small-scale investments in agribusiness, 
manufacturing, and communication (also see Table 5-3).
750
 Among the investments in the 
“land grab” literature that were studied for this thesis, the majority was undertaken by 
provincial and central SOEs in the mining or construction sectors, or by those SOEs active 
in the agricultural friendship farms. On the other hand, it is important to highlight the 
changing interest structure of state actors, which is reflected by the discursive turn outlined 
in the previous section on guiding ideology. State actors are increasingly in it for profit, 
which they then manage themselves.
751
 Given that capital investments in Africa are said to 
have a 60% higher return than in Asia,
752
 this detail seems essential for explaining why 
these investments take place as they do, particularly against the Chinese background of 
declining returns, domestic market saturation, limited economies of scale, and high wealth 
inequality.  
                                                 
750 Jansson (2009), 3. 
751 Also see He (13 November 2012). 
752 Liu (4 November 2011). 
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Table 5-3 – Three Levels of Chinese Engagement in Africa (Jansson 2009)753 
 
Level 1 – 
government 
Actors: Primarily Chinese 
and African governments 
and embassies, government 
departments, banks (China 
Export – Import; China 
Development Bank), and 
other financial institutions  
Activities:  
Bilateral relations and official 
visits, FOCAC, party-to-party 
relations, policy bank-financed 
concessional finance agreements, 
donations (stadiums, parliament 
buildings, hospitals), development 
aid, debt relief.  
 
 
Level 2 – larger 
company level 
Actors: Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and 
larger private Chinese 
companies. These actors 
mostly have close relations 
with the Chinese Embassy in 
the respective African 
country, but they do not 
always work on projects 
financed by the Chinese 
government.  
 
Activities:  
- Large-scale infrastructure 
undertakings financed either by 
Chinese concessional loans, the 
AfDB, the WB, the African 
government, or other financial 
institutions.  
- Extractive industries: oil, 
minerals, timber.  
- Larger manufacturing/assembly 
plants.  
 
Level 3 – small-
scale economic 
activity level 
Actors: Small-scale traders, 
owners of processing plants, 
and ‘fast-moving’ 
businessmen who entered 
African countries 
independently.  
Between these actors and the 
Chinese Embassy there is 
often very little interaction, 
assistance, and/or control.  
Activities:  
Import and trade in consumer 
goods, mineral processing, timber 
export, other small-scale 
economic activities.  
Changing State-Market Relations 
The material presented above highlights two aspects of the changing state-market 
relationship that are critical to understanding how and why Chinese investments occur. 
Firstly, the central state is not necessarily in control of what is happening. And, secondly, 
the strong position of the state does not imply that these investments are not for profit. 
                                                 
753 Jansson (2009), 3 (Table 1). 
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Rather, the high degree of state fragmentation has provided discretionary power to the 
provinces, and the emergence of bureaucratic entrepreneurs has given rise to changing 
interest structures and an enhanced focus on profit, together with a development discourse 
that matches this interest structure and profit orientation.  
Adding to these increasingly complex state-market relations is a third aspect: the 
SOE management reforms that began in the 1980s (these were briefly alluded to in the 
‘home country measures’ section of this chapter). In fact, over time, the Chinese 
government and the CCP introduced a policy (zhengqi fenkai) that separated “government 
functions from business operations.”754 As a consequence, “state-owned companies of all 
kinds have gradually been losing some of the advantages once conferred by their 
relationship with the state.”755 While SOEs gained leeway in terms of choosing CEOs, and 
now can hold on to the profit they generate, they are also held accountable for their failures 
by state officials, who have increasingly become distanced from SOEs. As a consequence, 
a rising number of SOEs has gone out of business.
756
  
This complex relationship is reflected in Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA, as 
even agricultural cooperation projects are operated by Chinese state farms on a for-profit 
basis, often without financial support from the government.
757
 The complex nature of the 
relationship is also evidenced by the fact that construction sector SOEs have turned into 
contract bidders that pursue their own business strategies. Even in the case of China’s 
policy banks, the marketization of state interests, as well as the effects of the SOE 
                                                 
754 Woetzel (8 July 2008). 
755 Woetzel (8 July 2008). Also see Wang (2002). 
756 Woetzel (8 July 2008).  
757 Brautigam (2009). 
253 
 
management reform, is of fundamental importance. While bank loans are “heavily 
influenced by government policies and are not to operate in full compliance with the 
market rules,”758 as outlined earlier, banks are not permitted to accumulate debts and/or 
engage in unprofitable business. This also applies to the China-Africa Development Fund, 
which is expected to generate returns on the support it provides to Chinese businesses 
investing overseas.
759
  
Also, the assessment of private investors highlights the importance of a 
differentiated analysis of state-market relations for a better understanding of what is 
happening and why. While thus far private entrepreneurs have hardly profited from 
Chinese funding or state institutions when investing overseas,
760
 research shows that their 
motivation to go abroad is often related to the state-dominated political economy back 
home – in two ways. On the one hand, their motivation seems to be related to the crowding 
out effects of IFDI policies within China, together with domestic market saturation and 
unfavorable regulations.
761
 On the other hand, a detailed study on the practices of Chinese 
companies in Angola has shown that Chinese privately-owned enterprises (POEs) seem to 
operate in the periphery of SOEs, with the former taking on activities that the latter 
outsource from their overall production processes. This indicates that an isolated 
                                                 
758 Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
759 Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
760 Jansson (2009); and Brautigam (2009), 257. 
761 Rui et al. (2010), 182. 
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assessment of SOE and POE activity might miss the pull-and-push dynamics that link the 
two types of enterprises.
762
  
Summary 
The assessment of state-market relations underlines that key economic and political 
changes since the 1990s match the shifting development discourse in which Chinese land-
consuming investments are embedded. The economic and political changes also explain 
the way these investments take place, namely their use of modern development finance, 
for-profit orientation, and/or the complex actor constellations.  
The intermingling of political power and economic wealth, the rise of sub-state 
actors, and the linked dynamics between SOE and POE activity characteristic of China’s 
political economy are not adequately addressed in common explanations of Chinese land-
consuming FDI that assume that these investments are primarily conducted by state agents 
with the intent to secure resources. Such a narrow narrative also overemphasizes 
differences in relation to liberal countries. Take the example of home country measures 
applicable to Chinese OFDI: from a comparative perspective, these are very similar to the 
institutional landscape that has been in place in industrialized countries for a long time. In 
fact, China is just catching up to the range of mechanisms that companies in OECD 
countries have at their disposal. The greatest finding of this section might indeed be the 
high degree of institutional similarity (rather than uniqueness or innovation) that 
                                                 
762 Action for South Africa (2011), 1; also see Belchior (2010). Overall, activities of privately-owned 
enterprises (POEs) are under-researched, and POE projects are hardly mentioned in “land grab” 
databases. 
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characterizes Chinese engagement with African countries when compared to Western 
relations with the continent – a fact that is particularly interesting with regards to the 
South-South cooperation rhetoric often applied not just by Chinese and African partners, 
but also by multilateral organizations, such as the FAO.
763
 
5. Development Context 
China has moved from close to zero OFDI activity to becoming an important 
investor country within less than three decades. From this historical perspective, but also 
with regards to China’s more recent decision to pro-actively promote such capital exports, 
the linkage of development trajectories and OFDI promotion deserves closer attention. 
After all, OFDI has become an important component of the country’s contemporary 
foreign economic policy as well as its diplomatic efforts. And FDI research has rightly 
noted that “OFDI is one part of the country’s overall strategy of economic development. It 
is a means to an end, not the goal itself.”764 The next paragraphs will bring together the 
various threads about OFDI in the context of Chinese development that appeared in earlier 
sections. Within the context of this thesis, and together with a similar segment in the 
British case study (see Chapter 7, Section 5), this section provides the foundation for the 
comparative discussion of role of OFDI in the context of home country development. 
I argue that Chinese land-consuming investments are part of a trend by the Chinese 
government to further internationalize development, – in the search for markets, resources, 
profitable business, and/or political allies, and in the face of rising resource pressures, 
                                                 
763 Goetz (2015) (forthcoming). 
764 Broadman (2010), 331. 
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external dependencies and high international competition.
765
 In international comparison, 
this globalization of Chinese development via its “emerging transnational companies” is 
nothing out of the ordinary. For instance, authors such as Hirsch have drawn attention to 
the fact that transnational or multinational enterprises play important roles in a home 
country’s social and economic development. 766  Their foreign supply sourcing and 
embeddedness in international markets are, for instance, important in terms of facilitating 
international economies of scale in spite of the problem of domestic diseconomies of space. 
They also enable industrial upgrading and provide institutionalized access to resources 
looked for in the particular industrial setting: 
The MNEs’ value activities lower the barriers separating countries from their foreign sources 
of supply and their international markets. This enables home countries to increase the 
benefits they derive from the international division of labor, exploitation of economies of 
scale and the ownership advantages of their MNEs. Other things being equal, an extension of 
the global reach achieved through cross-border value activities is likely to compensate for 
the tax loss and the diminution of sovereignty implied by outward FDI.
767
 
At the same time, of course, it can be argued that the wave of deregulation in the 
1990s, together with advances in transportation and communication, has changed the 
nature of state-market relations, thereby rendering the home country’s advantages that it 
can obtain through its companies’ OFDI activities (even) less feasible. For instance, 
transnational enterprises increasingly threaten governments to exit their country’s economy 
and relocate their production activities to other countries in the case of unfavorable policy 
measures. Moreover, corporate actors pursue a narrow shareholder value objective, and tax 
evasion is widespread. Yet, it seems that in many cases, the perception that the paybacks of 
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766 Hirsch (2012), 1-2.  
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the “extension of the global reach achieved [by companies] through cross-border value 
activities” outweigh the costs still prevails among policy makers. Perhaps this is partly due 
to the lack of theorized alternatives, but it also partially results from the fact that policy 
makers are often closely interlinked with corporate actors and interests, as the specificities 
of China’s political economy have perfectly illustrated.  
According to the outline of the 11
th
 Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which has become 
the foundation of China’s evolving OFDI policy framework, the policy stance towards 
OFDI seeks to promote five developmental objectives.
768
 First, going overseas shall raise 
companies’ competitiveness through enhanced international economic and technical 
cooperation, which will provide them with new opportunities, economies of scale, and 
knowhow. Second, OFDI shall support the export sector by means of “overseas project 
contracting and labor service cooperation.”769 Third, the sourcing of domestically scarce 
resources overseas is seen by the government to address the dramatic environmental 
impact of China’s development trajectory while securing stable and efficient supplies. 
Fourth, overseas research and development activities are intended to improve the 
technological base and upgrade relevant sectors. Fifth, OFDI is framed as a means to 
globalize the economy by internationalizing production chains and business operations. 
This (foreign) economic strategy is complemented by an IFDI strategy that aims both to 
                                                 
768 Wilkes and Huang (2011). 
769 Put together and expanded on by A.G., based on information provided by Wilkes and Huang (2011), 
9-10. 
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regulate IFDI such that it becomes “greener” and advances the technology and knowhow 
transfer (see also the 12
th
 Five Year Plan, 2011-2015).
770
  
Clearly, the above-presented policy choices and official rhetoric that Chinese land-
consuming FDI projects are reflective of and embedded in cannot be fully captured without 
looking more closely at the specific development challenges that the country has faced and 
that increasingly threaten the political elite. China’s development path since opening up 
has been summarized by Wenran Jiang as “heavy industrialization, labor- and capital- 
intensive manufacturing industries, export-led growth, low labor cost and high 
environmental damage.”771 By 1993, the country had turned from petroleum exporter to 
petroleum importer.
772
 Moreover, the development trajectory has resulted in low worker 
welfare, the stagnation of political reforms, and a burgeoning rise in social (wealth) 
inequality in a context where economic opportunity is linked to public office.
773
 Together 
with the intense environmental consequences
774
 of the country’s rapid urbanization,775 
industrialization, and modernization processes, these factors have come to pose a challenge 
for the country’s social stability, as well as its food security,776 and they are viewed as 
                                                 
770 Chinese Government (2011). 
771 Jiang (2009), 587. 
772 Vissers (June 2013), 1-7. 
773 Jiang (2009), 587. 
774 WB and SEPA (China) (2007).  
775 Liu et al. (2005), 450.  
776 While China managed to maintain a self-sufficiency rate of 95% with regard to food security, 
defined as grain security, it became a net importer of certain crops and products such as soybeans, 
vegetable oils, and sugar. For example, soybean imports today cover three quarters of domestic 
demand. Agricultural investments in Latin America and Eastern Europe (e.g., Bulgaria) try to grow 
these crops for export to China. See for instance Economic Observer (11 February 2012) and Council of 
Ministers (26 November 2013). 
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matters of national security that have the potential to threaten the stability of the political 
party regime.  
The IFDI-led export growth strategy has also had a negative impact on domestic 
enterprises. In many cases, these struggle to compete with foreign companies because they 
lack access to credit services, have to deal with political interference, and are less 
embedded in international markets. As one entrepreneur going overseas put it: “The best 
food has all been eaten up by the global giants and what we can do is to have those 
leftovers.”777 At the same time, the country’s overall industrial productivity and efficiency 
did not necessarily improve all that much through foreign investment.
778  
To a certain 
degree, China has been locked in the existing international division of labor, and it has 
become the workshop in the international production line of foreign companies, resulting 
in less skill and technology transfer than had been hoped for by the political elite.
779
 The 
current challenge is to avoid falling in the so-called “middle-income trap” that many 
emerging economies are confronted with. That is, China increasingly loses its competitive 
edge “against low-income countries at low wages;”780 but, at the same time, the country 
“cannot compete with high-income countries on innovation and higher value 
production.”781 
Importantly, the changes in China’s OFDI policy preferences and foreign policy 
regarding Africa have occurred in the context of these internal and external development 
                                                 
777 Rui et al. (2010), 182. 
778 Jiang (2009), 589. Moran (2011), 64-71. 
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challenges. Significant events in this process were the country becoming a net oil importer 
(1992); the collapse of export markets during the Asian crisis (1997); and the strong 
domestic competition that resulted from the IFDI-led development strategy, as well as the 
WTO accession, which negatively impacted indigenous enterprises due to their limited 
access to credit and world markets (2001). Moreover, the mounting socio-economic and 
ecological pressures have pointed to the need to upgrade economic activity back home. 
Regarding interests, these reforms are part of the political elite’s continued pursuit 
of economic growth as a way to stabilize and legitimize the political system though 
economic success. Moreover, they reflect the interests of the country’s resource-intensive 
and export-dependent (state-owned) manufacturing industry, which functions as the 
country’s economic backbone and plays an important role in the accumulation of foreign 
reserves. In addition, Chinese land-consuming OFDI also involves a number of actors 
which respond to these policy changes, such as workers that hope to improve their 
(family’s) livelihoods; construction companies that establish themselves as independent 
contract bidders; and/or POEs or SOEs that seek to make their fortune overseas, evading 
political interference and/or crowding out effects of IFDI activities back home. 
Summary 
Land-consuming OFDI in SSA is part of China’s resource and expansion 
diplomacy that has ensued since the late 1990s, picking up speed in 2000. Overseas 
investments by Chinese companies emerged as part of the tool set available to the Chinese 
government to pursue certain interests and policy objectives. At the same time, the paths 
taken and choices made regarding the Chinese presence in African countries can only be 
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fully grasped by revisiting the core traits of the Chinese political economy, such as the rise 
of bureaucratic entrepreneurs, the marketization of power, and the emergence of a 
“neoliberal governmentality,”782 all of which have been conducive to a promotional OFDI 
policy stance and guiding ideology.  
The previous assessment of the home country context also showed that China is not 
an isolated country; rather, the international context matters. The choice of instruments, as 
well as the guiding ideology characteristic of Chinese OFDI in SSA, reflects major traits of 
mainstream economic theory that are embedded in the international economic and aid 
governance architecture. Interestingly, the international context is crucial for understanding 
the Chinese foreign policy concept of “peaceful development” that aims to differentiate 
China’s expansion overseas from the violent history of the North. Regarding the liberal 
international context within which Chinese expansion occurs, the “peaceful development” 
idea seems less ‘innovative’ than the Chinese government wants it to appear. Instead, 
China is profiting from an international economic system that allows countries and 
societies to expand their consumption and production patterns beyond their sovereign 
borders without waging war. In contrast to those of the late 19
th
 century, contemporary 
overseas investments are rationalized within a “win-win” narrative and are part of a 
technical regime of international economic governance that regulates how they should take 
place but does not query their legitimacy, such as the WTO or BITs (see Chapter 4).
783
  
                                                 
782 Feng (2009), 432.  
783 See Chapter 3; and Trentmann (2008), 7. Consequently, this raises the interesting question of what 
such a “peaceful development” approach would look like under a different international architecture 
which acknowledged zero-sum aspects of international social, ecological, and economic relations. 
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Moreover, other features of the international context, such as the price volatility of 
international energy markets, their quasi-monopolistic structure, and/or the reluctance of 
Western governments and companies to integrate emerging Chinese companies into the 
international (energy) markets play a role in explaining why these investments occur.
784
 
These aspects have led the Chinese government to search for new partners – such as 
African countries – to facilitate the economic expansion and globalization process that 
land-consuming FDI is part of. At the same time, Chinese OFDI is not a unilateral 
undertaking: African governments play a crucial role in shaping which investments take 
place and how. 
This section will conclude by looking at the question of whether, in fact, OFDI 
lives up to the rhetoric used for its legitimization. Can we say that land-consuming FDI 
activities in Sub-Saharan Africa are a success story from a home country perspective, 
particularly given the empirical evidence which underlined that many of the stated goals 
attached to FDI projects in the recipient countries did not materialize? Again, it appears 
that the reality of these investments, as well as their utility, is rather complex.  
From the official Chinese perspective, these investments are said to “deepen the 
development of international energy resources and (…) processing cooperation.”785  In 
international comparison, China is just catching up to international practices and standards 
of development that have a long tradition within OECD countries. Yet, there remains great 
skepticism among the Chinese public, which largely seems to oppose OFDI.
786
 In 
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785 See National People’s Congress (2011); and State Council (2012). 
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particular, overseas investment projects that construct hospitals or schools have been 
commented on with rising sarcasm by Chinese netizens who point to the rural areas in 
China where such services and infrastructure are largely missing. In view of the high social 
costs of the Chinese development trajectory over the past three decades, characterized as it 
is by a dramatic increase in social wealth inequality, the denial of social rights, and very 
low wages, it seems to be widespread public opinion that these investments, grants, and 
social development measures should instead be put to work in the Western provinces and 
rural areas, which for the time being remain decoupled from the overall development 
process.
787
 The aspect of high wealth inequality
788
 is particularly interesting from a 
historical perspective (see Chapter 3). This usually curbs demand in home countries while 
also contributing to an unprecedentedly high level of capital to be exported. Accordingly, 
calling Chinese land-consuming OFDI a success story at this point does not capture the 
complexity associated with OFDI from the perspective of home country development. 
6. Conclusion  
Given the multifaceted dynamics at play, I did not attempt to provide a monocausal 
explanation of how and why these investments take place as they do. As Marks has rightly 
noted, “[m]onocausal explanations are too simple to take account of the complexity of 
people, societies, and historical change.”789 However, the key argument that has been put 
forward in this case study is that these investments are part of several (interrelated) drivers, 
namely Chinese efforts to diversify the country’s resource supply, open new markets, to 
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internationalize production processes, and strengthen the “soft power” in international 
relations. 
More in detail, the review of the home country context highlighted that China has 
moved away from self-identifying as a planned economy aimed at a high degree of autarky, 
and transitioned towards a “socialist market economy”790 that is increasingly integrated in 
the world economy. Responding to particular events in time, such as the growing external 
resource dependency, the collapse of its main export markets during the Asian crisis, the 
unfavorably tough competition between foreign investors and domestic industry, and the 
untenably high social and environmental costs of development, the government has 
adopted an promotional policy stance towards OFDI.  
Since 2000, Chinese SOEs going overseas operate in an increasingly elaborate 
institutional framework, and they benefit directly or indirectly from the wide range of 
home country measures supporting overseas activities, such as commercial diplomacy, 
economic cooperation projects, and/or new forms of development finance. At the same 
time, substantial reforms of corporate governance have given SOEs more leeway from 
state control in their business operations. Importantly, these ideological shifts and the 
reform processes are part of profound political reforms that have occurred since the 1980s. 
These have significantly changed the country’s political economy. While the state remains 
the central actor, the rule of law and markets play a greater role in China’s economic 
governance; regulatory procedures have been eased; a new actor group of bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs, i.e. officials who use their favorable political positions in the system to 
                                                 
790 See, for instance, People’s Daily (13 July 2005). 
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profit economically, has emerged; party structures have been opened to private sector 
actors; and competencies in particular policy fields have been decentralized, increasing the 
importance of sub-state actors (see brief summary in Table 5-4).  
Together, these home country features explain the core empirical characteristics of 
Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA, which were introduced in the previous chapter. 
Accordingly, the sectoral composition, with its focus on resources and manufacturing, 
reflects the home country economic setting, i.e. the manufacturing industry’s interest in 
external resources and business opportunities to continue and/or expand its operations; and 
the political elites’ focus on growth as a source of wealth and political stability. This also 
explains the minor share of agricultural investments in SSA, as these have not been a 
priority. Instead, SOE-run agricultural and construction projects often started at the request 
of African governments that wanted to reactivate the former friendship farms and build 
infrastructure in exchange for resources. From the Chinese perspective, these are part of a 
“soft power” strategy to build up a reputation as peaceful emerging power that acts to the 
benefit of its partners. At the same time, the labor exports that are accompanying the 
increases in trade with and investment to SSA highlight the very low worker welfare in the 
home country – the competitive edge of Chinese companies seemingly remains their low 
costs. 
Chinese investments in SSA also reflect the increasingly elaborate home country 
measures. As a result of the newly established forms and forums of China-Africa economic 
cooperation, Chinese trade with, and OFDI in Africa has risen significantly. At the same 
time, the altered quality of China-Africa cooperation mirrors the profound political reforms 
and related changes in the ideological superstructure and economic governance that have 
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taken place since the 1980s. As a consequence of the rise of bureaucratic entrepreneurs, the 
adoption of mainstream economic theory to guide foreign and industrial policy, and the 
reform of SOE corporate governance back home, Chinese companies that have been active 
in SSA for decades no longer act only as non-profit operators of aid projects. Using the 
new leeway at their disposal when doing business (for private or public gain), they have 
often become successful contract bidders (e.g., construction companies) and profitable 
transnational companies (e.g., agricultural companies). Even in the case of development 
finance and economic cooperation projects, SOEs apply a for-profit rationale in their 
operations. This also has implications for the role of land in these investment projects. In 
projects that use land as space for productive activities (e.g., manufacturing and 
construction), the main driver is clearly to profit from the productive activities rather than 
to secure land. However, even in the case of resource exploitation projects, products are 
often not intended for consumption back home, nor are they allocated outside of domestic, 
regional, or international markets. Instead, land consumption in almost all cases is related 
to the profit orientation of related operations. 
Finally, I have shown that Chinese OFDI is characterized by a diversity of actors, 
public and private, with divergent and often conflicting agendas. In particular, the rising 
importance of sub-state actors in the Chinese development context explains the 
significance of provincial actors in China’s overseas activities. Sometimes the latter even 
go to the extent of non-conformance with central state policy objectives (see summary of 
findings in Table 5-4). From a micro-perspective, the interests in these investments are 
many: for part of the political elite, they represent a welcome mechanism to ensure the 
continued pursuit of economic growth as a way to stabilize and legitimize the political 
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system though economic success. Moreover, they reflect the interests of the country’s 
resource-intensive and export-dependent (state-owned) manufacturing industry. And, they 
involve a diverse range of actors that hope to improve their (family’s) livelihoods; 
establish themselves as independent contract bidders; and/or seek alternatives to the 
political interference and/or crowding out effects back home.  
In concluding, the multiplicity of actors involved in the investments, as well as their 
entrenchment in mainstream economics, raises the question of what exactly makes these 
investments Chinese? The widely made distinction between state-backed and private 
investments, on the basis of which the difference between Chinese and non-Chinese 
investments is usually discussed, fails to answer this question in a meaningful way while 
oversimplifying state-market relations in the context of OFDI. Instead, the factors that 
make these land-consuming OFDI activities Chinese are to be found in the specific 
combination of industrial set-up, development trajectory, contingent events, ideology, and 
political economy that I outlined above.   
More broadly, reflecting on the role of land-consuming OFDI in the context of the 
home country’s development trajectory, Chapters 4 and 5 have shown that these 
investments are part of a trend to “catch up” and establish an open economic system that 
can meet the resource and export interests of the manufacturing industry, which has 
become the backbone of economic development and foreign exchange accumulation since 
the 1990s. Looking beyond China’s industrial set-up, the investments reflect the 
specificities of the country’s current development context, especially its challenges. For 
instance, the problem of social development, which is reflected in surplus labor and low 
wages, is tied to both increasing migration and the ability of Chinese companies to gain a 
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competitive advantage. Other key challenges in the context of China’s development 
include resource dependency, which is reflected in the expanding resource diplomacy that 
these investments are part of; unsustainable levels of pollution, which have led to a push 
toward offshore pollution processing segments; and heightened competitive pressures – 
following the IFDI-led development approach and WTO accession – that have led to the 
search for knowhow and technology abroad.  
The consequences of this development for the broader development context of 
China remain to be seen. While the approach since 2000 has thus far strengthened 
investment, trade, and aid relations with African countries, it is unclear how capital exports 
will improve worker welfare or productivity levels back home. While they might help to 
diversify resource supplies, establish trading hubs to access European markets, engage in 
economic opportunities on the African continent, stimulate exports of manufactured goods, 
and establish economies of scale, they also represent an outflow of capital that will no 
longer be available for investment back home. The capital outflow also portends a 
potential loss in domestic jobs and the danger that large companies might move 
permanently offshore (compare the historical perspective in Chapter 3). Though it might be 
too early to draw any strong conclusions, there is no evidence to suggest that we are 
witnessing the off-shoring of Chinese industry’s polluting and energy-intensive operations 
to African countries.  
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Table 5-4 – Brief Review of the Home Country Context and Chinese OFDI in SSA 
Category Home Country Context Chinese OFDI in SSA 
Development 
context 
Since opening up in the 1980s, the country 
has focused on the growth of its resource-
intensive manufacturing industry, resulting 
in rising resource dependency, 
overcapacity, and high social and 
environmental costs. 
The resource-intensive manufacturing 
industry is reflected in the sectoral 
composition of Chinese investments, 
namely in the focus on the resources sector 
and manufacturing operations. The small 
share of agricultural projects is a result of 
economic cooperation and part of China’s 
resource diplomacy.  
Home Country 
Measures 
Reform processes since the 1990s, and the 
“Go Out” OFDI framework since 2000, 
have led the country to catch up with 
international standards. 
It is unclear how much support companies 
receive. However, OFDI in Africa could 
potentially profit from various measures, 
such as commercial diplomacy, regulatory 
reforms, and newly introduced forms of 
development finance. 
Guiding 
Ideologies 
The country has shifted away from a focus 
on self-sufficiency and adopted a growth 
agenda for development that follows 
mainstream economic theory in many 
respects. 
The ideological shift is reflected in 
projects that have been operating for a 
long time in Africa and have recently 
moved from an aid to business 
management approach. 
Investor Legacy While China has only recently become an 
important source of investment, it shares a 
long history of aid and political 
cooperation with African countries. 
China builds on relations established since 
the 1950s with African countries and the 
related capacities of companies, but it has 
also established diplomatic and economic 
relations with additional African countries. 
Political 
Economy 
China’s political economy has changed 
significantly over the past decades. Key 
events include the rise of bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs, i.e. officials who use their 
favorable political positions to profit 
economically; corporate governance 
reforms that have provided SOEs with 
managerial leeway; the opening up of 
party structures to private sector actors; the 
decentralization of competencies in 
particular policy fields and the related rise 
of sub-state actors; and the formalization 
of regulatory procedures. 
Changes in the political economy explain 
the diversity of actors and interests 
involved in land-consuming OFDI (e.g., 
provincial actors) and the profit orientation 
that even holds true for economic 
cooperation projects (e.g., agricultural 
development centers). The multiple actors 
come from different levels of government 
and some of act in conflict with the central 
government’s foreign policy. The 
marketization of power has led to a profit 
focus.  
Events Becoming a net energy importer; Asian 
crisis; WTO accession influenced the 
OFDI policy framework, as well as the 
social and ecological costs of the 
development trajectory. 
Core events influencing the development 
of a favorable OFDI policy framework 
since the country’s opening up, as well as 
its turn to Africa have been several: the 
rising resources dependency, the Asian 
crisis, and the WTO accession. 
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Chapter 6: BRITISH INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA – “THE LAST FRONTIER TO FIND 
ALPHA?”791 
We want to support African countries to seize the opportunities before them and are injecting 
new energy into partnerships to build growth. (…) this government believes global business 
– including British business – can make an absolutely vital contribution here and we will do 
all we can to foster further commercial ties, open up trade and deepen investment. 
– Henry Bellingham, Minister for Africa, 2011792 
The UK is well placed to benefit from the world of the future. The National Security 
Strategy of the United Kingdom is: to use all our national capabilities to build Britain’s 
prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in the world and strengthen our security. The 
networks we use to build our prosperity we will also use to build our security. 
– National Security Strategy (Whitepaper), 2010 
1. Introduction 
Orthodox explanations usually understand land-consuming OFDI emerging from 
liberal economies as the rational choice of profit-seeking private actors in a context of 
resource scarcity and/or financial crisis. In the case of the UK, for instance, Susan Payne, 
CEO of the London-based Emergent Asset Management, has been repeatedly quoted as 
saying that her African Agricultural Land Fund focuses on Africa as “the last frontier for 
finding alpha,” – that is, for finding above average returns on investments.793 In a similar 
vein, other British investors, particularly in the biofuel and financial sectors, have argued 
that above-average returns outweigh the risks attached to agricultural and land-consuming 
projects in Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world. Indeed, investors commonly 
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2009). 
792 Speech by Bellingham (2010). 
793 Knaup and von Mittelstaedt (30 July 2009). 
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refer to mounting scarcity pressures, growing demand, commodity price rises, and/or 
(comparatively) cheap land prices to make these investments appear like safe bets while 
also emphasizing their positive contributions to greater food and energy security. Hence, 
land-consuming investments are seen not only to promise above-average returns but to be 
ethically sound. 
In practice, however, the empirical evidence shows that this narrative 
oversimplifies the drivers and interests involved, while the related rhetoric of success and 
the promise of high returns rarely materialize.
794
 Projects fail, people are dispossessed in 
the process, and seemingly cheap land turns out to be very costly due to the upfront 
investments required to build roads and housing and undertake planting.
795
 Further, the 
financial crisis also led to massive crashes in the share values of companies and/or 
contributed to the ultimate failure of projects. As Chapters 6 and 7 will show, this verdict 
applies to many of the British land-consuming investments made since 2000. At the same 
time, the orthodox narrative does not sufficiently capture and explain the (home) country-
specific drivers and (f)actors that are part of British land-consuming OFDI in SSA. 
I argue that British land-consuming OFDI happens for several complex reasons that 
go beyond the orthodox narrative. Specifically, four drivers of land-consuming OFDI are 
important from a home country perspective. I maintain that British land-consuming 
investments are part of (1) a corporate strategy to profit from economic reforms and 
rapidly growing consumer markets in the host countries; (2) international and national 
energy and climate policies that have increased investments in biofuels in SSA; (3) a 
                                                 
794 WB (2011), 51. 
795 Interview with CEO of Highbury Finance, London, (2013). 
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strategy by actors of the financial sector to invest in the primary sector in Africa (and 
related industries) at a time of the financial crisis and economic stagnation back home; and, 
increasingly, (4) a strategy by the UK government to promote land-consuming OFDI to 
Sub-Saharan Africa as way to economic recovery and international political power through 
rising exports and industrial activity. 
Key evidence for this argument is found in official documentation, where land-
consuming investments in SSA are openly linked to the national development agenda to 
rebalance the UK economy as a source of international power, prosperity, and stability. At 
the international level, this rhetoric is matched by a rising degree of commercial diplomacy 
and the use of institutional and normative resources in British-African relations. Most 
importantly, this argument is based on the study of the main empirical characteristics of 
British OFDI to SSA since 2000.  
In the structure of this thesis, – similar to the Chinese case – this chapter is the first 
part of the two-part UK case study. It will show the main empirical characteristics of how 
(and to a limited extend why) British land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
occur. The collected data stems from the systematic process-tracing of over 20 projects 
that have been listed in influential “land grab” databases until 2012 (see Appendix B for 
the final list of projects). In addition, I have constantly followed up on British investments 
activities and relevant home country developments that took place later. This chapter aims 
to present the rich empirical details of British land-consuming OFDI. These provide the 
foundation on which to explore alternative explanations about why the investments take 
place from a home country perspective (Chapter 7). They also allow me to make cross-
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country comparisons, and deliberate more broadly about the role of OFDI in the home 
country context (Chapter 8).  
Following this introduction, Section 2 of the chapter introduces the history of 
British-African relations. These relations reach far back, but they have intensified 
significantly since 2000. Section 3 then discusses the details of how these investments 
occur. In particular, it will focus on land-consuming FDI’s sectoral composition and 
timelines, the role of land, the recipient context, key actors and institutions, and the issue 
of investment funds. The chapter will conclude by summarizing the key empirical findings 
about Chinese land-consuming FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Core findings of this chapter accentuate that the empirical characteristics of British 
land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa are more multi-layered than is 
commonly acknowledged. Many projects predate the 2007/2008 crises and they comprise 
investments in multiple sectors, from construction and mining to farming. They are 
distributed highly uneven across the continent, reflecting the British investor legacy. 
Biofuels composed the largest share of listed projects, and the general emphasis has been 
on the primary sector and related activities (food processing). Overall, the investments 
reflect a very diverse private sector: companies with a long presence on the African 
continent are involved, as are early-stage companies that invest in biofuels, and/or 
alternative stock markets, and financial investors. In addition, several public institutions 
and multilateral organizations seem to be relevant, together with host country governments. 
Land is of primary importance in these investments. It is used as a resource and productive 
space, and, increasingly, as a strategic asset. Different from the “profit through scarcity” 
and “seeking alpha” rhetoric, though, most biofuel projects, as well as some investment 
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funds, have failed, for multiple reasons. The empirical evidence shows the exposure of 
British investment to financial volatility, the dependency on developments back home, 
such as the economic crisis, and the lack of realistic business models. 
2. Background on the UK in Africa 
British relations with the African continent go far back, while the “Second Wave of 
European Imperialism”796 in the 19th century seems to be most relevant for the assessment 
of contemporary relations. As shown in Chapter 3, multiple motives and factors have 
shaped these relations. Importantly, the dominant presence of Britain on the continent 
continued after the empire’s post-WWII disintegration.797 As of 2011, British companies 
are still among the top five investors and trading partners in former dependencies, and on 
the political level, most former colonies are members in the Commonwealth of Nations, an 
intergovernmental organization that emerged out of the British Commonwealth.
798
  
British engagement with the African continent has been characterized by several 
waves of intensifying and decreasing exchanges of capital, people, and goods, reflecting 
broad domestic and global restructuring processes, like, for instance, colonization and 
decolonization. Since 2000, British interest in the African continent has been growing 
                                                 
796 Kegley and Raymond (2011), 110-112. 
797 See White (1999), 184-185. British decolonization was the function of multiple factors, including 
nationalist pressures and global economic trends (e.g., UK financial industry focused beyond formal 
and informal empire in its investments; decline in rubber trade worldwide after innovative synthetic 
rubber introduction; improved balance of payment position of Great Britain; new economic strategies 
pursued in metropolis that focus on North America and Europe; and/or the declining meaning of 
sterling area).  
798 See, for instance, the edited volume by Dumett (1999). It critically evaluates the influential 
publication by Cain and Hopkins on British imperialism published in 1993. The latter publication is 
referenced in the following as Cain and Hopkins (2001), which refers to the second edition of the 1993 
publication. Also see Ernst & Young (2011a), 38-41.  
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again. This was first led by the private sector, but then the public sector followed the 
corporate trend (see Chapter 7). There seems to be a new “gold-rush mood” among British 
investors and trading companies as the following 2012 statement from the CEO of British-
American Tobacco (BAT) highlights: “So the point really is not whether you should be 
doing business in Africa, but rather how.”799  
The new focus on African economies by private and, increasingly, public actors is 
reflected in the intensifying trade and investment relations of the UK with the continent. 
From 2007 to 2011, UK FDI in Africa increased by 9% per annum, and UK exports to 
Sub-Saharan Africa have risen faster than in other transitioning or developing countries.
800
 
According to the British Chambers of Commerce, currently “[m]ore Chamber member 
exporters currently export to the Middle East and Africa (57%) than to North America 
(47%) and Australasia (40%).”801 At the same time, UK-African relations are not a one-
way road: imports from SSA to the UK have nearly tripled, climbing from USD 4 billion 
in 1990 to USD 11 billion in 2004. However, this trend was primarily linked to rising 
imports of a few products (primarily clothing, petroleum, and minerals) from a small 
number of countries, namely South Africa and Botswana.
802
  
Similar to the case of China, the growing interest in Africa since 2000 has been 
accompanied by significant changes in the official rationalization of these relations. 
Moving away from the previous focus on humanitarianism and security/terrorism, more 
                                                 
799 Ernst & Young (2012), 9. 
800 Ernst & Young (2013), 34; Te Velde and Calì (2006), 9-10; Smallbusiness.co.uk (13 October 2011). 
801 Dhillon (3 February 2014). 
802 Simultaneously, EU and global imports from SSA have declined or risen only moderately, indicating 
that the intensification of trade relations between the UK and SSA is rather unique. See Te Velde and 
Calì (2006), 9-10. 
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recent official statements stress the economic and social benefits of engagement with 
Africa for the actors involved.
803
 At the same time, the budget deficit and fiscal 
conservatism of the acting government limit the extent to which this new interest of the 
UK government will be met by assigning resources to its promotion. In fact, “[r]esources 
allocated to Africa are (…) extremely stretched, and the British presence on the continent 
[which has never been a high priority] already consists of a network in which large regions 
are covered by as few as one or two diplomats in the field.”804 As of 2011, the UK’s 
diplomatic presence (e.g., sovereign embassies) ranked 10
th
 after that of the US, Russia, 
China, France, South Africa, Nigeria, Germany, Brazil, and Japan.
805
  
Against this background of tight budgets, it is worth noting that the UK also 
benefits from membership in institutions of pooled sovereignty, such as the European 
Union (EU), which is an active and important investor and trading partner on the African 
continent.
806
 However, domestic economic recession and the rise of the BRICS have begun 
to affect the UK’s relative economic and political presence on the African continent. For 
instance, the UK’s leading investor position, particularly in the extractive industries, which 
it historically shared with the US and France, is increasingly contested by newcomers such 
as China and India, the latter of which “edged out” the UK as leading investor in Ghana in 
2005 (measured by the number of projects per annum since 2000).
807
 Simultaneously, 
some African countries, like South Africa, have started to critically review the role of 
                                                 
803 E.g. Bellingham (2010); and Cargill (2011). Also, see Chapter 7 on guiding ideology. 
804 Cargill (2011), 3. 
805 Cargill (2011), 3. 
806 Allen (8 October 2012), 9; Cargill (2011), 11. 
807 AfDB/OECD/UNDP/UNECA (2011), 10; and Modern Ghana.com (23 January 2005). 
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British companies in economic development – asking whether these are “viable investment 
partner[s]” or just a “remnant of the British Empire,” compared to newcomer investors 
from the emerging powers.
808
 
Despite the new attention directed towards UK-Africa relations, it is crucial to note 
that by both regional and historical comparison, the share of British FDI in Africa since 
2000 has been marginal – at least from the investor country’s point of view. The regional 
figures point to the issue of asymmetric significance mentioned previously.
809
 In 2011, the 
African continent continued to rank lowest regarding the share of total UK FDI stock by 
region.
810
 At the same time, UK overseas investment flows to the continent have been 
highly volatile: while in 2010, UK overseas investment flows to Africa (GBP 7,822 million) 
were astonishingly close to those to Europe (GBP 11,374 million) and higher than those to 
the Americas (GBP -13,814 million), the year 2011 was characterized by divestment (GBP 
-3,291 million).
811
 Importantly, UK investment in SSA has remained highly concentrated 
in four countries, namely Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. This reflects 
legacies of very uneven regional and sectoral investment.
812
  
3. Key Characteristics of British Land-Consuming OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The complex and evolving nature of economic and political relations between the 
UK and African countries is not adequately captured by common “free market” 
                                                 
808 Osei (2011), 1. 
809 See Chapter 3. 
810 Allen and Dar (14 March 2013), 11-12. 
811 Allen and Dar (14 March 2013), 11-12; and Loots and Kabundi (2012), 134.  
812 Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2009), 14. 
278 
 
explanations.
813
 Therefore, to achieve a more meaningful understanding of British land-
consuming FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, this section will summarize the key empirical 
characteristics, focusing on sector distribution, timelines, the role of land, stated goals in 
the recipient context, the phenomenon of investor funds involved in agriculture, and other 
key actors and institutions.  
The major findings are as follows: (1) The majority of “land grab” projects consists 
of biofuel projects which have been initiated since 2005. (2) Land is of primary importance 
in most of these investments. It is accessed through mixed forms of direct lease and/or 
outgrower schemes. (3) Contrary to the “profit through scarcity” and “seeking alpha” 
rhetoric, most biofuel projects, as well as some investment funds, have failed, for multiple 
reasons. (4) The respective host country government is a central actor in these investments. 
It often cooperates with British corporations, some of which have been invited to 
participate in host country policy-writing processes, – for instance, regarding the national 
biofuel strategy. (5) From the UK perspective, a diverse private sector, and, increasingly, 
public institutions are at work. 
Sector 
A breakdown of investments by industry highlights both the UK’s colonial investor 
legacy on the continent, with its focus on natural resources, and the processes of 
diversification that have occurred since decolonization.
814
 While detailed data was very 
                                                 
813 Also see the literature review in Chapter 2. 
814 In 1999, 40% of UK OFDI in Africa still went to the mining and quarrying industry (compared to 
20% worldwide), and two thirds of US OFDI stock was in the petroleum sector. In addition, UK OFDI 
undertakings in African countries have an extraordinary high degree of profit repatriation: about 75 
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difficult to obtain, an itemization of FDI projects by industry for the year 2008, which was 
received upon request from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), shows that the bulk of 
UK FDI went into mining and quarrying (42.5%) and financial services (43.5%), followed 
by real estate and business services (3.9%) and food production (2.5%).
815
 Not a single 
project was recorded for the agricultural sector during that particular year (see Figure 
6-1).
816
 2006 data on British FDI projects by industry and target country also emphasizes 
the above-mentioned uneven sectoral and capital stock distribution across the continent.
817
 
Regarding sectoral distribution, 74% of investments in South Africa went into financial 
services (most of which did not have any relation to natural resources), while FDI in 
Kenya was largely geared towards food production, and investments in Eastern Africa 
primarily directed towards biofuel production.
818
 At the same time, British FDI stock was 
primarily located in South Africa.
819
 
The investments that this thesis investigated, as well as newly established databases 
(such as Land Matrix), show that British land-consuming OFDI covers the full range of 
sectors from food and biofuel production, livestock farming, and forestry for wood to 
tourism and mineral extraction (including petroleum).
820
 In more detail, the projects grow, 
process and trade Jatropha, sugar cane, palm oil, cassava, and sweet sorghum; cultivate 
rice, livestock (e.g., beef), and horticulture (e.g., paprika, chilies, maize, and cocoa); 
                                                                                                                                                    
cents of every dollar invested went back to the parent company (compared to a UK average of 37 cents 
in other countries). See Te Velde (2002), 4.  
815 Data obtained from Office for National Statistics (UK) via email request in June 2012.  
816 Data obtained from Office for National Statistics (UK) via email request in June 2012.  
817 Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2009), 14.  
818 Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2009), 14. 
819 Wei and Balasubramanyam (2004), 177-178; and Schenk (2005), 463-481.  
820 TradeInvestNigeria.com (10 October 2009); and TradeInvestNigeria (19 November 2009). 
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exploit uranium; or are involved in construction (e.g. infrastructure) and the provision of 
agribusiness support services (e.g., agriculture machinery showcase).  
While the sectoral composition of British land-consuming FDI is important for a 
better understanding of what is happening, it is equally essential to be aware that on the 
project level, this sectoral differentiation might not fully capture the nature of activities on 
the ground. In several cases, investor companies are involved in multiple sectors that 
together make up one project. Take, for example, the biofuel projects, in which companies 
integrate the whole supply chain from farming to refining to trading activities. In other 
instances, a single company engages in multiple unrelated industries, such as the Avana 
Group in Madagascar, which exploits minerals while also being involved in biofuel 
production, at least temporarily.
821
 Finally, some companies have switched their operations 
from one sector to another. One example is Agriterra Ltd., which was active in the 
petroleum sector prior to moving into farming with the goal to “build itself into a multi-
commodity African focused agricultural business.”822  
From a broader perspective, the rising number of early-stage companies involved in 
the agricultural sector mirrors the widespread belief in its potential as a future growth 
market, as stated by Agriterra Ltd.: “We believe that the agricultural sector in Africa is an 
area of activity which has the potential to be particularly resilient to the current global 
economic climate.”823 At the same time, the British government remains indeterminate on 
                                                 
821 It seems that Avana dropped its biofuel activities and is now focusing on mining again; no 
information is available on the former plans to plant Jatropha on 10,000ha. See, for instance, GEXSI LLP 
(2008), Slide 58; Energy-profile (2009), 53; Matthews (2010), 117-119. 
822 Agriterra Ltd. (29 February 2012). 
823 Agriterra Ltd (6 January 2009). 
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the matter of agricultural OFDI in Africa. On the one hand, statements by the former 
Minister for Africa (2010-2012), Henry Bellingham, clearly reveal the established bias 
towards the extractive sector.824 On the other hand, the CDC Group, the UK’s development 
finance institution, has begun to step up its private equity activities in African agriculture, 
and British industrial policy promotes farmland-consuming “clean tech” investments like 
those in biofuels (see Chapter 7). 
Figure 6-1 – UK OFDI in Africa by Industry, 2008 (in USD millions, ONS 2008)825 
 
Timelines 
In stark contrast to the case of China, British “land grab” projects have largely 
occurred after the year 2000.
826
 A closer look at the timelines of British land-consuming 
FDI in SSA shows three investment trends – characterized by investment focus and 
                                                 
824 Aigaforum (9 June 2011). 
825 Data obtained from the Office for National Statistics upon email request in June 2012. 
826 It remains unclear whether this is simply owing to the problem of data collection through the 
method of crowdsourcing or if it also reflects the problem of biased attention towards some industries 
(e.g., biofuels campaigns by NGOs) and countries (e.g., China) compared to others. 
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investor type – since 2000. Firstly, around the year 2000, land-consuming investments 
were largely conducted by British companies already present on the continent, and they 
were related to legal and institutional reforms in the recipient country.
 
A good example is 
Unilever Ghana, which acquired plantations in Ghana in 1999 by taking advantage of the 
opportunities presented to it by the host government’s divestiture program.827  
Secondly, from 2005/2006, another investment trend can be observed. Around that 
time, a large share of projects was seemingly related to the international climate 
negotiations and, more specifically, the emerging British and European policy framework 
promoting renewable energy (see Chapter 7). The predominant investor types were newly 
founded companies, many of which floated their shares on the AIM Stock Exchange in 
London,
828
 and financial investors. Both actor groups tried to profit from the policy-
induced (new) biofuel market and related support structures at the domestic, regional (EU), 
and international levels (UN FCCC). Importantly, “old investors” with a long presence on 
the continent were hardly involved in this trend. For instance, British Petroleum (BP) 
engaged in biofuel production through a joint venture (“D1-BP Fuel Crops”) with D1 Oils 
Plc., one of the doyens of the crude Jatropha oil industry. However, this cooperation 
remained rather short-lived, and BP exited the project in 2009.
829
 Similar divestments 
happened in other sectors, such as the aviation industry. Lufthansa, for example, originally 
participated in biofuel investments in the form of offtake agreements
830
 with the British 
                                                 
827 Ntsiful (2010), 129-137. 
828 AIM stands for Alternative Investment Market, a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange where 
small firms can float their shares under less restrictive regulations than in the London Stock Exchange. 
829 Bloomberg News (17 July 2009). 
830 An offtake agreement is an agreement between a producer and a buyer to acquire a certain amount 
of the anticipated production. It is very common in the natural resources sector. 
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biofuel producer Sun Biofuels, but later decided to end the cooperation in response to 
protests regarding the potentially unsustainable production of biofuels and the resulting 
land use competition and food insecurity. 
Finally, a significant share of investments started in 2008/2009. These investors – 
investment banks and private equity funds (public and private) – are seeking “alpha.” That 
is to say, they are aiming to achieve extraordinary returns on their investments in spite of 
the financial crisis. In practice, they are making land-consuming investments in agriculture 
or trying to cash in on opportunities offered by international climate finance, like, for 
instance, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
831
 As a consequence, this group of 
actors is increasingly involved, primarily as shareholders, in the business operations of the 
early-stage companies that began investing in 2006. Some, however, have also taken over 
the existing operations, such as Highbury Finance Ltd. in the case of Sun Biofuels 
Mozambique.
832
 While financial investors involved in agricultural projects are often 
framed as pioneers in the sector, this perception is only partially true. Instead, they follow 
in the footsteps of UK development finance, such as the CDC Group and Department for 
International Development (DFID). Investments in agribusiness have been a major part of 
the CDC’s operations since 1948, allegedly producing high returns of “up to 40 
percent.”833 Moreover, recent private equity investments by the CDC Group were also 
                                                 
831 For more information on the CDM, see the website of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) (http://cdm.unfccc.int/). Also, see Chapter 7. 
832 Highbury Finance (2013).  
833 AltAssets.net (26 April 2006). 
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explicitly intended to motivate financial investors to operate in African agriculture 
projects.
834
  
While a look at these timelines reveals general investment trends, an assessment of 
detailed project lifecycles shows what is actually happening on the ground. In this regard, 
the empirical evidence reveals that many projects do not merit comparison with their 
rhetoric of success and promise of high returns. Instead, they are often rather short-lived, 
for numerous reasons. For example, the case of Sun Biofuels (SBF) shows that a 
company’s performance can suffer from inexperience, false assumptions, lack of funding, 
and/or the financial crisis. In 2005, the company began to grow Jatropha in Ethiopia on 
land with poor soil, which together with drought conditions made the 1,000ha planted trial 
area economically unviable.
835
 In the words of the SBF Business Development Director, 
Harry Stourton: “The idea that jatropha can be grown on marginal land is a red herring.”836 
Consequently, SBF moved its biofuel operations to Mozambique and Tanzania in 2006. In 
those countries it acquired a total of 4,854ha and 8,000ha of prime land, respectively, with 
long-term plans to expand the operations to cover 20,000ha in total. Yet, the company’s 
operations continued to face difficulties in the form of a dramatic decline in share value 
(see Figure 6-2) due to the financial crisis and a constant lack of funding. Finally, in 2011, 
SBF went into administration after its majority shareholder, Trading Emissions Plc., 
decided to divest. As a consequence, SBF’s Tanzania- and Mozambique-located subsidiary 
                                                 
834 AltAssets.net (26 April 2006). CDC (8 November 2013). 
835 Wendimu (2013), 12. 
836 Reppert-Bismarck (21 January 2011); and see Pohl (2010) on Jatropha. 
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companies were sold to financial investors and some plots were discontinued. Data is 
lacking on the latest status of these projects (as of 2014).
837
  
A similar story of failed potential emerges from my investigation of most biofuel 
projects. Take, for example, D1 Oils, a UK-based share company founded in 2005. It was 
one of the first companies worldwide to focus on value-added operations of Jatropha 
biofuel production; and it experienced a crash in share value from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 
6-2). Throughout its existence, it has been struggling with the economic viability of its 
operations, and up to this day it has not paid any dividends to its shareholders. By 2012, 
D1Oils’ operational losses amounted to more than GBP 1 million.838 In order to indicate a 
fresh beginning, the company changed its name to NEOS Resources in 2010, shifted its 
focus to India, and announced a diversification away from Jatropha production in African 
countries.
839
 However, this strategy was not successful either, as the latest update from 
NEOS in 2014 highlights. A corporate notice from 30 January 2014 states that the 
company is in the process of selling off the assets from its Indian and other ventures: “it 
will not be possible to reach sustainable profitable volumes in the near future and therefore 
plans to develop the trade have been put on hold and all revenue generating activities 
                                                 
837 Subsequently, SBF’s subsidiary companies in Tanzania and Mozambique were sold to two financial 
investors in 2011, namely the London based merchant bank Lion’s Head Global Partners , operated by 
former Goldman Sachs employees, and Highbury Finance, a project development and investment 
advisory firm, founded in 2004 with a specialization in “alternative investment opportunities.” In both 
cases, the new owners have only conducted maintenance work on the former SBF plantations, which 
means that large parts of the acquired land lie fallow. Moreover, LGHP only employs 50 of the former 
700 workers while also falling short of clarifying the problem of outstanding compensation payments. 
See Lion’s Head Global Partners (2013); Highbury Finance (2013); Bergius (September 2012); and 
Bergius (5 July 2013).  
838 StockMarketWire.com (13 March 2012); Hawkins and Chen (2011), 21-23; Mitchell (2010), 118-
125. 
839 NEOS Resources Plc (12 October 2011); NEOS Resources Plc (15 November 2011); NEOS Resources 
Plc (15 March 2012). 
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within the Group have effectively ceased with effect from January 2014.” 840  Short of 
funding and running the risk of losing its AIM London Stock Exchange listing, the 
company’s board and key shareholders have begun to negotiate “the future direction of the 
Group and its funding requirements for the next 12 months.”841 
Another example of the difficulties encountered by these projects is GEM Biofuels. 
The company was founded in 2004, and it has been AIM-listed since 2007. Focusing on 
Jatropha production, the company has managed to secure over 495,000ha in Madagascar 
since 2005.
842
 Yet, its planting operations came to a halt in 2009, when tied-up capital 
markets and bad plantation management forced it to focus on maintaining existing 
plantations rather than (re)investing in their planned expansion.
843
 Thus, during 2011, 
GEM concentrated on letting the plantations mature, and did not engage in any further 
planting while reducing the number of staff. By the end of 2011, it had planted Jatropha on 
a total of 55,737 hectares.
844
 Still, the share value did not recover, nor did the company 
manage to attract additional funding during 2012.
845
 Unable to profit from its land bank, 
the company changed its name to Hunter Resources PLC in January 2013 to indicate its 
new investing policy and board changes.
846
 The latest corporate notice from December 
2013 stated that the company’s share trading had been suspended as it did not become an 
investment company in time to meet AIM London Stock Exchange requirements. The 
same notice announced that the management was in negotiations to become active in 
                                                 
840 Investigate.co.uk (30 January 2014). 
841 Investegate.co.uk (30 January 2014). 
842 GEMBioFuels (28 September 2011). 
843 Hawkins and Chen (2011), 3, 24-25. 
844 OnVista.de (2014); and GEM Biofuels (12 April 2012). 
845 GEM Biofuels (5 December 2012). 
846 ADVFN.com (1 August 2013); and Hunter Resources Plc (30 December 2013). 
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Peruvian mining projects 563km from the city of Lima in an area where eight exploration 
concessions (a total of 3,500ha) are located.
847
 What has happened to the Jatropha 
production remains unclear. 
Figure 6-2 – Three Examples of Crashes in Share Value, 2008-2012 (www.iii.co.uk.uk) 
Agriterra Ltd, 2008-2012 
 
GEM Biofuels, 2010-2012 D1Oils Plc, 2008-2012 
   
 
Together, these project timelines emphasize that those explanations which identify 
the financial crisis as a primary driver of land-consuming FDI fall short of comprehending 
the complexity at play. On the one hand, many land-consuming projects were started prior 
to the crisis and seem to be related to other events in the home and host countries, such as 
the climate regulations or divestiture programs. On the other hand, the financial crisis also 
resulted in massive crashes in the share values of companies and contributed to the failure 
of investors in search of profitable investments during a time of economic crisis.  
Moreover, these timelines provide interesting clues about the multiple individual 
and systemic difficulties encountered by different actors during a project’s lifecycle. For 
                                                 
847 Hunter Resources Plc (30 December 2013). 
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example, the financial situation has been aggravated by a systemic conflict of interest 
between the different actors involved in these projects: while companies “on the ground” 
focus on long-term value creation, financial investors “off the ground” are interested 
primarily in short-term profit. In this regard, the operational problems and long maturation 
timelines of agricultural projects “on the ground” (for instance, five years for Jatropha) led 
to constant struggles for early-stage companies that also negatively impacted the respective 
company’s majority shareholder, usually a financial company promising high returns to its 
investors and under pressure to deliver. In the case of SBF and its majority shareholder 
Trading Emissions Plc, a board decision was reached in 2010 to deny SBF additional funds, 
because the “value creation in this business was a long-term project.”848 
In other cases, data shows that financial investors made unrealistic earnings 
forecasts, sometimes in combination with allegedly fraudulent business practices. Cru 
Investment Management and its Africa Invest Fund, for instance, did not live up to 
predicted earnings of 30% for 2009-2010. Instead, Cru and Africa Invest were facing fraud 
investigations for misuse of funds in 2010, as money invested in other funds managed by 
Cru had been transferred to Africa Invest as loans, without notification of the respective 
shareholders. At the same time, the CEO Jon Maguire was accused of having withdrawn 
money without proper documentation.
849
 In 2010, Africa Invest was sold for GBP 175,000. 
This was hardly sufficient to cover fees and liabilities, and investors were unable to 
recover their investments.
850
An audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers revealed that Cru’s asset 
                                                 
848 Trading Emissions Plc (2011), 7. 
849 Merrett (29 November 2013); BBC (6 February 2010); and Miller (7 July 2011). 
850 Grote (16 March 2010). 
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base was overvalued, and this aggravated liquidity problems in 2011, when the company 
was unable to sell the (illiquid) holdings of land fast enough to respond to the massive 
withdrawal of investors.
851
  
In sum, the empirical evidence on project timelines illustrates that investment 
projects are characterized by constant changes in focus and details over time, including 
projects that do not end in failure. A good example is the aforementioned Unilever Ghana. 
It operated plantations in Ghana that it had acquired in 1999 through the host government’s 
divestiture program.
852
 Eight years later, in 2010, Unilever sold its majority share in the 
7,200ha Benso Oil Plantation Ltd, which is listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange and on 
which more than 9,000 people’s livelihoods depend, to Wilmar Africa.853 This was the 
follow through of a headquarter decision to concentrate on the company’s core business of 
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution.
854
 Moreover, the empirical evidence highlights 
the exposure of British land-consuming FDI to financial volatility; the dependency on 
developments in the home country, such as the economic crisis; or the inadequacy of 
business models to factor in the reality on the ground in the form of insufficient markets, 
limited economies of scale in agriculture, or bad plantation management. Together, these 
facts illuminate the discrepancy between the ‘profit from scarcity’ rhetoric and the actual 
                                                 
851 Miller (7 July 2011). 
852 Ntsiful (2010), 129-137. 
853Wilmar Africa, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Singapore-headquartered Wilmar International 
Ltd, which was “founded in 1991 as a palm oil trading company,” and “is today amongst the largest 
listed companies by market capitalisation on the Singapore Exchange and one of Asia’s leading 
agribusiness groups.” See Wilmar International Limited (7 February 2011), 3. 
854 Ntsiful (2010), 129-137. With regard to Unilevers’ standpoint on plantations over time, see Jones 
(2005b), 185-214. Also see statement by Wilmar International Limited (7 February 2011), 2. 
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performance of the respective companies, even in areas, such as biofuels, that are 
supported by governments worldwide. 
Land: Its Role and Use in These Investments 
The previous sections showed that British land-consuming FDI takes place in 
multiple sectors and engages multiple actors. At the same time, their assessment has 
pointed to fundamental challenges that several investment projects are facing, sometimes 
even leading to their ultimate failure. The following section will assess more closely the 
role of land used in these investments, major approaches to access land as well as relevant 
features of its governance. It can be noted that the Chinese cases do not differ in any 
significant way on these issues from the UK projects. 
Extent 
The scale of British land-consuming investments varies enormously, with projects 
ranging in size from a 100ha pilot farm to a total investment of 495,000ha (e.g., GEM 
Biofuels). While this range indicates the great diversity of investment projects falling 
under the label of land-consuming FDI, these numbers also show that compared to Chinese 
investments in SSA, the majority of which use less than 10,000ha, British investments are 
fairly large, particularly in the biofuel sector. To provide some examples: the Equatorial 
Palm Oil Company (EPO) acquired a total landholding of 169,000ha-182,000ha in 
Liberia;
855
 D1 Oils held 155,000ha in Zambia;
856
 CAMS Agri-Energy acquired 45,000ha 
                                                 
855 Global Witness (20 December 2013); Equatorial Palm Oil (2011); Equatorial Palm Oil (2013); and 
The Rights and Resources Group (2013), 267. 
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in Tanzania;
857
 and VEPOWER Ltd, a bioenergy company focusing on fuel production and 
power generation, teamed up with Jatropha Africa, a biofuel feedstock company, and 
signed a feedstock acquisition agreement regarding the produce from the 50,000ha leased 
land area in Ghana.
858
 However, UK investment projects also tend to be large in other 
sectors, such as timber: the Equatoria Teak Company owned by the CDC and FinnFund 
was managing an 18,640ha forest reserve in South Sudan;
859
 and livestock farming: 
Madabeef, a company active in Madagascar, seems to be operating ranching activities on 
200,000ha.
860
 In many cases, companies (e.g., D1Oils, SBF, Agriterra Ltd.) have or had 
enormous land banks in multiple countries located in SSA, making the total land at their 
disposal even larger.  
However, it has already been highlighted above that a large land bank does not 
necessarily result in large returns or necessarily represent high asset values for the 
company in case of a need to sell company assets due to project failure. Still, these figures 
are impressive, at least at first sight and in view of the local repercussions in the form of 
land tenure. In practice, a closer assessment of the timelines and details of many projects 
reveals a huge discrepancy between announced, acquired, and actually planted land area 
(see Table 6-1). For instance, Sun Biofuels’ (failed) business model envisioned 20,000ha. 
                                                                                                                                                    
856 Investigate.co.uk (14 June 2006). There is diverging data on how much land has been secured and 
how much has been planted. See Table 6-1 for competing sources. 
857 Obulutsa (19 September 2008).; Oakland Institute (2011b), 4, 18-19, 30. 
858 BioZio (2011), 110, 127. 
859 In 2010, the CDC and FinnFund divested and sold the companies to unknown investors following 
controversies that resulted from protests by local communities and an inability to make the forest 
plantation economically viable in a sustainable way. However, as of 2014, the company and the 
acquired area, which was leased for 32 years, continue to exist. It is now managed by Maris Capital, a 
London-based venture capital group. See corporate website under Equatoria Teak Company (2014). 
Also see Concession Agreement (28 June 2006), 11, 15; Deng and Mittal (2011), 2, 11, 28-29. 
860 Üllenberg (2008); Hamelinck (2013), 87. 
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However, the company ‘only’ managed to secure a total of approximately 12,854ha-
13,854ha. And of this land area, which spread across three countries, it had only planted a 
total of (approximately) 4,310ha prior to its failure.
861
 Similarly, as of 2011, (then) D1 Oils 
had only managed to plant a minor part of the total of 174,000ha it had negotiated in 
Zambia in 2006 (see Table 6-1). 
These enormous gaps between announced, negotiated, and planted land areas under 
management point to the challenges that these projects face on the ground, some of which 
were already alluded to in the previous section, such as expansion difficulties, 
unprofessional plantation management (GEM), inexperience and/or natural events (SBF), 
land disputes (Equatorial Palm Oil), competition over scarce input seeds, lack of funding 
and/or marginally viable business models, and administrative challenges.
862
 More broadly, 
these discrepancies between the secured and planted areas over time provide useful data 
for a grounded discussion about the benefits of large-scale agricultural production in view 
of rural development or food security, since most large-scale projects have not managed to 
fully operationalize their business models.
 
 
                                                 
861 See Table 6-1 for details. 
862 D1 Oils (2011), 30; and Hawkins and Chen (2011). 
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Table 6-1 – Discrepancies between Announced, Acquired, and Planted Land Areas in Selected 
Projects
863
 
Project Country Hectares announced/ 
acquired 
Hectares acquired Hectares planted 
Sun Biofuels 
(SBF) 
Ethiopia
864
  
 
Business model aimed 
at 20,000ha, but 
company only managed 
to acquire 13,000ha 
5,000ha since 
2005 
1,000ha  
Tanzania
865
 8-9,000ha since 
2006 
Approx. 
2,000ha by 2010 
Mozambique
866
 4,854ha since 
2006 plus two 
farms of 607ha 
and additional 
3,000ha under 
negotiation 
2,310ha 
D1Oils
867
 Zambia 155,000-174,000ha 
(including outgrower 
schemes) allocated by 
Zambian government 
in 2006 
155,000ha In 2007: 
2,411ha; and 
20,760ha 
through contract 
farming 
GEM 
Biofuels
868
 
Madagascar Secured 495,500ha; 
plan: 200,000ha 
planted area by 2010 
Exclusive rights 
over more than 
495,000ha 
55,700ha (in 
2010), plus 
access to 
40,000ha forest 
area 
Equatorial Palm 
Oil
869
 
Liberia 169,000ha; plans to 
develop 50,000ha 
within first 10 years, 
169,000-
182,000ha since 
2008 in the form 
Unclear, but due 
to financial 
problems and 
                                                 
863 Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30. 
864 Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30. 
865 Bergius (September 2012), 3; Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30. 
866 Highbury Finance (2013); Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30. 
867 Data remains unclear. According to GEXSI LLP (2008, 50, 55), the company had 7,386ha in South 
Africa and 25,525ha in Zambia under operation in 2008. Other reports state that D1Oils had been 
allocated 155,000ha of land by the Zambian government in 2005 for Jatropha planting (e.g., 
Investigate.co.uk (14 June 2006)), amounting to a total of 174,000ha when including the company’s 
contract farming relations (e.g., Reuk.co.uk (15 January 2007)). The Home and Mittal (2011, 28) 
country report confirms that the company was using 2,411ha of managed plantations and 20,760ha of 
outgrower schemes by 2007. The 2010 annual report by D1 Oils shows that the company has 
subsidiaries in multiple African countries (Malawi, Ghana, South Africa, Zambia, and Swaziland), all of 
which focus on biofuels. See D1 Oils (2010), 50. However, no data is provided regarding the total land 
bank or planted area. 
868 Data from 2010; see Gasparatos and Stromberg (2012), 296; Hawkins and Chen (2011), 21, 23-24; 
GEM Biofuels (2010); Biofuelsdigest.com (1 July 2010); Biofuelsdigest.com (25 June 2010); Cleantech 
Investor (May 2008); Proactiveinvestors.co.uk (25 November 2009); and GEM Biofuels (28 September 
2011). 
869 Global Witness (20 December 2013); Equatorial Palm Oil (2011); Equatorial Palm Oil (2013); and 
The Rights and Resources Group (2013), 267. 
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and 100,000ha within 
20 years 
of three 
concessions 
social resistance 
the planted area 
is limited (est. 
3,200ha in 2012 
according to 
RRI 2013).  
Use and Purpose  
Land in British land-consuming FDI projects fulfills three functions, namely land 
as natural resource, as strategic asset, and as productive space for industrial purposes 
and/or modernization projects. Lonrho, a formerly UK-listed company with an ambiguous 
reputation and operations in agriculture, infrastructure, transport, and support services in 
SSA dating back to 1909, was taken over by a Swiss investor in 2013. Two years before 
that takeover it described the attractiveness of investments in land and agriculture in Africa 
as a composite of the following factors: 60% of the world’s arable land, of which only 10% 
is cultivated;
870
 major continent for oil and gas reserves; a primary source for minerals; and 
the relatively low external debt levels of African countries.
871
 
While use of land as a natural resource or productive space for industrial purposes 
has been a common trait of British land-consuming OFDI in African countries, use of land 
as a strategic asset in overseas investments is relatively new, though not unprecedented. As 
                                                 
870 These figures are false. They are a modified version of a dominant narrative promoting agribusiness 
in Africa. The origin is a report by McKinsey (2010, 7-8, 42-44) which states that “Africa’s agriculture 
holds enormous potential for companies across the value chain. With 60 percent of the world’s 
uncultivated arable land and low crop yields, Africa is ripe for a “green revolution” like the ones that 
have transformed agriculture in Asia and Brazil.” Since then, this storyline has been taken up by 
international organizations (e.g., United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)) and 
businesses, often with a significant change in wording: uncultivated (with crops) land has become 
“unused,” resembling the idea of a “terra nullius.” Take the example of an article by UNECA, which 
argues that the “world’s largest reservoir of unused arable land, about 60%,” is located in Africa. See 
Lopes (2014). 
871 See The African Business Journal (May 2013); Bloomberg News (20 July 2011); and Lonrho (2012), 
1-5. 
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Chapter 3 briefly mentioned, land’s asset function was already a component of business 
models of chartered companies granting land titles, and of investment portfolios during late 
19
th
-century globalization. However, historical evidence on land acquisitions by businesses 
also highlights that land constituted only a minor share of personal wealth. Instead, it was 
largely a reflection thereof, and land holding was a status symbol rather than a standalone 
promise of extraordinary returns.
872
 In this context, and against the background of the high 
failure rate of land-consuming investments by funds (presented in Section 5), I argue for 
the need to critically revise contemporary claims that land is an asset class which 
withstands the wealth destruction witnessed in equity investments during times of financial 
crisis.
873
 Clearly, the above summary of project timelines highlighted problems related to 
the overvaluation of assets and the limited economies of scale that can be gained through 
large-scale land holding. Moreover, the illiquidity of land turns out to be disadvantageous 
once a project runs into financial problems. 
The quality of land is equally important for assessing the meaning and impact of 
British investment projects. Project details show that food and biofuel investments occur 
on prime land, which is defined by fertile soils, moderate climatic conditions, and 
proximity to important infrastructure and cities. Agriterra Ltd., for instance, leased 
45,000ha of brownfield agricultural land in Sierra Leone, close to the Liberian border, to 
produce palm oil in an area with high levels of rainfall.
874
 And the Equatorial Palm Oil 
Company has been granted concessions for three palm oil plantations in Liberia, all of 
                                                 
872 Nicholas (1999). 
873 Collinson (24 July 2010). 
874 Agritrade (6 February 2012); Agriterra (29 February 2012). 
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which are located in a favorable climatic zone, close to cities, and in proximity to ports 
with facilities that can accommodate export operations. 875 Similarly, the plots that SBF 
negotiated for biofuel production in Tanzania and Mozambique were prime land, following 
the project failure in Ethiopia due to poor soils.
876
  
In most cases, it remains difficult to judge the environmental impact of land 
acquisitions due to the limited data available on the prior use of the lands. The few cases 
where such data is available show that land deals resulted in land-use rehabilitation
877
 as 
well as land-use change. Particularly in the latter case of land-use change, several projects 
reveal ways in which these investments might negatively affect local and regional 
livelihoods, climates, and landscapes (e.g., water security, wildlife habitat, or 
microclimate). For instance, SBF’s operations in Tanzania took place on land formerly 
used by charcoal makers, including a swamp area that was important for local water 
security.
878
 In some cases, a given company has stalled its operations due to international 
pressure over the environmental implications. This was the case with G4 Industries Ltd, 
which abandoned its 28,000ha biofuel project in Kenya before operations had begun in 
response to pressure from NGOs over the potential negative impact on wildlife in the 
wetlands of the Tana River Delta.
879
  
                                                 
875 Global Witness (20 December 2013); Equatorial Palm Oil (2011); Equatorial Palm Oil (2013); and 
The Rights and Resources Group (2013), 267. 
876 Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30. 
877 For instance, SBF’s operations in Mozambique involved land that had formerly been used as a 
tobacco plantation, and Equatorial Palm Oil (Liberia) engages both in the rehabilitation of old 
plantations and the creation of new ones. Hawkins and Chen (2011). 
878 WWF Tanzania (2009), 84-86. 
879 Cernansky (26 October 2011). 
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More broadly, the question remains of whether the land is intended to produce for 
overseas consumption, as is widely assumed in the “land grab” literature (see Chapter 2). 
In the case of British land acquisitions, most projects were indeed originally intended for 
international markets, and several had clear export infrastructure in place (e.g., Equatorial 
Palm Oil). In this context, it appears that host governments have been largely reluctant to 
ensure that a certain percentage of the harvest is available for domestic consumption and/or 
value-added operations (e.g., refining).
880
 However, in practice, the exports often did not 
materialize. To provide several examples: the Equatoria Teak Company only managed to 
sell a few consignments (of timber) from its forest reserves in South Sudan due to local 
protests. Consequently, the CDC Group and FinnFund sold the concessions in 2010, after 
three years of operations.
881
 Also SBF (in Mozambique and Tanzania) had only managed 
to sell and export one consignment of 30 tons of biofuel (Jatropha) by 2011. Thereafter, the 
company went into administration and its subsidiaries were sold to new owners who focus 
on plantation maintenance (rather than expansion). Meanwhile, Lufthansa, which had a 
biofuel offtake agreement with SBF, withdrew from this form of cooperation due to 
European protests over unsustainable biofuel production practices.
882
 Similarly, D1 Oils, 
active in Malawi and Zambia, ended up selling locally prior to its closure. The small scale 
of its operations – largely a function of limited availability of input seeds – made the 
pricing difficult. Marketing locally had the advantages of low transport costs and local 
                                                 
880 Zagema (2011); and Cotula (2011). 
881 Burnett (7 April 2014). 
882 Insight Group Plc (26 October 2011); Dahlbeck (2012), 21; Lufthansa (2014); Greenaironline.com 
(23 January 2012). 
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offtake agreements, both of which allowed for agreement on market value.
883
 In other 
cases, such as Cru Investment Management’s Africa Invest fund, the project had simply 
collapsed by the time of the first harvest. Regarding the question of how much of the 
biofuel produced in Africa has actually ended up in British transport fuel, it is interesting 
to note that, according to the UK Renewable Fuel Agency, no Africa-produced biofuel was 
used in 2010-2011, even though 78% of biofuels had been imported.
884
 This information 
correlates with my empirical findings, according to which most British biofuel producers 
ended up selling locally or closing operations altogether.
885
  
To better understand the utility derived from overseas land acquisitions, it is 
important to look beyond the question of exports. In addition to land, these projects 
employ multiple factors of production, including labor, while also creating new markets 
for British input services and thus potentially creating jobs back home. Moreover, they are 
reflective of profitable policy frameworks, such as climate finance and related carbon 
credits, for which at least two biofuel companies, D1 Oils and the SBF, applied. At the 
same time, the government operates on the assumption that these projects will generate 
state revenues derived from overseas investment earnings, and the early-stage companies’ 
projects represent profitable business streams for London banks issuing Initial Public 
Offerings (see Chapter 7). 
                                                 
883 Mitchell (2010), 124-125. 
884 See UK Trade and Investment (2012), 17. 
885 Instead, land used for UK biofuels has been located in Europe (e.g., France, Germany, Ukraine, UK, 
Belgium), Latin America (e.g., Argentina, Brazil), and Asia (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia), with a focus on 
oilseeds, rapeseed, palm oil, soy, corn, sugar beet, sugar cane, and wheat as input factors. Renewable 
Fuels Agency (2011), 50.  
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Strategies of Access 
Land is accessed through lease agreements, public-private partnership programs, 
the granting of concessions, joint ventures, outgrower schemes, Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) with county districts and tribal communities, and/or the purchasing 
of shares in listed plantations. In many cases, mixed access strategies are applied, such as 
plantation production plus outgrower schemes, or the purchase of a trading company (e.g., 
Agriterra Ltd. in Sierra Leone) that has preferential supply agreements with a sufficiently 
large farmer base.
886
Moreover, several companies rely on additional land-intensive inputs 
from third parties, such as Jatropha seedlings grown by the supplier Diligent Tanzania Ltd. 
on 3,500ha.
887
 In some cases, the privatization of public plantations provided investors 
with access options. For instance, the two plantations acquired by Unilever in 1999 and 
2004 (through shareholding) both trace back to 1976.
888
  
Aspects of Governance 
Since the land that is leased is often owned by the state, key ministries and 
government agencies are involved in the land deals, as are parliaments.
889
 At the same time, 
several British biofuel companies have been part of committees established by host 
governments to develop governance structures in their particular sector. Jatropha Africa 
                                                 
886 Agriterra (29 February 2012). 
887 Chaponniere et al. (2010), 10. From a historical perspective, these strategies of indirect land 
(function) access are not new. During British colonial administration, smallholder schemes were often 
favored over plantations out of concern over social tensions and because they were seen to be more 
efficient. Also see the summary on “Oil Palm in Ghana” by the World Rainforest Movement (6 August 
2010); and Gyasi (1996). 
888 Ntsiful (2010), 129-137. 
889 Cotula (2011), 16; Lahiff (2012). 
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participated in the biofuel committee that supported the Ghanaian Ministry of Energy 
during deliberations on a renewable energy policy;
890
 D1Oils took part in a task force 
committee on renewable energy that framed biodiesel regulations in Zambia;
891
 and G4 
International West contributed to West Africa’s biofuel strategy under UEMOA.892  
Most of the deals seem to be fully embraced and promoted by the respective 
recipient government.
893
 For instance, the Equatorial Palm Oil Company’s 169,000ha 
holding, of which 89,000ha are concessions granted by the government and 80,000ha are 
part of an MoU with the county district and tribal communities, is embedded in a plan by 
the Liberian government to re-establish export-oriented plantations as a growth sector and 
foreign exchange earner. On a similar note, Agriterra Ltd.’s lease of over 45,000ha of 
brownfield agricultural land has been promoted by the Sierra Leone Investment and Export 
Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) in line with the government agenda to use “oil palm as a 
priority growth sector.”894  SLIEPA, in cooperation with the District Councils and the 
Ministries of Land and Agriculture, has been “earmarking and preparing a number of 
                                                 
890 Jatropha Africa (22 August 2010). However, due to the unclear policy environment and lack of 
funding, a policy overview by Antwi-Bediako (31 October 2013) mentions that Jatropha Africa went 
into administration. 
891 See Investigate.co.uk (14 June 2006). 
892 See ESG/ICTSD/LeHub/UEMOA/UN Foundation (2008), vii. 
893 In most cases, the terms seem very favorable to foreign investors. In Sierra Leone, for example, 
investors often seem to be exempt from taxation and they are allowed to lease land for up to 71 years 
(for USD 20-30 per ha per year) while profiting from low labor costs, which range between two and 
three dollars per day. See Caulker (2010), 12. A similar case is Liberia, which is currently extending 
and rehabilitating its plantations by granting concessions to foreign investors such as the Equatorial 
Oil Palm Company. That this company’s investments are fully embraced by Liberian President Sirleaf is 
highlighted by the fact that she took part in the 2011 inauguration ceremony of the company’s newly 
established mill. Moreover, the concessions over 50 years were enacted by the Parliament of Liberia. 
Equatorial Palm Oil 2011; Equatorial Palm Oil (23 February 2010), 6-8; Carrere (2013), 15, 55-56. 
894 Bangura (2011); World Rainforest Movement (9 August 2011). 
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suitable sites for 10,000+ hectare palm plantations.” 895  Moreover, several companies 
cooperate with state agencies, such as D1Oils, which co-manages a 600ha farm with the 
Zambian Ministry of Agriculture, and CAMS Agri-Energy Tanzania, which collaborates 
with a Tanzanian seed authority and Indian NGO to reach out to farmers.
896
 Also, the terms 
of the agreements seem highly favorable to the investor side, as land leases range between 
32 (Equatorial Teak Company) and 50 years,
897
 the costs of compensation schemes appear 
to be extremely low, while governance structures in the host countries are rather weak, and 
labor costs are very low.
898
 
Aside from governance schemes at the domestic level, some investments are also 
part of international governance arrangements. Jatropha Africa, for instance, is an industry 
partner of an EU-funded interregional cooperation program (EU-ACP) on “Capacity 
Building in South Africa, Namibia and Ghana to create Sustainable, Non-Food Bio-Oil 
Supply Chains.”899 
Actors and Institutions 
The empirical evidence on the governance of land has highlighted that, as in the 
Chinese case study, the presence of African governments in these investments is obvious 
in the form of ministerial and parliamentary involvement, investment promotion centers, 
and/or legislation. At the same time, civil society groups and local community members 
                                                 
895 Caulker (2010), 29. 
896 Obulutsa (19 September 2008).; and WWF (2009), 14-15, 23, 26, 29-36. 
897 One of the largest investments by land area, the 495,000ha GEM Biofuels project in Madagascar, is 
granted for over 50 years and made up of parcels which range between 2,500 and 50,000ha. Included 
are the rights to a 40,000ha natural forest. 
898 Caulker (2010), 12. 
899 Jatropha Africa (n.d.).  
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seem to remain largely on the sidelines during the negotiations, and investor promises 
made to these groups, such as the building of health services and schools or the provision 
of sufficient jobs for the community, are often the first to be broken when a project fails 
and/or is taken over by new investors, – as, for instance, in the case of the projects of SBF 
in Tanzania and Mozambique. 
From the British side, public agencies and government officials from different 
levels, as well as private actors and institutions, are involved. In addition to the prominent 
roles played by early-stage companies, alternative stock markets, and financial investors, 
several public institutions seem to be relevant. One such institution is the CDC Group, the 
UK’s public development finance institution that has begun to enhance its efforts with 
regard to land-consuming (private equity) investments in Africa, focusing on infrastructure, 
real estate, and, increasingly, agriculture. Moreover, new political institutions and reforms, 
such as bilateral investment forums or aid programs, have been introduced by the acting 
government as part of a broader attempt to step up commercial diplomacy with African 
countries. 
Also, several financial institutions, such as the Standard Chartered Bank, a UK 
merchant bank with a long presence in African economies, and/or investment funds, and 
the AIM London Stock Exchange play an important role, as the majority of companies rely 
on their financial services for funding. At the same time, the UK government proactively 
calls on entrepreneurs to make use of aid-funded business opportunities in the form of 
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public-private-partnerships. Some companies have also accessed aid funding through 
institutions of pooled sovereignty, such as the EU.
900
  
On a (inter)national and regional level, there are a number of interlinked (non-) 
financial institutions at work, especially in the biofuel sector. These include domestic 
obligatory blending mandates, European and UK directives on carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions reduction, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and/or UNFCCC-related 
mechanisms, all of which promote a renewable energy market (see Chapter 7, Section 1 for 
more details). Also, the newly launched G8 Alliance for Food Security, which was 
established in 2012 and “gathers together donors, partner countries and the private sector” 
to “promote private sector investments in agriculture by improving the business 
environment and explore ways to reduce risk through providing better legal and 
administrative conditions for investors,” has British companies among its members.901 In 
the G8 Alliance program for Tanzania, for instance, the UK is expected to contribute GBP 
63 million from 2012 to 2015. Several British companies submitted a letter of intent to 
participate in the program, namely Syngenta, Unilever, and Vodaphone, which basically 
implies expanding their business activities in multiple African countries.
902
 
A significant share of the actors and institutions active in these investments also 
reflects the existence of a transnational or even global business culture that is characterized 
by personal linkages; registration in the same locations, namely the tax havens of 
                                                 
900 P. Harvey (2010). 
901 European Commission (18 May 2012). 
902 See New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (http://new-alliance.org/). For a critical 
discussion of the G8 Alliance in the context of commercial pressure on land, concentration of land 
ownership, and crowding out effects, see Hall and Sulle (2013).  
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Mauritius and Guernsey; the involvement of multiple investors from different countries in 
one project; and the reappearance of the same actors in different institutions.
903
 At the 
same time, the network does not consist entirely of private actors but also includes UN 
agencies (UNECA; UN FCCCWB) and other public agencies on the international (AfDB), 
regional (European Investment Bank), and domestic levels (see Table 6-2). 
                                                 
903 For instance, SilverStreet advised GAVI alliance, and CAMEC and Agriterra had the same board 
members before CAMEC was sold to a Kazakh firm. 
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Table 6-2 – The UK in Africa: Actors involved in Land-Consuming OFDI (selected) 
Actors Involved at Different 
Levels of Governance 
Public Private Hybrid 
INTER-
NATIONAL 
International 
agents 
-United Nations 
Industrial 
Development 
Organization (UNIDO) 
-UNFCCC Clean 
Development 
Executive Board 
-UNECA 
-European 
Commission Biofuel 
Directive 
-African Union 
-NEPAD Cassava 
Initiative 
-EU-ACP  
-AU (biofuel promise) 
-Jatropha Alliance 
-Lufthansa 
-UoP Houston 
-Refining company in 
Helsinki 
-Africa Invest (Channel 
Island-listed) 
 
-African Biofuel 
Board 
-G-8 New Alliance 
for Food and 
Nutrition Security  
-Jatropha Africa in 
cooperation with 
EU-ACP 
UK National -The CDC Group Plc  
-UK Renewable Fuels 
-Agency (closed 2011) 
-UK Department of 
Trade and Investment 
(UK TI)  
 
-British Airways 
-G4 Industries ltd 
-GEM Biofuels 
-CAMS Agri-Energy 
Tanzania 
-Schroders Investment 
Management 
-Vepower Ltd 
-Cru Investment 
Management 
-Virgin Train 
-Biodiesel Plants 
-Sun Biofuels Ltd 
-Trading Emissions Plc 
-ReSolve group 
-D1Oils (called NEOS -
Resources Plc since 2012) 
-BP International (exited 
2009) 
-Lion’s Head Global 
Partners (run by former 
Goldman Sachs employees) 
-Highbury Finance 
-Principle Capital 
Investments 
-Saner Plc 
-Avana Group 
-Funds 
-Private Equity 
Funds 
Sub-
national 
-Regional investors 
(Wales) 
  
BILATERAL    -Investment 
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Forums (e.g. UK-
Nigeria Investment 
Forum 2012) 
RECIPIENT 
COUNTRY 
National -Ministries 
-Parliament of Liberia 
-President of Liberia 
-President of Sierra 
Leone 
-Sierra Leone 
Investment and Export 
Promotion Agency 
-Jatropha Africa (Ghana)  
Sub-
national 
-Government agencies  
-Communities 
-Farmers  
-Contract farmers 
-Diligent Tanzania Ltd 
(Seed company) 
 
 
4. The Investments in the Recipient Context: Stated Goals and Multifaceted Reality 
British FDI projects are embedded (as described above) in national and regional 
development frameworks which are characterized by their rhetoric of rural development, 
energy/food security, and economic growth with its alleged promise of jobs, better 
livelihoods, and state revenues. The Tanzanian government, for instance, has leased 
600,000ha to foreign investors since 2006 in the context of a national development 
program that prioritizes biofuel production.
904
 Similarly, the Ghanaian government 
promotes biofuel investments in the context of its national energy policy.
905
  
Many host countries’ national development programs aim to ease the administrative 
process that affects land-consuming FDI. At the core of such IFDI-attraction strategies is 
the perception that the host countries have to reduce barriers to investment “and tap their 
potential and comparative advantages to develop the biofuels sector and benefit from 
                                                 
904 See, for instance, Veit (2010). 
905 Dietrich-O’Connor (2011); and Ministry of Energy, Republic of Ghana (2010), 20. 
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globalization through CDM [Clean Development Mechanism, A.G.] and the global carbon 
market”906 while boosting their agricultural sectors. This is expected to improve negative 
terms of trade and earn foreign exchange through export growth, but also to contribute to 
greater self-sufficiency in food and energy within the context of global market failure, 
namely the failure of the global market to ensure reliable access to cheap resources. Also, 
on a regional level, these investments are embedded in development frameworks. For 
instance, West African countries agreed on a “blueprint for bioenergy, agriculture and rural 
development” for 2009-2011. This so-called UEMOA strategy was facilitated by UN 
agencies.
907
  
In line with the official rhetoric, most companies “on the ground” identify their 
projects as impact investments that combine profits with development objectives. Notably, 
there is a difference between “on the ground” and “off the ground” investors. “On the 
ground” companies tend to highlight the benefits of their programs, which allegedly 
contribute to rural development through jobs, housing, or health services. “Off the ground” 
actors, such as the financial companies that are majority shareholders in “on the ground” 
companies, seem to focus more on goals related to the context in which their headquarters 
operate, such as the UK and the EU. Trading Emissions Plc., for instance, stated its intent 
to profit from climate change mitigation policy by producing “clean” and renewable 
energy. Moreover, the scarcity rhetoric pursued by most agricultural funds appears to be 
more targeted towards capital from rich investor countries than poor ones, as in the latter 
case scarcity might be associated more with poverty than profit. 
                                                 
906 UNECA (2008), 30. 
907 ESG/ICTSD/LeHub/UEMOA/UN Foundation (2008), 3-26, 110-118. 
308 
 
Whether the choice made by African governments to realize their development 
plans with foreign capital will be sustainable remains to be seen. In contrast to 
contemporary mainstream economics, with its focus on capital location, the above 
highlights that capital ownership and home country context could be equally important for 
a country’s sustainable development. Take, for example, those biofuel investments that 
struggled to gain funding in the UK due to conflicting interests between headquarters and 
the subsidiary regarding timelines, or other events in the home country that affected the 
realization of development plans in the host country, such as the economic recession. 
Another factor to consider is the historically low rate of reinvestment regarding the profits 
made. At the same time, host governments have made unfortunate choices, such as 
providing support without accounting for the specific planting season of a crop.
908
 
The discrepancy between planned and actually planted areas of land over time, the 
frequent change of owners, and the high degree of project failure all highlight the 
challenges of realizing domestic development plans through private foreign capital. For 
instance, the company SBF had not resolved its compensation problems by the time the 
company was resold, and the new investor was not interested in acting on the matter either. 
In many cases, new investors taking over failed projects do not make necessary 
investments while only reemploying a minor share of the previous workers. In addition, the 
above-average remittance rate that has characterized some British subsidiaries in Africa for 
a long time – with 75 cents of every dollar of profit being repatriated to the home 
                                                 
908 Mitchell (2010), 124-125. 
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country
909
 – appears worrisome, as this means that only a minor share of the realized 
profits might actually be reinvested in host country operations. The ambiguous 
developmental impact of these investments also holds true in view of the underpinning 
business models. Many of these foresee the reduction of labor over time while relying on 
constantly low wages and minimum environmental standards to stay economically viable 
(e.g., Jatropha).
910
 
Consequently, there remains sufficient room for doubt about whether these 
investments, and the extended commercial presence of British companies and actors in the 
form of aid and trade, will be “Delivering Prosperity Together”911 as claimed (see also 
Chapter 7). On a national scale, many host countries’ overall governance performance has 
improved over the last decade.
912
 At the same time, governance areas that are relevant in 
order for land-consuming OFDI to be beneficial for host country development, such as the 
rule of law, have deteriorated in many countries, also those that are considered to be the 
continent’s economic powerhouses (Nigeria, South Africa). 913  Also, from a broader 
perspective, it is debatable whether export-oriented biofuel investments are a good way to 
achieve greater food and energy self-sufficiency, as assumed by many national 
development programs. In fact, many African countries seem to be already over-
consuming locally produced biomass, and this is a challenge that is likely to expand in 
view of anticipated population growth, negative effects of climate change on land and soils, 
                                                 
909 Te Velde (2002), 4. 
910 See, for instance, the case of D1 Oils in Mitchell (2010), 124-125. 
911 Bellingham (2010). 
912 The Africa Report (29 September 2014). 
913 See, for instance, WB Governance Indicators 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports); and findings of the 2014 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance survey (http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/9). 
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and/or general land-use conflicts (food vs. fuel vs. urbanization/modernization).
914
 Many 
governments do not seem to attach any export restrictions or local content requirements to 
land-consuming investment projects, or to demand the development of domestic refining 
capacities to diversify their countries’ economies. 
5. Investment Funds for Agriculture  
Similar to the issue of labor in the Chinese case, one particular aspect of British 
land-consuming FDI has gained widespread international attention: the rise of new actors 
in the form of investment funds that engage in agricultural projects. For a better 
understanding of what is actually happening, the following paragraphs outline the key 
characteristics of these projects. The goal is to capture the reality of this investor type, 
which is responsible for, or at least involved in, a significant number of British land-
consuming FDI projects (see Table 6-3).  
A first challenge towards the assessment of these funds is their complex and 
evolving nature and opaque structures. Accordingly, the first important question is who is 
actually investing. Take, for example, the self-proclaimed “largest agricultural fund in 
Africa,” African AgriLandFund, which has been launched by the British hedge fund 
Emergent Asset Management. It is based on a capital transfer made by a US pension fund 
with the stated intent to make private equity investments in African agriculture.
915
 Running 
from 2009 to 2011 under the management of EmVest, an operating company under the 
control of Emergent Asset Management, the fund was spun out of the Asset Management 
                                                 
914 Mushi (18 May 2012).  
915 EdificeCapital.com (2014); and McNellis (2009), 11. 
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investment portfolio in 2011. These constant changes in management and shareholding are 
in fact key characteristics of these funds, which makes it difficult to capture what is 
occurring and why. 
Judging from the rhetoric of a range of fund managers, the focus on SSA is 
explained by the region’s favorable conditions for food production. In the words of the 
African AgriLandFund: "because of its series of microclimates, its highlands, its 
agricultural diversity and good logistics, South Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa can deliver 
an enormous amount of food."
916
 At the same time, most funds use the same overarching 
theme to explain their business interest in farmland and agriculture: they apply a resource 
scarcity framing. Accordingly, in a world with a growing population, a rising middle class, 
a declining arable-land-per-capita ratio, climate pressures, high commodity prices, and 
competing claims over (farm)land, investments in agriculture promise high returns at a 
time of otherwise meager investment prospects as a result of the financial crisis.
917
  
In practice, however, the connection to farmland and food production is in many 
cases less obvious than it first appears. While empirical evidence does highlight a variety 
of farmland and food-related activities, it primarily reveals funds investing in the private 
equity of agricultural companies (e.g., Cru Investment Management) or going into related 
sectors, such as real estate, trading, shipping. So far, only a few funds have invested in land 
itself. For instance, Schroders Investment Management’s “Agricultural Land Fund,” which 
was launched in 2008 when commodity prices peaked, pursues a mixed strategy by 
                                                 
916 McNellis (2009), 13. 
917 Schroder (August 2008).  
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investing “in companies and funds which ‘will generate capital and income from the 
efficient management of land,’ as well as holding direct stakes in agricultural land.”918  
Moreover, alongside this new trend of investment funds framing agriculture and 
land as an asset class, there are critical voices as well. Take, for example, David Bryant, 
Managing Director of Rural Fund Management (Australia), who warns that the rise of 
investments in natural assets, such as agricultural land, hints at the formation of a new 
bubble that is likely to burst in the future.
919
 According to Bryant, the rosy predictions of a 
continuous appreciation in farmland value are by no means certain. Instead, the correlation 
of high commodity prices and land value raises serious doubts about the long-term 
profitability of such undertakings. From a historical perspective, total returns from 
agriculture, of which land values are a key component, “rose in line with [commodity] 
prices, but were driven back again by economic events,” most of which were outside the 
control of individual companies, such as the Asian crisis. In reality, the “property 
component of agricultural businesses is that these assets are natural resources;” and the 
“dynamic of agricultural property business is that the ability to yield, combined with the 
price of the commodity it produces” defines the profitability of the operation and the value 
of agricultural land.  
Returns from large-scale agricultural projects are also severely challenged by other 
factors, such as the price volatility of agricultural markets, and/or the risks of currency 
appreciation, extreme weather events, and pests; the fact that “economies of scale in 
agriculture tend to approach an optimum at relatively low levels of scale” – due to the 
                                                 
918 McNellis (2009), 16. 
919 Bryant (2011), 16-18.  
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relative increase of overhead costs compared to returns; and the difficulty of establishing 
adequate corporate structures which respond to the volatile and dynamic farming realities 
on the ground.
920
 In practice, and similar to the biofuel projects discussed before, the 
investment fund sector has already witnessed cases of dramatic value destruction and 
allegedly fraudulent behavior, as the case of Cru Investment Management (Africa Invest) 
highlighted.
921
 Moreover, the illiquidity problem experienced by Cru Investment shows 
that holding land as a strategic asset also poses a challenge in the case of project failure. 
Together, these factors indicate that it is not surprising that the business rationale of 
agricultural investment funds often turns out to be less successful than it first appears, 
particularly with regard to the claim of above-average returns in the medium term (see 
below). They also suggest that a business rationale which assumes appreciation in land and 
commodity values in its profitability calculations could become troublesome in view of 
global food security. The inherent problem for food security becomes obvious in a 2002 
presentation about falling wheat prices by Silver Street Capital, “an investment 
management firm focusing on investing in two major areas: Africa and the agricultural 
sector.”922 The presentation starts out with a “problem definition” centered on the fact that 
the front month futures prices for wheat were “still around 40% off the 2008 peak.”923 
Ascribing declining world wheat inventories to extreme weather events since 2008, the 
presentation comes to a ‘positive’ outlook of re-rising wheat prices:924 “Global inventories 
                                                 
920 Bryant (2011), 16-18. 
921 See Chapter 6 (Section 3). 
922 Silver Street Capital (12 March 2015). 
923 Silver Street Capital (9 August 2010), 10.  
924 Silver Street Capital (9 August 2010), 10. 
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are now near balance once the Black sea shortfall [i.e. reduced production due to drought 
conditions, A.G.] is replaced [i.e. once US farmers have sold surplus inventories, A.G.] so 
any further negative surprises in wheat harvests will lead to price rises.”925 While expected 
price increases are clearly bad news for people depending on markets to access their food 
supplies, they are good news for the investor. 
Against this background, a growing body of literature has been emerging since 
2008 that discusses the disconcerting implications of this financialization of the food 
sector.
926
 It seems particularly worrisome to see financial actors gaining equity-related 
control over various activities in the global food-supply-chain.
927
 This could bestow 
investors with the power to induce scarcity in the medium term in order to increase profits, 
– for instance, by withholding crops in storage or not planting anything. It also reflects the 
broader trend of the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few. In this case, the 
owned land is then leased to farmers or directly operated by the investment fund.
928
 At a 
minimum, examples from other sectors characterized by similar processes of ownership 
concentration and control over supply chains – from production to storage and distribution 
– serve as a warning about the potential repercussions. Take, for example, the manipulative 
control of a physical commodity market in the form of price rigging through hoarding – an 
                                                 
925 Silver Street Capital (9 August 2010), 10.  
926 For a detailed discussion of the political implications of the financialization of the food sector in the 
form of distancing and private accumulation, see Clapp (2013).  
927 Also see Patel (2012); and Clapp (2013). 
928 Wilson (28 July 2013).  
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accusation that Goldman Sachs was confronted with in 2013, when the stockpiling of tons 
of aluminum allegedly drove up prices.
929
 
For the time being, the empirical evidence on UK financial companies investing in 
African land and agriculture (presented below in Table 6-3), highlights that reality is 
starkly different than the assertion that scarcity pressures and rising demand will ensure the 
success of these undertakings, which in turn will contribute to food security and reduce 
import dependency in host countries. Instead, Cru Investment Management’s Africa Invest 
turned out to be fraudulent in its use of financial resources. And, Susan Payne’s widely 
mentioned African Agricultural Land Fund came under new management in 2011, though 
it did attract an impact investment of USD 500 million from another financial investor. At 
the same time, Actis’ Africa Agribusiness Fund’s monopoly in grain handling allegedly led 
to food price increases in Kenya, highlighting the dangers associated with excessive 
market power. And Schroders’ Agricultural Land Fund did not generate the alpha returns 
promised; in fact, it mostly performed under the benchmark level from 2006 to 2013, 
showed great volatility over time, and invested largely in futures rather than equity.  
This empirical evidence, then, raises a very different question: How is it that this 
rhetoric of success and profit continues to be so powerful (and go unchallenged) in the 
media and government policies, even though the counterexamples are so numerous? 
Additional and more detailed assessments of these investment projects are needed in order 
to trace the path of the millions of US dollars associated with cases of fund failure. This 
                                                 
929 Wilson (28 July 2013); United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (23 
July 2013); and The New York Times (26 July 2013).  
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would help to clarify the underpinning interest formations that are characteristic of a 
significant share of these investments. 
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Table 6-3 – Examples of UK Financial Companies Investing in Africa  
(Merian Research and CRBM 2010)
930
 
Name Time Vehicle & 
Purpose 
Projects Additional Information 
Cru 
Investment 
Managemen
t 
Unclear start 
(2008?); 
suspended in 
2009 
Africa Invest 
Management 
Ltd. London 
Invest in 
agriculture for 
food production 
(e.g., paprika, 
chilies, 
potatoes) and 
profit from 
rising global 
food demand 
 
Private equity 
investments in five 
to seven farms in 
Malawi (conflicting 
information) 
Approx. 6,000ha 
and additional 
outgrower schemes 
The fund was suspended in 2009, 
farms were sold to a Malawi 
farming company, and CEO Jon 
Maguire was accused of misuse 
of financial resources for 
personal profit.
931
 
Just before its closure, Africa 
Invest was awarded the European 
Market Research Centre award at 
a UN FAO conference, as well as 
the “Best SME in Africa” Award 
at the “Commonwealth Business 
Council – African Business 
Awards Ceremony” held in 
London in 2008.
932
 
Actis 
Capital LLP 
London 
Actis was 
established in 
2004. Until then, 
it had been part of 
the CDC, the 
UK’s 
development arm, 
which was 
founded in 1948 
to invest in the 
Commonwealth.
933
 
Actis Africa 
Agribusiness 
Fund 
Sectors: tea and 
coffee 
processing, 
aquaculture, 
horticulture, 
forestry, and 
bio-power.
934
 
Private equity 
investments  
Actis was previously part of the 
CDC, which still holds 40%.
935
 
Grain Bulk Handlers Ltd., in 
which Actis is invested, has 
established a monopoly in grain 
handling in Kenya which has 
driven up food prices.
936
 
In 2009, Actis was voted Africa 
real estate firm of the year, 
highlighting that most of its 
investments are in effect not 
flowing into agricultural 
projects.
937
 Instead, the Fund 
focuses on mining, gas and oil, 
                                                 
930 The table is based on Merian Research and CRBM (2010), as well as information from corporate 
websites. 
931 Merian Research and CRBM (2010), 28. 
932 Merian Research and CRBM (2010), 28. 
933 Actis (2014a). 
934 AltAssets (26 April 2006). 
935 AltAssets (26 April 2006). Accordingly, “[a]gribusiness has been a core part of CDC’s investments in 
Africa over the past 50 years and realizations have generated returns of up to 40 per cent, according to 
CDC. All of CDC’s portfolio companies need to comply with CDC’s business principles, including health 
and safety, business integrity and social policies.” 
936 Merian Research and CRBM (2010), 9. 
937 Actis (2014a). 
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financial services, and/or real 
estate rather than agriculture.
938
 
Emergent 
Asset 
Managemen
t Ltd. 
London
939
 
2008 until 2011 African 
Agricultural 
Land Fund, 
London
940
 
Sectors: biofuel, 
livestock, game 
farming, and 
timber 
Private equity fund 
investing in 
multiple projects 
150,000ha of land 
under management 
in 15 African 
countries (in 2008) 
Opened by former employees of 
Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, 
Susan Payne and David Murran. 
Susan Payne also has 
microfinance projects in Africa. 
When Susan Payne left Emergent 
Asset Management Ltd. in 2011 
the fund was spun out as well. As 
of 2012, the fund had received a 
USD 500 million investment 
from Truestone Impact 
Investment Management.
941
  
Schroders 
Investment 
Managemen
t 
2008 Schroders 
Agricultural 
Land Fund 
Hybrid fund 
involved in real 
estate, private 
equity, and equity 
markets 
942
 
Follows investment 
theory that 44% 
growth in 
population over 
next 40 years will 
be highly profitable 
in these areas. 
 
Total fund size is 
USD 200.8 million. 
The fund shall deliver 10-15% to 
institutional investors per year 
over 5 years by investing 25% in 
agricultural land-related equities 
and commodities – to get returns 
on land holding and land 
management.
943
 
De facto, it had primarily 
invested in futures of agricultural 
commodities by 2013, and it did 
not generate alpha (above 
average returns) but rather stayed 
largely below the benchmark 
value while reflecting great 
volatility.
944
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the main empirical characteristics of what is happening 
regarding British land-consuming OFDI since 2000. The rich empirical details are the 
foundation that allows me to explore alternative explanations of British land-consuming 
                                                 
938 Actis (2014b). 
939 McNellis (2009), 11, 13. 
940 Murrin (2009); and Private Equity (10 February 2012). 
941 See Private Equity (10 February 2012); and corporate website Truestone Impact Investment 
Management (n.d.). 
942 Also see De Schutter (2011b). 
943 Schroders (2008). 
944 Schroders (2014). 
319 
 
OFDI from a home country perspective (Chapter 7); to meaningfully compare the 
differences and similarities of Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI; and to put 
forward an argument about the role of OFDI in the context of home country development 
(Chapter 8). Importantly, the empirical findings move beyond the orthodox narratives 
about British ‘land grabbing,’ due to the complexity of (f)actors at play and/or the different 
timelines involved (also see Chapters 1 and 2).  
The key empirical characteristics of British land-consuming FDI in African 
countries highlight the necessity to critically investigate investor claims. Instead of 
representing cases of scarcity-induced success, many projects have failed and/or never 
lived up to their promise of high returns and developmental impact. This holds even in 
areas, such as the biofuel sector, where government policies and international frameworks 
are highly supportive of related entrepreneurial activities. In some cases, the resulting 
market concentration even led to price rises, pointing to the challenges associated with 
massive capital inflows in developing countries.  
The predominant actors in British land-consuming OFDI are large corporations 
with a long presence on the continent, early-stage companies, and financial investors. More 
recently, British government officials have also become involved in promoting OFDI, and 
the CDC, the development finance institution, has expanded the range of its activities in 
SSA. It promotes trade and investment and also acts as both an indirect and direct investor 
in land-consuming OFDI projects. Important institutions that influence investor rationales 
and/or open business opportunities are the international and domestic climate regime, host 
country privatization policies, the London Stock Exchange, and multilateral aid projects. 
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The UK’s long investor history is obvious in the activities of “old” companies in 
the recipient countries, but also in the responsiveness of new actors to 
international/transnational incentive structures. At the same time, it is surprising that the 
majority of investments are undertaken by newly founded companies, or by actors (e.g., 
funds) that engage in new operations (e.g., agriculture). Thus far, the majority of 
investments have used land as a natural resource, with the focus on export to world 
markets. However, the reliance on stock markets for industry finance often leads to the 
problem of crashing share values and a lack of patient capital, particularly in agricultural 
projects with medium-term maturation timelines.  
The previous assessment devoted a section on the nature and implications of new 
actors that have attracted a lot of attention in the contemporary debate, namely financial 
funds investing in the physical commodities of food and land. The overview highlighted 
that their business rationale is less self-explanatory than it might appear at first sight. 
Indeed their business models might come at a high price in cases where this yields market 
power concentration and wealth destruction. Even though their access to large sums of 
capital puts these investors at an advantage over competitors that are only active in the 
productive or farming sector, the poor performances of the various funds raises doubt 
about their business rationale and developmental impact. Moreover, and similar to the 
Chinese case study, the agency in host countries also featured prominently in these 
investment projects: not only did the respective governments try to attract British land-
consuming FDI, but British companies also participated in regulatory initiatives. 
In concluding, several tendencies of British land-consuming OFDI seem notable 
and demand a more detailed assessment in the home country context. In particular, the 
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British investment projects in SSA reflect a very diverse private sector that seems to have 
distinct business interests that relate to host country reforms, biofuels legislation, and/or 
the search for alternative investment outlets at a time of financial crisis. In this context, the 
findings also show the predominant use of alternative stock markets to access funding and 
the related lack of patient capital has led many projects ‘on the ground’ to ultimately fail – 
highlighting a potential dysfunctionality of the UK’s political economy. More recently, 
public actors and institutions have begun to engage in British land-consuming OFDI 
activities, as investors and/or agents that pro-actively support the private sector through 
commercial diplomacy. Importantly, these investments seem to respond to home country 
policies and/or crises that influence investor choices, and the government promotes them 
as a part of its development agenda and foreign policy – indicating that they do not take 
place in a “free market” vacuum. What this actually means from a home country 
perspective will be evaluated in the following chapter. 
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Table 6-4 – Brief Review of the Empirical Characteristics of UK OFDI945 
Category Core Empirical Characteristic 
Actors Three types of actors are predominantly involved: corporations with a 
long presence on the continent, early-stage companies, and financial 
investors. Recently, the British development finance institution, the 
CDC, has become involved as investor. 
Institutions Important institutions include the international and domestic climate 
regime (e.g., the CDM), host country privatization policies, the 
London Stock Exchange, and multilateral aid projects (e.g., the G8 
Alliance). Increasingly, commercial diplomacy institutions (e.g., 
bilateral investment forums) and British development finance (the 
CDC Group) are involved. 
Sectors While official data shows that British OFDI in SSA goes largely into 
mining projects and financial services, “land grab” databases largely 
list projects in agriculture for food and energy (biofuel) purposes. 
Timelines Most investments started around 2000 or later. Three major timelines 
can be identified: around 2000, from 2005 onwards, and post-2007. 
Role of land Land is used as a natural resource, as a space where profitable 
business opportunities open up (e.g., construction), and as an asset. 
Investments often intend to produce for export; however, they often 
end up selling locally. 
Recipient context British investments are part of national development plans in host 
countries which try to attract IFDI. In the case of biofuels, British 
companies were invited by several host governments to participate in 
the development of sectoral regulations. 
 
                                                 
945 This table intends to reduce complexity and orientate the reader. In doing so, it leaves out some 
findings presented in this chapter that though important, do not form the core of British OFDI in SSA. 
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Chapter 7: THE BRITISH CONTEXT: INVESTMENTS FROM A HOME COUNTRY 
PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
The empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter highlighted that British 
land-consuming FDI in African countries comprises several sectors, and reflects distinct 
motivations, as well as a wide range of operations. The evidence also shows a complex 
actor constellation: in addition to the highly diverse private sector, increasingly, agents of 
the public sector are involved. A significant share of these investments clearly pre-dates 
the 2008 crises. The production of food does not seem of primary importance in these 
investments, while biofuels investments have featured quite prominently – producing 
largely for international markets. Together with the important role of the financial sector, 
also the use of land as a strategic asset has been increasing.  
Based on the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 6, this chapter assesses how 
and why British land-consuming OFDI activities happen against the background of the 
investor country. In particular, it will discuss these activities in view of the country’s OFDI 
policy (Section 2), the guiding ideology of UK-Africa relations (Section 3), and, finally, 
against the backdrop of the country’s political economy (Section 4) and development 
trajectory (Section 5). The multiple threads emerging from this discussion will be 
summarized in the conclusion (Section 6), which will be guided by the question of why 
these investments occur as they do in and over time. In addition to domestic dynamics and 
international contexts, this section will also briefly assess the investments’ likely welfare 
implications. 
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In this part of the two-part case study, I argue that the following features of the 
home country context are significant in explaining British OFDI from a home country 
perspective: (1) The investments are embedded in a long-established OFDI framework; 
however, this framework has undergone some changes in the past decade, such as the new 
“official” focus on Africa and the introduction of novel financial instruments. (2) Many 
investments are part of a foreign policy ideology tailored to domestic development 
ambitions captured under the acting government’s “prosperity agenda,” while some relate 
to (inter)national climate policies. (3) The actors and institutions involved reflect the 
dominance of the financial industry in an era of deregulated capital markets whilst 
highlighting the challenge of attracting patient capital for agricultural investments through 
the stock exchange (AIM) mechanism. At the same time, (4) the detrimental impact of the 
financialization-led growth model pursued over the last decades has led the acting 
government to support OFDI in Africa as a way to reindustrialize and “rebalance the 
economy” – after the financial crisis hit. 
More broadly, as stated in the introduction of Chapter 6, I conclude that four 
drivers explain why British land-consuming OFDI in SSA happens from the home country 
perspective. This general argument about British land-consuming OFDI in SSA builds 
upon the empirical evidence presented about the home country context in this chapter, and 
the main empirical characteristics of British OFDI presented in the previous chapter. 
Accordingly, I maintain that British land-consuming OFDI projects in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are part of multiple strategies to profit from the economic reforms and rapidly growing 
consumer markets in the host countries; to abide by the international climate regulations 
and use domestic energy and climate policies to encourage investments in ‘clean’ biofuels; 
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and/or to “seek alpha” through alternative investments in the primary sector in Africa at a 
time of the financial crisis, Eurozone crisis, and economic stagnation back home. 
Increasingly, land-consuming OFDI to Sub-Saharan Africa are also part of a (long-term) 
political strategy to economic recovery and international political power through rising 
exports and industrial activity. 
2. Home Country Measures  
Britain has benefited from that global system over a long period of time. But we cannot 
afford to rely on history or sentiment if we are to earn our living. We cannot take it for 
granted that markets will remain open to our business, or that our businesses will always be 
able to take full advantage of the opportunities that exist.  
– Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011946 
British land-consuming investments in Africa are embedded in a fully developed 
framework of home country measures that has evolved over time. Some of its elements 
trace back to the late 19
th
 century, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that 
emerged out of the Colonial Office (est.1854) and the Dominions Office (est.1925). 
Historically, the adoption of home country measures underwent several stages, from a pre-
WWI laissez faire approach to a more guided course since WWI, and an increasingly 
promotional stance since the mid-1970s.
947
 The introduction of explicitly promotional 
OFDI policies occurred in the UK in 1974.
948
  
The shifting OFDI policy stances of the various UK governments reflect specific 
domestic development concerns and international events in time. For instance, Treasury 
                                                 
946 BIS (2011a), 3. 
947 Atkin (1970), 324-335; and De Beule and Van den Bulcke (2010), 296-297. 
948 De Beule and Van den Bulcke (2010), 296-297. 
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instructions in 1919 to tighten OFDI regulations reveal the intention to protect foreign 
exchange and ensure the availability of capital for domestic development, like housing, 
following WWI. And, more recently, the promotion of overseas FDI by the UK 
government seems to be related to the prevailing perception that OFDI is an important 
component of the UK’s ability to “punch above its weight” and maintain “prosperity” at 
home in a changing world order characterized by the rise of the BRICS. That is, to play an 
extraordinary influential role in international political and economic relations given the 
country’s actual size.949 At the same time, UK OFDI has remained astonishingly stable, at 
about 2% of GDP, since the end of WWII while the British share in world stock of FDI has 
mostly ranged between 14% and 15%.
950
 
OFDI: Development, Context, Objectives  
A closer look at the historical evidence shows the nature and sequence of events 
and development objectives that made various governments (under their respective 
political economies and development strategies) reach conclusions about the usefulness (or 
ineffectiveness) of overseas investments to address internal or external challenges or 
realize certain development ambitions. As has been mentioned before, the UK moved 
through several stages in this respect, namely a laissez faire approach during the 19
th
 
century, when it was a significant capital-exporting country;
 
a permissive approach in the 
                                                 
949 Atkin (1970), 325; M.Harvey (2011). 
950 While OFDI flows briefly spiked to nearly 15% during 1996-2000, due to an increase in mergers 
and acquisitions of British firms overseas (e.g., Unilever), the percentage of overseas FDI as a portion 
of GDP had dropped again to 2.5% by 2002. However, the interim spike had the long-term effect of 
raising “the stock of UK FDI” to 1980s levels of approximately “14.5 per cent of world stock of FDI.” See 
Schenk (2005), 474.  
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late 19
th
 century “when it was rapidly losing its industrial supremacy;”951 a slightly more 
regulated phase post-WWII, when the country was focusing on recovering its industry and 
infrastructure; and an increasingly promotional stance since the mid-1970s, following EU 
accession and the oil crisis, when OFDI was seen as a way to help the tarnished 
manufacturing industry to access European markets. 
Over time, government rhetoric suggested that OFDI would facilitate the 
acquisition of natural resources, technology, and knowhow for domestic industry, promote 
exports, mitigate market failure, and, to a rising degree, create new markets and strengthen 
UK industry through globalized production processes that allow companies to internalize 
locational advantages. At the same time, OFDI has increasingly been perceived as an 
income earner able to moderate the negative post-1947 UK trade accounts. This holds 
particularly true since the Thatcherite era in the 1980s, when the terms of trade deteriorated 
as a result of multiple factors, such as structural changes within the economy in the form of 
deindustrialization, financialization, and deregulation; high commodity prices during the 
oil crisis in the 1970s; and a changing international context, in which many countries had 
begun to catch up with regard to industrialization, and British companies were losing their 
competitive edge.
952
 
Through the above-mentioned periods, the framing and administration of OFDI 
changed significantly: while the 19
th
 century was characterized by a political perception of 
OFDI that reflected mercantilist thought and great power struggles over resources, markets, 
strategic locations, and spheres of influence, increasingly, an economic-technical framing 
                                                 
951 Chang (2004), 695-697. 
952 Carnell (1996). 
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of OFDI gained influence in public debates and international economic governance. 
However, more recently, under the trade and investment agenda of the acting government 
(since 2011), OFDI has been loosely yet explicitly (re)linked to the UK’s national interests.  
In practice, official documentation shows that in the years after the British empire’s 
disintegration, particularly during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the UK focused on 
resource security and negotiated bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The UK governments 
were concerned over expropriations in the former dependencies, where the colonial 
investor legacy, the call for a New International Economic Order (1974), and the 
popularity of dependencia theories (early 1980s) had led to a hostile attitude among host 
countries towards British FDI.
953
 At that time, OFDI policy was still strongly guided by the 
UK’s foreign policy agency, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which was in 
charge of the negotiations. Once British officials and business reoriented their focus 
towards market access as well as investment and export promotion, competencies were 
transferred to the UK Trade and Investment Department.
954 
 
As of 2012, proactive OFDI promotion is part of a larger package of industrial 
policy that focuses primarily on export promotion and IFDI-attraction while being 
embedded in a reindustrialization program designed to “rebalance the economy.”955 The 
reindustrialization program aims to promote “the growth of high-tech industry, small firms, 
and service providers (tertiary sector).”956 In this context, OFDI promotion is framed as 
helping British business to “go global,” thereby opening markets for specific industries that 
                                                 
953 For information on the history of UK bilateral investment treaties, see Walter (2000), 9-11, 23-26. 
954 Walter (2000), 9-11, 23-26. 
955 BIS (2011a).  
956 Nagle (2000), 304. 
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the government perceives to be the UK’s comparative advantage (e.g., pharmaceutical, 
biotech sector, food manufacture), encouraging trade, securing access to resources (oil, 
minerals), enhancing competitiveness, and profiting from growth markets overseas and 
from contract work opportunities that might help to secure jobs back home (e.g., 
construction projects).
957
 While the geographical focus rests on Asia, the Gulf, and Latin 
America, there has been a growing interest in Africa as well. For instance, the Foreign 
Secretary has established a Commercial Taskforce “to increase the presence of British 
companies across Africa.” 958  Correlating with the intensified commercial diplomacy, 
exports to African countries as well as investments increased significantly. However, the 
case of Angola, a major crude oil exporting country with little refining capacity where 
British companies have managed to significantly increase their exports (of refined oil) 
since 2012, highlights that it in many cases, the established trade and investment legacies 
of the UK play out.
959
  
The Home Country Measures: Jumping on the Corporate Bandwagon and “Rebalancing 
the Economy”960 
As of 2014, the UK is categorized as a country with a low degree of OFDI control 
and a high degree of OFDI promotion.
961
 For comparison: China has been characterized as 
a country with a high degree of control and promotion of OFDI flows. The UK’s set of 
home country measures involves multiple policy areas. It is composed of encouragement 
                                                 
957 BIS (2011b); BIS (2011a), 1-25; and HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 3-4; FCO (2011b). 
958 Bellingham (2010). 
959 Soque (30 June 2014); KPMG (2014). 
960 See HM Treasury and Osborne (9 July 2013); and Cargill (2011), 13. 
961 De Beule and Van den Bulcke (2010), 299.  
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policies, simplified approval processes, and regularized supervision. While some features 
were disbanded at a certain point, such as the energy attachés, and/or taken over by 
diplomatic staff, others persist, such as the net food-importing country’s agricultural 
attachés, though their locations and numbers have changed, particularly after the UK’s 
accession to the European Economic Community in 1973.
962
 Several agencies were 
transformed into hybrid organizations that now comprise private and public actors. Take, 
for example, the FCO/ Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Joint Export Directorate 
that became the UK Department of Trade and Investment (UKTI), a government agency 
that works closely with industry partners and associations. In addition, British investors 
have increasingly profited from the pooled sovereignty of the EU, as well as from 
multilateral institutions and related political and financial support mechanisms. At the 
same time, it has to be noted that the OFDI policy framework should not be overestimated 
in view of effectiveness. In practice, the government budget is tight, and the multi-level 
home country measures’ framework lacks coherence. For instance, the UK’s BITs can be 
in disaccord with EU standards, as many have been negotiated prior to the UK’s accession 
to the European Economic Community (now European Union).
963
 Also, the government 
does not have a long-term vision for its engagement with the African continent.
964
 
The home country measures (HCMs) that apply particularly to investment projects 
in African countries have often been in place for several decades. As mentioned above, the 
BITs were negotiated in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Export Credits Guarantee 
                                                 
962 The National Archives (2005), 21-22. 
963 Harrison (2010) and (2013). 
964 Chafer (2010). 
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Department (ECGD), the UK’s export finance and credit agency, has been offering 
political risk insurance for overseas investments since 1970, in the form of loans to finance 
purchases, sharing credit risks with banks, and insuring UK overseas investors.
965
 However, 
the case of the UK’s political risk insurance also highlights the degree to which the 
utilization of home country measure services has amplified: investor insurance liability 
increased by 58% between 1998 and 2001, covering GBP 1 billion.
966
 With regard to 
regional distribution, however, Africa ranks rather low in HCM services. In 2007, only 6% 
of ECGD services went to projects in Africa.
967
  
Key institutional reforms and program re-conceptualizations linked to these long-
standing policy frameworks took place under the Labour (1997-2010) and Conservative 
governments (since 2010). These reforms and re-conceptualizations have proven important 
for British land-consuming investments in SSA. Already in the late 1990s, UK 
development assistance began to focus on Africa while embracing the concept of poverty 
alleviation through private-sector-led growth. In 2010, the Conservative government re-
aligned the DFID programs with FCO interests, echoing the credo of the 1980s to “give 
greater weight in the allocation of our aid to political, industrial, and commercial 
objectives alongside our basic development objectives” (Neil Marten, Minister for 
Overseas Development, 1980).
968
  
In practice, this has meant that investment-related bilateral aid, which research 
shows to positively correlate with OFDI flows, has increased from 18% in the 1970s to 
                                                 
965 For an assessment of the UK’s export promotion agencies, see Hauswirth (2006), 96-102. 
966 TeVelde (2007), 97. 
967 Te Velde (2007), 97. 
968 Barder (2005), 7, 10. 
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30% in 2002 (as a share of total UK aid).
969
 Major emphasis lies on improving the 
investment environments of host countries through programs that focus on infrastructure, 
human resource development, macroeconomic stability, legal rules, or private sector 
support.
970
 For example, the Investment Climate Facility for Africa finances policy and 
regulatory work “to improve the investment conditions in Africa,” while providing a 
platform “for the private sector to work in partnership with governments and donors.”971 
Moreover, the UK’s development finance institution, the CDC, strengthened its 
geographical focus on Africa (and South Asia) in 2011, and it has transformed its 
operational strategy from being a “fund of funds” (i.e., intermediary equity investments) to 
becoming an investor engaged in direct private equity operations. This move is important 
as it will result in more equity investment geared towards improving the economic 
fundamentals of recipient countries – to the benefit of British investors – while reducing 
the risk potential. By 2011, the CDC had invested in several funds that were engaged in 
land-consuming investments in SSA: it transferred USD 20 million to the previously-
mentioned SilverLandsFund of London-based Silver Street Capital LLP, which 
concentrates on agribusiness operations in Central and Southern Africa. It also invested in 
the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), a firm focusing on clean tech operations which 
currently manages 468,860ha of forestry land in Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Swaziland, and South Africa.
972
 And, it made a USD 15 million investment (i.e., 15% of 
the total target of USD 100 million) in Schulze Global Ethiopia Growth and 
                                                 
969 Te Velde (2006), 24. 
970 Te Velde (2006), 24; and Te Velde (2007), 96. 
971 Department for International Development (25 March 2013). 
972 Data calculated from data provided by GEF (http://www.globalenvironmentalfund.com/). 
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Transformation Fund I, a private equity investment fund involved in agriculture and food 
production in Ethiopia.
973
  
In the words of Andrew Mitchell, former Secretary of State (2010-2012) for DFID, 
the sole CDC shareholder, these investment activities, particularly the investment in 
Schulze Ethiopia Growth, are living proof of the marked shift in geographical and strategic 
focus that the CDC Group has experienced: "For the first time, CDC is directing its much-
needed capital to help promising entrepreneurs and businesses in Ethiopia to transform 
agriculture and food production.” 974 At the same time, the CDC has begun to invest in 
service industries catering to the interests of these agribusiness investments. For instance, 
it is involved in the Progression Eastern African Microfinance Equity Fund (2012) that 
provides microfinance in Kenya Tanzania, Rwanda, Zambia, and Uganda.
975
 This is 
particularly interesting against the background of the outgrower schemes that are applied 
by many investor companies. These schemes, as described above, rely on farmers who are 
able to pay for inputs; as a result, microfinance has repeatedly been recommended by 
industry representatives to support rural development and private-sector-led growth. 
In the bilateral political realm, the Cameron government in the UK has begun to 
step up its commercial diplomacy in the form of high-level visits and the launch of 
bilateral investment forums. These resemble similar Chinese and French platforms, though 
they are undertaken in a more ad hoc fashion. In this context, the then Minister for Africa, 
Henry Bellingham (2010-2012), stated in 2010 that he was “on track to visit all 53 states in 
                                                 
973 Department for International Development (9 May 2012). 
974 CDC (9 May 2012). 
975 Manson (8 March 2012). 
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Africa by our next general election in 2015.” 976  The key actors in this commercial 
diplomacy spree are the FCO, DFID, and UKTI, which are frequently located in the same 
offices in African countries due to the previously mentioned budget cuts that have 
impacted diplomatic infrastructures.
977
 
In addition to these domestic home country measures, the previous chapter has 
highlighted that companies from liberal economies which are well-integrated in the global 
economy, such as the UK, also have access to regional institutions that belong to the wider 
set of HCMs.
 
Take, for example, the ACP Investment Facility (IF) under the management 
of the European Investment Bank (EIB). Set up in 2003 to “[p]rovide long term lending to 
promote European objectives,”978 the IF is a “EUR 3.137bn risk-bearing revolving fund (…) 
[that] was established to support investment in private businesses and commercially-run 
public sector companies (including revenue-generating infrastructure)” in African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific countries.
979
 The IF provides risk capital through equity 
participation, quasi capital, and guarantees, as well as ordinary loans (non-concessional 
and concessional).
980
 Moreover, other regional and international institutions are important, 
such as the EU-Africa strategic partnership and related summits and action plans since 
2007;
981
 the Lomé and, now, Cotonou agreement between the EU and ACP countries;
982
 
                                                 
976 Bellingham (2010). 
977 Bellingham (2010). 
978 See, for instance, Sakellaris (4 October 2010). 
979 European Investment Bank (9 December 2010). 
980 Analysis for Economic Decisions (2010), 4-10. 
981 See European Union, External Action (2014b); European Union, External Action (2014a); and Rodt 
(2012), 1-6. 
982 See Te Velde and Bilal (2003). 
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the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism; and the G8’s “New Alliance to improve 
Food and Nutrition Security.”983  
This means that (inter)national regulatory frameworks and support structures that 
go beyond the traditional understanding of home country measures play a significant role 
in British land-consuming investments. They impact investor choices, and match the self-
description of the UK as a cosmopolitan economy. Therefore, I will briefly outline the key 
features of the frameworks that are most important with respect to British land-consuming 
FDI in SSA, the setting of incentive structures at different levels of governance, and the 
creation of new markets: climate finance and biofuels regulations.
984
  
Empirical evidence presented in Chapter 6 pointed to the importance of 
international climate negotiations for overseas biofuel investments. In particular, the Kyoto 
Protocol (1997), an agreement related to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, has been influential because it established legally binding greenhouse 
gases emissions reductions which feature prominently in biofuel industry statements, 
particularly with regards to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the tradable 
Carbon Emission Reduction (CER) mechanism. For example, Trading Emissions Plc., the 
investment company that bought a majority share of SBF (2008-2011), stated at the time 
that it was “paying close regard to the growth and development of these businesses and 
                                                 
983 European Commission (18 May 2012). For a critical discussion of the G8 initiative as industrial 
policy to strengthen UK agribusiness, see Haigh (2014). 
984 See Chapter 6 (Section 3). 
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their market position vis-à-vis domestic and international climate and renewable energy 
policy.”985  
Related developments on the European level were equally important in the creation 
of the biofuel market. In 1997, the European Commission (EC) published the first 
whitepaper which set the target for renewable energy in Europe’s energy mix at 12% by 
2010.
986
 The whitepaper was a response to the climate negotiations and related concerns 
over the potential socio-economic implications of emissions reductions for European 
growth. Renewable energy sources were framed as low-carbon energy sources that would 
allow the European Union Member States to meet the legally binding reduction targets 
(amongst other measures, such as energy efficiency), without threatening the overall 
growth strategy regarding trade and transport activities.
987
 
Consequently, renewable energy has been deemed to improve energy (supply) 
security, foster industrial innovation, provide low-carbon energy, and promote rural 
development – a rhetoric that remains central in European development strategies as of 
2014. Subsequent EC directives followed this line of reasoning while advancing the details: 
Directive 2003/30/EC established a 5.75% share of renewable energy in the transport 
sector, to be reached by 2010. In 2009, Directive 3009/28/EC raised the renewable energy 
target to 10% in all Member States by 2020, and it introduced sustainability criteria to 
counter rising criticism of biofuels, particularly regarding their negative impact on food 
                                                 
985 Trading Emissions Plc (2010), 9, 32. 
986 European Commission (1997). 
987 See, for instance, the guidance note by the Department for Transport (5 November 2012). It 
discusses the renewable transport fuels obligations (RTFO) and applies this narrative.  
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security.
988
 In addition to the introduction of targets and the framing of renewable energy 
as low-carbon energy, the EU established a European Emissions Trading Scheme.
989
 As 
aviation emissions have been included in the scheme since 2012, the aviation sector has 
taken great interest in the biofuel industry. In the case of British investments in SSA, 
Lufthansa had signed offtake agreements with SBF, and it conducted trial flights with 
biofuels.
990
 While the company backed out of that agreement in the face of mounting 
protest in the home country, it continues to consider Jatropha and its resourcing via offtake 
agreements as a viable option to meet its CO2 emission reduction requirements in the near 
future.
991
 
The international and European agreements have also had relevant repercussions at 
the domestic level. While the UK government introduced its first biofuel regulations in 
2000 as a response to the Kyoto Protocol obligations, it raised the targets in 2003 to 20% 
                                                 
988 The European Commission introduced sustainability criteria in 2009 (European Directive 
2009/28/EC, articles 17, 18 and 19). These relate to greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions, biodiversity, 
high-carbon stock land, and agro-environmental practices. The sustainability scheme is based on two 
tools: firstly, voluntary schemes (to be assessed and recognized) and multilateral and bilateral 
agreements that promote “sustainable production of agricultural raw materials”; and, secondly, a 
review of “default values” in the context of CO2 accounting. While these sustainability criteria focus 
solely on the environmental aspect of biofuel investments , social sustainability criteria (e.g., land 
rights, wages) were deliberately left unacknowledged, as these conflict with WTO rules on trade 
barriers (Directive 2009/28/EC, articles 17, 18 and 19). Moreover, they ignore the problem of direct 
and indirect land use changes as a result of biofuels production, which would significantly change the 
CO2 calculation – to the extent that biofuels are more CO2 intensive than fossil fuels, while their land 
take creates a wide range of new problems. In the policy world, the view that renewable resources 
provide low-carbon energy, persists. See, for instance, UK Trade and Investment (2012, 16): “Reducing 
carbon emissions of the transport sector is vital if the UK is to meet its 2020 targets; the replacement 
of fossil fuels in vehicles by biofuels has been identified as one of the key mechanisms.” A more 
detailed analysis of assumptions and critical interrogation of framings in the European biofuels debate 
is provided by Franco et al. (2010).  
989 European Directive 2003/87/EC. This cap and trade scheme uses market mechanisms to limit 
emissions from intensive industry while rewarding companies with low emissions. See Cleveland and 
Tietenberg (29 August 2009). 
990 See UK Trade and Investment (2012), 26-27.  
991 Personal communication with Lufthansa staff, November 2014. 
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CO2 savings by 2050 (compared to 1990 levels). The 2003 Energy Whitepaper stated that 
the “increased use of biofuels is considered a way to contribute to the achievement of these 
targets.”992 In 2007, the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) was legally enacted 
by the government. It required major transport fuel suppliers “to ensure that a percentage 
of their sales were from a renewable source, intended to deliver carbon savings in the 
transport sector and provide a sound platform for private sector investment in renewable 
fuels infrastructure and technology.”993 From 2008 to 2011, the Renewable Fuel Agency, a 
non-departmental public body, administered the implementation of the RFTO.
994
 Moreover, 
the Climate Change Act was published, establishing a framework to cut between 26% and 
32% of the UK’s carbon emissions by 2020, and 80% by 2050 (compared to 1990 
levels).
995
 With regard to the socio-economic outlook, the “clean tech” industry has been 
reframed as a future industrial growth sector under the reindustrialization program, and has 
also been at the core of the traditional HCM framework (see above). For instance, the 2009 
UK Low Carbon Transition Plan foresees the medium-term creation of 1.2 million green 
jobs.  
It is usually difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of such frameworks in achieving 
their objectives of CO2 reduction and reindustrialization. However, the empirical 
assessment of biofuel projects in Chapter 6 has provided valuable insights in this regard, 
and they will be presented in the remainder of this section. Operators of British land-
                                                 
992 MRL Public Sector Consultants (2014); Department of Trade and Industry (2003). 
993 See MRL Public Sector Consultants (2014). 
994 The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation applies to fuel suppliers. These have to prove that a 
certain percentage of fuel consists of renewable energy sources. See Department for Transport (5 
November 2012). 
995 UK Climate Change Act (2008). 
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consuming FDI in the biofuel industry, as well as financial investors in London, constantly 
refer to these political frameworks, if only to use the related rhetoric in their promotional 
materials. Biofuel investments appear as a ‘safe bet’ in view of the (predicted) growth in 
demand for bioenergy in the future, which is based on the assumption that biofuels will 
become an alternative to oil. Moreover, the framing of biofuels as an alternative energy 
source that provides “clean” energy and contributes to “green growth” through multiplier 
effects in the form of jobs and energy security in the host, as well as the home country, 
bestowed these investments initially with a positive image.
996
 By 2004, so-called “clean 
tech” companies made up 6% of the AIM London Stock Exchange’s initial public 
offerings (IPOs).
 997
  
However, contrary to the extremely ambitious sector goals embedded in the policy 
framework and/or business plans of companies involved in biofuel projects that aim at 
becoming a “clean energy leader,” and in spite of the largely positive outlook of companies 
and sector analysts alike, the empirical data presented in Chapter 6 showed that most 
biofuel projects experienced dramatic wealth destruction. Aside from operational 
challenges, alternative energy (i.e. first generation biofuels) has also not lived up to its 
socio-economic and environmental promises, and the business models rely on minimum 
                                                 
996
 This framing and rhetoric is directly taken from the official frameworks, such as European Directive 
2009/28/EC, which explicitly argues as follows: “The control of European energy consumption and the 
increased use of energy from renewable sources, together with energy savings and increased energy 
efficiency, constitute important parts of the package of measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and comply with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and 
with further Community and international greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments beyond 2012. 
Those factors also have an important part to play in promoting the security of energy supply, promoting 
technological development and innovation and providing opportunities for employment and regional 
development, especially in rural and isolated areas.” For a discussion of the evolving bioenergy directives, 
see Ismail and Rossi (2010). 
997 Cleantech Investor (March 2007). 
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social and environmental standards to be economically viable. In the UK context, the 
Gallagher Review (Renewable Fuels Agency 2008), commissioned by the Secretary of 
State for Transport to study the “indirect effects of biofuels production,”998 came to the 
conclusion that biofuels contributed to rising food prices and deforestation while failing to 
reduce CO2 emissions. Subsequently, the report called for a moratorium on biofuel 
investments until government could ensure that only idle and marginal lands were used for 
biofuel production – if they do exist.999  
In sum, then, the multi-level regulatory climate regime that biofuels are embedded 
in and supported by highlights a key problem, namely that such frameworks and measures 
might have significant undesirable repercussions. It is ironic that it was the growing 
awareness of the negative feedback loops between food and energy production that led 
many investors to focus on Jatropha-based biofuel projects, assuming that such projects 
could flourish on marginal land. In practice, however, the empirical evidence presented, 
such as the SBF trial plots in Ethiopia, has revealed that Jatropha is not economically 
viable under harsh conditions. Moreover, its prevalence on prime land clearly intensifies 
the negative feedback between food and energy production under conditions of insufficient 
                                                 
998 Renewable Fuels Agency (2008). 
999 The UK Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA), the first organization globally with an independent board 
intended to assist in the implementation of the Renewable Fuel Transport Obligation (RFTO) from 
2008-2011. It identified additional problems preventing sustainable biofuels production: First, “under 
a largely voluntary system, obligated suppliers are able to buy un-certified biofuels on the spot market, 
avoiding the need to establish supply contracts that are longer term;” second, the lack of a “price 
premium for feedstock with assured Carbon and Sustainability provenance” discouraged producers; 
and, third, the sustainability criteria under the European Renewable Energy Directive “focused on 
avoiding the worst practices rather than promoting the best” – setting only very broad sustainability 
standards in view of land use, which were related to biodiversity and carbon stocks. See Renewable 
Fuels Agency (2008), 6-8; and Renewable Fuels Agency (2011), 6. 
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governance while hardly resulting in economically viable undertakings conducive to rural 
development. 
Summary 
Four observations follow from the interrelation of UK HCMs and British land-
consuming investments in SSA. First, OFDI promotion continues to be a by-element of the 
UK’s broader trade and investment strategy, which puts primary emphasis on export 
promotion, market access, and the attraction of IFDI.
1000
 This is highlighted by 
whitepapers and strategy papers published since 2000.
1001
 At the same time, the OFDI 
approach to SSA has become more planned as a consequence of institutional reform, 
changing strategies, and geographical program adjustment.  
Second, from a broader perspective, the pro-active government approach and the 
cooperation of public and private actors in the area of OFDI reflect the newly adopted 
“grand strategy” of the current UK government. 1002  It tries to encourage the close 
cooperation of government agencies in support of British trade and investment activities 
(e.g., cooperation by UK DTI, DFID, the FCO, and BIS
1003
), and reflects the government’s 
decision to revive the economy by jumping on the rising corporate interest in the African 
continent as a new growth region. In particular, the rise in investment-related aid, a 
significant part of which is going to SSA, will have a positive impact on British investment 
flows to the region. For instance, the CDC Group and DFID have expanded their 
                                                 
1000 See, for instance, BIS (2011a); and HM Treasury and BIS (2011). 
1001 BIS (2011a); UK Trade and Investment (2006); BIS (2011b); UK Trade and Investment (2011). 
1002 E.g., BIS (2011a); or Allen (8 October 2012). 
1003 This acronym stands for the UK Department for Business, Innovation & Skills. 
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operational activities and shifted their focus (at least part of it) towards SSA.
1004
 At the 
same time, aid-funded business opportunities are promoted by the FCO and UK DTI and 
facilitated by DFID. And new trade policy initiatives, such as the Africa Free Trade 
initiative (AFTi) promoted by UK DTI, are explicitly geared towards securing market 
access in SSA. Overall, however, it is important to remember that it was the private sector 
that led the way and invested in African economies, and that the government largely 
followed suit, matching public finance programs with private sector interests.  
Third, despite the growing interest in SSA-directed OFDI, recent budget cuts and 
the dramatic indebtedness of the UK government limit the prospects of the ambitious grand 
strategy approach. This problem is multiplied by the fact that the UK does not have a 
coherent and long-term vision for its political and economic relations with African 
countries.
1005
 However, the access to EU support structures mitigates the budget constraint 
problem.  
Fourth, the importance of UK-Africa relations is highlighted by the impressive 
quantitative increase in UK OFDI in Africa during the last decade. This is remarkable, 
considering that it is happening at a time when UK OFDI flows worldwide have been 
falling dramatically, from USD 233,371 million in 2000 to USD 11,020 million in 
                                                 
1004 E.g., the CDC shifted from intermediary equity to direct equity and debt investments, and DFID 
established Challenge Funds to support UK companies overseas. 
1005 Chafer (2010, 1) has argued that “(…) policy relating to Africa is often short-termist and 
preoccupied with meeting, often annual, targets, with the result that a long-term view of the strategic 
importance of Africa is not taken and that the resources deployed in support of UK Africa policy by the 
FCO/MoD/DFID are not deployed in a strategic way (e.g., initiatives launched one year and then 
abandoned a year or two years later, leading to waste of effort and resources). On Africa policy, both 
London and Paris are confronted by what one might describe as the "ends vs. means" dilemma: in 
other words, both the UK and France wish to remain key players in Africa but increasingly do not have 
the means (financial and personnel) of their ambitions.”  
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2010.
1006
 While the fall of OFDI flows is related to the financial crash and the Eurozone 
crisis, the intensified trade and investment with African economies correlates with UK 
interests of the private (and, more recently, public) sector to participate in and profit from 
the continent’s growth dynamics. It strongly mirrors an international trend, namely the 
shifting perception within the capital markets of the African continent.
1007
 For instance, the 
British Standard Chartered Bank estimates that the region will grow at a rate of 7% per 
annum, faster than China.
1008
 In practice, data from 2001, 2002, and 2003 highlights that 
UK OFDI has generated “profit rates that are two to three times higher in Africa than 
worldwide.” 1009 However, this is a finding that hardly matches the empirical evidence 
about land-consuming FDI presented in this thesis.  
3. Guiding Ideology  
The rhetoric running through the key documents of the political and financial 
mechanisms introduced above highlights that British land-consuming investments are 
embedded in a guiding ideology (in the form of several sets of ideas that perform 
ideological functions)
1010
 about national development and international grandeur that has 
emerged over the last decade from significant government speeches, reports, and 
whitepapers across several policy sectors. While some elements of this ideological frame 
are clearly about framing development challenges and pathways of the UK regarding 
                                                 
1006 See Annex 1 of Allen and Dar (14 March 2013). 
1007 See Ernst & Young (2012). Accordingly, between 2003 and 2011, the number of FDI projects 
increased by 253%, from 339 (2003) to 857 (2011), and – as the diverse sector distribution in the 
China case indicated – this growth in the number of projects was associated with an increasing share in 
the non-extractive industry sectors, such as manufacturing or business services. 
1008 Ernst & Young (2012), 18. 
1009 Te Velde and Calì (2006), 12. 
1010 See Chapter 1. 
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economic recovery, others serve to legitimate the measures taken, by underlining that they 
help to mitigate environmental challenges or that they are tailored to host countries’ 
interests while ensuring domestic security and prosperity back home, creating jobs, 
ensuring international influence, strengthening energy security, and meeting climate 
obligations. In sum, the argumentative structure of the guiding ideology flowing through 
relevant government documents connects growth, prosperity, and security, and takes the 
form of a hypothetical syllogism along the following lines: when there is private-sector-led 
growth there is prosperity,
1011
 and when there is prosperity, there is security (and vice 
versa);
1012
 therefore, when there is private-sector-led growth, there will be both prosperity 
and security.
1013
 
In more detail, the discourse surrounding British investments in Africa reflects the 
fundamental transformations that have taken place in view of domestic and international 
economic relations. On the one hand, a turn in UK industrial policy is detectable. After 
decades of an arms-length approach and relative neglect of this sector, the current UK 
government openly embraces a closer linkage of business and state actors, domestically, as 
well as with regards to overseas business opportunities;
1014
 and it favors reindustrialization 
                                                 
1011 BIS (2011a). 
1012 HM Government (2010). 
1013 HM Treasury and BIS (2011); and BIS (2011a).  
1014 This “grand strategy” is envisioned in multiple government whitepapers and publications, such as 
the “Trade and Investment” Whitepaper (BIS (2011a)) and the FCO’s Five Year Plan (FCO (2011a)). It 
is also mentioned in government speeches (Hague 2010). Accordingly, “British Ministers” can be “a 
valuable asset when it comes to persuading other countries to work with us or adopt our objectives as 
their own”; and “joint initiatives between businesses” can be influential in “changing attitudes” in 
different governance forums as well. See Hague (2010); HM Treasury and BIS (2011); BIS (2011a), 55-
59. 
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as a way to promote domestic economic recovery.
1015
 On the other hand, the tone in 
bilateral relations has begun to shift from an asymmetric top-down rhetoric that 
highlighted the challenges of African economies to one that praises the opportunities 
African economies have to offer. In this context, the public statement by BIS that national 
economic interests are a key driver behind the intensified relations with African countries 
constitutes a major change in the UK’s more recent development policy. 1016  In fact, 
following the empire’s post-WWII disintegration, international development narratives 
concentrated strongly on topics of humanitarianism and security, and national interests 
were considered by many (politicians and public) to be a rhetorical taboo in relation to 
Africa.
1017
 Additionally, the outlook on international economic relations has changed. 
Since the failure of the OECD initiative to promote a multilateral investment regime in the 
1990s – during which time bilateralism was framed as a step away from multilateralism – 
the UK now officially embraces bilateralism as a stepping stone towards multilateral 
economic institutions.
1018
  
A British Africa Policy? 
As mentioned above, British land-consuming overseas investments in SSA are part 
of development rhetoric about coming to terms with international challenges and changes 
and about “rebalancing the economy” through trade, investment, and reindustrialization in 
                                                 
1015 Hague (2010). 
1016 BIS (2011a). 
1017 Cargill (2011). 
1018 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was an initiative in the mid-1990s (1995-1997) 
by the US and other OECD countries to negotiate universal investment rules, similar to those for trade 
under the WTO. For more information, see the collection of articles at the Global Policy Forum (2014). 
346 
 
particular areas, such as “advanced manufacturing, life sciences, creative industries, green 
energy and non-financial business services.” 1019 In this context, OFDI is seen as a way to 
secure overseas business opportunities and “allow (…) businesses to grow and 
diversify.”1020 However, the lack of a coherent long-term vision means that there is no 
visionary ‘Africa policy’ in place.  
To counter concerns about the fact that trade and investment has become a topic of 
British foreign policy, all relevant official documentation (see Table 7-1) applies the 
rhetoric of mutual benefit, using mainstream economic arguments (“win-win”) while also 
embracing an image of the UK as a country characterized by “enlightened national 
interest.”1021 As the “Trade and Investment for Growth” Whitepaper puts it: 
(…) as we work to rebuild our economy, we must redouble our efforts to enable developing 
countries to build their own paths to growth through trade and investment, and to help them 
develop the capacity to do so, especially in Africa. This is the right thing to do both on moral 
grounds and for Britain’s national interest.1022 
In the words of the former Minister for Africa, MP Henry Bellingham (2010-2012), 
the UK pursues “a foreign policy in which the promotion and protection of human rights 
around the world is indivisible from our efforts to bring security and prosperity to Britain, 
and, of course, in Africa as well.”1023 On the project level, the mutual benefit rhetoric is 
taken up by framing many investment projects as impact investments that contribute to the 
host country’s development while generating above average returns. Yet, in spite of this 
mutual benefit rhetoric, the African continent continues to be portrayed largely as a source 
                                                 
1019 HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 4. 
1020 BIS (2011a), 4; also BIS/FCO/UK Trade and Investment (2012). 
1021 FCO (2011a), 1-2. 
1022 BIS (2011a), 4. 
1023 Bellingham (2010). 
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of primary commodities, i.e. as possessing “relatively abundant reserves” to meet the 
“global demand for oil, minerals, natural gas, food and agriculture and other natural 
resources.”1024  
In his speech “UK and Africa: Delivering Prosperity Together,” Bellingham lists 
three aspects of how this mutual development agenda is being operationalized. Firstly, 
cooperation with governments and enterprises has been intensified in order to profit from 
“the trade and investment opportunities on offer.”1025 Secondly, enhanced intra-African 
trade has been supported by the UK government. And, thirdly, the “removing of barriers to 
Africa’s goods in global markets” is being promoted.1026 In practice, the discourse supports 
several measures that were introduced to operationalize the new interest in African 
resources and growth markets, such as the Africa Free Trade initiative (AFTi
1027
), the pro-
actively pursued commercial diplomacy in the form of high-level forums and visits, the 
channeling of aid funding through the Foreign Office (FCO), the alignment of DFID 
programs with FCO trade and investment objectives using, for instance, global challenge 
funds, and the generally close cooperation between the government and private sector.  
                                                 
1024 BIS (2011a), 41. 
1025 Bellingham (2010). 
1026 Bellingham (2010). 
1027 BIS (2012), 8. 
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Table 7-1 – Key Documents Outlining the UK's Development in Relation to UK in Africa (selected)1028 
 
Speeches 
 
2010 – “Britain’s Foreign Policy in a Networked World,” William Hague (FCO) 
2010 – “UK and Africa: Delivering Prosperity Together,” Henry Bellingham (Minister for 
Africa) 
2011 – “The UK Prosperity Agenda – growth, open markets and good governance,” Henry 
Bellingham  
 
Government (White) Papers 
 
1997 – Whitepaper, “Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century,” DFID 
2000 – Whitepaper, “Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor,” 
DFID 
2004 – Whitepaper, “Making Globalization a Force for Good,” DTI 
2007 – Whitepaper, “Meeting the Energy Challenge,” DECC 
2010 – Strategy paper, “A Strong Britain in an age of Uncertainty: The National Security 
Strategy,” HM Government 
2011 – Whitepaper “Trade and Investment for Growth,” BIS 
2011 – Strategy paper, “A Charter for Business,” FCO 
2011 – Strategy paper, “The Plan for Growth,” HM Treasury and BIS 
2011 – Strategy paper, “Britain open for business,” UKTI 
2011 – Strategy paper, “FCO: Business Plan 2011-2015,” FCO 
   
Reports and policy 
 
2011 – Report, “International Trade & Investment: The Economic Rationale for Government 
Support,” BIS  
2008 – Report, “Ensuring the UK’s Food Security in a Changing World,” DEFRA 
2008 – Policy, “Climate Change Act 2008, Charter 27” 
2008 – Report, “The Gallagher Review of the indirect effects of biofuels production,” RFA  
2007 – Legislation, “The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation Order (RTFO) 2007” 1029  
2006 – Report, “The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006,” DECC 
 
International Policy 
 
1997 – International Agreement, “Kyoto Protocol,” UNFCCC1030 
2003, 2007, 2009 – Policy, EU Renewable Energy Directives 
2005 – Report, “Our Common Interest,” Commission for Africa 
2010 – Report, “ Still Our Common Interest,” Commission for Africa 
                                                 
1028 The references for the documents listed are as follows: Hague (2010); Bellingham (2010); 
Bellingham (2011); BIS (2011a); FCO (2011b); HM Treasury and BIS (2011); UK Department of Trade 
and Investment (UKTI) (2011); DTI (2004); UK Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) 
(2007); DFID (2000); DFID (1997); HM Government (2010); FCO (2011a); BIS (2011c); RFA (2008); 
DECC (2006); Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2008); RTFO (2007); 
Commission for Africa (2005); Commission for Africa (2010). 
1029 See UK Trade and Investment (2012), 17. 
1030 For more information, see UNFCCC (n.d.). 
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Summary 
The UK’s changing development rhetoric, which has moved from humanitarianism 
to mutual development, as well as its renewed interest in the African continent, correlates 
with the contemporary challenges that the country is facing. These include prolonged 
economic recession, the financial crisis, and the failure of the financialization-led growth 
model – embraced by British governments since the Thatcher-era – to generate sufficient 
jobs, growth, and revenues (for more details, see also Section 4 on political economy). 
Most striking is the similarity of the Chinese and British guiding ideologies – the mutual 
development rhetoric applied in British policy documents might have been influenced by 
the rise of the BRICS and the popular discourse characteristic of South-South 
Cooperation.
1031
 
At the same time, the empirical evidence on the timelines of British land-
consuming FDI projects emphasizes that the framing of UK-Africa relations as mutual 
development opportunity and national security measure is the result of the government 
jumping on the corporate trend of investing in African economies, a trend that has been 
gaining momentum since 2000. Therefore, the relatively recent promotion of British land-
consuming FDI in SSA by the UK government has to be seen in the broader effort to 
address the economic recession that the country has been suffering from since 2007/2008. 
Many investors who saw Africa as a new growth region where novel markets could be won, 
and extraordinary profits and returns on investments earned, moved their business focus 
towards African economies long before the 2008 crisis became an additional driver to look 
                                                 
1031 Goetz (2015) (forthcoming). 
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for profitable options overseas. However, the crisis does seem to have instigated actors 
from the public sector to redirect development finance, expand commercial diplomacy, and 
introduce a range of mechanisms to support this trend as part of a national recovery 
approach. 
Importantly, the change in UK-Africa relations that is reflected in the application of 
a “grand strategy” of business-government cooperation for economic development and the 
strengthening of explicitly identified British stronghold industries (in the form of advanced 
manufacturing, life sciences, creative industries, green energy, and non-financial business 
services) does not only apply to international economic relations.
1032
 Instead, the core 
characteristic of the close cooperation and coordination between public and private actors 
is a reflection of the fundamental domestic reforms that have been occurring over the past 
two decades. These are characterized by the ongoing privatization of public services, 
which has led to the state-funded operation of public services by private actors – under the 
assumption that this will promote private sector growth while enhancing efficiency.  
4. Political Economy 
As a country that has a proud and successful history of trading and benefiting from 
investment and that sees these factors vital to our prospects for growth, the UK offers a good 
case for how, in practice, trade and investment drive growth. 
– Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 20111033 
While the UK continues to be portrayed as an ideal-type liberal economy,
1034
 
particularly against the European background of so-called ‘coordinated continental 
                                                 
1032 HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 4. 
1033 BIS (2011a), 17. 
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economies,’ this simplified typology ignores the changes that have taken place since the 
1980s, such as the increase in public regulation during the New Public Management era in 
the 1990s,
1035
 the adoption of a “grand strategy” approach towards trade and investment 
under Conservative rule (since 2011), and the changing quality of (foreign) economic 
policy and state-market relations.  
In this section, I will focus on two aspects of British political economy, namely 
state-market relations in the context of financialization and the transformation of the 
political economic paradigm. I will show that both are relevant for a meaningful 
understanding of what is occurring with regard to land-consuming FDI. The major 
arguments emerging from the findings are as follows: (1) Even though the financial sector 
(aka “the City”) features prominently in overseas investments, it would be wrong to argue 
that these investments are primarily driven by it. Instead, there is an overlap of interests 
and “intellectual capture” across different actor groups in the public and private sectors. (2) 
These investments are embedded in broader economic restructuring endeavors, such as 
reforms that aim at the delivery of public services by private actors and foreign economic 
policies that focus on strengthening the capacity of British producers to retain influence in 
international political and economic governance while rebalancing the economy. However, 
in the meantime, (3) the economy remains highly dysfunctional in view of industry finance, 
as has been highlighted by biofuel investments in SSA.  
                                                                                                                                                    
1034 Hall and Soskice (2001). 
1035 Hood et al. (1999).  
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The City, Once Again? – State-Market Relations in the Context of Financialization 
The empirical evidence on industrial finance (presented in the previous chapter), 
together with the rising number of investment funds “seeking alpha,” has highlighted the 
prominent role of the financial sector in British land-consuming investments in SSA. 
Based on this evidence and the liberal characterization of the UK economy, it would be 
rather easy to conclude that, similar to claims about the British empire and ‘gentlemanly’ 
capitalism in the 19
th
 century, the financial sector in London is once again – under “free 
market” conditions – the primary driver of these investments. However, state-market 
relations in general, and issues pertaining to finance and industrial development in 
particular, are far more complex than the liberal characterization would suggest – even 
under conditions of financialization. Also, the national context continues to influence the 
perceptions of and options available to financial investors, as in those cases where the 
capital that is exported via London to Sub-Saharan countries has its origins outside of the 
UK. 
In fact, the empirical evidence about British investments in SSA has emphasized 
that there are multiple actors and mechanisms at play, extending beyond stock markets and 
private enterprises, such as public policy-induced markets in the renewables sector, public 
finance through the CDC Group, and/or investment-related aid programs. Moreover, the 
old narrative, according to which the financial sector (alias “the City”) was the sole driver 
behind the colonial expansion, has long been undermined by subsequent historical 
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research.
1036
 Next, I will highlight relevant developments that have occurred in the 
financial and state sectors since the 1980s, both with regard to actor constitution and 
economic orientation, and in view of related changes in state-market relations.  
While the financial sector plays a key role in the British economy, it is important to 
note that the City’s actor composition and business culture has been altered significantly 
since the “Big Bang” stock exchange reforms in the mid-80s – in the sense that it has been 
globalized. These reforms have opened the investment banking sector to foreign 
competitors, resulting in the dramatic decline of investment banks under British ownership 
and the related “death of gentlemanly capitalism.”1037 The latter has been described by 
Augar as the demise of a business culture characterized by strong relational ties and 
aristocratic cultural traits.
1038
 In its place, a global financial business elite has emerged.
1039
 
The corresponding internationalization of London’s financial sector is well reflected in the 
British biofuel investments in SSA, where lead actors have personal linkages with US 
investment banks, sometimes being former high-level employees. For example, Susan 
Payne and David Murrin, who launched the Emergent Asset Fund in 1997, had worked as 
                                                 
1036 Great Britain’s political economy of decision making was fairly complex at the end of the 19th 
century, when “fractions between free marketers and interventionists ran across business and political 
actors,” and the bias towards financial interests in public policy was the outcome of many factors, such 
as personal ties, profit seeking, and/or regime stability. In the medium-term, overseas expansion 
facilitated the continuation of elite strata and the maintenance of a high degree of social inequality 
(characterized by low domestic demand), in spite of the profound changes in the economic and 
political systems that emerged as a consequence of the first Industrial Revolution. Cain and Hopkins 
(1987), 199-200; and Halperin (2005).  
1037 See Augar (2001) for a description of the demise of the British banking system since the late 1980s. 
1038 Augar (2001), 6. 
1039
 Augar (2001), 6-7. Accordingly, the reasons for this failure were multiple: British banks did not have the 
level of experience and scale of their US counterparts; the hands-off approach under Thatcher led to “the 
existence of a vacuum where the authorities should have been;” and the business culture itself that had 
largely remained unchanged since the 1950s and revealed traits of new aristocracy that “inhibited good 
management.” Augar (2001), 320.  
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traders at JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs.
1040
 Also, Bim Hundal, founder of Lion’s Head 
Global Partners, a London-based investment banking group which took over the operations 
of Sun Biofuels in Tanzania in 2011, previously worked for over 17 years at Goldman 
Sachs, running the capital markets business for Central Europe, Russia, the Middle East, 
and Africa.
1041
  
At the same time, the state and its political economy paradigm have transformed 
considerably, moving from “embedded liberalism” to an “embedded financial 
orthodoxy”1042 and “free market” ideology during the Thatcher era in the 1980s. This shift 
has been characterized by deregulation, a hands-off approach, and arms-length industrial 
policy. In practice, this paradigm modification has had far-reaching consequences for the 
state’s relations with the financial sector and the society, as well as with regard to industry 
development. Since these developments partially explain how British land-consuming FDI 
occurs, I will introduce them in following paragraphs by focusing on three aspects, namely 
transformations of the state, industrial development, and societal implications.  
Firstly, the state has grown even more dependent on the City’s overseas earnings as 
a result of this paradigmatic shift.
1043
 In fact, financial sector OFDI earnings “kept the 
trade account in reasonable balance.” 1044  While the trade in the goods account had 
deteriorated over time, its last net surplus being recorded in 1980-1982, the UK’s trade in 
                                                 
1040 Oakland Institute (2011a).  
1041 Lion’s Head Global Partners (n.d.). 
1042 Cerny and Evans (2004), 53. 
1043 Augar (2006), 181. 
1044 BIS (2010), 15. 
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(financial) services has largely been in surplus since the mid-1960s.
1045
 Contributing 
factors for this growing dependency of the state on the financial sector are structural and 
personal, comprising, for instance, rising public debt due to the tax cuts during the 
Thatcher era; personal ties and “intellectual capture”; 1046 the need for electoral funding of 
political parties and the fact that the financial sector has made significant contributions to 
the acting government’s Conservative party; and the phenomenon of revolving doors.1047  
Secondly, the financialization of the British political economy since the 1980s has 
impacted the country’s industrial development, especially by aggravating the negative 
deindustrialization path
1048
 that had set in post-WWII.
1049
 While the collapse of the 
manufacturing sector during the late 1970s was strongly related to the oil crisis, the 
financialization of the economy and the adoption of the “free-market ideal based on neo-
classical political economy” slowed reinvestments by the private sector necessary to 
modernize the UK’s industrial base.1050 Specifically, four aspects contributed to this effect, 
which is best described by the rise of market control over organizational control. On the 
one hand, British companies had hardly established organizational control models at the 
time of liberalization. On the other hand, the accounting practices and corporate law made 
                                                 
1045 BIS (2010), 15. 
1046 The degree to which governments embraced the financial sector as source of prosperity is 
reflected by a speech made by (then) chancellor Gordon Brown at the annual Mansion House Dinner in 
2004, in which he praised the City’s innovative capacity to adopt to changes in the international 
economy (e.g., derivatives), and referred to it as a role model for British industry at a time of 
globalization. See Brown (2004). 
1047 See Augar (2006), 180-186. 
1048 Negative deindustrialization means that the decline in industry production was not the result of 
upgrading of economic production or economic re-orientation, but primarily the result of companies 
going into administration. 
1049 Specifically, the traditional separation of finance and industry in the UK accelerated the decline of 
the industrial sector. See Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1997). Also see HM Treasury and BIS (2011) for a 
critical assessment of this development path. 
1050 The New Political Economy Network (2010), 14, 11, 12. 
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it more unlikely for organizational reforms to occur, as they treated investments in labor, 
as well as returns on labor, as expenses, making it – from a market control perspective – 
undesirable to invest in these factors of production and thereby enhance productivity and 
foster innovation. In addition, the framing of market control as “shareholder value” 
prevented changes towards greater organizational control within the company structures, as 
these would negatively impact the “principal.”1051 Finally, the generous (financial) rewards 
received by the top managers of industrial companies applying market control strategies 
advanced the adoption of market control strategies.
1052
 In view of British land-consuming 
FDI in SSA, biofuel projects, such as the SBF, highlight a key difficulty presented by this 
political economy, namely the absence of patient capital and lagging reinvestment. 
Thirdly, the process of financialization has also produced multiple long-term effects 
with regard to state-society relations, both domestically and internationally. As a result of 
an ongoing domestic reform process, public services under the new public management 
approach became increasingly commodified and framed as commercial contracts.
1053
 This 
process led to a high degree of interconnectedness between private and public actors in the 
provision of public services that is characteristic of the UK’s political economy today. In 
                                                 
1051 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1997, 29) have highlighted the importance of this “shareholder” ideology 
in preventing change: “The ideology that the ‘shareholder’ is the ‘principal’ of the industrial 
corporation helps to ensure that such organizational transformations will not take place. This ideology 
places a premium on economic performance that reaps the benefits of prior investments in productive 
capabilities while ignoring the new investments in organizational learning that can potentially 
generate greater returns for more people in the future.”  
1052 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1997), 27. 
1053 The New Political Economy Network (2010), 13-14. Accordingly, “[p]ublic services were turned 
into quasi-markets governed by cost efficiency and targets. Commercial values all but supplanted the 
ethos of public service. (…) A new kind of consumer compact between individual and the market began 
to replace the old social welfare contract.” 
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the context of British land-consuming FDI, this trend is highlighted by the shift of public 
development finance and diplomacy to match corporate interest in the African continent.  
At the same time, this process of publicly-funded privatization also led to the 
gradual integration of citizens into financial markets with their volatile pressures, 
increasingly linking the realization of British workers’ social security rights with the 
livelihoods of people in other countries. In fact, the history of pension funds depicts the 
ensuing connection of workers and people through financial markets, where the prosperity 
of some might be founded on the impoverishment of others through land-consuming 
investments that result in forced disappropriation and/or low workers’ welfare. Pension 
funds and other institutional investors began to divest from fixed-interest securities, 
searching instead for more profitable investments. Some have started to explore 
investments in commodities and farmland, though not necessarily in SSA. For instance, BT 
Pension Scheme, a large UK pension fund, stated its intent in 2012 to replace its 
commodity future investments with farmland investments in the near future.
1054
 These 
actors have prominent supporters, such as Sir Bob Geldof, who allegedly “warn[s] UK 
pension funds they are missing out on the ‘last great investment opportunity left’ by not 
placing money in Africa.”1055  
                                                 
1054 Bow (13 March 2012). It remains unclear whether this actually happened – according to the latest 
BT Pension Scheme report (2013), it did not.  
1055 Silver Street Capital (20 June 2010), quoting an article in the Financial Times. 
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The Transformation of the Political Economy Paradigm 
The resulting dominance of the financial sector within the UK economy is 
highlighted by the sectoral distribution of British OFDI in SSA (see introduction).
1056
 At 
the height of the “embedded financial orthodoxy,” Gordon Brown praised the 
achievements of the financial sector as an extraordinary contribution to the UK’s 
prosperity and economic position in the globalized world. Accordingly, the fact that over 
40% of the world's foreign equities are transacted in London was perceived as proof of the 
rise of “an era that history will record as the beginning of a new golden age for the City of 
London” and that will benefit the UK at large.1057 
However, these hopes for a financialization- and service-led solution to the 
economic development challenges posed to the UK by deindustrialization and a globalized 
economy were unrealistic – and soon to be shattered. Instead, the financial crisis and the 
ensuing Eurozone crisis aggravated problems that had been accumulating. Key examples 
are the rising unemployment (over 8% till 2009),
1058
 unsustainable and rising wealth 
inequality,
1059
 and mounting private sector debt.
1060
 Regarding the latter, it is important to 
note that part of the rising private sector debt was escalating personal debt whose share of 
disposable income increased from 45 per cent to 160 per cent between the 1980s and 
2007.
1061
 While other European countries managed to recover from the financial crash, at 
least partially, Britain, with its reliance on the financial sector experienced a prolonged 
                                                 
1056 US Central Intelligence Agency (2014). 
1057 See Brown (2002).  
1058 TradingEconomics.com (2014) 
1059 See Hills et al. (2010); and The Equality Trust (2012). 
1060 The New Political Economy Network (2010), 10. 
1061 The New Political Economy Network (2010), 25. 
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economic recession up until 2014. At the same time, growing public debt and fear over 
international marginalization made the development approach seem unsustainable.  
Consequently, the detrimental impact of the financialization-led growth model 
pursued over the last decades has been identified in the acting government’s Plan for 
Growth (2011-2015): 
This Plan for Growth is an urgent call for action.  
Britain has lost ground in the world’s economy, and needs to catch up.  
If we do not act now, jobs will be lost, our country will become poorer and we will find it 
difficult to afford the public services we all want. If we do not wake up to the world around 
us, our standard of living will fall, not rise. In the last decade other nations have worked hard 
to make their economies more competitive. They have reduced their business tax rates, 
removed barriers to enterprise, invested in their infrastructure, improved their education 
systems, reformed welfare and increased their exports.  
Sadly the reverse has happened in Britain over the last ten years. The UK economy stopped 
saving, investing and exporting and instead turned to a model of growth that failed. It 
resulted in rising levels of debt, over-leveraged banks, an unsustainable property boom, and a 
budget deficit that was forecast to be the largest of any of the world’s twenty leading 
economies. Continuously rising but unaffordable government spending disguised the fact 
that it was an unsustainable economic boom, with the economy becoming steadily more 
unbalanced, less competitive and less prepared to meet the challenges of the future.
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The ongoing transition towards a new political economy paradigm has been 
promoted under the heading of “rebalancing the economy”1063 and guided by the FCO. The 
current Conservative government aims to address the legacy of deindustrialization through 
reindustrialization in the form of advanced manufacturing projects: 
We want to remain the world’s leading centre for financial services, yes; but we should 
determine to become a world-leader in, for example, advanced manufacturing, life sciences, 
creative industries, green energy and non-financial business services.
1064
  
                                                 
1062 HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 3. 
1063 BIS, FCO, UK Trade and Investment (2012).  
1064 HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 3. 
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Aside from financial services, telecommunications technology, clean tech and low-
carbon goods and services, business to business services (excluding finance), biotech and 
pharma, energy and utilities, retail, oil, and gas are among the key sectors that have been 
identified as contributors to UK economic growth.
1065
 In practice, this new development 
approach, implemented under the current government’s “Plan for Growth” (2011-2015), 
focuses on private sector growth through export promotion, access to growth markets, 
high-quality IFDI attraction, and OFDI advancement. For its operationalization, the FCO 
and UK TI have begun to cooperate across government agencies and work closely with 
industry, the government has stepped up its commercial diplomacy in Africa, and new aid 
programs have been created that call for public-private partnerships in their realization, 
thereby opening up publicly-funded business opportunities for British companies overseas.  
The relatively open economy, with a deregulated capital market and a great 
dependency on foreign inputs, leaves the government with only limited options at its 
disposal to moderate the negative side effects of its economy’s global exposure and 
financialization. In this regard, reindustrialization as an approach to rebuilding the 
economy seems to be among the few measures remaining that would not prompt fears of 
retaliatory action from countries and actors that the UK has come to rely on. 
Summary 
The assessment of state-market relations highlights that simply pointing to the 
financial sector to explain why land-consuming investments occur does not address the 
                                                 
1065 Ernst & Young (2011b), 18 (Graph 19). 
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whole story. One must also take into account the “embedded financial orthodoxy” that has 
informed British economic policies and trajectories since the 1980s; the intellectual capture 
of the public sector agents who have prepared the ground for the dominance of “the City” 
and the neglect of the industrial sector; the increasing dependence of public and private 
sector actors on financial markets in their operations; and, more recently, the adoption of a 
strategy to strengthen industry through better coordination of government agencies and 
their cooperation with the private sector.  
Core traits of the British political economy explain certain characteristics of land-
consuming OFDI in SSA. Firstly, the great number of financial investors involved in these 
investments has been highlighted. The material presented above shows that this situation 
has developed for multiple reasons. Clearly, some investors have begun investing in 
African economies and agricultural projects as part of their strategy to “seek alpha” at a 
time of financial crisis back home. Others, however, are involved primarily as providers of 
industry finance. In fact, most of the early-stage companies that invested in biofuel projects 
had to turn to the AIM stock exchange for funding. In this context, the short-term focus of 
the financial investors who are financing such operations reflects the dysfunctional nature 
of the existing structures for industry finance, specifically the lack of patient capital. For 
example, the case of the SBF highlights that financial investors withdraw their investments 
after a period of time that does not match the long maturation time of Jatropha plantations, 
contributing to the failure of the project.  
Secondly, following the financial crisis, British land-consuming OFDI has taken 
place in the context of a rise in commercial diplomacy and a reorientation of existing UK 
development finance programs. For instance, I have presented the strategic modification 
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that occurred in the CDC Group’s investment strategy. The increasing presence of public 
actors and institutions in private British OFDI projects in SSA is related to the 
government’s renewed interest in industrial policy and the rebalancing of the UK’s 
economy.  
5. Development Context 
As I have shown above, the current government promotes OFDI as a way to 
“rebalance the economy”1066 and maintain the UK’s influential international status as a 
major investor and trading country. At the same time, the UK has a long investor legacy, 
and a promotional OFDI policy stance has been evident since the 1970s. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that in the case of British land-consuming FDI projects in African countries, 
national and foreign factors have played crucial roles in the interest formation of investors, 
such as the IFDI-attraction programs of recipient countries; the international and European 
climate regime and the related creation of a market for biofuels; and the Eurozone crisis 
that led to a search for new growth markets. Importantly, though, it was the private sector 
that pioneered the UK’s reorientation towards the African continent. Due to the liberal 
economic context of the home country, global markets and overseas developments are key 
parameters shaping corporate portfolios. In the context of British OFDI in Africa, it is the 
perception of the continent as a new growth region that has been influential. 
From the perspective of the home country’s development context, the empirical 
evidence that emerges from official documentation, policies, and speeches suggests that 
                                                 
1066 See, for instance, BIS/FCO/UK Trade and Investment (2012). 
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overseas investments in SSA are explicitly linked to particular national interests and 
development ambitions of individual or collective actors. In addition to concerns about the 
home country’s energy security and CO2 emission targets, as well as related policy 
regimes that explain the high number of biofuel investments by early-stage companies, 
these investments are also part of the search for (more) profitable investment outlets by the 
financial sector. More recently, these investments have become part of the proactive trade 
and investment agenda of the current UK government (since 2011) – a development that 
contrasts starkly with the “embedded financial orthodoxy,” “free market” ideology, and 
related development strategies pursued since the 1980s. It seems remarkable that OFDI in 
Africa today is part of a larger development ambition to both rehabilitate the country’s 
crisis-stricken state budget and economy through reindustrialization and secure its 
international position by promoting investment in productive assets and related operations, 
such as export promotion and overseas expansion. Yet, the financial sector clearly remains 
an important component of the British economy, and the focus on reindustrialization is 
seen as a necessary complement to address the development challenges yielded by the 
financialization-led growth model over time.  
In fact, the development model that has been pursued since the 1980s, with its 
focus on the financial sector and “free market” ideology, has come at a high cost in view of 
economic and social development, and since the financial crisis in 2008, the volatility of 
state revenues and incidents of social unrest have provided an additional incentive to 
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modify the emphasis of the existing development model.
1067
 Among the most pressing 
problems of the service-oriented development trajectory is the neglect of productive 
industry. For decades, the productive sector only contributed a small share of the country’s 
GDP, and the UK’s share in the international trade of manufactured goods has been 
declining. Since 2000, the rise of, and heightened competition from, emerging countries 
has aggravated the problems confronting the British manufacturing industry and the 
government.  
On a national level, this non-productive development trajectory has resulted in a 
vicious cycle of lagging investment in the industrial base at home, declining exports and 
increasing imports (machinery and transport equipment), deteriorating terms of trade, and a 
growing dependence on the financial sector for jobs, growth, and revenues.
1068
 This 
situation is further aggravated by the country’s increasing dependence on external 
resources (energy and food), which is unsustainable, especially during times of high and/or 
very volatile commodity prices.
1069
 Socially, the country has recently faced rising 
unemployment – repeatedly over 8% between 2009 and 2012; 1070  rising wealth and 
economic opportunity inequality, which was identified as a core driver of the 2011 London 
                                                 
1067 For a discussion of the UK’s financialization-driven development trajectory, also see Lapavitsas 
(2014). 
1068 Te Velde and Calì (2006), 8. 
1069 In 2005, the UK, the EU’s largest energy producer and exporter (e.g., natural gas and oil), became a 
net importer of energy due to its declining oil and natural gas reserves. See US Energy Information 
Administration (2013) and Kuzemko (2010). The UK is also a net food-importing country, raising 
concerns during the food price crisis in 2007/2008. In 2008, the UK imported 40% of its food needs. 
See Cabinet Office (2008), i-x. 
1070 TradingEconomics.com (2014). 
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riots;
1071
 and mounting private sector debt, partly due to a personal debt load whose share 
of the disposable income rose to 160% in 2007 (compared to 45% in 1980).
1072
 Clearly, the 
global economic slowdown also aggravated the mounting public debt. Since the financial 
recession began, the national debt has risen to 76.6% of GDP (January 2014), without 
accounting for the financial sector interventions.
1073
  
Summary 
British land-consuming FDI has become part of the transformation of industrial 
policy towards reindustrialization. This is an official strategy to moderate unemployment; 
provide decent wages; ease social tensions; and increase state revenue while improving 
international accounts through the increased export of advanced manufacturing goods, 
thereby retaining the country’s international economic standing. In the context of the 
financial crisis, the strengthening of high-tech manufacturing in particular sectors is 
supposed to provide the UK with the competitive advantage needed to successfully 
participate and compete in international markets.  
However, tight government budgets and a dysfunctional industry finance system 
pose serious hurdles to operationalizing the acting government’s attempt to strengthen the 
secondary sector.
1074
 Moreover, it would be unrealistic to assume that the core traits of the 
country’s political economy have changed since the crisis. Although the government has 
                                                 
1071 The Equality Trust (2012). In 2010, a national survey on inequality revealed that the UK suffers 
from high levels of systematic inequality (within and across social groups) of income and opportunity. 
See Hills et al. (2010), 386. 
1072 The New Political Economy Network (2010), 25, 10. 
1073 Watt (7 June 2010). 
1074 Theodora.com (31 January 2014).  
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begun to promote reindustrialization, the key characteristics that run across all of the UK 
government parties, such as the credo of marketization and privatization, continue to 
prevail. Instead, the “grand strategy” approach towards OFDI promotion and 
reindustrialization shall mitigate the high costs of the “cosmopolitan economy,” which 
include unemployment, private debt, rising wealth inequality and increasing import 
dependency, and declining state revenues. Also, the strategy is said to ensure the favorable 
position of the UK in world politics, – allowing the country to “punch above its weight” 
despite changes in the international political and economic landscape.
1075
 
At the same time, international incentives have played a strong role in spurring 
contemporary land-consuming FDI. It is important to recall that the current government 
jumped on the corporate bandwagon rather late. In fact, British-African trade and 
investment relations have increased since 2000, when Africa was increasingly framed as a 
new growth region by the British private sector. Only after the financial crisis in 
2007/2008 did the government adopt this perception as a way to address the country’s 
prolonged economic recession. Significant events that influenced private decision making 
regarding the utility of land-consuming OFDI in SSA include economic reforms in the host 
countries (e.g., divestiture programs) and the emergence of a climate regime after Kyoto 
(1997). 
Whether the foreign economic policy approach will be successful remains to be 
seen. However, at this point in time, there is reason for doubt. On the one hand, a quote by 
the former Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham, reflects the assumption that British 
                                                 
1075 For a detailed discussion of UK attempts to position itself in a changing world, see M.Harvey 
(2011). 
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relations with African economies will continue to be characterized by their asymmetry, 
sustaining prosperity on the one side while mitigating “abject poverty” on the other: 
“[o]pen markets offer the only realistic hope of pulling billions of people in developing 
countries out of abject poverty, while sustaining prosperity in the industrialized world.”1076 
This would be disadvantageous for the host countries.  
At the same time, the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 6 reveals the reality 
that many projects, particularly in the ‘clean’ energy sector, witnessed dramatic wealth 
destruction over time and never actually realized their business goals. Even putting these 
operational challenges aside, alternative energy (i.e. first generation biofuels) did not live 
up to its socio-economic and environmental promises.
1077
 Moreover, the short-term focus 
on value creation by financial investors collided with the long-term maturation timelines of 
the projects “on the ground.” Further investigation would be needed to identify the extent 
to which capital exports made during the Eurozone and financial crises are, in effect, 
manifestations of capital flight. According to one British corporate actor I interviewed, the 
case of Cyprus, where savings above Euro 100,000 were taxed by a compulsory capital 
levy to moderate state debts, has led capital owners to deliberate on relocating their savings 
out of fear that something similar might take place in other European countries in the 
medium term. In this case, then, capital exports would aggravate the UK’s domestic 
problems, such as lagging investments, rather than addressing them. Finally, historical 
evidence on the implications of OFDI for home country development, presented in Chapter 
3, underlines the high cost that such a capital export strategy might entail due to the often 
                                                 
1076 Bellingham (2010).  
1077 Renewable Fuels Agency (2008), 8. 
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inverse relationship of capital exports and domestic job creation; and/or lagging 
reinvestment in industry back home. 
6. Conclusion 
Overall, this case study highlighted a great variety of factors at play in British land-
consuming OFDI. The key argument that has been put forward is that these investments 
are part of multiple strategies to profit from the economic reforms and rapidly growing 
consumer markets in the host countries, to advance biofuels investments in the context of 
international and domestic energy and climate policies, and/or to “seek alpha” through 
alternative investments in the primary sector in Africa at a time of the financial crisis and 
economic stagnation back home. Increasingly, land-consuming OFDI to Sub-Saharan 
Africa is also part of a (long-term) political strategy to economic recovery and 
international political power through rising exports and industrial activity. Importantly, the 
private sector perceived Africa as a new growth region as early as 2000. Only later did the 
government jump on the corporate trend in an attempt to revive the economy.  
More in detail, British OFDI in SSA is reflective both of the country’s long 
investor legacy and the government’s promotional policy stance towards OFDI since the 
1970s; as well as the domestic challenges the country has been facing recently, such as the 
rising energy insecurity and the socio-economic costs of the non-productive development 
model. British companies are experienced at factoring international incentive structures 
into their business operations; in contrast, Chinese companies are just beginning to 
globalize their operations. This is clearly reflected by the fact that host country and 
international reforms played an important role in corporate decision making, in addition to 
369 
 
home country developments. More recently, the current Conservative government in the 
UK explicitly (re)aligned OFDI in Africa with its foreign policy interests, namely by 
sustaining the country’s favorable international economic and political presence at a time 
of domestic crises and global re-ordering. As a result, OFDI in Africa has become part of 
ODA-funded business opportunities; has been backed by commercial diplomacy; and has 
been promoted by a rhetoric that no longer frames the continent as a place ridden by 
humanitarian crises, but as a region of great opportunity and hope. 
Consequently, these investments happen in the context of multiple country-specific 
developments that can be divided between pre-crisis and post-crisis dynamics. Pre-crisis 
dynamics include, for instance, economic liberalization in host and investor countries since 
the 1980s, as well as the introduction of domestic targets for biofuels to meet CO2 
emission targets and strengthen energy security. And post-crisis dynamics include the 
increasing severity of socio-economic problems in the financial-sector-dependent domestic 
economy; the changing landscape at the international level, where the rise of new 
economic powers has led to increasing competition over political influence, economic 
opportunities, and access to resources; and the development of a fear among the British 
political elite which recognizes that the UK has an exceptional position in world politics 
relative to its actual geographical size, and that, accordingly, the country might lose its 
status as a great power in the future. At the same time, financial actors in the UK’s 
deregulated capital markets have been drawn to African growth economies and the “real 
asset” sector at a time of economic crisis, when private equity investments are no longer 
profitable and growth at home is stagnant. In addition, the growing availability of 
multilateral finance mechanisms and development programs, particularly in the area of 
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renewable energy, food security, and carbon credits seems to have impacted investor 
choices. 
These findings on how British land-consuming FDI occurs underline my broader 
argument that also in the case of liberal economies, these investments are not the outcome 
of so-called “free markets,” but that the country’s legacy, development trajectory and 
ambitions, political economy, guiding ideology, and international context matter. The 
investments around the year 2000 were related to host country reforms, largely conducted 
by investors with long histories in the host economies, often dating back to the late 19
th
 
century. Another cluster of investments reflects the emerging climate regulations and has 
involved a high number of early-stage companies trying to profit from the newly created 
markets. Once the financial crisis hit, financial investors in search of at a time of economic 
recession became involved in the investment projects. At the same time, the acting 
government in the UK has adopted a proactive approach, intensifying commercial 
diplomacy with African countries and introducing bilateral investment forums in the 
French and Chinese model, though they are on an ad hoc basis. Still, ODA programs have 
been aligned with foreign policy goals, and they place special emphasis on supporting 
private companies investing overseas. In this context, the official rhetoric with regards to 
African countries has changed significantly – they are now described as markets of 
opportunity rather than areas in need of humanitarian intervention.  
Moreover, it has become clear that the importance of financial actors and the AIM 
stock exchange in these operations does not verify the assumption that these investments 
are largely driven by the financial sector. Instead, it reflects the intellectual capture and 
overlap of public and private sector actors characteristic of the UK’s political economy, 
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and refers back to the financialization-led development trajectory pursued since the 1980s. 
Consequently, and promoted by public policy, financial actors play a major role in the 
British economy and land-consuming OFDI, both as direct investors as well as the main 
source of industry finance. The problems associated with this constellation have been 
visible in British OFDI projects, namely in the difficulty of identifying who is actually 
involved in a project due to the constant changes in shareholding and the lack of patient 
capital. The latter is something that institutional development finance (the CDC) and 
DFID-directed aid programs are intended to address. Similarly, the sectoral composition of 
British land-consuming OFDI reflects the country’s investor legacy. The investments are 
directed to a few countries, and they primarily head towards the resources and services 
sectors. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this sectoral composition resembles the economic 
constitution of the home country, which is characterized by high external resource 
dependency and a strong services sector. 
Finally, I have shown that British OFDI involves a wide range of interests of the 
very diverse private sector. Many of these actors share the perception of Africa as a new 
growth region. Consequently, we see investment funds from the public and private sector 
that try to profit from this growth dynamic at a time of economic recession back home. 
Others respond to public policy-induced markets. Early-stage companies, for instance, 
invest in the production of biofuels in African countries, which continue to be framed as 
“land-abundant,” in spite of the ongoing land crisis. At the same time, related industries 
support these investments, such as actors from the aviation sector that seek access to cheap 
fossil fuel alternatives, and try to cooperate with biofuels companies through offtake 
agreements. What is surprising is the large numbers of inexperienced investors that engage 
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in land-consuming OFDI, often with very unrealistic expectations and/or business models 
in place – a fact that also explains the high number of failed projects. From an official 
perspective, these investments are promoted as a way to strengthen economic recovery 
through increases in exports and sustained access to cheap resources. Moreover, 
geopolitical considerations have entered the debate, reflecting realist assumptions. 
Accordingly, an intensified economic presence is useful to sustain the country’s influence 
at the international level at a time of global restructuring.  
Similar to the Chinese case, and against the background of the diverse range of 
actors and interests at play, my description of British OFDI shows that what makes these 
investments British is the specific combination of industrial set-up, development trajectory, 
contingent events, ideology, and political economy in and over time.  
More broadly, reflecting on the role of land-consuming OFDI from a home country 
perspective, the previous assessment stresses that these investments are part of a trend 
among private sector actors that has gained speed in the context of financial crises in the 
UK and the Eurozone, namely to profit from overseas growth markets and/or to respond to 
incentives provided by host country reforms or the domestic/international climate regime. 
More recently, the investments have become part of the government’s attempt to support 
these corporate interests. The deeper context is the failure of the UK’s financialization-led 
development path to deliver sufficient jobs, revenue, and other aspects of economic 
development. Against this background, the renewed expansion of the productive industry 
at home and abroad is part of a broader strategy and “prosperity agenda” that promises to 
deliver security while advancing domestic prosperity and growth: 
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The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom is: to use all our national capabilities 
to build Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in the world and strengthen our 
security. The networks we use to build our prosperity we will also use to build our 
security.
1078
 
The success of British land-consuming investment projects and the new foreign 
policy they are part of is not at all clear, however. The high project failure rate, regular 
involvement of fraudulent actors, and danger of capital flight all point at the challenges 
confronting these investments. Moreover, government efforts have so far not addressed the 
dysfunctional features of the home country political economy, such as the lack of patient 
capital or the effects of financialization on the state and society. 
 
                                                 
1078 HM Government (2010), 9. 
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Table 7-2 – Brief Review of the Home Country Context and British OFDI in SSA 
Category Home country Context UK OFDI in SSA 
Development 
context 
Since the 1980s, the country has pursued a 
financialization-led development trajectory 
and neglected its productive sector, 
resulting in deteriorating terms of trade, a 
decline in British manufacturing, and high 
social and economic costs, particularly at a 
time of financial crisis, and in the context 
of heightened international competition 
(e.g., BRICS). Also, the country is a net 
importer of food and energy and 
confronted with the challenge of meeting 
its CO2 emission targets under the climate 
regime. 
The unsustainable development 
trajectory has resulted in attempts to 
address related problems and 
reindustrialize. As a consequence, the 
British government has been 
proactively involved in land-consuming 
OFDI in SSA since 2010/2011. The 
outcomes of this involvement have to 
been seen yet. Moreover, the 
development trajectory, with its neglect 
of the industrial sector, and the investor 
legacy, with its focus on resources, 
explain the predominance of 
investments in resources and (financial) 
services (and fewer investments in 
manufacturing) characteristic of UK 
OFDI in SSA. At the same time, new 
actors (e.g., funds, early-stage 
companies) are investing in land for 
agricultural production. 
Home Country 
Measures 
The UK as a long-term liberal economy 
has had a promotional policy stance 
towards OFDI since its accession to the 
EU in the 1970s, as well as an elaborate 
HCM framework. Recently, OFDI has 
become a part of the country’s foreign 
policy.  
OFDI and trade to Africa as a new 
growth region is proactively promoted 
by newly introduced instruments, such 
as aid-funded business opportunities 
facilitated by DFID; new trade policy 
initiatives; and commercial diplomacy. 
Guiding 
Ideologies 
OFDI is embedded in a rhetoric which 
argues that related private sector-led 
growth is important for prosperity and 
national security and necessary for 
“rebalancing the economy.” 
In the particular case of Africa, the 
guiding ideology has shifted. It now 
links OFDI in Africa with national 
economic interests, formerly a taboo 
(after decolonization); rhetoric of 
mutual benefit has been adopted. 
Investor Legacy As a former empire and long-term investor 
in African economies, the UK is still a 
dominant investor country today. 
This investor legacy is also highlighted 
by the uneven investment structure in 
terms of sectors (e.g., resources, 
financial services) and countries. 
Political 
Economy 
Since the 1980s, the political economy has 
been characterized by an “embedded 
financial orthodoxy” that only now is 
being challenged. Core traits are the 
overlap of public sector and financial 
sector interests through intellectual capture 
and personal affinity and the 
financialization of society. 
The dominance of the financial sector 
in the British political economy is 
reflected in the prominent role of 
financial actors in the investments (in 
the form of finance provision and direct 
investments). More recently, public 
actors have become involved (e.g., the 
CDC), jumping on the corporate 
bandwagon. Most remarkable is the 
high number of early-stage companies 
responding to energy and climate 
policies.  
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Events Several incentives have influenced 
investor choices: host country reforms; 
climate regime and energy policies; and 
the financial crisis. 
These events explain different actors 
involved in land-consuming OFDI, 
namely old companies exploiting 
opportunities in host countries; new 
companies trying to profit from the 
novel climate and energy regime; and 
financial actors in a post-crisis search 
for “alpha.” 
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Chapter 8: PUSHING THE LIMITS – CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
This thesis has sought to explore alternative explanations and provide a more 
accurate version of “land grabbing” by capturing the complexity of agencies, structures, 
and ideologies at play. The main focus of my research project has been on the reasons for 
and the impact of “land grabbing” from the home countries’ perspectives. Consequently, I 
have assessed the empirical characteristics of Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI in 
SSA since 2000 in the home country settings, linking project-level data with the home 
countries’ political economies, ideologies, and development trajectories. The comparative 
study of two major investor countries in SSA that are at different junctures of their 
economic development and have very dissimilar political economies allowed me to 
identify the main country-specific and cross-country factors at play.   
I have argued that land-consuming investments from China and the UK occur as 
they do for numerous complex reasons, many of which are overlooked by the orthodox 
narrative. In the next paragraphs I briefly highlight the main findings of my two case 
studies, which will then be reviewed in detail in the Sections 2-5. Importantly, my 
argument that a comprehensive assessment of “land grabs” has to account for the home 
country context of outward FDI activities is country-centric, not state-centric. While the 
analysis of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI activities in Sub-Saharan Africa takes 
note of the particular context, it does not primarily focus on the activities of the state. 
In the case of China, four drivers stand out from the home country perspective. I 
argue that Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects are part of (1) a long-term strategy to 
diversify supply and access to resources (mineral products), even if these were not always 
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exported back home; (2) a diplomatic strategy to foster political alliances and expand the 
country’s soft power in international relations; (3) a strategy to develop and open new 
markets for Chinese products; and (4) a strategy to internationalize China’s industrial base 
to address the competitive pressures back home, as well as the ecological and social 
challenges of the country’s development trajectory. 
In the case of the UK, four drivers of land-consuming OFDI are important from a 
home country perspective: (1) they are part of a corporate strategy to profit from economic 
reforms and rapidly growing consumer markets in the host countries; (2) they are part of 
international and domestic energy and climate policies that have increased investments in 
biofuels in SSA; (3) they are part of a strategy by actors of the financial sector to invest in 
the primary sector in Africa (and related industries) at a time of the financial crisis and 
economic stagnation back home; and, increasingly, (4) they are part of a strategy by the 
UK government to promote land-consuming OFDI to Sub-Saharan Africa as way to 
economic recovery and international political power through rising exports and industrial 
activity. 
In comparison with the orthodox explanations, the country case findings suggest 
that the focus on the 2007/2008 international crises and the related resource-security 
concerns only captures a minor share of what is happening. For instance, evidence from 
both case studies shows that a significant share of land-consuming OFDI projects started 
prior to the 2007/2008 international crises. In the case of China, OFDI to African countries 
has been occurring since the country opened up in the 1980s, picking up speed in 2000. 
Most British land-consuming OFDI projects also began before 2007/2008, though a 
sizeable portion did indeed occur around 2007/2008. Moreover, in a related point, the 
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empirical evidence indicates that neither Chinese nor British investments are undertaken 
solely to secure food or energy resources. Instead, the main drivers are country-specific, 
and relate to events that resonate(d) in the context of the home country’s economic 
structure, political constellation, and ideological outlook.  
In the case of China, a combination of factors led the government to support 
Chinese OFDI to Africa, and incentivized companies and private actors to get involved. 
These include the rise in external energy dependency since the 1990s; the collapse of 
major export markets in the late 1990s; the mounting competitive pressure faced by 
indigenous companies due to foreign investment in China since 2000; the limited transfer 
of skills and technology through IFDI back home; and the international economic 
governance regime, particularly the quasi-monopolistic energy markets that have made 
integration difficult, but also the liberal framework that has provided Chinese actors with 
the opportunity to peacefully expand overseas in response to domestic challenges. At the 
same time, the role of the triple crises in 2007/2008 remains unclear. China was largely 
food self-sufficient when the food crisis hit, and had been actively diversifying its energy 
supplies since the 1990s. Clearly, the financial crisis allowed some Chinese companies to 
go overseas and profit from ‘cheap bargains’ in the context of increased price sensitivity 
and falling asset prices. However, it also deprived companies of necessary funds, yielding 
a temporary decline in Chinese overseas investments in 2009/2010.  
In the case of the UK, land-consuming investments were linked to privatization 
policies in the host countries in the 1990s, and they have been associated with the 
emerging climate regime since 2000. A bulk of land-consuming OFDI projects since 2008 
have also been related to the financial crisis and the economic recession in the home 
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country. However, as in the Chinese case, the financial crisis had an ambiguous impact in 
the form of tight capital markets that led to a dramatic fall in British OFDI flows globally 
and crashes in the share values of a considerable number of companies. 
In addition, the dominance of the primary resource sector in Chinese and British 
investments does not necessarily imply that these investments’ purpose is to provide for 
resource and/or food security back home – as is often assumed. The empirical evidence 
highlights that Chinese projects in the agricultural sector are mainly intended for host 
country or regional markets. Similarly, investments in the energy sector do not necessarily 
lead to the production output being shipped to China. In several cases, the products are 
sold on regional and world markets, and the profits are then repatriated back home. 
However, more than two thirds of China’s imports from the continent comprised minerals 
and energy resources (as of 2010), emphasizing the significant role of resources in China’s 
involvement with African countries.
1079
 Interestingly, in the case of the UK, many projects 
that were originally intended to produce for international or British export markets ended 
up selling domestically (in the host country), due to multiple operational problems.  
Furthermore, although the notion that these investment activities are beneficial for 
the home countries and investors is a core assumption of the orthodox explanations, 
empirical evidence highlights that seemingly inexpensive bargains often turn out to be very 
costly and unsustainable; for instance, due to the high overheads of developing ‘cheap 
land’ or the lack of patient capital. Besides, in both country cases, land-consuming 
investments involve a large number of inexperienced investors, such as early-stage 
                                                 
1079 Africa Research Institute (2012), 3; and State Council (2013). 
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companies, SOEs beginning the process of globalizing their operations, established 
companies entering new areas of activity, and financial investors searching for new 
investment outlets. As a result, many projects fail. And, in those instances where projects 
are economically successful, it remains difficult to clearly indicate in which ways they 
might benefit the home country. Although the investments are embedded in and reflective 
of their home countries’ domestic policy frameworks and support mechanisms, which 
ascribe to capital exports a particular, positive function in the overall development 
trajectory (see Sections 2, 3, and 5), it is far from clear whether these investments will 
actually live up to the expectations and rhetoric promoting them.  
In this context, it is also important to account for the purposeful agency in the host 
countries. My empirical assessment highlights that Chinese and British land-consuming 
OFDI is often embedded in the national development strategies of host governments, 
which attract and frame foreign capital as another source of development finance. For 
instance, Chinese agricultural development centers have been realized upon the request of 
African host countries, and, in the British case, biofuel corporations have been invited to 
develop large-scale plantations and participate in the development of associated regulatory 
frameworks. 
Finally, the orthodox assumption of a single conscious rationale and policy driving 
these investments has to be questioned in the face of the diversity of interests, actors, 
reasons, and events involved. Clearly, these investments are part of the home and host 
countries’ industrial and foreign economic policies, which set the boundaries within which 
they take place. The investments also involve a significant number of public actors on both 
sides. However, this does not imply that all of the actors from a given country have the 
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same intentions, nor does it mean that the related policy frameworks and institutional 
settings are more coherent than they are in other policy areas. In practice, even Chinese 
state actors and SOEs pursue multiple agendas, some of which conflict with the 
overarching strategic outlook of the central government. In the British case, the short-
termism of the financial actors often clashes with the long-term business models of the “on 
the ground” companies and/or the “rebalancing” aspirations of the current government. 
Moreover, the history of relevant policy frameworks shows that these have emerged in 
response to particular events rather than as a result of a long-term plan or strategic outlook.  
 Regarding the contemporary role of land-consuming OFDI in the context of home 
country development, therefore, this thesis advances the broader argument that these 
investments “push the limits” which confront home country actors in view of advancing 
their economic, political, and/or ideology-driven interests. This means that the investments 
are pursued even when they are not at all economically successful, because they serve the 
interests of the diverse agents (individuals, firms, governments) that participate in them. In 
spite of their different investment models, this is true for both China and the UK – in both 
cases, the investments are driven by a mix of political, economic, and ideological 
rationales.  
Overall, this thesis makes three contributions to the contemporary research on “land 
grabbing,” that will be reviewed in the following sections in greater detail. First, the thesis 
provides actual empirical evidence on Chinese and British investment activities and 
explains these from a home country perspective. The findings of the two case studies will 
be revised in Section 1 and 2, respectively. Second, the comparative research design 
critically interrogates stereotypic narratives and identifies the differences, as well as the 
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similarities, that are characteristic of both countries’ overseas investments, in and over 
time. The review of the comparative findings of the contemporary and historical 
assessment will take place in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Third, based on these findings, 
the thesis considers the role of OFDI in the domestic development of the home countries. 
These results will be briefly reviewed in the final Section 5 of this chapter. 
1. China in Africa: Resources, Alliances, Markets, and Globalization 
Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, I argue, are part of 
multiple strategies to diversify supply and access to resources (mineral products), foster 
political alliances and expand the country’s soft power in international relations, develop 
and open new markets, and internationalize China’s industry in response to the competitive 
pressures as well as the ecological and social challenges back home.  
From an official perspective, Chinese land-consuming OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is expected to assist the country’s economic expansion in an exclusive, highly competitive, 
and crisis-ridden international setting. It is also part of the country’s political 
transformation and the broader economic liberalization and globalization process, and 
reflective of its political economy of growth. At the same time, from a project-level 
(agency) perspective, it is important to remember that Chinese land-consuming 
investments comprise a very diverse range of actors and interests that often reflect the 
country’s social and economic conditions. As a result, the projects include workers that 
hope to improve their families’ standard of living; SOEs and POEs searching for lucrative 
business opportunities; central state officials that support and use the increasing levels of 
trade and investment in their diplomatic strategy to build political alliances; state-owned 
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and foreign manufacturing companies in China that are interested in the access to cheap 
resources and new markets; sub-state government officials and representatives of China’s 
financial institutions that promote the export of labor and pursue intergovernmental 
economic cooperation to facilitate growth and moderate the social tensions of their 
administrations’ development plans; Chinese companies that have been crowded out by 
inward FDI and try to find new business opportunities overseas; and/or national oil 
companies interested to diversify their portfolio in the face of declining reserves‐to‐
production ratios (R/P ratio)
1080
 of Chinese oil fields and rising demand. The investments 
also include Chinese state-owned agribusiness companies delivering economic cooperation 
projects; as well as infrastructure companies that use changes in corporate law to act as 
contract bidders, in addition to implementing China-Africa cooperation programs. 
In the following paragraphs I will review the core empirical elements of Chinese 
OFDI in SSA in the context of the social, ecological, and economic dimensions of China’s 
development trajectory, as well as in view of the country’s political economy, institutional 
frameworks, and ideological context.  
The empirical characteristics of Chinese land-consuming investments in Sub-
Saharan Africa are complex: they involve multiple agencies from the private and public 
sectors, home and recipient countries, and multilateral agencies. Most projects are 
implemented in collaboration with actors from key ministries and/or the host country 
parliament. They are also embedded in the national development strategies of the home 
and host countries, and often rely on funding from third parties. The empirical findings 
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show that these investment projects take place in a wide range of sectors, from farming and 
mining to infrastructure construction. They mostly pre-date the 2007/2008 crises, with 
some projects even tracing back to before the year 2000. Surprisingly, the Chinese 
government’s official data suggests that investments in agriculture, the central focus of the 
“land grabbing” debate, only made up a minor share of total Chinese FDI (measured by 
value) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, the role of land in these investments is multifaceted. A 
significant share of projects uses land as a resource for mining or farming. However, other, 
equally important projects use it as a productive space in which infrastructure projects are 
realized, Special Economic Zones constructed, or processing plants operated. On the 
operational level, most projects extract and produce primary commodities for domestic, 
regional, or international markets, rather than for export back to China. Moreover, the 
projects function on the basis of market principles and mainstream economic theory, also 
in cases involving Chinese development finance. 
Home-country-specific structures, agencies, ideologies, and events provide for a 
better understanding of why these investments occur while also explicating their extent and 
the forms they take. Since the early 1990s, China’s government has opted for an IFDI-led, 
export-oriented economic development path. While the country has experienced 
tremendous quantitative economic growth during this period, specific events at different 
points in time have highlighted the shortfalls of this development trajectory. Insofar as they 
have presented a threat to the political and economic elite and/or led to relevant changes in 
the country’s actor constellation, structural setting, or ideological superstructure, these 
events have been significant for Chinese OFDI policy and regulation. In particular, four 
successive events stand out: the economic expansion beyond the carrying and provisioning 
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capacity of the country’s resource base in the mid-1990s, the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, 
the WTO accession in 2001, and, subsequently, rising civil discontent with the socio-
economic and ecological implications of the development trajectory. In the home country 
context, these events have stressed China’s growing external dependency on resources, 
ecologies, markets, and political cooperation. They have also demonstrated the necessity of 
upgrading the country’s domestic processing operations to improve the ecological and 
social conditions of this development trajectory and reduce the crowding-out effects of 
WTO accession on Chinese industry. In response to these events – and the underlying 
challenges for Chinese actors (individuals, firms, government) that have made them 
meaningful – the Chinese government has adopted an increasingly promotional policy 
stance towards OFDI.  
Consequently, China, formerly a country with close to zero overseas investments, 
had become a major global capital exporter by 2009. While African economies still receive 
the smallest share of total Chinese OFDI, the continent’s overall share has been rising 
significantly since 1991 (1991: 0.2%; 2007: 5.9%).
1081
 The home country’s development 
trajectory also explains the sectoral composition of Chinese land-consuming OFDI in 
African countries, namely the strong focus on resources for energy and industrial purposes, 
as well as the importance assigned to manufacturing activities and overseas markets. In 
addition, the infrastructure projects improve the operating space of (Chinese) companies in 
African countries, and/or strengthen the diplomatic relations by demonstrating the 
government’s commitment to host country requests. 
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At the same time, it is this official emphasis on resources and commercial activities 
that sheds light on the surprisingly small share of agricultural investments in total OFDI 
since 2000. African governments have repeatedly asked the Chinese government to engage 
in the rehabilitation of the so-called Friendship Farms as part of the mutual benefit 
approach that allegedly characterizes China-Africa cooperation. In response, the Chinese 
government has agreed to build 30 agricultural demonstration centers across Africa, and it 
has become involved in other food security activities in the partnering countries through 
capacity building measures, donations to multilateral programs, and/or the establishment of 
a special fund (China-Africa Development Fund) that supports agricultural operations 
overseas. Largely, these activities relate to the reputational concerns of the Chinese 
government, which has to rely on soft power to advance its economic and political interests 
in its relationships with African countries. Thus, investments in the agricultural sector, 
particularly by SOEs, have been driven by the desire to demonstrate a different approach 
than the major resource importers from the North, with their violent histories of expansion 
and exploitation. At the same time, these activities have enabled Chinese actors, such as 
the Chinese agribusinesses which run the Friendship Farms on the basis of mainstream 
managerial economics, to internationalize their operations and gather first-hand managerial 
experience as transnational companies.  
Moreover, the home country’s particular actor constellations and ideological 
context are important factors in understanding Chinese land-consuming OFDI from a home 
country perspective. They constitute important “mechanisms of selection”1082 with regard 
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to the responses to the particular events described above while also explaining the form of 
these land-consuming investments. In particular, the victory of the economically liberal 
faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1990s has led to the adoption of 
an expansionist guiding ideology of development. Importantly, (GDP) growth is perceived 
by the political elite as a way to identify whether development plans and strategies for 
economic governance are achieving success. It has thus come to determine political career 
paths within the CCP. In addition, the cluster of expansionist ideas (alias: guiding ideology) 
frames growth as a means to ensure the stability of the political regime by offering jobs 
and opportunities to the Chinese population. In this regard, the adoption of the set of ideas 
about growth performs ideological functions – it legitimizes, rationalizes, and promotes 
what is happening. It also drives overseas investments. 
Concurrently, political reforms since the 1990s resulted in the growing importance 
of sub-state actors in the home country’s domestic politics and international relations; the 
rising degree of “rule by regulation;”1083 the modification of Chinese corporate law so that 
it bestows SOEs with discretionary managerial power in their enterprises; and the shifting 
mind-set of political agents who act as “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” and are interested in 
profitable business.
1084
 Together, these home country features explain why multiple actors 
with diverse interests are involved in the initiation, implementation, and operationalization 
of Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Regarding Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA, this politico-economic and 
ideological transformation process explains the shifting nature of China-Africa cooperation 
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visible on the policy and project levels. Powerful interests of the country’s altered political 
and economic elite, particularly the manufacturing industry and bureaucratic entrepreneurs 
at different levels of government, in economic expansion, resource security, and profitable 
business opportunities have shaped OFDI-related policies. Official documentation, 
significant speeches, and whitepapers published since 2000 showcase the government’s 
move away from the historical framing of self-reliance and autarky as the ultimate (foreign) 
policy goal informing China-Africa relations. Instead, mainstream economic ideas have 
become the core framing and modus operandi of economic cooperation. This has resulted 
in the profound modification of how projects are run by Chinese actors. For instance, 
construction companies that were previously aid-funded have become successful 
entrepreneurs and contract bidders on the African continent, and even aid projects have 
adopted a for-profit rationale in their operations.  
I have highlighted above that it remains unclear how successful the promotion of 
land-consuming OFDI will be in securing resources, opening markets, strengthen political 
partnerships, and/or internationalizing China’s industrial base. China-Africa trade and 
investment activities have intensified significantly. The trade and investment patterns 
strongly take after traditional asymmetries of North-South relations, with the focus on 
resources and the export of machinery.
1085
 Regarding the official framing of China-Africa 
cooperation as “mutually beneficial,” the effect could be very different for China and 
African countries. From a home country perspective, manifold evidence from other 
countries’ globalization experiences highlights that the impact of overseas expansion on 
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home country development is ambiguous, and might entail the export of jobs, the 
hollowing out of the productive sector, amongst other problems. From a host country 
perspective, the outcome depends on whether the governments steer these activities to 
support the genuine development and diversification of their economies.  
Overall, the varied assemblage of interests that range from geopolitical 
considerations, crowding out effects, individual hopes for a better life, and/or the specific 
characteristics of the Chinese political economy explains why the increase in land-
consuming OFDI is likely to continue, even though many projects might fail and 
associated risks remain high. It appears that for many actors, the opportunity costs are 
comparatively low. 
2. UK in Africa: Growth Regions, Climate and Energy Security, Reindustrialization  
British land-consuming OFDI projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are part of multiple 
strategies to profit from the economic reforms and rapidly growing consumer markets in 
the host countries, to respond to international and domestic energy and climate policies and 
the markets created for biofuels, and/or to “seek alpha” through alternative investments in 
the primary sector in Africa at a time of the financial crisis and economic stagnation back 
home. Increasingly, land-consuming OFDI to Sub-Saharan Africa are also part of a (long-
term) political strategy to economic recovery and international political power through 
rising exports and industrial activity. 
From a project-level perspective, British OFDI in SSA mirrors the interests of a 
highly diverse private sector characteristic of the UK’s liberal political economy: some 
actors with long histories of operating on the “new growth continent” have exploited the 
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opportunities presented to them through divestiture programs, while others, such as the 
financial sector, have just begun to engage in land-consuming investments in the wake of 
multiple crises. Public and private funds search for alternative investment outlets as a 
result of the financial crisis and the prolonged economic recession, whereas a number of 
wealthy individuals seem inclined to invest overseas to avoid any future compulsory 
capital levy to moderate state debts in the context of the Eurozone crisis. Also, the 
adoption of biofuels and CO2 emission targets provided incentives to newcomers to invest 
in agricultural projects and produce for the related markets. Early-stage companies have 
started to invest in Jatropha plantations, and actors of the aviation industry – affected by 
the CO2 emission targets – got involved and offered these companies medium-term offtake 
agreements for their seemingly ‘clean’ energy products. More broadly, the perception of 
Africa as the new growth region has attracted numerous different actors to join in land-
consuming OFDI activities, of which many have little prior experience, desolate growth 
outlooks back home, and an overly optimistic (and in some cases fraudulent) profit 
expectation. From the official perspective, land-consuming OFDI has been part of a liberal 
policy stance towards capital exports that was adopted back in the 1970s. Only recently, 
OFDI to SSA has become an explicit component of the UK’s foreign economic policy, 
which reflects the country’s self-identification as a “cosmopolitan” economy and major 
political and economic power (and former empire). This policy frames overseas 
investments (alongside trade and IFDI) as a way to facilitate home country growth, thereby 
generating wealth, welfare, political stability, and international recognition. In this view, 
the overseas economic networks associated with OFDI can be used to sustain or expand 
the country’s “soft power” at the international level. 
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In the following paragraphs I will review the core empirical elements of British 
OFDI in SSA in the context of the social, ecological, and economic dimensions of the 
UK’s development trajectory, as well as in view of the country’s political economy, 
institutional frameworks, and ideological context.  
Empirically, British land-consuming OFDI involves a wide range of actors from the 
home and host countries, private and public sectors, and regional and international 
institutions. As in the Chinese case, these investments are often part of the domestic 
development plans of the host and home countries. Moreover, despite the predominance of 
food and biofuel production projects in the “land grab” databases, the investments actually 
cover a wide range of sectors. Most British projects produce for export to international 
markets or the UK. This is a significant departure from Chinese land-consuming projects, 
which are largely aimed at domestic (i.e. host country) and regional markets, particularly 
in the context of agricultural projects. In many cases, however, the export-oriented 
business models designed by British companies did not materialize due to project failure, 
pricing problems, funding issues, and/or inexperienced plantation management, to name 
just a few of the problems encountered on the ground. As a result, many projects ended up 
selling their products in the host country or regionally. Regarding the role of land in British 
investment projects, it has been perceived primarily as a resource or financial asset and, 
again in contrast to the Chinese case, less often as a space for productive activities. On the 
subject of timelines, three trends are observable in the 2000 to 2013 period. Separated by 
the emergence of key events and factors, these are described in the next paragraphs. 
The first trend comprises investments made around the year 2000. The empirical 
details of British land-consuming investment projects indicate that at that time, host 
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country divestiture programs and private sector perceptions of Africa as a new growth 
region were fundamental factors impacting investor decisions. Importantly, these factors 
emerged when economic growth in Britain and its major trading and investment partners 
was stagnant. The related investments were conducted by companies that had a long 
presence in the host countries, and/or they involved companies with the financial capacity 
and international experience and mind-set to respond to these national and international 
incentives.  
The second trend is observable regarding land-consuming FDI projects that took 
place between 2000 and 2007. Most of these were related to international, European, or 
domestic renewable energy and climate policies, namely directives, targets, and carbon 
credits developed to achieve energy security and/or CO2 emissions-reduction targets.
 1086
 
The related land-consuming OFDI projects were operated primarily by new business actors, 
such as the early-stage companies that often had little prior experience in agriculture, and 
whose business models aimed to profit from these new policy regimes and related markets 
– they frequently failed to do so.  
The third bulk of British land-consuming investments started after 2007. These 
projects have been strongly linked to the financial crisis, the economic recession in the UK, 
and the Eurozone crisis. These economic shocks have led financial actors to seek new 
investment outlets, often in the form of primary commodities. They have done this either 
as a hedge against inflation or, given the dire situations in the UK, the partner countries of 
continental Europe, and the crisis-ridden US, in pursuit of new growth markets. Since 2011, 
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the British government has also jumped on this corporate trend by trying to promote 
British OFDI in African countries as a way to revive its manufacturing sector and open 
new export and business opportunities. 
Home-country-specific structural factors, agencies, ideologies, and events explicate 
the extent and forms of these post-2000 investments and make sense of them in the home 
country context. Importantly, the UK’s investor legacy and long history as a liberal 
economy, as well as its promotional OFDI policy stance since the 1970s, explain why a 
significant share of British land-consuming investments have been made in response to 
particular pull-factors, such as host country reforms and international policy regimes. 
“Old” investors with a long presence in the respective host country, such as Unilever, have 
taken advantage of the opportunities presented to them in the form of privatization 
programs. And early-stage companies investing in African economies have tried to profit 
from the newly created (energy) markets that emerged from climate negotiations. At the 
same time, the sectoral composition of British land-consuming OFDI, with its focus on 
resources and financial services, echoes the country’s investor legacy, as do the highly 
unequal investment patterns across countries. In fact, the investments are concentrated in a 
few countries and focus on the same sectors that have characterized British-African 
economic relations for over a century. The limited number of manufacturing projects also 
mirrors the (financial-) service-sector orientation of the home country and the “embedded 
financial orthodoxy” of its political economy. 
Compared to the Chinese case, the UK case study findings highlight that in a 
country with an open economy, host country dynamics and international events play out 
more prominently. At the same time, the specific home country setting, namely the actor 
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constellation, development context, and ideological superstructure, remains central to the 
explanation of how these investments take place. Take, for example, the dysfunctional 
system of industrial finance that is characteristic of the British political economy. Its 
effects are evidenced by the lack of patient capital that has plagued British biofuel and 
agricultural projects, often leading to their failure. Moreover, the strong presence of 
financial actors in British land-consuming OFDI projects reflects the “intellectual capture,” 
as well as the overlapping interests of seemingly distinct public and private sector actor 
groups, that are characteristic of the UK’s political economy of growth.  
The relatively recent involvement of the British government in land-consuming 
OFDI activities in SSA has concurred with changes in the guiding ideology. In fact, the set 
of ideas that promote, rationalize, and legitimate OFDI in Africa has been modified in 
outlook and emphasis. The current UK government now emphasizes the “mutually 
beneficial” nature of UK-Africa business relations, explicitly associating overseas 
investments more with national and foreign economic interests rather than unilateral 
humanitarianism. In the context of the 2007 financial crisis and ensuing economic 
recession, the UK government identified the financialization-led development approach, 
with its focus on financial services and its dependency on credit-financed public and 
private consumption, as posing a key challenge to economic recovery and the operative 
functioning of the state.
1087
 The core problems of that approach include reduced and 
increasingly volatile government revenue; the country’s declining industrial base, which 
has gone hand in hand with the loss of decent jobs and deteriorating terms of trade, 
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particularly since the country became a net importer of energy sources;
 1088
 economic 
recession at a time of international financial crisis; and rising socio-economic inequality 
and the associated risk of social disintegration. Against this background, the current 
government has begun to frame and reengage in OFDI activities as a means to stimulate 
growth, access resources, improve industrial competitiveness, and provide for socio-
economic essentials such as jobs.  
Official documentation also references realist assumptions and geopolitical 
considerations and suggests that the country’s economic expansion – through further 
extension of the international economic networks comprising OFDI, IFDI, and trade – 
correlates with political power in international relations. OFDI to SSA is framed as an 
important component of the government’s ambition to play an influential role in world 
politics by sustaining the country’s economic and political presence overseas and in 
multilateral institutions. On the institutional level, this rhetoric is matched both by an 
increase in the UK’s commercial diplomacy and by the aligning of UK development 
finance and programs with the country’s foreign policy goals. As a result of this “grand 
strategy” approach, development finance is increasingly being invested in the private 
sector operations of British companies active in African countries.  
It remains to be seen how successful British OFDI in SSA turns out to be in 
meeting the multiple expectations associated with it. While trade and investment has 
increased significantly, the investment activities are spread very uneven, both with regards 
to countries and sectors. Moreover, the high project failure rate, regular involvement of 
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fraudulent actors, and danger of capital flight all point at the challenges confronting these 
investments, on the project-level as well as from a home country perspective. Overall, the 
official rhetoric seems overly optimistic regarding the utility of OFDI for the home country; 
while no long-term strategy exists regarding the UK’s engagement with Africa. At the 
same time, government efforts have so far hardly addressed the dysfunctional features of 
the home country political economy, such as the lack of patient capital or the effects of 
financialization on the state and society. From a host country perspective, the impact is 
strongly dependent on the steering of these investments to the benefits of the affected 
populations and societies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the attraction of large-scale 
land-consuming FDI often comes at a high cost for the affected populations and ecologies, 
with no safeguards in place.  
3. Comparing Chinese and British Land-Consuming OFDI 
The foregoing case study summaries underline that Chinese and British land-
consuming FDI projects are embedded in country-specific guiding ideologies, influenced 
by the social, economic, and ecological dimensions of domestic development, related to 
specific events, and supported by institutional frameworks. At the same time, the forms 
taken by these projects are reflective of the home countries’ particular political economies, 
and OFDI is framed as an important tool in the geopolitical ambitions of both countries’ 
foreign economic policies.  
This section’s comparative study of the unlike cases is intended to systematically 
explore alternative explanations of “land grabbing” from a home country perspective, and 
identify country-specific as well as cross-country factors and dynamics at play. In the 
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structure of this thesis, this approach complements the process tracing and builds on the 
rich empirical evidence generated by it.  
In the following paragraphs, I make three (interrelated) arguments based on the 
comparative findings. Firstly, the thesis shows multiple differences regarding Chinese and 
British land-consuming OFDI. However, these differences are not necessarily significant 
in explaining why these investments happen, nor are they antithetic. Instead, difference is 
best understood as variation of the particular composition of actors and interests involved. 
Secondly, the complexity of (f)actors at play forbids any monocausal explanations of what 
is happening. Thirdly, it is important to note the similarities that exist regarding Chinese 
and British land-consuming OFDI. From a home country perspective, land-consuming 
OFDI is backed by relatively similar policy frameworks, and sets of ideas that associate 
OFDI with particular socio-economic and geopolitical interests. On the project-level, the 
investments apply the same managerial economics. Thus, for a better understanding of 
why these investments occur as they do, it is necessary to assess the main characteristics in 
the home country context. In the following paragraphs, I will explicate the comparative 
findings under the headings of difference, complexity, and similarity.  
In view of difference, firstly, the particular mix of home-country-specific 
conditions explains how and why land-consuming investments occur, and ultimately 
highlights what makes them Chinese or British. In other words: difference is best 
understood as a variation. It does not refer to any sort of (antithetic) absolute difference in 
how and why these investments occur from a home country perspective. To explicate this 
finding, the next paragraphs will review the main empirical differences of Chinese and 
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British land-consuming OFDI in SSA, and their significance in explaining what is 
happening. 
 Both country cases differ considerably in their empirical characteristics. The 
sectoral composition of Chinese investments reveals a focus on manufacturing and 
infrastructure projects, as well as energy resources, while British investments are largely 
resource- and service-oriented and include a significant share of agricultural projects aimed 
at biofuel and food production. Regarding the role of land, Chinese investors prioritize its 
use as a resource and space for productive activities, whereas British investors use it 
mostly as a resource and, increasingly, as an asset. This does not, however, imply that all 
of these investment projects are related to the 2007/2008 resource and financial crises. In 
both cases, a large share of land-consuming OFDI projects began prior to the 2007/2008 
timeline. Chinese projects often build on, or rehabilitate former aid projects, particularly in 
the agricultural sector where some projects can be traced back to the 1970s. Moreover, a 
large share of Chinese investments involves equity investments in existing projects, often 
in the form of a Chinese SOE investing in an African company that is itself an SOE or has 
close ties to the host government. Many British investments also go into existing 
enterprises (such as plantations) and involve companies with a long presence on the 
continent. At the same time, the bulk of early-stage companies are involved in greenfield 
investments, specifically the operation of plantations for export purposes.  
The most obvious difference can be observed in the actor composition of both 
countries’ investments. In spite of the great diversity of public and private actors from the 
host and home countries that are involved during a project’s lifecycle, in the Chinese case, 
the investigated OFDI projects were predominantly executed by SOEs. British investments, 
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by contrast, were undertaken primarily by private companies and financial investors, with 
the exception of the CDC Group. However, I have also shown that the British government 
has become involved through commercial diplomacy and/or the provision of investment-
related development finance to British investors operating in African countries. 
A detailed assessment of these investments in the home country context also shows 
that different events, investor legacies, and political economies play important roles. In the 
Chinese case, the country is a relatively new source of FDI in Africa. The OFDI policy 
supporting this trend has emerged since the 1990s in response to particular events, such as 
the country’s rising resource dependency in the 1990s, the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, 
and WTO accession in 2001. This means that Chinese land-consuming OFDI is strongly 
related to political reforms that have occurred since the 1990s and led to fundamental 
change and partial liberalization of the country’s industrial and foreign economic policies 
and related administrative procedures.  
In the British case, by contrast, the country’s long investor legacy and presence on 
the continent is of importance. Consequently, investments made prior to 2007/2008 were 
largely related to external pull factors, such as reforms in the host economies, the 
perception that African countries provided profitable business opportunities, or the 
international climate regime. Political reforms and home country strategies have come into 
play only more recently, in the form of a revised foreign policy regarding the British 
presence in African countries.  
Whereas in the Chinese case public sector reforms seem to have set the ground for 
the investments to occur as they do, in the British case it has been the private sector that 
has triggered the government to reconsider its engagement with African countries at a time 
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of stagnant growth back home. In both cases, the public and private sectors overlap greatly, 
either through the strong role of SOEs in the domestic economy (China); the guiding 
ideology shared by public and private actors involved in the political economy of growth 
relevant for overseas investments in Africa (UK and China); or though revolving doors and 
the dependency of capitalist states on the economy to generate the revenues and jobs that 
are necessary for societal reproduction.  
It is also noteworthy that most Chinese investment projects produce for domestic or 
regional markets in Africa, while most British investors planned to export to international 
markets or the UK. In the Chinese case, investors have just begun globalizing their 
activities and are producing largely for local and regional markets in the host countries. In 
the UK case, this export orientation is largely a continuation of historical investment 
patterns, as well as a reflection of the capacities of relevant actors.  
Additionally, the dissimilar rationales embedded in relevant official documentation 
and policies reflect another way in which Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI 
projects differ. In the case of China, these investments cater to the interests of a political 
economy of growth characterized by a very resource-intensive and export-oriented 
manufacturing sector, the marketization of power by state representatives, and the official 
interest in improving China’s position and influence in the international political and 
economic landscape. Consequently, these investments open new markets, form part of a 
globalization process of Chinese companies, focus on the diversification of energy supplies, 
and are embedded in an official strategy to intensify political and economic networks. 
Contemporary agricultural projects have largely been motivated by reputational concerns 
and stem from the “mutual benefit” principle of China’s Africa policy, i.e. they are 
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intended to give something back in exchange for the increased, yet highly asymmetric 
trade and investment relations, thereby fostering good relations. Moreover, many 
investment projects have a medium-term profit strategy built in to their operations. The 
core actors in the Chinese political economy of growth are government officials, SOEs, 
and the private sector, all of which pursue the same expansionist agenda, albeit for 
different reasons. Documented rationalizations range from considerations of political 
stability and resource security to access to new markets and the hope of finding profitable 
business opportunities overseas in light of the fierce competition back home. 
In the case of the UK, the political economy of growth comprises private actors 
seeking profitable investments in established sectors and, more recently, new actors trying 
to profit from newly created markets for renewable energy or the presence in new growth 
markets. The important role of the financial sector as a source of industry finance in these 
investments also reflects on the service-sector-driven growth strategy that has been 
pursued by British governments since the 1980s. More recently, in the face of the financial 
crisis, public actors have reengaged with the industrial sector in pursuit of a source of 
growth. However, it remains to be seen what this implies for land-consuming OFDI in 
SSA. At the same time, the dominance of the financial sector in British OFDI reflects the 
problems generated by the country’s political economy, namely the lack of patient capital, 
which is needed, for instance, in the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
Together, these details of Chinese and British OFDI in SSA highlight the core 
differences between the predominant trends in Chinese and British investments, 
particularly in view of their actor composition, sectoral distribution, timelines, events, and 
strategic rationalizations. As I have shown, these differences relate to home country-
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specific aspects of the political economy, development context, investor legacy, and 
institutional setting. However, a closer look at how Chinese and British investments 
transpire also shows that many of these differences are not useful in explaining the purpose 
of these investments. Clearly, there are more public actors involved in the Chinese case, 
and a greater presence of financial investors in the UK case. At the same time, however, 
Chinese investments are largely for-profit, and are rationalized using mainstream economic 
thought. This means that the important role of public actors reflects China’s role as a 
newcomer to the international economic realm, and not the final purpose of these 
investments. Accordingly, the country has to rely more strongly on inter-governmental 
cooperation to open new markets for industrial expansion and to diversify the country’s 
supply of industrial resources. Moreover, the findings refer back to the Chinese domestic 
set-up, which clearly favors state enterprises.  
In the UK case, meanwhile, this difference in actor composition does not mean that 
private investments appear in a vacuum. Instead, the less frequent involvement of public 
actors seems related to the UK’s long-established ties with the African continent and 
private actors’ correspondingly lengthy operational histories there. Moreover, these 
investments are embedded in national and international public policy frameworks and 
supported by home country measures. The huge number of financial actors is reflective of 
the “embedded financial orthodoxy” that has guided UK’s domestic development policies 
since the Thatcher Era.  
More broadly, the comparative discussion of (dis)similarities between British and 
Chinese investments implies that difference is best understood as variation rather than 
opposition. At the same time, it is important to note that not every difference is inevitably 
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significant in the comparative explanation of how and why land-consuming OFDI occurs – 
a fact that holds for both the project level and the aggregate one. 
Secondly, in view of the causal mechanisms at play in each case, the comparison 
accentuates that the interrelation of the country-specific conditions and outcomes is 
characterized by complexity. For the assessment and explanation of how and why Chinese 
and British land-consuming OFDI occurs, it is impossible to ascribe any of the domestic 
undercurrents in the form of agency, ideology, structure, and events a precise function as 
independent or dependent variable, or to give a single (f)actor primary importance in 
explaining the outcome, namely land-consuming OFDI ventures. Instead, these domestic 
undercurrents are co-determinant over time. The example of China shows this most clearly. 
Since the country’s opening up, its socio-economic and ecological dimensions of 
development have changed fundamentally and, as a result, so have the guiding ideology 
and actor constellations. China today embraces the type of overseas investments it termed 
exploitative four decades ago, and it has fundamentally reformed its administration, 
political system, and aid system in order to foster the newly adopted manufacturing and 
export-oriented growth strategy that matches the interests and international ambitions of its 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs. 
Finally, thirdly, the comparative study of these two cases reveals institutional and 
ideological similarities between these rather different countries that highlight the important 
role of OFDI in contemporary development approaches of home countries. Over the past 
three decades, China has adopted an elaborate system of home country measures and is in 
the process of catching up with policy frameworks that are standard in OECD countries. 
This means that the countries only differ with regard to the degree (high/low) of stimulus 
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and control exercised in their home country FDI policies.
1089
 While China applies high 
stimulus and control, the UK is characterized by high stimulus and low control. 
Additionally, both countries have changed the guiding ideology underlying their 
foreign economic policies and overseas operations; however, the alterations differ in scale. 
On the one hand, China has fundamentally shifted from an earlier focus on autarky towards 
embracing open system features and factoring in other countries’ land and resources in its 
development policy. In this process, a previous set of ideas on development and 
international relations has been replaced by another. On the other hand, the UK has 
(slightly) shifted the emphasis of its foreign policy towards Africa, and it has recently 
stepped up its commercial diplomacy to profit from the new growth region. The former 
guiding narrative of unilateral humanitarianism is increasingly complemented by a 
rationale of “mutual benefit” and “delivering prosperity together” that seems strikingly 
similar to the rhetoric commonly applied in South-South cooperation.  
Importantly, the two countries share a similar outlook on foreign economic policy 
when it comes to the role of OFDI promotion in accessing markets, securing resources, 
promoting exports, or strengthening the country’s “soft power” and position in the 
international political and economic landscape (also see concluding discussion in Section 
5). However, the detailed explanations of why both countries promote OFDI in Africa are 
rather different, and they reflect the particular political economies of growth in the two 
countries at certain points in time. On the project level, both countries’ investment projects 
pursue a for-profit rationale, and involve a rather diverse range of actors. 
                                                 
1089 See, for instance, Buckley et al. (2010), 243-277. 
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4. Chinese and British “Land Grabs” in Historical Perspective 
A remaining question is the novelty of contemporary Chinese and British land-
consuming investments when compared to large-scale land acquisitions in the late 19
th
 
century. I showed in Chapter 3 that the broad references to colonialism made by some in 
the “land grab” debate often oversimplify the past and/or the present; for instance, such 
critiques’ narrow focus on resources as the sole determining factor can have this effect. At 
the same time, the review in Chapter 3 showed that large-scale land acquisitions in the past 
and present are highly similar in terms of the complexity of their main empirical 
characteristics. In the late 19
th
 century, and again today, land-consuming investment 
activities serve(d) a variety of purposes aside from that of securing resources. These 
purposes include opening markets, acquiring strategic assets, expanding spheres of 
influence, and searching for profitable business opportunities. Moreover, the 19
th
-century 
investments, just like the contemporary ones, involved a diverse range of agents; and, 
instead of being a total success story, many were confronted with insurmountable problems 
on the ground – leading to their ultimate failure. 
But what does a more detailed historical comparison of large-scale land 
acquisitions in the South tell us about the similarity of key elements over time? In this 
section I will look more closely at a selected range of aspects to highlight the co-existence 
of path-dependent and new aspects of Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI activities 
in SSA since 2000 – making them both novel and old to a certain degree. To narrow down 
the historical comparison of differences and similarities to a manageable size, and 
concentrate on this co-existence argument, the discussion will revolve around three aspects: 
ideology, uneven development geographies, and institutions. These aspects have been 
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central to the analysis of land-consuming OFDI from a home country perspective, and they 
evidence the importance of the events of the 19
th
 century for our contemporary world.
1090
 
In fact, the “global transformation” that was the industrial revolution in the 19th century 
has brought about particular ideologies and structures and a range of significant events that 
are still visible today.
1091
 
In terms of similarities, firstly, it is striking to see that in both China and the UK, 
the guiding ideology supporting capital exports uses basically the same narrative that was 
common during the Scramble for Africa in the 19
th
 century. Together with trade and IFDI, 
OFDI is said to improve the home country’s economic setting, to secure access to 
resources, to open export markets, and to sustain or reach a favorable position in the 
international economic landscape. Overall, the official narrative during the Scramble, as 
well as today, promotes land-consuming investments as “not a choice, but a necessity.”1092  
However, a closer look at this ideological conformity also shows the development 
of new aspects regarding the official rationalization and implementation of land-
consuming investment activities – in the form of an ideological turn. During the Scramble, 
overseas investments were part of the “doctrinal, quasi-religious (…)” free trade doctrine, 
but this has changed since WWII.
1093
 While its core principles of multilateralism and non-
discrimination persist, trade and investments have come to belong “to the more technical 
pages of economic theory and the diplomatic fineprint of international rules” under the 
                                                 
1090 Buzan and Lawson (2013), 1-17. 
1091 Buzan and Lawson (2013), 1-17. 
1092 Compare Hobson (1965), 73. 
1093 Trentmann (2008), 7.  
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protection of the WTO and/or bilateral consultations.
1094
 Accordingly, contemporary land-
consuming OFDI is rationalized, legitimized, and promoted using the frames of 
mainstream economic theory, and it is an ordinary component of both home countries’ 
industrial and foreign policies. Furthermore, host governments apply this technical frame, 
too, and are actively involved in many of the Chinese and British OFDI activities, 
welcoming them as another source of capital that can be used to progressively finance 
national development plans – a narrative that also greatly resembles the rhetoric of colonial 
governments during the Scramble.
1095
  
I have argued that this technical framing of international economic exchanges in 
general, and of OFDI in particular, together with the institutionalization and legalization of 
the principles of multilateralism and non-discrimination, has enabled China to pursue a 
“peaceful development” approach. The institutions and strategies that have supported 
China’s economic expansion since the 1990s, and its globalization since 2000, are fairly 
similar to those of the OECD countries; indeed, they are catching up with those standard 
measures even though the Chinese government claims that they are innovative.
1096
 At the 
same time, we see that the rising Chinese involvement on the African continent has alerted 
“old” investor countries such as the UK. In fact, an increasing number of OECD countries 
have started to reengage with OFDI promotion beyond the formal frameworks they have in 
place. I have already shown that the UK has stepped up its commercial diplomacy via 
                                                 
1094 Trentmann (2008), 7.  
1095 See Cottrell (1975), 28. 
1096 State Council (2011b). 
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official visits and bilateral investment fora, but it has also refocused its development 
programs to Africa (and Asia).  
Secondly, another comparison can be made regarding the uneven economic 
development geography. Vis-à-vis the international economic context, Chinese and British 
land-consuming OFDI activities clearly reflect – and most likely sustain – an international 
division of labor that emerged during the industrial revolution and the European imperial 
age of the 19
th
 century. Unless African governments proactively engage with and steer 
capital imports to support economic diversification, their countries will continue to occupy 
the lowest positions in this order as primary commodity exporters and/or markets for 
industrialized goods in the world economy.  
At the same time, the cases of China and the UK also reveal that these land-
consuming investments are part of some relatively novel processes of global economic 
restructuring that might lead to an alteration of this development geography. In fact, as an 
emerging economy, China has become a major investor in Africa within the last two 
decades, and it is currently aiming to strengthen and improve its positional status within 
this international division of labor through upgrading. At the same time, the UK is trying to 
hold on to its favorable international position. To that end, it has started promoting land-
consuming OFDI as a way to remain visible internationally, as well as rebalance its 
economy and profit from overseas growth markets.  
From the viewpoint of uneven national development geographies, it is worth noting 
that certain conditions in the home countries are remarkably similar to those of the past. 
Now, as it did in the late 19
th
 century, rising OFDI takes place in a home country context 
of high socio-economic and wealth asymmetries. This observation is particularly 
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interesting when recalling Hobson’s argument that the concentration of wealth might have 
been one reason why capital was ‘free’ and available in home countries for profitable 
investment overseas.
1097
 At the same time, the UK case highlights that, due to the 
realization of particular social security rights through financial market instruments, the 
situation is now more complex than in the 19
th
 century. For instance, the rising aspiration 
of pension funds and public investors to invest in land-consuming overseas investment 
projects means that a diverse range of actors, including workers, have been implicated as 
implicit shareholders in this phenomenon since 2000.  
Thirdly and finally, a core social institution rooted in the 19
th
 century remains 
central to land-consuming OFDI today: the corporation.
1098
 During the era of colonialism, 
exploration, and free trade, chartered companies operated on the basis of a royal or 
government charter that outlined the terms and goals of their activities and granted them 
the right to military engagement and land governance. Importantly, institutions like the 
chartered company facilitated costly overseas enterprises by bringing together multiple 
investors and their capital resources through the practice of shareholding. As early as 1855, 
such companies were granted limited liability, which greatly reduced the risk carried by 
their shareholders.
1099
 At the same time, provisions such as the ultra-vires doctrine forbid 
the companies to act outside the charter rights assigned to them by the government.
1100
  
While the corporation has remained an important institution regarding trade and 
capital exports until today, state-market contexts have changed significantly. On the one 
                                                 
1097 Hobson (1965), 85-92; also see Chapter 3 (Section 2). 
1098 Sukdhev (2012), 37-46. 
1099 Sukdhev (2012), 37-46. 
1100 Mack (1930). 
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hand, most countries have subscribed to the open system economy and liberal principles. 
On the other hand, the charter has been replaced by a formal administrative process, and 
the legal means of protection available to corporations have been strengthened as a result 
of BITs, domestic reforms, and multilateral institutions. Plus, government provisions, such 
as the ultra-vires doctrine, have been cut, and trade and capital flows deregulated in many 
countries. In addition, both the relevant infrastructure (communication, transport) and the 
international economic governance structure have been improved. Overall, corporations’ 
operational freedom vis-à-vis the state has been augmented as a result of these changes. In 
fact, the favorable economic context and the reduction of the risk associated with overseas 
operations also explain the rise of capital exports in the form of OFDI.
1101
  
In view of these altered state-market relations, the case studies have highlighted 
that the Chinese and British governments try to influence corporate decision making 
through compulsory, institutional, and productive forms of power in their interactions with 
economic actors. Accordingly, material, symbolic, and normative resources are applied by 
state agents in these investment processes through regulations (e.g., energy and climate 
policies); home country measures ranging from commercial diplomacy to financial 
incentives; and discursive framings. At the same time, the fact that political and economic 
elites in both countries are closely interlinked on an individual, as well as intellectual, level 
helps to exert sway in both directions: from the public to the private sector and the private 
sector to the public sector. However, compared to the prevalence of government doctrines 
that companies had to obey in the 19
th
 century, the public sector’s influence on corporate 
                                                 
1101 See the rise of IFDI and OFDI in the World Bank’s country data (http://data.worldbank.org).  
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behavior has decreased fundamentally, and corporate operations now tend to be associated 
with the representation of narrow shareholder (rather than stakeholder) values.
1102
  
Against this background, it is surprising to note the multiple ways in which the 
Chinese and British governments promote overseas investments using political and 
economic narratives similar to those popular in the late 19
th
 century. Importantly, foreign 
land, in its function as resource, marketplace, productive space, strategic location, and/or 
financial asset, features prominently in the development policies and foreign economic 
policies of these two home countries. Moreover, overseas FDI stock in areas deemed to be 
of the utmost importance to the functioning of the home country’s economy and society is 
considered to belong to that country’s core infrastructure; it is often referred to as critical 
infrastructure (that needs protection).
1103
 
Thus, the two governments argue and act on the presumption that their support for 
corporate overseas activities will be of economic, social, and political advantage to their 
countries. The involvement of state actors in OFDI activities highlights that OFDI serves 
to open new markets, access cheap resources, and improve the relative trade and foreign 
exchange position of the home country, thereby enhancing its competitiveness, creating 
jobs, improving the terms of trade, and strengthening economic and political spheres of 
influence. Subsequently, land-consuming OFDI in SSA is said to be an important step in 
ensuring the stability of the existing political and economic regimes. 
                                                 
1102 Sukdhev (2012), 37-46. 
1103 Wikileaks (2009b). 
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It remains to be seen whether the rhetoric and expectations surrounding land-
consuming OFDI will materialize, either on the project level or in the aggregate. At a 
minimum, the limited leeway that governments have to ensure that the accessed resources 
are sold back home, that profits are repatriated, or that corporate activity contributes to the 
prosperity and security of the home country in other ways, raises serious doubts about the 
core presumptions of the two countries’ official rationalizations. In the case of China, I 
have highlighted some instances in which corporate actors acted in conflict with the central 
government’s foreign ambitions. In the case of the UK, the prevailing dominance of the 
financial sector and the focus on shareholder value in overseas operations does not seem to 
be conducive to strengthening the productive sector. However, it is too early to judge the 
cumulative impact of OFDI on China and the UK. 
Overall, this historical comparison highlighted that broad references to historical 
events are not meaningful in explaining the quality of contemporary phenomena such as 
“land grabbing.” Instead, a detailed assessment is necessary to apprehend the changes and 
continuities over time, and thereby to learn more about what is unique today. 
5. “Pushing the Limits:” Land-Consuming OFDI from the Home Country 
Perspective 
The findings of the two case studies show that diverse purposeful agents partake in 
land-consuming OFDI for very different reasons. Overall, these investments are a function 
of geopolitical considerations, national development trajectories, political economies, and 
ideational paradigms, – rather than any single master plan. Consequently, their explanation 
from a home country perspective goes beyond the orthodox “land grabbing” narratives 
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with their focus on resource security and/or the search for profitable investments. In 
concluding, I will briefly review the findings about the (alternative) role(s) of OFDI from a 
home country perspective. 
From an official line of reasoning, these investments are part of foreign economic 
and diplomatic strategies to access resources, enter new markets, restructure the economy, 
and/or expand/sustain the sphere of influence using industrial activities and economic 
power. At the national level, these investments are supported in both countries by political 
elites that are closely interlinked with dominant economic actors, on a personal level, by 
way of “intellectual capture,” or through political institutions, like, for instance, the 
opening up of China’s CCP to entrepreneurs and/or party finance in the UK.  
OFDI, together with trade, is framed and perceived by the managerial and 
economic elites of the UK and China to advance their macro-level development agenda 
and address the structural problems they face. On the Chinese policy level, I highlighted 
that concerns about the rising dependency on external resources and markets, together with 
the fear of unsustainable levels of pollution, social welfare, and crowding out effects on 
indigenous industry have led to the adoption of an elaborate OFDI policy framework 
promoting overseas investment. In the British case, the main issues that yielded the 
establishment of a promotional and increasingly state-supported OFDI strategy included 
the EU accession and interests in market access shortly after the oil crisis; concerns about 
energy security; and, the search for growth markets following the financial crisis and 
prolonged economic recession. 
Concurrently, both countries’ political elites pursue geopolitical ambitions in their 
cooperation with Africa, a continent that in their eyes has much to offer, namely resources, 
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growth markets, and business opportunities. The intensification of economic networks and 
cooperation in this new growth region is said to build and/or sustain the home country’s 
favorable (relative) position in the international political landscape and increase its 
economic strength at a time of global restructuring. 
From a project-level perspective, the diverse interests reflect goals that range from 
hopes for a better life to ‘seeking alpha,’ mirroring the great variety of actors involved.1104 
In fact, Chinese and British investments involve actors that are part of the powerful and of 
the marginalized groups in the home country’s political economy, and that respond to the 
occasions open to them – expecting higher returns, livelihood improvements, competitive 
advantages, and/or growing markets.  
In this context, I also identified particular clusters of ideas linked to land-
consuming OFDI (referred to throughout as the ‘guiding ideology’). These have proven 
important in the associated perceptions, as well as policy and decision-making processes of 
countries and individuals. They shape the expectations and imagined futures of a wide 
range of diverse actors. Specifically, they reflect, justify, and obscure powerful interest 
structures, mobilize support, and create the institutions and purposeful agencies at play in 
OFDI activities in Africa. In line with the nature of ideologies, these clusters of ideas are 
“intended to be believed in by those affirming them publicly and by all men, because they 
are “true,” and they thus have universal character.”1105  
                                                 
1104 In this context, it is also important to note that even though a company is unprofitable and 
accumulates huge losses, the chief executive staff still receives above-average annual salaries. See, for 
instance, Equatorial Palm Oil (2014). 
1105 Gouldner (1976), 33. 
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In both country cases, firstly, mainstream economic theory is at the core of the 
guiding ideology that frames these investments as an economic “necessity” and technical 
management issue. It informs the official language and normative narrative on land-
consuming OFDI in Africa, and parts of it are also taken up by private actors, and reflected 
in the overly optimistic expectations. In addition, secondly, the assessment highlighted that 
China and the UK reference modern development prescriptions that focus on economic 
expansion as a way to prosperity, international political status, and domestic security. 
Propagated in significant whitepapers, as well as official documents and speeches, the 
framing of development in both cases comes close to President Truman’s 1949 declaration 
that increases in the productivity and activity of an economy are “key to prosperity and 
peace” and preconditions of a progressively “higher standard of living.”1106  
This means that both countries share a global “quest for modernity (…) all wrapped 
in distinctive economic and political structures.”1107  Consequently, contemporary land-
consuming OFDI from China and the UK does not mark a turning point away from old 
development prescriptions or “free market” ideas, as is assumed by some authors who 
apply a narrow resource-security framing in their analyses.
1108
 Rather, OFDI from these 
countries reflects the assertion of existing practices and ideologies, namely the uneven 
development geographies with regard to the processes of value creation and consumption; 
and the prevalence of mainstream (managerial) economic theory which promotes capital 
exports due to their framing as a technical management issue (rather than contentious 
                                                 
1106 Gillespie (2001), 1.  
1107 Gillespie (2001), 1. Also see Victor (2008), 18-19. 
1108 E.g., IISD (2013). 
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control grabbing issue), and their macro-economic explanation as a rational choice to 
foster exports, access resources, expand skills and knowhow, create employment, and 
sustain a country’s economic growth.1109 .  
In sum, the comparison of the two country cases shows that part of what drives 
Chinese and British OFDI activities is that they allow a diverse range of actors to “push the 
limits” they are confronted with back home – in the form of limited political influence, 
ecological boundaries, political interference, low social mobility and welfare, crowding out 
effects, limited markets, and/or (comparatively) low returns on investments made. In other 
words: the comparatively low opportunity costs reflected in the related rationalizations and 
expectations of the different actors explain why these investments occur despite the high 
risks attached and the mixed record of economic success. In this regard, political 
economies play out, as do clusters of ideas that promote, explain, and/or legitimize these 
investments.  
 
 
                                                 
1109 See, for instance, Lavoie (2014), 1-30; Sornarajah (2010), 49-53; Moran (2011), and 1-9; Denisia 
(2010).  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Chinese Investments in Africa (19 investigated projects). 
Company/Project/Activit
y  
(Note: Several activities 
listed in the “land grab” 
databases turned out to be 
agreements, or projects, not 
companies. Therefore, this 
rubric also comprises 
agreements and project 
names.) 
Recipient 
Country 
Size (ha) 
 
Purpose, 
Approach, 
and Goal 
 
Project Development Project 
Announced  
Sources 
Announce
d 
Acquir
ed 
 
Under 
Production 
 
Sino Cam Iko 
 
The company is a 
subsidiary of the Chinese 
state-owned (provincially 
managed) Shaanxi Land 
Reclamation General 
Corporation and part of the 
Chinese State Farm 
System.  
 
(Note: This project is run 
by a manager named Wang 
Jianjun. Several databases 
list the project as a separate 
project by “business man 
Wang Jianjun,” like, for 
instance, GLP (2010: 31, 
35)). 
 
Cameroon 10,000 
(long-term) 
 100-150 (in 
2011) 
Project Purpose: 
 
Food production 
for local markets. 
 
 
After bilateral negotiations and 
an exploratory visit in 2005, the 
project was announced at the 
FOCAC 2006 Summit. An 
investment agreement of over 
USD 62 million was signed by 
both countries’ governments. 
Funding took place through the 
China EXIM Bank, which 
transferred USD 40 million in 
2009. In 2010, the contract for 
land was awaiting approval 
from Cameroon's Prime 
Minister. The project's current 
status (as of 2014) is unclear. 
The project was launched as 
part of China’s technical 
cooperation framework. The 
overarching goal was to reduce 
rice imports to Cameroon by 
increasing the country’s output 
from 50,000 to 400,000 tonnes 
per year. Apart from rice, the 
project also comprised maize, 
fruits, vegetables, and cassava 
production. One location, the 
Nanga-Eboko Rice Station, was 
formerly a Taiwanese 
2006 Brautigam and Zhang 
(2013), 1684-1685; Li 
(2010); Khan and Baye 
(2008), 7, 15; Wikileaks 
(2010a); World Bank 
(1998); Putzel et al. 
(2011), 31; Afriquinfos 
(2011, October 4); GLP 
(2010), 31, 35; Grain 
(2010, October 22). 
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cooperation farm (until 1972).  
According to available 
information, no consultation 
with local authority took place, 
with the exception of one 
location. The investment faced 
local opposition as well as 
organized urban civil society 
opposition due to fears that the 
produce would not be sold 
locally (as there was no such 
legal guarantee). The 
operationalization of this MoU 
began in 2008 on the 
preliminary 120ha site. 
However, as of 2011, the 
investor was still waiting for 
the concession license to be 
approved by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. To gain access to 
the fertile ground in a moderate 
climate zone of the preliminary 
site, the investor cut down 
trees, which might result in 
problematic changes to the 
regional micro-climate, but the 
local Ministry of the 
Environment had not been 
allowed to access the site and 
conduct the mandatory 
environmental impact 
assessment. In addition, local 
residents complained about the 
lack of sufficient 
compensation. 
Resettlement of Chinese 
farmers  
 
This project has been one 
of the very few explicit 
Chinese land lease 
requests. 
Mozambiq
ue 
Unknown 
scale 
  Project Purpose: 
 
Resettlement of 
farmers from 
China to 
Mozambique, 
worth RMB 700 
million. 
The resettlement project was 
first proposed in 1997. It was 
later discontinued due to 
political sensitivities, but 
negotiations were reportedly 
resumed in 2010. The current 
status of the project is 
unknown.' 
1997 Ekman (2010); 
Jansson and Kiala 
(2009). 
 
China International Fund - 
MOZ 
 
Mozambiq
ue 
  4.1 
 
Project Purpose: 
 
Mining and 
The background of the project 
is the shortage of cement and 
the related high prices in 
By 2011 Brautigam (2010, June 
2); Duran 2012: 
Cementchina.net (2011, 
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The company is a joint 
venture between the China 
International Fund and SPI. 
The latter is a holding of 
the Frelimo Party, whereas 
China International Fund is 
a Hong Kong real estate 
company. 
 
production of 
cement for the 
local market. 
 
 
Mozambique, together with 
Chinese commitments to 
rebuild infrastructure. (Other 
Chinese companies also applied 
for licenses to survey for 
suitable terrain to mine and 
produce cement.) 
The mining concession in 
Matutuine (Maputo province) 
was approved in 2011; it is 
valid until 2036. The total 
investment for the cement 
factory amounts to USD 72 
million. Allegedly, the factory 
construction took place without 
a prior environmental impact 
assessment. Moreover, the 
project commenced without a 
prior resettlement of the 230 
families affected by the 
construction.  
May 31). 
 
ZTE Energy  
 
Established in 2007, the 
company focuses on R&D 
of bio-energy, R&D of 
energy saving and system 
services ,and palm 
cultivation and oil 
processing trade. It is a 
subsidiary of the ZTE 
Corporation (its largest 
shareholder), a Shenzhen-
based corporation with 
previous links to the China 
Ministry of Aerospace. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
3,500  10 to 600ha 
are used as 
an 
experiment
al plot. 
Project Purpose: 
 
Food production 
for local use. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Training farmers 
in food production 
techniques and 
planting high 
yielding crops. 
 
 
ZTE Energy started producing 
food in 2008 on an 
experimental plot of 10ha near 
Kinshasa, in cooperation with 
the DRC Ministry of 
Agriculture. According to the 
corporate website, ZTE Energy 
was also accredited as a 
supplier of the UN World Food 
Programme, 
 
In 2010, the company became 
involved in the effort to 
rehabilitate Domaine 
agropastoral industriel de la 
N’Sele (DAIPN), a former 
Sino-Congolese cooperation 
project dating back to 1972. 
The area of 600ha was granted 
for the new project by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in 
2010.The project – focused on 
maize, soybean, kidney, 
cassava, and vegetables – was 
supposed to involve Chinese 
2007 Baende (2010, March 
29); Braeckmann (2009, 
September); CAITEC 
(2010); ZTE Energy 
(n.d.b); ZTE Energy 
(n.d.a); Putzel and 
Kabuyaya (2011), 34-35; 
ZTE Energy. (n.d.c). 
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investors as well as other 
foreign companies and the 
African Development Bank.  
 
This project is one of several 
agricultural projects in the 
DRC that is operated by a 
subsidiary of the ZTE 
Corporation. 
ZTE Agribusiness 
Company Ltd. 
 
This company is a 
subsidiary of the Shenzhen-
based ZTE Corporation 
with previous links to the 
China Ministry of 
Aerospace. It invests in 
agriculture and palm oil 
projects, and is part of the 
ZTE Corporation’s 
decision to diversify its 
operations. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
100,000  256  Project Purpose: 
 
Palm oil 
production for 
local use. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Plantation. 
 
The ZTE project in the DRC 
would have consumed up to 
100,000ha. It was negotiated in 
2007 between the DRC 
Ministry of Agriculture and the 
ZTE Corporation. It intended to 
convert palm oil into biofuels, 
reportedly in abandoned 
plantations in Bandundu and 
Equateur. However, the project 
did not materialize. Instead, as 
of 2013, the company operated 
a 256ha farm that produced 
maize, soy, meat, chicken, and 
eggs. Officially, the company 
has said that high transport 
costs made the palm oil project 
unprofitable. 
Negotiations 
in 2007 
Brautigam (2009); 
Brautigam and Zhang 
(2013), 1686; Putzel and 
Kabuyaya (2011), 34-35; 
Beiping. (2009, July 10); 
Koswanage (2011, April 
29); Sun (2011), 15. 
Malawi Cotton Company 
 
The company is a joint 
venture of the 
China-Africa Development 
Fund and the Qingdao 
Ruichang Cotton 
Corporation. 
Malawi   Access to 
land 
through 
110,000 
rural 
households. 
Project Purpose: 
 
Cotton 
production, 
including 
agriculture and 
processing for 
export to China. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Central farming 
contract scheme 
(“company + rural 
household”) 
 
 
The Malawi Cotton Company 
involves over 110,000 rural 
households under a central 
farming contract scheme. The 
farmers produce cotton, and the 
company provides inputs as 
well as takes the harvest and 
processes it at a spinning and 
ginning plant in Balaka for 
export to China. In 2011, the 
company harvested close to 
40,000 tonnes of cotton. To 
ensure sufficient cotton supply 
for domestic ginneries, Malawi 
put an export ban in place for 
unprocessed cotton. At the 
same time, a China Restraint 
Agreement was negotiated to 
reduce textile imports. 
2008 China Development 
Bank (2012, May 31); 
Chirombo (2009, 
December 29). 
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SUKALA SA 
 
The company is a China-
Mali joint venture with a 
70% majority stake by the 
Chinese state-owned 
CLETC. 
Mali   5,000 Project Purpose: 
 
Biofuels 
production 
(ethanol) for 
domestic and 
regional markets 
(Burkina Faso). 
The molasses is 
used as animal 
feed. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Sugar cane 
plantation and 
processing 
activities. 
 
 
The China-Mali joint venture 
owns a sugarcane plantation of 
approximately 5,000ha. It 
started in the form of a debt-
equity-swap between the 
Chinese state-owned company 
CLETC and the Malian 
government. The arrangement 
gave the Chinese side control 
over operations due to its 
majority stake (70%) in the 
project. 
The project dates back to 1996, 
but it has changed significantly 
over time. Prior to the joint 
venture with a Chinese 
majority stake, it was part of an 
aid and technical cooperation 
program under cooperative and 
transitional management. Also, 
precursor factories were built 
and renovated by the Chinese 
government in the 1960s and 
1980s. 
1996 Diaz-Chavez et al. 
(2010), 41, 50, 53, 113; 
Baxter and Mousseau 
(2011); 
Nolte and Voget-
Kleschin (2013), 16-17; 
World Trade 
Organization (2004), 50; 
Xinhuanet.com (2009, 
February 11). 
 
 
 
 
N-SUKALA SA 
 
A China-Mali joint venture 
created in 2009. 
Mali 19,142 
(long-term 
vision of 
leasehold 
for sugar 
production) 
 857ha titled 
land for 
factory 
premises  
Project Purpose: 
 
Sugar cane 
production for 
consumption 
(candy). 
 
Company Goal: 
 
Producing 
103,680 tonnes of 
sugar and 9,6 
million liters of 
ethanol per year. 
 
 
The creation of the company, 
dedicated to growing and 
processing sugar for food 
production, was approved by 
the Malian parliament in 2009. 
The company has a renewable 
50-year land lease for an area 
of 19,142ha. The China EXIM 
Bank financed the construction 
of a processing factory based 
on a preferential loan which 
covers less than the overall 
costs. Main competitors have 
been complaining about the 
preferential position of this 
venture. For example,  
the US Company Schaeffer has 
alleged that N-SUKALA SA 
plans to expand on land 
originally reserved for 
Schaeffer in an attempt to 
preserve its quasi-monopolistic 
2009 
 
Diaz-Chavez et al. 
(2010), 50, 53, 113; 
Baxter and Mousseau 
(2011); 
Wikileaks (2009a); 
Xinhuanet.com (2009, 
February 11). 
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position in Mali.  
The project provides 639 
permanent and 10,000 seasonal 
jobs. 
ChongQing Seed 
Corporation 
 
The state-owned 
(municipal) company runs 
one of the Agricultural 
demonstration centers that 
were announced during the 
2006 FOCAC meeting. 
 
Tanzania   62-300 Project Purpose: 
 
Food production, 
mostly for 
domestic markets; 
training local 
farmers. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Centralized out-
grower scheme 
with local 
farmers. 
The company grows and 
processes hybrid rice (its own 
intellectual property). The 
company’s seeds are said to 
double the usual output. Some 
of the rice might be sold to 
China. The project is expected 
to profit from the Chinese 
experience and boost the 
Tanzanian agricultural 
development. 
2006 ChinaDaily.com.cn 
(2008, May 17); 
Tanzanian Affairs (n.d.); 
Moshi and Mutui (2008), 
5-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intergovernmental 
Agreement 
 
The two countries allegedly 
signed an agreement 
stipulating that China 
would deliver fertilizers 
and provide other forms of 
assistance, while Senegal 
would grow peanuts for 
export to China. 
Senegal   100,000 Project Purpose: 
 
Food production. 
It has been reported that the 
farmers' association of Senegal 
organizes the production of 
peanuts on 100,000ha, with 
30% of the yield to be shipped 
to China and the rest processed 
at local factories. It should be 
noted that while China imports 
significant amounts of peanuts 
from Senegal, the details of this 
particular case has not been 
confirmed. 
 Smaller et al. (2012), 16; 
China DSIC 
International Trade Co. 
Ltd. (2014); The Japan 
Times (2013, March 26). 
 
 
Datong Enterprises 
 
The private Chinese 
company invested in 
sesame production. 
 
Senegal   35,000 Project Purpose: 
 
Food (sesame) 
production for 
export to China, 
Latin America, 
and Europe. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Out-grower 
scheme eventually 
involving up to 
200,000 people. 
 
The Chinese private company 
announced plans to invest USD 
5 million and produce 150,000 
tonnes of sesame per year. It is 
not clear whether those plans 
came to fruition.  
It has been reported that the 
company received credit from 
Caisse Nationale and subsidies 
from the Senegalese state, and 
that the project is part of the 
Senegalese Growth Plan 
(“GOANA”). This plan 
resulted from the food crisis, 
and it includes the promotion of 
foreign investments in 
2008 Smaller et al. (2012), 17; 
Lewis (2009, February 
11); Aiddata.org (n.d.a); 
People’s Daily (2009, 
February 20). 
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agriculture through the free 
repatriation of profit and tax 
breaks. Allegedly, the project 
faced problems because 
farmers sold their harvest to 
other buyers at a better price.  
Jonken Farm 
 
The former friendship farm 
is operated by Jiangsu 
Agricorp (Jiangsu State 
Farms Group Corporation) 
and Zhongguo Agricorp 
(China National 
Agricultural Development 
Group Corporation) since 
2003. 
Zambia   3,500 Project Purpose: 
 
Food production 
(crops, husbandry, 
animal breeding) 
for local markets. 
The Chinese project in Zambia 
employs 200 people. The 
project dates back to 1994, 
when the company began to 
rehabilitate a former China-
Zambia friendship farm. The 
farm was an assistance project, 
but it was privatized in 1990 
because it was not 
economically viable. Since 
2003, Jiangsu Agricorp 
(Jiangsu State Farms Group 
Corporation) and Zhongguo 
Agricorp (China National 
Agricultural Development 
Group Corporation) now hold 
40% and 60% respectively of 
the Friendship Farm.  
1994/2003 Mwanawina (2008); 
Freeman et al. (2008), 
17; Liu (n.d.), 1-2, 12-
14; China National 
Agricultural 
Development Group 
Corporation (n.d.).  
 
Chipata Cotton Company  
 
The company (now the 
China Africa Cotton 
Company) is a subsidiary 
of Qingdao New Textiles 
Ltd, a Chinese SOE that 
has been present in Zambia 
since 2004. 
Zambia   2,500 
contract 
farmers, 
with a 
vision of 
20,000 
contract 
farmers 
Project Purpose: 
 
Cotton 
production. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Intermediate 
contract farming, 
which involves 
three actor groups, 
i.e. the company, 
the agent, and the 
farmer. 
The Chipata Cotton was 
renamed into the China Africa 
Cotton Company, following a 
2008 investment by the China 
Development Bank. It is a 
subsidiary of Qingdao New 
Textiles Ltd., which has been 
operating in Zambia since 
2004. Originally, only 2,500 
out of the envisioned 20,000 
contract farmers were involved. 
The project is one of several 
investments by the Chinese 
companies in the Zambian 
cotton sector. These 
investments have increased 
competition in this sector.i The 
project conforms well with the 
plans of Qingdao province to 
upgrade its domestic textile 
industry. 
 China Development 
Bank (2012, May 31); 
Chinese Embassy in the 
Republic of Zambia 
(2013, September 10); 
Phiri (2013, September 
11); Schoneveld et al. 
(2014), 25-27; Times of 
Zambia (2004, June 14); 
Tschirley and Kabwe 
(2009); Wang (2014, 
June 30); Pedersen 
(2009). 
SUCOCOMA Madagasca   unclear Project Purpose: It has been reported that  Üllenberg (2009); 
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The Chinese state-owned 
company Complant, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the state-owned State 
Investment and 
Development Corporation 
(SDIC). SDIC relies on 
Complant to implement 
Chinese foreign 
cooperation programs, 
particularly in the area of 
construction.  
 
 
r  
Land restoration, 
and construction 
of a sugar refinery 
SUCOCOMA's project 
revolved around restoring 
irrigated land formerly used by 
a state-owned sugar company 
for sugar case production. The 
current status of the project is 
unclear. However, a cable from 
the U.S. Embassy in 
Antananarivo as well as 
corporate information suggests 
that the Chinese SOE Complant 
manages two sugar refineries in 
Ambilobe and  
Namakia since 2008 under a 
twenty-year management 
contract. Complant also built a 
sugar refinery in Morondava, 
financed by the Chinese 
government. While this was 
turned over to the government 
of Madagascar in 2008, 
Complant continued to manage 
operations in 2012. 
Wikileaks (2010b); 
Complant (n.d.); SDIC 
(n.d.); SDIC (n.d.a); 
Tossa (2012, August 25).  
Viscount Energy 
 
Officially, the company 
presents itself as a 
“Chinese supported 
Nigerian firm.” 
Nigeria    Project Purpose: 
 
Biofuel  
factory 
construction. 
In 2006, the Ebonyi State 
Government and the Chinese 
company signed a MoU about 
building a factory for 
producing biofuel. The factory 
was built as a turnkey project 
by Tianjin Energy Resources 
Ltd., a Chinese construction 
company.  
The project by Viscount 
Energy is intended to improve 
domestic energy security. 
However, while it matches 
Nigeria’s National Biofuel 
Development Policy, the 
project is problematic in terms 
of food security and (the 
lacking) land use rationale. The 
ethanol plant intends to 
produce 20,000 gallons of 
ethanol per year, based on the 
input of 150,000 tonnes of a 
mix of cassava and sugar cane. 
2006 Biopact (2006, August 
14); Isiguzo (2006, 
August 28); Rothkopf 
(2007), 336; Oyeranti et 
al. (2010); McDowell 
(2012). 
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Hebei Hanhe Investment 
Company  
 
This is a state-owned 
provincial company. 
Uganda  17,000 
(10-year 
target) 
 173 Project Purpose: 
 
Food (maize, rice, 
vegetables) 
production for 
local and 
international 
markets. 
The Hebei Company's 10-year 
target is to develop around 
17,000ha. In 2010, it was 
growing maize, vegetables, and 
trees on the total area of only 
173ha. Hebei Hanhe 
Investment Company has 
started in Uganda in 2009. 
2009 Wang (2011, October 
10); Aiddata.org (n.d.b). 
China International Water 
and Electric Corporation 
 
The state-owned company 
is attached to the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce. 
Zimbabwe 100,000   Project Purpose: 
 
Irrigation system 
construction.  
The company’s cooperation 
with the government of 
Zimbabwe was not successful, 
and the project never got off 
the ground. Initially, the 
company had been approached 
by the Zimbabwean 
government to build an 
irrigation system and boost 
agricultural production. In the 
process of implementing the 
project, the company 
discontinued its operations due 
to political difficulties. 
 The Herald (2013, 
December 4); SW Radio 
Africa (2003, August 1). 
SUCOBE  
 
The company is an affiliate 
of COMPLANT, a Chinese 
SOE. COMPLANT is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the state-owned State 
Investment and 
Development Corporation 
(SDIC). 
Benin   4,800 Project Purpose: 
 
Biofuel 
production 
(ethanol) for 
export to Europe. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
The company uses 
sugar cane from 
its own land plot, 
plus cassava from 
local farmers in 
the production of 
biofuels. 
Since 2003, SUCOBE runs the 
Savé Factory, which was 
established in 1973 by Benin 
and Nigeria. After a period of 
mismanagement and economic 
crisis, the factory had 
undergone several management 
changes. The factory produces 
and processes sugar cane into 
sugar and alcohol. It employs 
approx. 5,000 workers, of 
which 4,637 are casual and 
seasonal workers, mostly 
women. The company relies on 
external harvests to 
complement its own 
agricultural output. In addition 
to the sugar cane produced on 
4,800ha of land, which the 
company is leasing for 99 years 
(renewable), the company uses 
cassava bought from local 
farmers for its plant operation. 
As a result, there has been a 
2003 Nonfodji (2011); Tossa 
(2012, August 25). 
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cassava price hike in Benin. 
 
SUCOBE Company in Benin is 
an affiliate of the Chinese SOE 
COMPLANT.  
Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ) 
 
The project is headed by 
the Taiyuan Iron & Steel 
Group, the Shanxi Group, 
and the Tianli Group. 
 
Mauritius   200-500 Project Purpose: 
 
Build a 
manufacture hub 
in the form of a 
Special Economic 
Zone, including 
light industrial 
products, 
medicines, 
textiles, and 
electronics. 
Negotiations began in 2007, 
development in 2009, and 
completion is expected in 2016. 
Comprising an area of 200-
500ha, this SEZ is headed by 
Chinese companies. It is 
intended to become a major 
manufacturing hub for Chinese 
light industrial products, 
medicines, textiles, and 
electronics. It is expected to 
accommodate 40 Chinese 
companies and create 34,000 
jobs, of which 8,000 will be 
given to Chinese contractors. 
The SEZ is expected to 
generate USD 220 million 
through exports and to attract 
investments worth USD 750 
million. On a global scale, 
China plans to build 50 Special 
Economic Zones. 
By 2009 Alves (2011); Brautigam 
and Tang (2011); 
Dwinger (2010, August 
2). 
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Appendix B: British Investments in Africa (22 investigated projects) 
Company Recipient 
Country 
Size (ha) 
 
Purpose, Approach,  
and Goal 
 
Project Development Timelines Sources 
Annou
nced 
Acquir
ed 
 
Under 
Produ
ction 
Project 
Announc
ed  
Lan
d 
Tran
sfer 
Harves
t 
SunBiofuels 
(SBF)  
 
SBF is a UK-
based company 
with several 
subsidiaries across 
Africa. It was 
established in 
2005. In 2008, it 
came under 
majority control 
(shareholding) of 
Trading 
Emissions Plc. 
(TE), a carbon 
trading fund 
managed by EEA 
Fund 
Management Ltd. 
In 2011, SBF 
went into 
administration, 
and its operations 
were closed or 
sold off to 
investors. 
 
Ethiopia 80,000  
 
 
5,000  1,000  Project Purpose:  
 
Production of 
biodiesel, using 
Jatropha (originally on 
marginal land, later on 
prime land). 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Plantation and 
outgrower scheme. 
 
Company Goal: 
 
SBF: to become the 
largest provider of 
biofuel, first for export 
markets, later for the 
African market. 
 
TE: to profit from 
climate change 
mitigation policy by 
producing “clean” and 
renewable energy. 
In 2005, SBF signed a lease 
with Benshangul Gumuz 
Regional State Government for 
80,000ha and purchased 80% 
of National Biofuel 
Corporation (Ethiopia) to 
strengthen presence in 
Ethiopia. SBF was also 
involved in the drafting of the 
Ethiopian Biofuels Strategy.  
SBF Ethiopia was not 
economically viable due to 
poor soil conditions, limited 
seed input, and the lack of third 
party finance (in addition to 
TE). The company used seed 
input from D1Oils (UK) and 
Diligent Tanzania Ltd. (the 
Dutch subsidiary uses 3,500ha 
through outgrower scheme to 
produce seeds for planting). 
SBF went into administration 
in 2011, when TE, its majority 
shareholder, denied it 
additional funds. It is unclear 
what happened to the Ethiopian 
operation of SBF. 
2005  2005  Bergius (September 
2012); Trading 
Emissions Plc. (2008); 
Trading Emissions Plc 
(2011), 7; Hawkins 
and Chen (2011), 29-
30; Sosovele (2010), 
120; Trading 
Emissions Plc (2009). 
 
Tanzania  8-
9,000  
2,000  SBF Tanzania negotiated a 99-
year government-backed lease 
in 2006. The 8-9,000ha were 
spread over 11 villages with 
11,200 people. This land was 
formerly used by charcoal 
makers and also included a 
swamp area important for local 
water security. The affected 
2006   Bergius (September 
2012), 3; Hawkins and 
Chen (2011), 29-30, 
88, 96, 196. 
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population was promised a 
compensation of USD 250 per 
household. 
After SBF went into 
administration, the Tanzanian 
subsidiary was sold to Lion’s 
Head Global Partners (in 2011). 
There have been allegations 
that this company only employs 
50 of the previous 700 workers, 
and that it has abstained from 
addressing the problem of the 
incomplete process of 
compensating the affected 
population. 
Mozambiqu
e 
 4,854 
plus 
two 
farms 
of 
607ha 
and 
additio
nal 
3,000h
a under 
negotia
tion 
2,310  SBF Mozambique secured land 
under a 50-year DUAT lease 
that was backed by the host 
government. The land is 
considered to be of prime 
quality regarding the 
combination of climate, 
location, soil quality, and 
infrastructure. The company 
also signed a MoU to supply 
the state-owned enterprise 
Petróleos de Moçambique SA 
with Jatropha crude oil, and it 
planned to export biofuel to 
Europe and India. In 2010, 
crude oil was sold to UOP 
Houston for experiments in the 
aviation sector; and in 2011, a 
lot of 30 tons of biofuel was 
sold to Lufthansa for trials. 
After SBF went into 
administration in 2011, the 
Mozambique subsidiary was 
sold to Highbury Finance. This 
is a project development and 
investment advisory firm, 
founded in 2004, that focuses 
on “alternative investment 
opportunities.” The new 
investor claimes to have 
2,310ha (of the total area of 
2006  2010 Highbury Finance 
(2013); Hawkins and 
Chen (2011), 29-30, 
93, 225, 227; Sun 
Biofuels Mozambique 
(2011). 
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4,854ha) under operation, 
focusing on food production. 
Vepower Ltd.  
 
The UK-
incorporated 
bioenergy 
company operates 
plantations in 
Ghana and 
Malaysia, and 
power plants in 
the UK, and 
provides related 
services.  
Ghana 50,000  50,000  Project Purpose: 
 
Provision of bioenergy 
through the planting of 
Jatropha and the 
production of fuel.  
The company has leased a 
50,000ha plantation to grow 
Jatropha. It is in the process of 
securing finance. It signed a 
feedstock acquisition 
agreement with Jatropha Africa 
in 2010. The current status (as 
of 2014) of operations is 
unclear. The company’s major 
partner, Jatropha Africa, 
allegedly went into 
administration in 2013 (see 
below). 
   BioZio (2011), 110, 
127; Vepower (n.d.). 
 
Unilever (UK-
Netherlands)  
 
The company, 
which has long 
been present in 
Ghana, operated a 
plantation from 
1999 to 2010. 
Ghana  7,200  Project Purpose: 
 
Production of palm oil.  
Unilever Ghana operated 
plantations in Ghana that it 
acquired in 1999 through the 
host government’s divestiture 
program. In 2010, Unilever 
sold its majority share in the 
7,200ha Benso Oil Plantation 
Ltd. (which is listed on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange, and on 
which more than 9,000 
people’s livelihoods depend) to 
Wilmar Africa. 
   Ntsiful (2010), 129-
137. 
Jatropha Africa 
 
Jatropha Africa is 
an industry 
partner of the EU-
funded 
program “Capacit
y Building in 
South Africa, 
Namibia and 
Ghana to Create 
Sustainable, Non-
food Bio-oil 
Supply Chains.” 
Its current status 
regarding 
ownership 
structures and 
operations is 
Ghana 50,000  
 
100  
 
 
 Project Purpose: 
 
To grow Jatropha 
seedlings in the 
nurseries, and produce 
Jatropha crude oil for 
biodiesel refining 
companies. 
 
Company Goal: 
 
To provide renewable 
energy sources, whilst 
working in partnership 
with rural African 
communities to 
support economic 
development. 
Jatropha Africa was invited to 
support the development of 
the Renewable Energy Policy 
for the Ghanaian Ministry of 
Energy in 2010. The bioenergy 
project started out with a pilot 
farm of 100ha with 100,000 
trees and aimed to expand to 
50,000ha in partnership with 
three villages in Ghana (no 
timeline). The latest project 
status is unclear. A report by 
Antwi-Bediako (31 October 
2013) mentions that Jatropha 
Africa went into 
administration, due to the lack 
of funding and difficult policy 
environment. Personal 
communication with the 
   Jatropha Africa (2010, 
August 22); Jatropha 
Africa (n.d.d); 
Jatropha Africa 
(n.d.a); Jatropha 
Africa (n.d.b); 
Jatropha Africa 
(n.d.c); Antwi-
Bediako (2013, 
October 31). 
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unclear. Ghanaian farm manager in 
2012 indicated that the 
company had come under 
Ghanaian ownership and was 
listed as a company with 
limited liability in Ghana. 
D1 Oils 
 
The UK-based 
share company 
was 
founded in 2005. 
In March 2012, it 
changed the name 
to NEOS 
Resources Plc. As 
of 2014, it is in 
the process of 
developing a new 
business strategy. 
 
Zambia 
(subsidiarie
s also in 
Malawi, 
Ghana, 
South 
Africa, 
Swaziland, 
and Asia) 
220,00
0 (total 
for 
India, 
Indone
sia, 
Malawi 
and 
Zambia
) 
 
 
155,00
0-
174,00
0 in 
Zambia 
(includ
ing 
outgro
wer 
scheme
s)  
2,411 
planted 
and 
20,760 
used 
throug
h 
contrac
t 
farmin
g (in 
Zambia 
in 
2007) 
Project Purpose: 
 
Biofuel production for 
export and domestic 
use.  
 
Project Approach: 
 
Selling Jatropha oil for 
direct use in diesel 
engines or to 
companies producing 
biodiesel. 
 
 
 
D1 Oils, founded in 2005, used 
to be the biggest Jatropha 
producer worldwide, with 
several subsidiaries in Africa 
and Asia. However, the 
company has been struggling 
with economic viability of its 
operations throughout its 
existence, and has never paid 
any dividends to its 
shareholders.  
 
D1 Oils abandoned its plan to 
sell Jatropha crude oil 
internationally, after its partner 
Beyond Petroleum (BP, 
formerly British Petroleum) 
withdrew from a joint venture 
project on Jatropha production 
in 2009. Since then the oil has 
only been sold domestically.  
 
From 2007 to 2012, the 
company’s share value 
drastically decreased; by 2012, 
operational losses amounted to 
more than GBP 1 million. To 
indicate a fresh beginning, the 
2005 2005  StockMarketWire.com 
(2012, March 13); 
Hawkins and Chen 
(2011), 21-23; 
Mitchell (2010), 118-
125;  
NEOS Resources Plc. 
(2012, October 12); 
NEOS Resources Plc. 
(2012, November 15); 
NEOS Resources Plc. 
(2012, March 15); 
Investigate.co.uk 
(2014, January 30). 
 
Data on total hectares 
secured or operated 
remains unclear. See 
also GEXSI LLP 
(2008), 50, 55; 
Investigate.co.uk 
(2006, June 14); 
Reuk.co.uk (2007, 
January 15). 
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company changed its name to 
NEOS Resources in 2012, 
shifted its focus to India, and 
announced a diversification 
beyond Jatropha production in 
African countries. However, 
severe financial difficulties 
have continued. As of 2014, the 
company is in the process of 
selling off its assets, while 
negotiating its future business 
outlook with major 
shareholders.  
Cru Investment 
Management 
 
This investment 
company was 
indirectly 
involved in 
operations in 
Malawi through 
shareholding 
(14.54%) in the 
Malawi-based 
Africa Invest 
Fund (running 
from 2006-2008). 
The fund and 
other Cru's 
operations went 
into 
administration in 
2011.  
 
 
 
Malawi  6,000  
 
 
 Project Purpose: 
 
Investment in 
agricultural land for 
food and land 
management, with a 
focus on paprika and 
chilies grown for 
export. 
 
Company Goal: 
 
Profiting from 
growing scarcity 
(related to the rising 
global demand for 
food production) by 
investing in 
agricultural land; 
generating income 
from efficient 
management of land 
and from holding 
direct stakes in 
agricultural land.  
Cru Investment Management 
managed the Africa Investment 
Fund from 2006 to 2008. The 
fund operated five to seven 
farms covering 6,000 acres in 
Malawi. It had a commercial 
farm workforce of more than 
1,450 workers, and it 
cooperated with more than 
5,000 outgrower farms. 
 
In 2010, the auditor 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers found 
that it was unlikely for Cru 
Investment Management to 
recuperate the money it had 
received as loans, due to the 
overvalued asset base. The Cru 
trustee Capital froze the money 
of the six funds managed by 
Cru. The operations managed 
by Africa Invest Fund in 
Malawi were sold in 2010 for 
GBP 175,000. The money was 
used for fees and liabilities 
while investors hardly 
recovered their investments. 
Moreover, a fraud investigation 
took place, due to the alleged 
misappropriation of funds. 
Money from Arch funds 
managed by Cru had been lent 
to Africa Invest without 
   BBC (2010, February 
6);Grote (2009, March 
24); Grote (2009, 
April 14); Grote 
(2010, March 16); 
Merian Research and 
CRBM (2010), 28; 
Merrett (2013, 
November 29); Miller 
(2011, July 7); Ntsiful 
(2010), 129-137;Paler 
(2010, July 14). 
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shareholder notification, and 
Africa Invest and Cru chairman 
Maguire had allegedly 
withdrawn money without 
following proper procedure. 
Cru’s case even resulted in a 
Briefing of the UK Parliament. 
CAMS Agri-
Energy Tanzania  
 
CAMS Agri-
Energy belongs to 
the CAMS group, 
established in 
1972. In the 
1970s, the group 
focused on airport 
and port 
operations; now it 
invests in 
emerging market 
growth sectors, 
such as renewable 
energy, oil and 
gas, carbon 
credits, housing, 
project finance, 
technology, 
infrastructure. 
CAMS Agri-
Energy started 
operating in 2008. 
Its current status 
(as of 2014) is 
unclear. 
Tanzania  45,000  Project Purpose: 
 
Sweet-sorghum-based 
ethanol production that 
does not undermine 
food security. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Food and Fuel: 
farmers already grow 
sweet sorghum; tall 
stalk can be used for 
ethanol production, 
without using food 
grain. Project will be 
profitable due to rising 
fuel prices and CO2 
reduction finance 
schemes. 
The project in Tanzania was set 
up in 2008, using 45,000ha of 
land in two county districts. 
The aim is to develop ethanol 
and power production from 
sweet sorghum stalks, with 
distribution centers in rural 
Tanzania. Funds have been 
raised through equity financing 
and from a commercial bank in 
London. To produce ethanol, 
the project intends to use 
Chinese technology of 
fermentation and distillation in 
each village. The company 
cooperates with the Tanzanian 
seed authority and with an 
Indian NGO to reach out to 
farmers.  
2008   Obulutsa (2008, 
September 19); 
Oakland Institute 
(2011b), 4, 18-19, 30; 
WWF-TPO (2009), 
14-15, 23, 26, 29-36; 
Locher and Sulle 
(2013), 6-7, 13-14, 32, 
36. 
 
 
 
 
  
Lonrho  
 
Lonrho – a 
formerly UK-
listed company 
with operations in 
agriculture, 
infrastructure, 
transport, and 
support services 
Angola 2   Project Purpose: 
 
Construction of a John 
Deere equipment 
dealership.  
 
Company Goal:  
 
Profiting from African 
growth markets. 
Lonrho, a formerly UK-listed 
company with an ambiguous 
reputation, was taken over by a 
Swiss investor in 2013. Two 
years before that takeover 
Lonrho described the 
attractiveness of investments in 
land and agriculture in Africa 
as a composite of the following 
factors: Africa hosts a large 
share of the world’s arable 
    Bloomberg News 
(2011, July 20); 
Lonrho (2012), 1-5. 
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in SSA dating 
back to 1909 – 
was taken over by 
two Swiss 
investors in 2013, 
and it has restored 
its status as a 
Private Company. 
 
land; it remains the major 
continent for oil and gas 
reserves as well as the primary 
source for minerals; and 
African countries have 
relatively low external debt 
levels. The current status (as of 
2014) and the timelines of the 
project are unclear. 
25,000   Project Purpose: 
 
Food production (rice) 
for domestic 
consumption. 
 
In 2009, Lonrho Agriculture 
announced it had signed a deal 
with the Angolan government 
to carry out agricultural 
projects on 25,000ha of land in 
the provinces of Uíge, Zaire 
and Bengo. The company 
secured a 50-year lease. The 
project was to be implemented 
within the scope of government 
initiatives to promote 
agricultural reconstruction and 
development. The agreement, 
signed on the Angolan side by 
the Agriculture and Rural 
Development Minister, Afonso 
Pedro Canga, and by the 
director of Gesterra, Gestão de 
Terras Aráveis, Carlos Alberto 
Jaime, anticipated rice 
production. This deal would 
have used up the bulk of the 
planned spending on 
agricultural projects in 2009 
(USD 6 million), and would 
have been leveraged with 
Angolan financing. As of 2014, 
it is unclear what has become 
of this particular investment. 
The website of the now Swiss 
company, however, suggests 
that the company is still active 
in the farming sector, stating 
that it has “60% of 
[agricultural, A.G.] production 
coming from our own farming 
operations, and 40% from out 
 2009  Burgis (2009, January 
16); Lonrho Fresh 
(n.d.); Lonrho Ltd. 
(2014, January 24); 
Macauhub (2009, 
January 14). 
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growers (including commercial 
farms and Lonrho organised 
local cooperatives and small 
farmer programs).” 
Procana 
 
The 2007 
bioenergy project 
of Procana, a 
subsidiary 
company of the 
British-based firm 
Bioenergy Africa, 
did not get off the 
ground. 
Mozambiqu
e 
30,000 30,000 -- Project Purpose: 
 
Production of biofuel 
from sugar-cane-
ethanol. 
In 2007, after negotiations and 
a signed contract with the 
Mozambican government, the 
British-based company 
Bioenergy Africa decided not 
to follow through with it 
biofuel investment in southern 
Mozambique. Consequently, 
the government cancelled the 
contract, assigning 30,000ha in 
Gaza province for the 
development of a sugar cane 
plantation for the production of 
ethanol. Earlier in 2007, 
Procana had also announced its 
plans to invest an additional 
USD 510 million in 
construction of a new plant for 
the production of ethanol, 
sugar, electricity and fertilizers. 
 2007  Allafrica.com (2009, 
December 23); 
Biopact (2007, 
September 4). 
Central African Mozambiqu  300,00  Project Purpose: During 2002-2009, CAMEC  2005  Agriterra Ltd. (2009, 
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Mining and 
Exploration 
Company Plc 
(CAMEC) 
 
CAMEC was 
listed at the AIM 
Stock Exchange 
during 2002-2009. 
Its Mozambican 
operations started 
in 2005. The 
company delisted 
from AIM once it 
was bought by a 
Kazakh firm in 
2009. 
e 0 in 
2005; 
plus 
67,620 
in 2007 
 
Mining (coking and 
thermal coal). 
was active in mining projects in 
DRC, South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique. In 2005, the 
company acquired ten licenses, 
covering 300,000ha, to explore 
for coal in Mozambique’s 
northern Tete Province. In 
2007, CAMEC acquired the 
majority share of Belde 
Empreendimentos Mineiros 
Limitada (Belde) of South 
Africa. Through the joint 
venture, CAMEC attained three 
additional mining licenses 
(coal), covering 67,620ha 
altogether. 
 
CAMEC also held 
approximately 54.84% of 
Agriterra Ltd., a British 
agribusiness active in 
Mozambique (see below) and 
had common directors with this 
company (as of 2009). In 2009, 
CAMEC was sold to Eurasian 
Natural Resources Corporation, 
a Kazakh firm. Thereafter the 
company changed its 
management and withdrew 
from the London-based AIM 
Stock Exchange. 
January 12); Creamer 
Media (2009, 
November 11); 
Marima (2012, August 
20); Refractories 
Window (n.d.); Webb 
(2009, September 18); 
Macauhub (2009, 
April 22).  
 
 
Agriterra Ltd 
 
Since 2009, 
Agriterra has been 
an AIM-listed 
agricultural 
business active in 
the production, 
processing and 
trading of 
multiple 
commodities in 
Africa. It has been 
aiming to “build 
itself into a multi-
Mozambiqu
e 
 17,050 
(since 
2008/2
009), 
plus 
2,500 
(since 
2013) 
 
 
 
 Project Purpose: 
 
Food production, 
namely livestock (beef 
ranch) and feedlot; 
intended for domestic 
consumption and 
export. 
 
 
Agriterra Ltd.’s subsidiary, 
Mozbife Ltd., runs the 
Mavonde Stud Ranch and the 
Dombe Ranch that altogether 
comprise 16,000ha. The 
1000ha Mavonde Stud Ranch is 
envisioned to expand both with 
regard to land and herd size; 
the company is in negotiations 
about additional 3,000ha. The 
15,000ha Dombe Ranch has a 
lease (DUAT) until 2061 that 
was granted by the 
Mozambican government. In 
addition, as of 2012, the 
   Agriterra Ltd. (2012, 
February 29); 
Agriterra Ltd. (n.d.b); 
Verdin (2009, March 
26). 
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commodity 
African focused 
agricultural 
business.” Until 
2008, the 
company was 
active in the oil 
exploration 
business and 
named White 
Nile. 
 
 
comapny operated the 1,050ha 
Vanduzi Feedlot and managed 
maize processing facilities. The 
company's objective is to build 
a total herd in excess of 10,000 
head by 2015.  
In January 2013, the company 
acquired the 2,500ha Inhazonia 
Ranch.  
Sierra 
Leone 
 Access 
to 
3,500 
farmers
, and 
45,000
ha 
 Project Purpose: 
 
Cocoa production and 
trading; palm oil 
production. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Buying a trading 
company with a 
buying register of 
3,500 farmers to 
access cocoa; securing 
a lease on brownfield 
agricultural land 
suitable for palm oil 
plantations. 
Agriterra operates multiple 
businesses in Sierra Leone. It 
bought a Sierra Leone-based 
trading and agricultural 
company to expand its 
operations in cocoa production 
and trading, including storage, 
a buying register of 3,500 
farmers, and a 3,200ha cocoa 
plantation. There are also plans 
to include coffee and palm oil 
production. As of 2014, 
negotiations are in place to 
acquire an additional 1,600ha 
of land adjacent to this 
plantation. The project 
management aims to plant a 
total of 4,000ha by 2017, with 
the ultimate aim of producing a 
minimum of 8,000 tonnes of 
cocoa per annum by 
2020/2021. Agriterra also 
bought control over a lease of 
45,000ha brownfield 
agricultural land that is suitable 
for palm oil production with 
highest levels of rainfall (as of 
2012). 
 
According to the Sierra Leone 
Investment and Export 
Promotion Agency (SLIEPA), 
   Agriterra Ltd. (2012, 
February 29); 
Agriterra Ltd. (n.d.a); 
Carrere (2013).  
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the “President and Cabinet 
have identified oil palm as a 
priority growth sector and are 
prepared to provide support at 
the highest levels to accelerate 
investment.” In this context, 
SLIEPA is “earmarking and 
preparing a number of suitable 
sites for 10,000ha+ palm 
plantations.” Companies are 
able to lease land up to 71 
years, for USD 20-30 per ha 
per year, with basic labor costs 
of USD 2-3 per day, flexible 
labor regulation, and 0% taxes 
for some investors. 
Liberia     In 2009, Agriterra signed a 
memorandum of understanding 
to acquire Equatorial Biofuels 
(Guernsey) Limited, a palm oil 
producer based in Liberia. 
Equatorial Biofuels Ltd. (now 
named Equatorial Palm Oil 
Company, see next project) has 
a total land holding of 
169,000ha granted by the 
Liberian government in the 
form of concessions. However, 
the deal did not materialize and 
Agriterra decided to withdraw 
from it (see below). 
   Macauhub (2009, 
October 28); Public 
Ledger (2009, 
September 22). 
Equatorial Palm 
Oil Company 
 
The company was 
founded in 2005 
as Equatorial 
Biofuels, and 
changed its name 
to Equatorial 
Palm Oil Plc in 
2008. It has been 
a publicly listed 
(AIM) crude oil 
producer since 
2010.  
Liberia 89,000 
(conces
sion), 
plus 
80,000
ha 
(Memo
randum 
of 
Unders
tanding
). 
  Project Purpose: 
 
Palm oil production 
for export. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Large-scale oil palm 
plantation. 
The Equatorial Palm Oil 
Company has been granted 
concessions for three palm oil 
plantations in Liberia, all of 
which are located in a favorable 
climatic zone, close to cities, 
and in proximity to ports with 
facilities that can accommodate 
export operations. In 2009, 
Agriterra Ltd. was interested in 
acquiring the Equatorial Palm 
Oil Company, however, 
decided against it. As of 
September 2014, the UK-
incorporated company is a 
2005   Equatorial Palm Oil 
(2015); 
Investigate.co.uk 
(2009, August 18); 
Public Ledger (2009, 
September 22); 
Equatorial Palm Oil 
2011; Equatorial Palm 
Oil (2013); Global 
Witness (2013, 
December 20); 
Equatorial Palm Oil 
(2011); Equatorial 
Palm Oil (2013); The 
Rights and Resources 
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subsidiary of the parent 
company and ultimate 
controlling company Kuala 
Lumpur Kepong Berhad 
(“KLK”), a company 
incorporated in Malaysia. KLK 
owns and controls 62.86% of 
the Equatorial’s share capital. 
Both, Equatorial Palm Oil and 
KLK have made significant 
losses in their operation in 2013 
and 2014. 
 
The Equatorial Palm Oil 
Company’s 169,000ha holding, 
of which 89,000ha are 
concessions granted by the 
government and 80,000ha are 
part of an MoU with the county 
district and tribal communities, 
is embedded in a plan by the 
Liberian government to re-
establish export-oriented 
plantations as a growth sector 
and foreign exchange earner. 
Group (2013), 267; 
Equatorial Palm Oil. 
(2014); Ejatlas.org 
(2014). 
GEM Biofuels 
 
Founded in 2005, 
Green Energy 
Madagascar 
(GEM) has been 
active in 
establishing 
Jatropha 
plantations. Since 
2007, it has been 
listed at the AIM 
London Stock 
Exchange. In 
2013, the 
company changed 
its name (to 
Hunter Resources 
Plc) and 
operational focus. 
Madagascar 495,00
0  
 
 55,700  Project Purpose: 
 
Jatropha crude oil 
production for export 
to the EU, North 
America, and 
Australasia. 
 
Project Approach: 
 
Plantation and 
outgrower scheme.  
 
Company Goal: 
 
Focus on Jatropha 
because it meets 
European criteria as a 
non-edible oil seed 
(since food based 
biofuel industry faces 
The company was founded in 
2004, and it has been AIM-
listed since 2007. Focusing on 
Jatropha production, GEM 
managed to secure over 
495,000ha in Madagascar. 
According to its reports, the 
company secured this land – 
which included over 40,000ha 
natural forest – in the period 
from 2005 to 2011 through a 
50-year lease, with parcel size 
ranging from 2,500ha to 
50,000ha. Moreover, the 
company concluded 18 
agreements with local 
communes for exclusive 
plantation rights as well as 
informal agreements about wild 
seed delivery. In 2007/2008, 
GEM was employing 4,500 
2005   Üllenberg (2008); 
ADVFN.com (2013, 
August 1); 
Investigate.co.uk 
(2008, September 20); 
GEMBioFuels (2011, 
September 28); 
GEMBioFuels (2012, 
April 12); 
GEMBioFuels (2012, 
December 5); Gerlach 
and Pascal (2010), 7; 
Hawkins and Chen 
(2011), 3, 24-25; 
Hunter Resources Plc. 
(2013, December 30); 
OnVista.de (2014); 
Bloomberg News 
(2009, September 30). 
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sustainability 
challenges); become 
the largest producer of 
biofuels in 
Madagascar and the 
region.  
local farmers in nine locations. 
The original plan was to plant 
200,000ha by 2010. Yet, 
planting operations came to a 
halt in 2009, when tied-up 
capital markets and bad 
plantation management forced 
the company to focus on 
maintaining existing 
plantations rather than 
(re)investing in their planned 
expansion. In 2010, first 
revenues of GBP 18,000 from 
Jatropha oil were made, with 
shipments to Germany and 
Australia. These came largely 
from the harvest of a 40,000ha 
forest with many Jatropha trees, 
allowing the company to start 
harvesting earlier. 
During 2011, GEM 
concentrated on letting the 
plantations mature, and it did 
not engage in any further 
planting. It also reduced the 
number of staff.  
By the end of 2011, it had 
planted Jatropha on a total of 
55,737ha. Still, the share value 
did not recover, nor did the 
company manage to attract 
additional funding. Unable to 
profit from its land bank, the 
company changed its name to 
Hunter Resources PLC in 
January 2013 to indicate its 
new investing policy and board 
changes. A corporate notice 
from December 2013 stated 
that share trading had been 
suspended as the company did 
not become an investment 
company in time to meet AIM 
London Stock Exchange 
requirements. The same notice 
announced that the 
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management was in 
negotiations to become active 
in Peruvian mining projects 
563km from the city of Lima, 
in an area where eight 
exploration concessions (a total 
of 3,500ha) are located. What 
has happened to the Jatropha 
production is unclear. 
Madabeef 
 
Madabeef appears 
tob e a UK 
company 
which intends to 
raise beef cattle 
on 200,000ha for 
the export market. 
Unclear status. 
Madagascar 200,00
0  
  Project Purpose: 
 
Livestock (cattle) for 
export. 
No details available.    Douguet (2013, 
September 5); 
Hamelinck (2013), 87; 
International Land 
Coalition (n.d.); 
Üllenberg (2008); Van 
Der Werf (2012), 95, 
179. 
Avana Resources  
 
This Malagasy 
subsidiary of the 
UK-based Avana 
Group was set up 
in 2008 to hold 
and manage 
Avana’s assets in 
Madagascar. 
Avana Group was 
founded in 2007 
to develop 
uranium 
opportunities. For 
some time it was 
also active in the 
production of 
biofuels, but those 
activities seem to 
have been 
terminated. 
 
Madagascar  30,000 
(minin
g),  
 
plus 
plans 
to 
establis
h a 
10,000
ha 
plantati
on 
 
 
 Projects Purpose: 
 
Minerals exploration 
and exploitation 
(uranium), as well as 
biofuels production. 
 
 
Company Goal: 
 
“Investment in energy 
sources that improve 
supply security and 
diversity while 
reducing carbon 
emissions per unit of 
energy used,” namely, 
uranium (nuclear 
power) and biofuels. 
Avana Group in Madagascar 
exploits minerals. Temporarily 
it was also involved in biofuel 
production. It seems that Avana 
has dropped its biofuel 
activities and is now focusing 
only on mining. The company 
acquired mining licenses in 
Beronono over an area of 
18,000ha, and in Starokala and 
Irina over a total area of 
12,000ha. No information is 
available regarding the former 
plans to plant Jatropha on 
10,000ha by 2015.  
 
  
2008 
license 
agreemen
t 
2009 
and 
2010 
expl
orati
on of 
urani
um 
 Avana Uranium (n.d.); 
Energy-Profile (2009), 
53; GEXSI LLP 
(2008), Slide 58; 
Matthews (2010), 117-
119. 
 
 
G4Industries Ltd 
(UK) 
 
The company 
Kenya 28,000    Project purpose: 
 
Biofuel production 
based on sweet 
G4 Industries Ltd., a British-
based company active in 
power, fuel and equipment 
projects, participated in the 
   Cernansky (2011, 
October 26); Business 
and Human Rights 
Resource Centre 
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withdrew from the 
biofuel project in 
2011 due to 
environmental 
concerns. 
sorghum.  
 
Project Approach: 
 
Field to fuel and field 
to power model. 
 
writing of the UEMA biofuel 
strategy for West Africa 2008. 
The company used to have two 
subsidiaries. The only one still 
active is G4 International 
(Denmark). This subsidiary 
benefits from Danish logistics 
and industry, and it works with 
the Danish government to 
provide farming solutions in 
Africa that are approved by the 
UN. The second subsidiary 
used to be G4 International 
Kenya, but G4 Industries Ltd. 
abandoned its 28,000ha biofuel 
project in Kenya before 
operations begun. This decision 
was taken in response to 
pressure from NGOs over the 
potential negative impact on 
wildlife in the wetlands of the 
Tana River Delta.   
(n.d.). 
 
 
Equatoria Teak 
Company (ETC) 
 
 
The company has 
operated since 
2006, together 
with the sister 
company Central 
Equatoria Teak 
Company. From 
2007 to 2010 it 
was run by 
governmental 
development 
funds the CDC 
and Finnfund; 
then it was sold to 
unknown 
investors. 
 
 
Sudan  18,649  
 
 Project Purpose: 
 
Timber (for export). 
In 2006, a concession 
agreement between the 
Sudanese government and the 
ETC was signed over a 
18,640ha forest reserve. Thus, 
ETC and its sister company 
gained control over the total 
area of 20,450ha forest reserves 
that were granted as 
concessions by the government 
for 32 years. The agreement 
stipulates royalty payment of 
USD 100 per cubic meter of 
exported sawn board; 80% of 
this amount goes to Western 
Equatoria State Ministry of 
Agriculture and 20% to Yambo 
County local Government. ETC 
sold some consignments 
between 2007 and 2010, while 
its sister company never 
harvested timber. 
 
From 2007 to 2010, the 
 2007
-
2010 
 Concession 
Agreement (2006, 
June 28); 
Deng and Mittal 
(2011), 2, 4, 28-29. 
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company was represented by 
the CDC, after the CDC and 
Finnfund – two 
governmental development 
funds associated with 
the British and Finnish 
governments – had obtained a 
majority interest. In 2010, 
Finnfund and CDC sold the two 
companies. This followed 
controversies due to protest by 
local communities and the 
impossibility to make the forest 
plantation economically viable 
in an environmentally and 
socially sustainable way. 
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